Resumo Neste artigo, vamos considerar o recente debate na metafísica da evolução, no que diz respeito tanto à persistência como à “mudança” em espécies biológicas, segundo a tese que considera a espécie como o agregado de indivíduos. Centrar-nos-emos na proposta de Thomas Reydon, que argumenta que em biologia, o termo “espécie” refere-se a duas entidades biológicas, por si denominadas evolverons e phylons, que desempenham vários papéis epistemológicos em pelo menos duas disciplinas diferentes, nomeadamente na biologia sistemática e na biologia evolutiva. (...) Em particular, analisamos criticamente a alegação de Reydon, que estas duas entidades biológicas geraram um problema para a tese que sustém a equivalência entre duas teorias de persistência, desenvolvidas pela metafísica analítica contemporânea: o tri–Dimensionalismo e tetra–Dimensionalismo. Neste artigo, pretende-se restaurar a tese da equivalência metafísica, recorrendo a uma tripla estratégia: promover a ideia de que os evolverons e os “phylons” são duas dimensões de uma mesma realidade; recorrer a uma noção menos problemática noção de endurantismo e, por último, destacar alguns problemas que surgem dos exemplos biológicos empregues por Reydon para basear o desenvolvimento dos seus argumentos. Palavras-chave : conceito de espécie, endurantismo, equivalência metafísica entre 3D e 4D, espécies biológicas sincrónicas e diacrónicas, persistênciaIn this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the species-as-individuals thesis. We focus on Thomas Reydon’s proposal that, in biology, the term “species” refers to two different biological entities, which he calls evolverons and phylons, and plays different epistemological roles in at least two different disciplines in which it is used, namely, evolutionary and systematic biology. In particular, we critically revise Reydon’s claim that these two biological entities raise a problem for the thesis of the equivalence between the two theories of persistence developed in contemporary analytic metaphysics: three–dimensionalism and four–dimensionalism. In this paper, we aim to reinstate the thesis of metaphysical equivalence by a threefold strategy: motivation of the idea that evolverons and phylons are two dimensions of the same entity, shifting to a less problematic notion of endurance, and an exploration of doubts about the particular biological examples upon which Reydon bases his arguments. Keywords : 3D / 4D metaphysical equivalence, endurantism, persistence, species concept, synchronic and diachronic biological species. (shrink)

History of Logic and Semantics offers a collection of studies on the development of the Aristotelian and terminist approaches to language, from the Boethian reception of Aristotle to the post-medieval terminism. These articles were also published in Vivarium, Volume 53, Nos. 2-4.

Abstract This paper discusses some recent work on the notion of possibility in Wittgenstein's Tractatus assessed by means of an interpretation of the notion put forward in Cerezo 2005. It argues that the proper way to understand the notion of possibility in the Tractatus must pay equal attention both to the picture theory and the truth-functions theory. From this perspective, through an examination of Peach's proposal (2007) it shows that the role played by the notion of logical space in (...) the determination of sense needs to be emphasized. In addition, the paper considers some consequences of the Tractarian notion of possibility, namely, the strong contingency of the world that it involves, which is revealed by the thinkability of logical space as empty envisaged by Wittgenstein in T 2.013, and also discusses the recent debate between Reinhardt (2005) and Geach (2006) on this issue. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI revise Zalabardo’s solution to the Tractarian problem of unity and raise some difficulties concerning the notion of logical instantiation, his understanding of the notion of expression (A...

Causal dispositionalism developed in metaphysics of science offers a useful tool to conceptualize shallow causes in behaviour genetics, in a way such that (a) it accounts for complex aetiology and heterogeneity of effects, and (b) genetic causal contribution can be considered to be explanatory. Genes are thus causal powers that make a difference.

