Aristotle connects modality and time in ways strange and perplexing to modern readers. In this book the author proposes a new solution to this exegetical problem. Although primarily expository, this work explores topics of central concern for current investigations into causality, time, and change.

Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.

An investigation into Aristotle's metaphysics of nature as expounded in the Physics. It focuses in particular his conception of change, a concept which is shown to possess a unique metaphysical structure, with implications that should engage the attention of contemporary analysis. First published in hardback in 1982, the book is now available for the first time in paperback. 'A powerful and appealing explanatory scheme which succeeds on the whole in drawing together a great many seemingly disparate elements in the Physics (...) into a neat unitary stucture.' Canadian Philosophical Review. (shrink)

Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of..

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

The concept of "nature as inner principle of change" is fundamental to Aristotle's theory of the physical world; it is the object of the present thesis to substantiate this claim by tracing the effects of this idea in Aristotle's rejection of materialism, in his doctrine of "natural places", in his definition of change and process in general, and in his notion of agency in general and the supreme Unmoved Mover in particular ). Aristotle elucidates "natural" by. contrast with "artificial" - (...) ), holding that natural substances not merely collectively - ) but as individuals each possess an 'innate impulse of change'. But this must be explained so as to allow for the fact that no change is entirely independent of external conditions - ). If, however, change were totally dependent on external conditions, its occurrence would be inexplicable - ), and the very concept of "change" would be incoherent. This latter conclusion emerges from an examination of the ancient paradox of becoming and Aristotle's treatment of it - ). The paradox is expounded -). Aristotle answers it by showing that language assumes a continuing subject of change - ). But this assumption meets the problem only if the metaphysical category of substance is also assumed, and along with it some distinction between substance-constitutive and non-substance-constitutive characteristics - ). The former mark off their subject as a thing of a certain causal type; thus change, in presupposing a substantial subject, presupposes one that makes some causal contribution to its own changes - ). But Aristotle means more than this by 'nature as inner principle'. He holds a natural substance to be the autonomous determinant of certain changes; these therefore are "natural", as manifesting the substantial nature - ). This problematic notion is taken for granted by Aristotle in the Vhys-ics - ), but can be seen to rest on his metaphysic of substance. It is a consequence of this that the natural change of a given substance be of one kind and display a unitary pattern reflecting the unity of the substance ). This view cripples scientific method as we understand it ), but Aristotle's idea of substance anyway cuts him off from the approaches successfully operated in later mechanics and chemistry - ). A summary of the ground so far covered ) introduces a further sense in which Aristotle's natures are "inner" principles of change: the subject of change is not external to the being which is the source of change - ). (shrink)