Individuals with major depression may benefit from psychiatric treatment, yet they may refuse such treatment, sometimes because of their depression. Hence the question is raised whether such individuals are competent to refuse psychiatric treatment. The standard notion of competence to consent to treatment, which refers to expression of choice, understanding of medical information, appreciation of the personal relevance of this information, and logical reasoning, may be insufficient to address this question. This is so because major depression may not impair these (...) four abilities while it may disrupt coherence of personal preferences by changing them. Such change may be evaluated by comparing the treatment preferences of the individual during the depression to his or her treatment preferences during normal periods. If these preferences are consistent, they should be respected. If they are not consistent, or past treatment preferences that were arrived at competently cannot be established, treatment refusal may have to be overridden or ignored so as to alleviate the depression and then determine the competent treatment decision of the individual. Further study of the relation between depression and competence to refuse or consent to psychiatric treatment is required. (shrink)

In the fall semester of 1772/73 at the Albertus University of Königsberg, Immanuel Kant, metaphysician and professor of logic and metaphysics, began lectures on anthropology, which he continued until 1776, shortly before his retirement from public life. His lecture notes and papers were first published in 1798, eight years after the publication of the _Critique of Judgment, _the third of his famous _Critiques. _The present edition of the _Anthropology _is a translation of the text found in volume 7 of _Kants (...) gesammelte Schriften, _edited by Oswald Külpe. Kant describes the _Anthropology _as a systematic doctrine of the knowledge of humankind. Kant’s lectures stressed the "pragmatic" approach to the subject because he intended to establish pragmatic anthropology as a regular academic discipline. He differentiates the physiological knowledge of the human race—the investigation of "what Nature makes of man"—from the pragmatic—"what man as a free being makes of himself, what he can make of himself, and what he ought to make of himself." Kant believed that anthropology teaches the knowledge of humankind and makes us familiar with what is pragmatic, not speculative, in relation to humanity. He shows us as world citizens within the context of the cosmos. Summarizing the cloth edition of the _Anthropology_,_ Library Journal_ concludes: "Kant’s allusions to such issues as sensation, imagination, judgment, taste, emotion, passion, moral character, and the character of the human species in regard to the ideal of a cosmopolitan society make this work an important resource for English readers who seek to grasp the connections among Kant’s metaphysics of nature, metaphysics of morals, and political theory. The notes of the editor and translator, which incorporate material from Ernst Cassirer’s edition and from Kant’s _marginalia _in the original manuscript, shed considerable light on the text.". (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) is scheduled to be legalized in Canada as of March 2024 for individuals with mental disorder/illness as their sole underlying medical condition (MAiD MD-SUMC). As guidelines are being developed for the safe and consistent provision of MAiD MD-SUMC, sufficient consideration must be given to the interpretation of ambiguous terminology in current legislation, and to ensuring sound use of acceptable ethics principles in these interpretations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of HumanismSandra Rudnick LuftImperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism, by Tzvetan Todorov; 254 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, $45.00.Tzvetan Todorov begins Imperfect Garden with an arresting premise: that the greatest achievement of the modern age—the moderns' assertion of the freedom of the human will, unlimited by allegiances to God, nature, or reason—was the fruit of a pact with the devil. Though a (...) familiar idea, Todorov uses this premise to provide a richly detailed map of the intellectual currents of the age, illuminating in the process the dangers inherent in the age's acceptance of this pact.The price to be paid for human free will would become apparent only in the following centuries—a separation from God, leading to secularism and materialism; a separation from other humans, culminating in a loss of sociality and a fall into radical isolation; ultimately, a loss of self, its unity dispersed into an "anomalous collection of impulses." Todorov delineates the age's four responses to this bargain, and the acquisition of human autonomy. They account for the four families whose interrelations characterize modernity: the conservative, which considers the three-fold price of autonomy too high, rejecting it for the authority of tradition; the scientistic—a diverse set of responses derived from modern science, historicism, Marxism, Darwinism, all of which deny the existence of human freedom and emphasize some form of determinism based on the laws of nature, reason, or history; the individualist, for which the "loss" of God, society, and self represents merely an extension of human liberation; and the humanist, which, while valuing human autonomy, does not want to [End Page 425] pay its price. Believing it can maintain communal existence, shared values, and responsible selfhood while acting out of an autonomous will, the humanist family wants to have its cake and eat it too, a desire Todorov clearly shares.Todorov delineates the views of these four families through close readings of their representative figures. Limiting himself to French authors, he includes Bonald and Tocqueville as conservatives; Condorcet, Diderot, the Encyclopedists as scientistic types; Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, De Sade, and Helvetius as individualists. Among the humanists, who are his focus, he emphasizes Montaigne, Descartes, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Constant, and Tocqueville again. While for me the primary value of Imperfect Garden is its contribution to the history of ideas of French humanism from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Todorov himself has a larger, more ideological goal. His interest is not primarily historical, but typological. He wants to crystallize the insights of his authors, distilling an ideal type whose characteristics include the ability of humans to initiate their own actions, which he calls the "autonomy of the 'I'," the ability to make another person the end of one's acts, which he calls the "finality of the 'you'," and the belief that every human has these abilities, that is, the "universality of the 'they'." Together they constitute an anthropology based on sociality, which insures the compatibility of human autonomy with social existence, shared values, and the stability of the self. He associates this "type" with a politics which provides the institutional structure for the exercise of these abilities. This latter point, the compatibility of humanism with democratic political structures, is the subtext running through the book. Humanism is, for Todorov, the modern family most compatible with democracy, just as democracy is the political institution most able to retain the positive aspects of human autonomy (pp. 29–32). This is his defense of humanism, subjected, as it currently is, to challenges which suggest the devil is trying to collect on the debt.Todorov argues his case by taking up each of the "losses" supposedly suffered when the moderns asserted the autonomy of human will. If the strength and value of his book are Todorov's close readings of his representative authors—readings rich in insights for the educated generalist, however much scholars of individual authors may differ with particular interpretations—ultimately his defense of humanism's ability to "have it all" is far less satisfying.The first price to be paid for the autonomy of the will is the social world, the fall... (shrink)