The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...) The motivation for this research is also very specific. We are interested in the apparent violation of Bivalence introduced by vague predicates, and in particular we want to respond to a family of arguments put forward by T. Williamson in support of the idea that allowing for exceptions to Bivalence would be incoherent. We have focused on these arguments for two reasons. On the one hand, what is allegedly threatened by a denial of Bivalence is no less than the very “nature of truth or falsity”. On the other hand, Aristotle is explicitly mentioned as one of the defendants of this “natural” conception of truth, and we are reminded about the connection between Aristotle’s theory and Tarski’s semantic conception. These arguments, therefore, give us an occasion to explore Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of truth and falsity, and to examine its connection with the Tarskian conception of truth. In particular, we would like to question the assumption, which has become a commonplace in the field of analytical philosophy, that Aristotle’s notion of truth can be encoded in the pair of disquotational biconditionals that derive from Tarski’s “T schema”. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 194 - 220 This paper offers an interpretation of Anselm of Canterbury’s semantic doctrines in _De Grammatico_, paying special attention to five distinctions present in the dialogue: _dicitur in eo quod quale/dicitur in eo quod quid, esse ut in subiecto/esse non ut in subiecto, significare/appellare, significare ut unum/significare non ut unum_ and _significare per se/significare per aliud_. It elucidates the theoretical role of these distinctions, showing that they are introduced with different purposes and (...) that conflation between them must be avoided. Three specific features of this interpretation are the following: an analysis of the distinction between _significare_ and _appellare_ in relation to the orders of intellection and predication, an account of the difference between predication _in eo quod quid/in eo quod quale_ and essential and accidental predication, and an analysis of the thesis that ‘_grammaticus_’ not only signifies _per se qualitas_, but also _per se habere_. (shrink)

This paper examines the analysis of judgements of belief that Wittgenstein offers in 5.54–5.5423 of the Tractatus. We offer an interpretation of these paragraphs wich also pays attention to 5.5423, usually forgotten. In our opinion, this interpretation fits with Wittgenstein’s doctrines, and makes clear that such non-genuine propositions are nonsense. These are not, as has sometimes been proposed, the propositions of psychology. In the second part of the article we give a detailed discussion of interpretations of these paragraphs which have (...) been offered previously. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop some reflections on the interpretation of the notion of Sachverhalt in the Tractatus, with a view to show the complexity of the tractarian view and to point out some tensions. I intend to elucidate this notion in the context of its relation to the notions of Tatsache and Sachlage, and in its relation to the two main theories of the Tractatus, the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. I hope that this elucidation sheds some light (...) on a possible comparison between Wittgenstein's and Husserl's views and I point out some suggestions in this sense in the last part of the paper. (shrink)

Raymond Bradley ha ofrecido una interpretacion esencialista de la ontologia deI Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein (R. Bradley, The Nature of All Being, 1992), en la que pretende desarrollar las dimensiones modales que en su opinión estan implícitas en el Tractatus. EI proposito de este trabajo es revisar la interpretación bradleyana de los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, examinando la noción tractariana de nombre y la kripkeana de designador rigido en Naming and Necessity, con un doble objetivo: contestar a la (...) cuestión de si es posible interpretar los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, y alumbrar algunas semejanzas y diferencias entre ambas teorias deI significado.Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logicophilosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley’s interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of name and the kripkeanconcept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and diffirences between the two theories of meaning. (shrink)

Raymond Bradley ha ofrecido una interpretacion esencialista de la ontologia deI Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein, en la que pretende desarrollar las dimensiones modales que en su opinión estan implícitas en el Tractatus. EI proposito de este trabajo es revisar la interpretación bradleyana de los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, examinando la noción tractariana de nombre y la kripkeana de designador rigido en Naming and Necessity, con un doble objetivo: contestar a la cuestión de si es posible interpretar los nombres (...) tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, y alumbrar algunas semejanzas y diferencias entre ambas teorias deI significado.Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logicophilosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley’s interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of name and the kripkeanconcept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and diffirences between the two theories of meaning. (shrink)

Raymond Bradley has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and aims to develop the model dimension that is implicit therein. Among other theses, Bradley maintains that tractarian names can be interpreted as Kripkean rigid designators; this idea enables him to approach the Tractus from the perspective of possible worlds semantics. I reassess Bradley's thesis by examining the tractarian notion of name and the Kripkean concept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, and consider whether (...) an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible. I also discuss similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning. (shrink)

I discuss the interest-relative account of vagueness and argue for a distinction between relational vague predicates and non-relational vague predicates depending on the kind of properties expressed by them. The strategy rests on three arguments arising from the existence of clear cases of a vague predicate, from contexts in which a different answer is required for questions about whether a vague predicate applies to an item, and whether such an item satisfies the interest of an agent, and from cases where (...) an object changes up to the point of becoming P, where P is a vague predicate. In the second part of the paper, I distinguish between relational properties and non-relational properties, and I argue for the view that some vague predicates can express non-relational properties, comparative relational properties and interest-relative properties. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that vagueness cannot be reduced to interest-relativity. (shrink)

