This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The ethical theories employed in health care today assume, in the main, a modern Western philosophical framework. Yet the diversity of cultural and religious assumptions regarding human nature, health and illness, life and death, and the status of the individual suggest that a cross-cultural study of health care ethics is needed. A Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Health Care Ethics provides this study. It shows that ethical questions can be resolved by examining the ethical principles present in each culture, critically assessing each (...) value, and identifying common values found within all traditions, It encourages the development of global awareness and sensitivity to and respect for the diversity of peoples and their values and will advance understanding as well as help to foster a greater balance and a fuller truth in consideration of the human condition and what makes for health and wholeness. (shrink)

Two overriding considerations shaped the development of early research on the biological effects of microwave radiation—possible medical application and uncertainty about the hazards of exposure to radar. Reports in the late 1940s and early 1950s of hazards resulting from microwave exposure led to the near abandonment of medical research related to microwave diathermy at the same time that military and industrial concern over hazards grew, culminating in the massive research effort known as ‘the Tri-Service program’ . Both the early focus (...) on medical application and the later search for hazards played important roles in dictating how this field of research developed as a science. (shrink)

Many adoptees face a number of challenges relating to separation from biological parents during the adoption process, including issues concerning identity, intimacy, attachment, and trust, as well as language and other cultural challenges. One common health challenge faced by adoptees involves lack of access to genetic-relative family health history. Lack of GRFHx represents a disadvantage due to a reduced capacity to identify diseases and recommend appropriate screening for conditions for which the adopted person may be at increased risk. In this (...) article, we draw out common features of traditionally understood “health disparities” in order to identify analogous features in the context of adoptees’ lack of GRFHx. (shrink)

BEGINNING with G. E. M. Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, various critics--e.g., Frankena, Foot, MacIntyre, and Murdock--have, to one extent or another, expressed dissatisfaction with the condition of modern moral philosophy. Prior to this round of critiques, H. A. Prichard in 1912 asked the question "Is Moral Philosophy Based on a Mistake?" in an essay of that title in Mind. One finds precedent for these expressions of discontent with the ground rules of moral philosophy in both Aristotle and (...) Kant, two thinkers whose reformulations of the questions and procedures of ethics proved seminal for the discipline. Even neglecting other important developments in contemporary moral philosophy, the diversity and rigour of these critiques alone suggest that the prognosis for the discipline of ethics is quite favorable. Philosophy in at least one of its dimensions has recovered that self-reflective attentiveness that marks its most productive phases. So it is that several of these contemporary critiques raise the suspicion that what is wrong with moral philosophy is that it operates outside of a context in terms of which talk about moral laws or moral goods would be intelligible. Our contemporary situation can thus be contrasted with, for example, that of Aristotle for whom a discussion of "magnificence" was firmly rooted in an Athenian context in terms of which an argument over the merits of that particular virtue might be resolved. Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue brings this line of reflection into sharp new focus with a series of illuminating discussions concerning the role of the virtues both in the history of moral practices and in the logic of moral argument. In general, MacIntyre tries to show that "contemporary moral debate is interminable" ; that is, he tries to show why, given the nature of contemporary moral philosophy, there is "no rational way of securing moral agreement". Because I believe MacIntyre is successful in his demonstration, I shall, in this paper, take that demonstration for granted and try to construct a set of arguments designed to show how, in terms of a universally accessible paradigmatic character, we have at hand a way of avoiding the "interminable" regress of moral debate. Thus although my argument is derivative to MacIntyre's diagnosis and dependent, in part, upon his treatment of the concept of virtue, the proposal I develop here for the resolution of moral arguments is, sadly to say, somewhat at odds with his own. (shrink)