A meta-ethical analysis demonstrates that care ethics is a grounded in a distinct mode of moral reasoning. This is comprised primarily of the rejection of principles such as impartiality, and the endorsement of emotional or moral virtues such as compassion, as well as the notion that the preservation of relations may override the interests of the individuals involved in them. The main conclusion of such a meta-ethical analysis is that such meta-ethical foundations of care ethics are not sound. Reasonable alternatives (...) for care ethics may be its formulation as an additional principle within an established principlist framework, or the move to a dialogical ethics, where the good to be acted upon is not decided in advance but rather critically discussed and established within the encounter of the parties involved. (shrink)

Human rights protect the conditions of a minimally decent life of which mental health is an indispensable element. Adequate care for mental health is thus recognized as part of the human right to health. However, for populations living far from urban centers, adequate in-person (mental) health care is often extremely costly and thus not provided. Digital mental health care options have become an effective alternative to in-person treatment. Benefitting from these new digital opportunities, though, requires sufficient access to the internet. (...) Because everyone has a human right to adequate health care, and digital mental health care is now an effective option for progressively realizing this human right for people who live in remote regions, these people also have to be understood to have a right to access to the internet. This right to internet access creates duties for public authorities and the international community to create the required digital infrastructure and (where needed) to cover the costs of internet access where this is the only feasible way of delivering, or progressively realizing, the mental health care that is indispensable for having the opportunity to lead minimally decent lives. (shrink)

The relation between the notions of (medical) invasiveness and (actual or potential) harm has not been systematically discussed nor theoretically grounded, despite its importance to clinical-ethical practice. This paper aims to clarify the notion of invasiveness beyond the traditional notion of invasiveness as breaking skin or inserting mechanical objects into the body. The traditional notion of invasiveness is challenged by counterexamples. Three approaches to the notion of disorder applied here are: deviation from what is common; deviation from what is considered (...) ideal; and disruption of self-organization. Assuming that more extreme measures are related to more harm, all three approaches to the notion of disorder suggest that invasiveness is proportional if not identical to harm, and show no clear relation to the traditional notion of invasiveness. In conclusion, the notion of invasiveness may best be eliminated from medical terminology, replacing it with a detailed understanding of the notion of harm. (shrink)

