An examination and evaluation of Hegel's most important works including The Philosophy of History, The Philosophy of Right and Law, and The Science of Logic.

Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention (...) has begun to be paid to the dualistic point of view, as a result of increasing discontent with the prevailing materialism and reductionism of contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Awareness has grown that dualism need not be restricted to its traditional form and that other varieties of dualism are not subject to the difficulties commonly raised against Descartes' own version of it. -/- Interest in these alternative versions of dualism is growing fast today, because it seems that they are capable of capturing deep-seated philosophical intuitions, while also being fully consistent with the methodological assumptions and empirical findings of modern scientific work on the human mind and brain. The object of this book is to provide philosophers, scientists, their students, and the wider general public with an up-to-date overview of current developments in dualistic conceptions of the mind in contemporary philosophy and science. (shrink)

Diese kleine Rechtsphilosophie bemillit sich, die heutige rechts­ philosophische Problematik in den groBen Rahmen der Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie hineinzustellen. Ein derartiges Unterfangen macht eine strenge Auswahl erforderlich, und jeder wird bei einer solchen zum Teil davon beeinfluBt sein, was er im Hinblick auf die Problema­ tik der Gegenwart als wesentlich empfindet. Viel Interessantes muB notwendigerweise unberiicksichtigt bleiben; als MaBstab fiir die Auswahl habe ich dabei im wesentlichen die Originalitat des rechtsphilosophischen Beitrags angesehen. Eine Ausnahme· bilden die Naturrechtler des 18. Jahrhunderts. (...) Man wird gewiB auch hier iiber vieles streiten Mnnen. Ich mochte an dieser Stelle dem Herausgeber, meinem Freunde WOLFGANG KUNKEL, fiir die groBe Millie danken, die er sich im ganzen Verlauf der Arbeit gemacht hat. Cambridge, Mass., Friihjahr 1955. CARL J OACBlM FRIEDRICH. Inhaltsverzeichnis. Erster Teil. Die Geschichte. Selta I. Einleitung......................... 1 II. Das Recht aIs Wille Gottes: Die Erbschaft des Alten Testaments. 4 III. Das Recht aIs Teilhabe an der Idee der Gerechtigkeit: Plato und Aristoteles......................... 7 IV. Das Recht aIs Ausdruck der Gesetzlichkeiten menschlicher Natur: Die Stoa. und das romische Naturrecht............ 16 V. Das Recht als Friedensordnung der Liebesgemeinschaft: Augustin 21 VI. Das Recht aIs Teil und Spiegel der gottlichen Weltordnung: Thomas Aquinas und die Scholastik................. 25 VII. Das Recht aIs Geschichtsphii. nomen: Die Humanisten....... 30 VIII. Gesetztes Recht gegen Naturrecht: Die Souverinitatslehre bei Bodin, Althusius, Grotius..................... 34 IX. (shrink)

Ausgehend von einer Analyse des "Begründungsstreits", der in den letzten Jahren im Anschluß an H. Alberts Kritik des methodischen Prinzips der Begründung v.a. in der deutschen Philosophie geführt worden ist, werden zunächst die Positionen von K. O. Apel und J. Habermas einer immanenten methodischen Kritik unterzogen. Beide Programme erweisen sich als undurchführbar. Ausgehend von einer Präzisierung des Begriffes "Begründung" wird durch systematische Einführung begründungstheoretischer Termini ein begriffsiches Instrumentarium vorgeschlagen, das eine Rekonstruktion von Begründungssituationen erlauben soll. Mit seiner Hilfe werden die (...) im "Münchhausen-Trilemma" unterstellten Begründungssituationen genauer analysiert. Das "Münchhausen-Trilemma" wird als Argumentation für eine konstruktivistische und gegen eine reduktivistische Begründungskonzeption gewertet. (shrink)

Carl J. Friedrich (1901?1984) defined constitutionalism as something more than can be expressed by the dominant behavioralist paradigm of modern political science and the typical academic focus on law and courts. A leading but now neglected post-WWII authority on constitutionalism, Friedrich argued that it should be understood as an institutionally-based, interactive system for deliberating the meaning and legal application of the norms of a political community. His approach shares much with the contemporary ?historical institutionalist? call to situate (...) law and courts within a broader, more normative, and more interactive conception of constitutionalism. Accordingly, a reconsideration of Friedrich's work may help current efforts to better articulate the full richness and complexity of constitutionalism as a distinctive way of ordering political life. (shrink)

Onderwerp en gezegde, door D. M. Bakker.--Enkele opmerkingen over het Godsbegrip van Justinus Martyr, door J. den Boeft.--Heidegger, Descartes, Luther, door J. van der Hoeven.--"Geschichtlichkeit" bij Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, door G. Horsman.--Menselijke ontmaskering en Bijbels démasqué , door R. Huson.--Kleine geschiedenis van het begrip "niets" in de antieke wijsbegeerte (tot e met de Sofisten en Plato), door P. A. Meijer.--De structuur van opvoeden en opvoedkunde, door J. W. Mojet.--Individualiteit in de fysica, door (...) M. D. Stafleu. (shrink)

The late 1960s saw the emergence of new philosophical interest in Kant's philosophy of mathematics, and since then this interest has developed into a major and dynamic field of study. In this state-of-the-art survey of contemporary scholarship on Kant's mathematical thinking, Carl Posy and Ofra Rechter gather leading authors who approach it from multiple perspectives, engaging with topics including geometry, arithmetic, logic, and metaphysics. Their essays offer fine-grained analysis of Kant's philosophy of mathematics in the context of his Critical (...) philosophy, and also show sensitivity to its historical background. The volume will be important for readers seeking a comprehensive picture of the current scholarship about the development of Kant's philosophy of mathematics, its place in his overall philosophy, and the Kantian themes that influenced mathematics and its philosophy after Kant. (shrink)

Volume I, Substance, contains, under the heading Substance, the writings of Plato, Plotinus, Boethius, Marsilio Ficcino, Tommaso Campanella, Johannes Kepler, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Feruccio Busoni. Under the heading Essence and Distinctness are found the writings of Aristotle, Aristoxenus, Philodemus, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich W.J. Schelling, George W.F. Hegel, Johann Herbart, and Eduard Hanslick.