This paper examines the analysis of judgements of belief that Wittgenstein offers in 5.54-5.5423 of the Tractatus. We offer an interpretation of these paragraphs wich also pays attention to 5.5423, usually forgotten. In our opinion, this interpretation fits with Wittgenstein's doctrines, and makes clear that such non-genuine propositions are nonsense. These are not, as has sometimes been proposed, the propositions of psychology. In the second part of the article we give a detailed discussion of interpretations of these paragraphs which have (...) been offered previously. (shrink)

The Post-genomic Era includes features both from a methodological and epistemic point of view and from an ontological perspective. Firstly, it incorporates new methods of high-throughput sequencing of DNA and RNA, and the development of complete genomes that allow a precise reference of the molecular results obtained. In addition, from an ontological perspective, the centre of gravity of the molecular processes is placed on the expression of genes, and the way in which such expression is regulated; these features turn the (...) attention towards the study of Gene Regulatory Networks, and in particular to the role of RNA. This new molecular-biological perspective based on new methodologies and approaches is affecting the existing Molecular Genetics Theory including the definition of gen and Central Dogma of Molecular Biology. An important philosophical challenges posed by this new situation is the question whether there is a sophistication of the present theory or a New Theory of Molecular Genetics and whether there is an incommensurability between this theory and the accepted theory. In this work we evaluate these changes in the light of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution in order to propose an alternative between a moderate and a strong view. According to the moderate one, the Post-genomic changes do not properly involve a paradigm shift or, if they do, they constitute a minor revolution. The strong view considers that, the anomalies disclosed in the Molecular Genetics Theory at conceptual and methodological level and the Post-genomic changes they lead to suppose a scientific paradigm shift. (shrink)

In this volume, María Cerezo examines Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as a response to some of Frege's and Russel's logical problems. In analyzing the tractarian conditions for the possibility of language, she explains the two main theories of the proposition in Tractatus : the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. Cerezo shows that Wittgenstein initially separates the account of the structure of a proposition from the explanation of its expression. However, contrary to his intention, the combination of these (...) theories creates new difficulties, since the requirements of each theory cannot be fully respected by the others. Cerezo also argues that Wittgenstein's theory of language cannot be fully understood unless attention is paid to his theory of expression and his doctrine of projection by the metaphysical subject. (shrink)

La Guerra Civil fue una experiencia decisiva en la evolución del pensamiento de María Zambrano. Entendida y vivida como una tragedia cuyo sujeto es el pueblo, personificación de lo más elemental de la condición humana en su lucha contra el fascismo, esa experiencia abolió cualquier razón en clave idealista y reductora de la vida. En su lugar y en diálogo íntimo con la poesía de Antonio Machado, Zambrano elaborará una razón amorosa que retoma su reflexión anterior a la guerra (...) y la proyecta hacia una razón poética que, ya en el exilio y ante la imposibilidad de una redención de la tragedia, tendrá que orientarse hacia una interioridad radical. (shrink)

Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature? Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to social (...) misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)

"Dr. Montessori was par excellence the great interpreter of the child; and though she herself has passed on from the scene of her labours her work will still go on."-- Westminster Cathedral Chronicle One of the landmark books in the history of education--and one of the least expensive editions now available--this volume describes a new system for educating youngsters. Based on a radical concept of liberty for the pupil and highly formal training of separate sensory, motor, and mental capacities, the (...) system enabled youngsters to master reading, writing, and arithmetic rapidly and substantially. Included are discussions of scientific pedagogy; discipline; the importance of proper diet, gymnastics, and manual labor; and many other topics. Unabridged reprint of the classic 1912 edition. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to conduct a critical approach to the concept and traditional measurement of scientific culture on the basis of an analysis of the phenomenon of the social appropriation of the science, assuming a multidimensional outlook sensitive to its contextual and behavioural dimensions. The analysis will be carried out along with a revision of some statistical results coming from a recent opinion survey about public perception of science and technology in Spain.