This study examines the ends of medical intervention and argues that mainstream contemporary medicine assumes that appropriate ends may be discovered (i.e., naturalism), rather than created or decided upon (i.e., conventionalism). The essay then applies these considerations to the problem of the demarcation of the normal from the pathological. I argue that the common formulations of this dispute commit a fallacy, as they characterize the "normal" as a state of the organism and not as an ongoing process within it. Such (...) a process may be characterized as self-creation and self-repair. Such considerations support the conclusion that normality may be regarded as a regulative idea, rather than as an end-state, and as part of the ends of medical intervention, depending upon choice and context. (shrink)

Biological psychiatry has been dominated by a psychopharmacologically-driven neurotransmitter dysfunction paradigm. The objective of this paper is to explore a reductionist assumption underlying this paradigm, and to suggest an improvement on it. The methods used are conceptual analysis with a comparative approach, particularly using illustrations from the history of both biological psychiatry and molecular biology. The results are that complete reduction to physicochemical explanations is not fruitful, at least in the initial stages of research in the medical and life sciences, (...) and that an appropriate (non-reducible) integrative principle - addressing a property of the whole system under study - is required for each domain of research. This is illustrated in Pauling's use of a topological integrative principle for the discovery of the functioning of proteins and in Watson and Crick's use of the notion of a genetic code as an integrative principle for the discovery of the structure of genes. The neurotransmitter dysfunction paradigm addresses single molecules and their neural pathways, yet their interactions within the CNS as a whole seem most pertinent to mental disorders such as schizophrenia. The lack within biological psychiatry of an integrative principle addressing a property of the CNS as a whole may be responsible for the empirical failure of orthomolecular psychiatry, as well as for the central role that serendipity has played in the study of mental disorders, which is dominated by the neurotransmitter paradigm. The conclusion is that research in biological psychiatry may benefit from using, at least initially, some integrative principle(s) addressing a property of the CNS as a whole, such as connectionism or a hierarchical notion. (shrink)

This article aims to clarify the notion of a psychiatric disability. The article uses conceptual analysis, examining and applying established definitions of (general) disability to psychiatric disabilities. This analysis reveals that disability as inability to perform according to expectations or norms is related to impairment as deviation from the (statistical) norm, while disability as inability to achieve (personal) goals is related to impairment as deviation from the (personal) ideal. These two views of impairment and disability are distinct from the self-organization (...) view of impairment as disrupted self-creation or disrupted self-repair and of disability as disrupted whole person self-compensation (in relation to an impairment). All these three views of disability pertain to psychiatric disability. Although there is nothing necessarily psychiatric about psychiatric disability other than the psychiatric impairment related to it, the life course and life circumstances typical of many people with (severe) psychiatric disorders may lead to disability and may thus confer some (psychiatric) specificity on this disability. This analysis may facilitate research on specific psychiatric disabilities and a broader scope for psychiatric rehabilitation. (shrink)

Improving nitrogen (N) fertilizer management in agricultural systems is critical to meeting environmental goals while maintaining economically viable and productive food systems. This paper applies a farm systems framework to analyze how adoption of N management practices is related to different farming operation characteristics and the extent to which fertilizer, soil and irrigation practices are related to each other. We develop a multivariate probit regression model to analyze the interdependency of these adoption behaviors from 966 farmers across three watersheds and (...) diverse cropping systems in the Central Valley of California. Our analysis demonstrates that farmers adopt varying combinations or portfolios of practices, with the most common portfolio featuring a core set of fertilizer-focused practices. Irrigation infrastructure is an especially important farm operation characteristic for encouraging adoption of innovative practice portfolios that integrate water and fertilizer management. These findings highlight the ability for a farm systems approach to improve our understanding of farmer decision-making across diverse agricultural landscapes. (shrink)