We argue that the Soros account of reflexivity does not provide a clear-cut distinction between a social science such as economics and the physical sciences. It is pointed out that the participants who attempt to learn from refutations of conjectures in the Soros world are likely to be haunted by the Duhem–Quine problem of conjointness of hypotheses and unfocused refutation. On a more constructive note, we argue that models of inductive learning, in which participants form conjectures on the basis of (...) strictly limited information sets, can capture the basic thrust of the Soros position. The conjectures are in motion, as the participants attempt to avoid those that are systematically wrong, and there is something vague and uncertain about what can be learned from experience and refutations. The only notion of market efficiency in this world is one contingent on the strictly limited and varied information sets in play. Finally we present a mathematical model and numerical simulations that help justify the causal relationship between reflexivity and far-from-equilibrium dynamics postulated by Soros. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Pragmatism and a Behavioral Theory of Meaning HAROLD N. LEE IT HAS BEEN ALMOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS since the publication of Peirce's article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in the Popular Science Monthly. There Peirce stated what came to be called The Pragmatic Maxim. 1 Since then pragmatism has been developed and expounded by many proponents. Some of the developments have differed markedly from others, and some (...) of these differences are not easily compatible.2 Opponents of pragmatism have differed in their interpretations in step with the proponents. As the century is rounded out, we should be able to review the scene and appraise the maneuvers and sorties. Just what is pragmatism? It has often been held that pragmatism is not the name of a philosophy but only of a loose collection of philosophies having at most a faint family resemblance. It must be admitted that this interpretation received some support from James's genial and hospitable personality. Nevertheless, I think it is incorrect. We can now discern a central, characterizing position which the early proponents of the new movement were setting forth and defending; and we can free it from misunderstandings that have historically beset it. It was apparent from the first that action and the consequences of action were to be regarded as fundamental to the new position, but this characterization is vague enough to cover many incompatible special developments. It can be sharpened now, after a century of discussion and debate, and we can identify the respects in which action is central, thus separating the general position from the special interests belonging to one or another of the individuals who were its early advocates. Such clarification will reveal a pragmatism that is highly relevant to contemporary philosophy. I. Peirce proposed his maxim as a theory of meaning: the clear apprehension of an idea is to be obtained by considering the effects or consequences on future possible action that follow from the idea. Meanings consist in the possible effects of present experience on future behavior. In accordance with the pragmatic maxim, I shall take the behavioral theory of meaning and the behavioral theory of knowledge that issues from it to be the central position of pragmatism. What is either incompatible or unnecessary to this behavioral core is expendable, and if it has contributed to the misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the core, it should be abandoned in the further development of pragmatism. Both Peirce and James presented pragmatism primarily 1 Collected Papers o/ Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1-6 ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; vols. 7-8 ed. by Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-35, 1958), vol. 5, paragraphs 2 and 402. Hereafter cited as CP followed by volume and paragraph number. 2 See A. O. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," Journal o[ Philosophy, V (1908); reprinted in The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsPress, 1963). [435] 436 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY as a method, but in the philosophies of both, and of Dewey as well, the emphasis on method is often obscured by specific doctrines in some field such as ontology, epistemology or ethics; and in the cases especially of James and Dewey, it was the special doetrines that elicited the bulk of the adverse criticism. The pragmatism of all the early pragmatists was so mixed with other advocacies and causes that it was often difficult to distinguish between what should be called pragmatic and what should not. Pragmatism did not emerge full-blown in stark separateness. Certain auxiliary positions that revolve around the behavioral theory of meaning also characterize pragmatism. They are to be found in the writings of all the early pragmatists and both yield and receive systematic support from the behavioral theory of meaning. Together with the theory of meaning they demarcate the core of pragmatism. The list is as follows: (1) Meaning and knowledge are behaviorally defined. (2) The various forms of pragmatism share an evolutionary, naturalistic outlook. (3) They all emphasize, in harmony with the evolutionary outlook, process and time-especially the continuity of passage and temporality. (4) They all show, in harmony with the continuity of process, a tendency to reject Cartesian dualism... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to introduce Harold Arthur Prichard is main philosophical thesis concerning human morality. According to Prichard, the whole body of moral philosophy rests on a set of mistakes, similar in many senses to those produced by epistemology. In this article I will try to..