Though my title speaks of Kant’s mathematical realism, I want in this essay to explore Kant’s relation to a famous mathematical anti-realist. Specifically, I want to discuss Kant’s influence on L. E. J. Brouwer, the 20th-century Dutch mathematician who built a contemporary philosophy of mathematics on constructivist themes which were quite explicitly Kantian. Brouwer’s theory is perhaps most notable for its belief that constructivism requires us to abandon the traditional logic of mathematical reasoning in favor of different canon of reasoning, (...) called intuitionistic logic. Brouwer thought that classical logic is intrinsically bound up with a nonconstructive view of mathematics. This means that, according to Brouwer, when we do mathematics we must give up bivalence, we must no longer use such familiar logical laws as excluded middle, and we must sometimes forebear from the classic method of reductio ad absurdum. All of these are intuitionistically invalid classical principles. (shrink)

Kant's views about mathematics were controversial in his own time, and they have inspired or infuriated thinkers ever since. Though specific Kantian doctrines fell into disrepute earlier in this century, the past twenty-five years have seen a surge of interest in and respect for Kant's philosophy of mathematics among both Kant scholars and philosophers of mathematics. The present volume includes the classic papers from the 1960s and 1970s which spared this renaissance of interest, together with updated postscripts by their authors. (...) It also includes the most important recent work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics. The essays bring to bear a wealth of detailed Kantian scholarship, together with powerful new interpretative tools drawn from modern mathematics, logic and philosophy. The cumulative effect of this collection upon the reader will be a deeper understanding of the centrality of mathematics in all aspects of Kant's thought and a renewed respect for the power of Kant's thinking about mathematics. The essays contained in this volume will set the agenda for further work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics for some time to come. (shrink)

L. E. J. Brouwer, the founder of mathematical intuitionism, believed that mathematics and its objects must be humanly graspable. He initiated a program rebuilding modern mathematics according to that principle. This book introduces the reader to the mathematical core of intuitionism – from elementary number theory through to Brouwer's uniform continuity theorem – and to the two central topics of 'formalized intuitionism': formal intuitionistic logic, and formal systems for intuitionistic analysis. Building on that, the book proposes a systematic, philosophical foundation (...) for intuitionism that weaves together doctrines about human grasp, mathematical objects and mathematical truth. (shrink)

IPC, the intuitionistic predicate calculus, has the property(i) Vc(A c /x) xA.Furthermore, for certain important , IPC has the converse property (ii) xA Vc(A c /x). (i) may be given up in various ways, corresponding to different philosophic intuitions and yielding different systems of intuitionistic free logic. The present paper proves the strong completeness of several of these with respect to Kripke style semantics. It also shows that giving up (i) need not force us to abandon the analogue of (ii).

Benacerraf’s Problem about mathematical truth displays a tension, indeed a seemingly unbridgeable gap, between Platonist foundations for mathematics on the one hand and Hilbert’s ‘finitary standpoint’ on the other. While that standpoint evinces an admirable philosophical unity, it is ultimately an effete rival to Platonism: It leaves mathematical practice untouched, even the highly non-constructive axiom of choice. Brouwer’s intuitionism is a more potent finitist rival, for it engenders significant deviation from standard (classical) mathematics. The essay illustrates three sorts of intuitionistic (...) deviations (weakening, refinement and outright contradiction), and goes on to sketch the technical tools and arguments that engender those clashes with classical mathematics and the philosophical principles underlying those arguments. Those philosophical principles coalesce into a “standpoint” no less unified and no less finitary that Hilbert’s. This intuitionistic standpoint is sufficiently detailed that it itself provides a benchmark for comparing all the rival positions; and it is sufficiently robust that it dissolves the Benacerrafian dichotomy. However, the intuitionistic refutation of the axiom of choice reveals two distinct sub-streams within that intuitionistic standpoint. Distinguishing these streams suggests perhaps that in spite of that robustness, intuitionism has an internal dichotomy parallel to the Benacerrafian split. The Benacerrafian split is a crack in the foundations of mathematics. But I shall argue that this internal intuitionistic dichotomy is not at all a foundational gap; it is rather a special insight about the nature of mathematical thought. (shrink)

“It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies,” Richard Hofstadter famously wrote, “but to be one.” Defining that “American ideology” or “American creed” obsessed scholars of the consensus era, who celebrated Americans’ allegiance to a limited liberal vocabulary of rights, freedoms, and markets. The cultural transformations begun in the 1960s seemed to question the very idea of a unitary culture or creed, but some historians responded by exploring alternative ideological founding myths to the liberal consensus. Over (...) the ensuing decades scholars mounted formidable efforts to support republicanism or millennial Christianity as challengers, but liberalism proved a resilient foe. And it seemed to have contemporary history on its side: during the Reagan revolution of the century's final decades the classic liberal combination of scaled-down government and free markets carried the day as Americans’ ideal if not their reality. The Lockean liberal tradition that Louis Hartz described a half-century earlier still appeared the only game in town, although scholars continued to argue over its terms, history, and boundaries. (shrink)