Contemporary biological psychiatry is in a seemingly inchoate state. I assert that this state of biological psychiatry is due to its violation of an epistemological criterion of rationality, i.e., the relevance criterion; that is, contemporary biological psychiatry is irrational as it adopts a conception irrelevant to the psychobiological domain. This conception is mechanistic. The irrationality of biological psychiatry is manifest as the dominance of neurochemical explanations of psychopharmacological correlations, resulting in predictive sterility and, correspondingly, in the dominance of serendipity. I (...) suggest a rationalization of biological psychiatry through a conception relevant to the psychobiological domain. This conception is hierarchical. Keywords: criterion of relevance, epistemology, hierarchical conception, mechanistic conception, rationality CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Dialogical ethics are a procedural alternative to substantive ethics such as consequentialism, deontology, principlism, casuistry, virtue ethics and care ethics. Dialogical ethics are procedural in that they do not establish goods in advance, unlike substantive ethics, but rather determine goods through a procedure enacted by the actual parties involved (although some substantive notion of justice may still be required); and they are dialogical in that the procedure is that of dialogue, involving both empathic critical discussion and negotiation. A fundamental tenet (...) of dialogical ethics may be the use of appropriate rules of order regulating dialogue among the parties involved. Some of the central characteristics of such rules of order are that they are reciprocally regulated by dialogue, that they override other ethical considerations, and that they institute empathic critical discussion and negotiation within the ethical dialogue. Dialogical bioethics are the application of dialogical ethics to ethical problems in medicine. The approach of dialogical bioethics has proven fruitful for resolving bioethical problems such as that of medical futility, where approaches of substantive ethics have reached an impasse. There is room for further study of special challenges within dialogical bioethics, such as the incompetence of some involved parties, conflicts of interests of third parties, and the cost-effectiveness of this ethical approach. (shrink)

BackgroundEthics consultations are established in contemporary health care. Informal ethics consultations often occur and are possibly beneficial, yet they have not been empirically studied. We sought to describe features of informal ethics consultations and to identify facilitators and disruptors of patient participation in such ethics consultations.MethodsWe used a mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative) evaluation design and conveniently sampled 64 sequential informal ethics consultations over a period of 3 years in two academic health care centers in one city in Canada. Data (...) were collected by the two participating ethicists. We used statistical description for the quantitative data and thematic analysis for the qualitative data.ResultsPatients participated in only two (3%) of the informal ethics consultations. Factors that disrupted patient participation in ethics consultations were related to patients’ issues (mental impairments), family issues (family withholding information from the patient), and team members’ issues (efficiency considerations).ConclusionInformal ethics consultations may be used for ethics capacity building of health care providers rather than for engagement with addressed patients. Further research on informal ethics consultations is required, including in different sites. (shrink)

Informed consent to breaking (or waiving) bad news is an important yet neglected topic. It is distinct from informed consent to diagnosis and to treatment, and may be logically and ethically sound, provided patients are competent and that no considerable harm may be caused to others by breaking or waiving bad news to patients. This requires a differential assessment procedure in order to balance patient autonomy, benefit and justice towards others, preferably exploring patients’ values, expectations and needs with them, so (...) that an acceptable decision can be made on whether to act on their consent to breaking or waiving bad news, or to ignore it and act on informed consent by proxy. Future study should attempt to provide a detailed characterization of procedures for attaining informed consent to breaking or waiving bad news, and to test their success in establishing ethically sound health care. (shrink)

Bioethics uses various theories, methods and institutions for its decision-making. Lately, a dialogical, i.e., dialogue-based, approach has been argued for in bioethics. The aim of this paper is to explore some of the decision-making processes that may be involved in this dialogical approach, as well as related pitfalls that may have to be addressed in order for this approach to be helpful, particularly in clinical ethics. Using informal logic, an analysis is presented of the notion of dialogue and of the (...) stages of dialogical decision-making, and then processes and related pitfalls associated with these stages in the context of clinical ethics are examined. The results of this exploration are expected to facilitate the implementation and empirical testing of dialogical bioethics. (shrink)

Jakovljevic and Crnčevic review the concept of comorbidity in relation to mental disorders, which is timely. Yet they seem to ignore a longstanding and important notion of comorbidity, highlighted in psychiatry particularly by Sigmund Freud. The ignored notion is that of compensatory comorbidity. Compensatory comorbidity is a special case of compensatory phenomena in relation to disrupted health.

