This essay is an informal examination of the efforts made by mathematical logicians from Russell on, to evade the paradoxes revealed by uncritical methods of definition and predication. Where systems are described it is with a minimum of formal apparatus, so that the climate is one of rather vague statement and imprecise question. Russell’s drastic banning of type–offending formulas gives the starting–point for queries about the connection of sense and formalism, and the conclusion may be summed up as the detection (...) of a contrast between mechanisation and sensefulness which is seen as constituting a line of tension, as it were a geological weakness in formal structures, which permits the insertion of a philosophic wedge. Interesting as such an idea is, it is not clear between what regions this line has been drawn. On the one hand the undecidability results of Gödel show that formal methods can be extended indefinitely beyond the scope of what is mechanisable; on the other the author methodically refrains from defining what he means by ‘sense’. In so far as he explicitly leaves his meaning on this point to be gathered form his treatment of non–sense, and the paradoxes are here taken as representative of the latter, we might suppose that he is equating sense with consistency. For expressions leading to paradox were only ruled senseless by Russell because they lead to inconsistency. But it is fairly clear that something more epistemologically interesting is intended, since the author dismisses from consideration ‘la déductivité structurale, sens immédiat d’une vaste architecture symbolique d’abord vide, et intégralement traduisible en syntaxe’. Such translatability has, incidentally, its limits, as Gödel’s results again show, and it is our belief that the discussion might have been put in a more exact and workmanlike frame if the list of works consulted had contained more than one, and that a relatively minor, publication of Gödel. (shrink)

This chapter lays out what we take to be the main types of justice and ethical challenges concerning those adverse effects of climate change leading to climate-related Loss and Damage (L&D). We argue that it is essential to clearly differentiate between the challenges concerning mitigation and adaptation and those ethical issues exclusively relevant for L&D in order to address the ethical aspects pertaining to L&D in international climate policy. First, we show that depending on how mitigation and adaptation are distinguished (...) from L&D, the primary focus of policy measures and their ethical implications will vary. Second, we distinguish between a distributive justice framework and a compensatory justice scheme for delivering L&D measures. Third, in order to understand the differentiated remedial responsibilities concerning L&D, we categorise the measures and policy approaches available. Fourth, depending on the kind of L&D and which remedies are possible, we explain the difference between remedial and outcome responsibilities of different actors. [Open access]. (shrink)