The article presents and analyzes different approaches of U.S. bioethicists in comprehending the Nazi medical crimes after 1945. The account is divided into two sections: one dealing with discussions on research ethics and the Nuremberg Code up until the 1970s and the other ranging from the 1970s to the present and highlighting bioethics' engagement with Nazi analogies. The portrayal of different bioethical scholars, institutions, and documents—most notably Henry K. Beecher, Jay Katz, the Belmont Report, the Hastings Center, Arthur L. (...) Caplan, and Robert M. Veatch—provides a nuanced interpretation of the motives that bioethicists held and the strategies that they applied to establish an understanding of the Nazi medical crimes and their relation to contemporary bioethical issues. In this, the different approaches shared a common goal: To integrate the Nazi medical crimes into an ethical framework by means of selective acknowledgments and representation of their history. (shrink)

The British political theorist and architect Arthur J. Penty (1875-1937) is today remembered as the co-originator of ‘post-industrialism’ and as the first guild socialist. His writings evince a lifelong aversion to the evils of commercial society, as well as an intense appreciation for Medieval life. Yet Penty's conservative tendencies belie his attentiveness to what Harold Perkin would call ‘professional society.’ Though he abhorred capitalism, Penty believed in assigning status to workers on the basis of social function and technical (...) expertise. Most surprisingly, given his reputation, he held that the guarantee of such status represented the first step towards a more democratic society. This essay accordingly recasts Penty as a political theorist of the professions. It does so through the analysis of not only his core interventions in political theory, but also his lesser-known trade writings. The first section focuses on Penty's early life and context. The second explains his historical understanding of architectural decline through his contrasting narratives of Classical and Gothic aesthetics. The third section outlines his theory of how to restore democratic architecture in modernity. The fourth section comments on Penty's larger significance in the history of ideas at a time of increasing populist references to ‘traditional’ aesthetics. (shrink)

First published in 1818, The World as Will and Representation contains Schopenhauer's entire philosophy, ranging through epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, aesthetics and philosophy of art, to ethics, the meaning of life and the philosophy of religion, in an attempt to account for the world in all its significant aspects. It gives a unique and influential account of what is and is not of value in existence, the striving and pain of the human condition and the possibility of (...) deliverance from it. This new translation of the first volume of what later became a two-volume work reflects the eloquence and power of Schopenhauer's prose and renders philosophical terms accurately and consistently. It offers an introduction, glossary of names and bibliography, and succinct editorial notes, including notes on the revisions of the text which Schopenhauer made in 1844 and 1859. (shrink)

Providing a model for the transformative work that is required going forward, The Crisis of US Hospice Care illustrates the potential of hospice for facilitating a new way of living our last days and for having the best death possible.

This paper presents a model-theoretic semantics for discourse "about" natural numbers, one that captures what I call "the mathematical-object picture", but avoids what I can "the mathematical-object theory".

Aesthetic internalism claims a link between judgement and motivation: aesthetic judgements bring with them motivations to act in characteristic ways. Critics object that there is a difference between merely liking something and judging it to be aesthetically good, and that it is our likings, not our aesthetic judgements, that motivate us. This paper develops a version of aesthetic internalism that can respond to this criticism. Wholehearted aesthetic judgements are characterized by stability, attention, and motivation. Making such judgements is an important (...) part of a good life, and so at least some aesthetic judgements are motivating. So we have reason to think that this version of aesthetic internalism is true. This paper defends wholehearted aesthetic internalism against objections, and assesses an argument from aesthetic internalism to aesthetic non-cognitivism. While wholehearted aesthetic internalism can only offer qualified support to non-cognitivism, it nonetheless offers a number of fruitful avenues for further work. (shrink)