abstract Ethicists such as Peter Singer argue that consciousness and self‐consciousness are the principal considerations in discussing the use of animals by humans, such as in medical experiments. This paper raises an additional consideration to factor into this ethical discussion. Ethics deal with the intentional impact of subjects on each other. This assumes a meta‐representational ability of subjects to represent states of mind of others, which may be termed other‐consciousness. The moral weight of other‐consciousness is manifest in the notion of (...) responsibility, where humans lacking in other‐consciousness (such as individuals with autism) may not be held responsible for their harmful actions towards others. As responsibility implies not only duties but also rights and more generally high moral status, it follows that other‐consciousness grants high moral status, other things being equal — recognizing that other factors grant moral status too. Other‐consciousness also increases the capacity for suffering, both due to increased freedom (and consequently increased possibility of restriction of freedom) and to increased empathy (with suffering of others). Hence, the more an animal is other‐conscious, the more it deserves high moral status and the more it can suffer, other things being equal, and consequently, the less it should be used for human purposes. Further study is required to elucidate to what extent animals used by humans, such as in medical experiments, particularly primates and other highly evolved mammals, are other‐conscious. (shrink)

Deviant forms of human thought may provide insight into epistemic standards, such as rationality. A comparative analysis of paranoia and reinforced dogmatism suggests that reinforced dogmatism, such as pseudo-science a-la-Popper, demonstrates a primary epistemic lack of critical rationality, that is, of testability, whereas paranoia demonstrates a lack of range of alternative statements leading secondarily to a lack of testability. This reflects the importance to both epistemology and psychiatry of epistemic standards in addition to testability, such as relevance to problems, and (...) emphasizes the distinction of the context of introduction from the contexts of discovery and of justification. Key Words: context of introduction • paranoia • reinforced dogmatism • relevance • testability. (shrink)

Practical and evidence-based, this unique book is the first comprehensive text focused on person-centered approaches to people with serious mental illness such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. It reflects a range of views and findings regarding assessment, treatment, rehabilitation, self-help, policy-making, education and research. It is highly recommended for all healthcare professionals, students, researchers and educators involved in general practice, psychiatry, nursing, social work, clinical psychology and therapy. Healthcare service providers, and policy makers and shapers, will find the book's wide-ranging, (...) multi-professional approach enlightening. 'Serious Mental Illness reflects a continued distancing from the outmoded and unsubstantiated belief that people with severe mental illnesses could not recover, and that they would respond positively only to goals and treatment plans chosen, designed and implemented by providers in order to prevent their further deterioration. Anyone with an interest in the concept of person-centered approaches will discover new ideas in this book. Indeed, anyone with an interest in person-centered approaches has to read this book. Not only is it the first such book on person-centered approaches, but it will serve as the gold standard in this topic area for years to come.' William A Anthony, in the Foreword. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of the general methodology of qualitative research, such as that used in some health research, has been inductivist or relativist to date, ignoring critical rationalism as a philosophical approach with which to discuss the general methodology of qualitative research. This paper presents a discussion of the general methodology of qualitative research from a critical rationalist perspective (inspired by Popper), using as an example mental health research. The widespread endorsement of induction in qualitative research is positivist and is suspect, (...) if not false, particularly in relation to the context of justification (or rather theory testing) as compared to the context of discovery (or rather theory generation). Relativism is riddled with philosophical weaknesses and hence it is suspect if not false too. Theory testing is compatible with qualitative research, contrary to much writing about and in qualitative research, as theory testing involves learning from trial and error, which is part of qualitative research, and which may be the form of learning most conducive to generalization. Generalization involves comparison, which is a fundamental methodological requirement of any type of research (qualitative or other); hence the traditional grounding of quantitative and experimental research in generalization. Comparison—rather than generalization—is necessary for, and hence compatible with, qualitative research; hence, the common opposition to generalization in qualitative research is misdirected, disregarding whether this opposition’s claims are true or false. In conclusion, qualitative research, similar to quantitative and experimental research, assumes comparison as a general methodological requirement, which is necessary for health research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 471 One would have liked amplification of the final chapter on "Descartes and History," first, as to how he was a product of the intellectual climate of his times, and secondly, as to the influence exerted by "the father of modern philosophy" at home and abroad. Even brief comments would have been welcome--for example, on Descartes's reaction to the Thomistic heritage, to Montaigne, Pyrrhonism, and Stoicism, Jesuit (...) formation, to the theory of "honn~te homme" capable of wielding the sword and the pen. The book mentions Chomsky; but why is there no reference to the exchange of four letters between Descartes and the Cambridge Piatonist Henry More on language as the criterion of reason to distinguish man from beast? The crucial role of theology in that age could be further emphasized, as well as the three-cornered nature of the century's combat between "the old philosophers," the Cartesians, and the empiricists who gathered strength after Gassendi. One looks in vain for reference to Descartes's role in denigrating history and promoting the moderns as a possible influence first in "la querelle des anciens et des modernes" and then in the Enlightenment faith in progress. The chapter would have been enriched by comment on Descartes's influence on "iatrophysical" and "iatrochemical" iatromechanism, particularly in the medical sciences. No doubt because of limitations of space, the internationalism of Descartes's "rayonnement " was not brought to light. In Holland, England, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland the sparks spread. But it is not fair to blame an author for not writing someone else's book with more on the history of ideas. Dr. R6e, the Editor of Philosophy and its Past, has made a personal and significant contribution to Cartesiana. We are grateful to him for helping us to understand Descartes. LEONORA COHEN ROSENFIELD University of Maryland Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity. Ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene. (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976. Pp. xxix + 480. $16.50) This is the second of two volumes of essays on Giambattista Vico, the early eighteenthcentury Neopolitan philosopher of history. The first volume was part of, and served to signal, a fairly intense quickening of interest in Vico.' Since its publication at least a half dozen books on Vico have appeared in English. The first Vico Conference to be held in this country took place in January, 1976, coinciding with the publication of this second volume.2 The Conference and the two volumes represent an effort to stimulate an interest in and manifest the riches of Vico's thought. They must surely be the fruits of a labor of love on the part of Professor Giorgio Tagliacozzo, Director of the Institute for Vichian Studies and co-editor of both volumes. The publication of the second volume, coming at the end of the most fruitful decade in Vichian scholarship in the English-speaking world, provides an opportunity for some assessment of the general trends emerging within that scholarship. I prefer to discuss two related but distinguishableaspects of those trends: first, their interdisciplinarycharacter, and second, the increasingly divergent nature of both the historical and methodological approaches to Vico. On the whole, the predominant disciplinary interest in Vico in books published or translated into English before 1969 has been philosophical and has been heavily influenced by Croce's ' Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969). "Vico and Contemporary Thought," sponsored by the Institute for VicoStudies, associated with the Casa ltaliana of Columbia University and the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research. 472 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY idealist interpretation. Vichian research has been enriched and broadened in the last ten years by the growth of philological studies, and the present volume is representative of this development. It is divided almost equally between articles in philology and philosophy. The primarily philological articles range from analyses, occasionally technical, of Vico's ideas about language and myth, 3 to Vico's place in the historical development of linguistics, rhetoric, and language usage from Aristotle to the eighteenth century4 and to his relevance for the contemporary study of language usage and... (shrink)

The essays by Scott DeVito and Abraham Rudnick are on largely the same topics - the meanings of health(y), normal, disease, pathological, diagnosis , etc., and they contain compatible conclusions - that medical precepts are value-laden and less objective than some na?ve model of scientific objectivity would suggest. This commentary opens with a brief critique of each and ends with a more in-depth account, one complaint being how lacking in weight the analyses are. In the middle portion of this (...) commentary, I consider the sorts of values that are present in some case studies - values that give the project much more weight . These include the values, scientific and self-serving, that professionalism provides. I show how medicine and its disease-related concepts can be thought to evolve in many ways. (shrink)

It is only in the past 20 years that the concept of 'recovery' from mental health has been more widely considered and researched. This book is unique in addressing philosophical issues - including conceptual challenges and opportunities - raised by the notion of recovery of people with mental illness.

Johannes Scottus Eriugena ragt als ein der Antike kongenialer Denker mit seinem originellen theologisch-philosophischen Entwurf von Gott und Welt weit über seine Zeitgenossen des 9. Jahrhunderts hinaus. Die vorliegende Untersuchung arbeitet die zentrale Bedeutung des freien Willens und einer optimistischen Sicht der Schöpfung für das Gesamtsystem heraus und zeigt inhaltliche Parallelen zwischen dem Werk des frühmittelalterlichen Autors und seiner irisch-keltischen Herkunft auf.