Contrary to economics or history, for example, there does not exist an organized field dedicated to the philosophy of political science. Given that the philosophical issues raised by political science research are just as pressing and vibrant as those raised in these more organized fields, fostering a field that labels itself Philosophy of Political Science (PoPS) is important. PoPS is advanced here as a fruitful meeting place where both philosophers and practicing political scientists contribute and discuss—with philosophical discussions that are (...) close to and informed by actual developments in political science, making philosophy of science continuous with the sciences in line with contemporary naturalist philosophy of science. The topics scrutinized in the different chapters of the Handbook will figure prominently in PoPS, as we lay out in this chapter. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is still, in the minds of many, identified with positivism. This is understandable since twentieth century philosophy of science originates with the work of the Vienna Circle. Positivism is most famous for the verification theory of meaning, the doctrine that the meaning of any proposition is the method by which it is verified, and that any nonanalytic locution which cannot be proven or disproven by some empirical test has no cognitive significance. Positivism is an attempt to construct (...) a “scientific philosophy” in the worst sense: it is maintained that (with the exception of propositions which are analytic and thus vacuous) only those propositions which occur in the sciences are meaningful, all other discourse having at best some emotive value, but no cognitive content, and all of this is maintained within the confines of an exceedingly narrow notion of scientific knowledge. This notion is so narrow that its advocates found themselves in danger of having to relegate most of physics to the realm of nonsense since physics contains many statements which are strictly universal and thus cannot be conclusively verified. (shrink)

Reviewing his life's work in several areas, Koestler shows that the development of human intelligence mirrors the hierarchical order of the universe, examines links between creativity and humor, science, and art, and criticizes the behaviorist theory of cultural evolution.

An extraordinary history of humanity's changing vision of the universe. In this masterly synthesis, Arthur Koestler cuts through the sterile distinction between 'sciences' and 'humanities' to bring to life the whole history of cosmology from the Babylonians to Newton. He shows how the tragic split between science and religion arose and how, in particular, the modern world-view replaced the medieval world-view in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. He also provides vivid and judicious pen-portraits of a string of (...) great scientists and makes clear the role that political bias and unconscious prejudice played in their creativity. (shrink)

I have for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.

The novel has always provided a vehicle for commenting on various aspects of human existence. We are familiar with the political novel, the historical novel, or the metaphysical novel, and in this sense Sorrentino's Mulligan Stew, with its running commentary on novels, novelists, critics and publishers, may be viewed as a critical novel. A critical novel, however, has a striking feature which it does not share with the other sorts of novels mentioned above in that a critical novel is itself (...) a novel, and a member of the class of objects on which it is commenting. This is a structure that logicians call “self-reference” and the phenomenon of self-reference has provided a central theme in twentieth century logic and philosophy. (shrink)

“There is, in addition, a second reason for doubting that scientists reject paradigms because confronted with anomalies or counterinstances. In developing it my argument will itself foreshadow another of this essay's main theses. The reasons for doubt sketched above were purely factual; they were, that is, themselves counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory. As such, if my present point is correct, they can at best help to create a crisis or, more accurately, to reinforce one that is already very much (...) in existence. By themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict. Many of the relevant modifications and qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature. If, therefore, these epistemological counterinstances are to constitute more than a minor irritant, that will be because they help to permit the emergence of a new and different analysis of science within which they are no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a typical pattern, which we shall later observe in scientific revolutions, is applicable here, these anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply facts. From within a new theory of scientific knowledge, they may instead seem very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise.”. (shrink)

Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

For many Christians, personal experiences of God provide an important ground or justification for accepting the truth of the gospel. But we are sometimes mistaken about our experiences, and followers of other religions also provide impressive testimonies to support their religious beliefs. This book explores from a philosophical and theological perspective the viability of divine encounters as support for belief in God, arguing that some religious experiences can be accepted as genuine experiences of God and can provide evidence for Christian (...) beliefs. (shrink)