Gary Kemp: Quine's Relationship with Analytic Philosophy: I try to explain why Quine, for all his fame amongst analytic philosophers, has so few explicit followers within analytic philosophy of the past fifty years – despite the fact that naturalism, at least as broadly conceived, is so popular. Partly it's because Quine's particular version of naturalism is so demanding, partly it's because the nature and seriousness of his commitment to extensionalism are not well recognized, and partly because his views were formulated (...) from an extremely general and abstract point of view in the philosophy of science. I focus on the second and especially on the third. Quine is more radical and more alien than is customarily appreciated. (shrink)

This book presents a series of case studies and reflections on the historiographical assumptions, methods, and approaches that shape the way in which philosophers construct their own past. The chapters in the volume advance discussion of the methods of historians of philosophy, while at the same time illustrating the various ways in which philosophical canons come into existence, debunking the myth of analytical philosophy's ahistoricism, and providing a deeper understanding of the roles historiographical devices play in philosophical thought. More importantly, (...) the contributors attempt to understand history of philosophy in connection with other historical and historiographical approaches: contributors engage classical history of science, sociology of knowledge, history of psychology and historiography, in dialogue with historiographical practices in philosophy more narrowly construed. Additionally, select chapters adopt a more diverse perspective, by making place for non-Western approaches and for efforts to construe new philosophical narratives that do justice to the voice of women across the centuries. Historiography and the Formation of Philosophical Canons will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in history of philosophy, meta-philosophy, philosophy of history, historiography, intellectual history, and sociology of knowledge. (shrink)

Between the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 and Husserl’s Ideas in 1913, the nineteenth century was a pivotal period in the philosophy of mind, witnessing the emergence of the phenomenological and analytical traditions that continue to shape philosophical debate in fundamental ways. The nineteenth century also challenged many prevailing assumptions about the transparency of the mind, particularly in the ideas of Nietzsche and Freud, whilst at the same time witnessing the birth of modern psychology in the (...) work of William James. -/- Covering the main figures of German idealism to the birth of the phenomenological movement under Brentano and Husserl, Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century provides an outstanding survey to these new directions in philosophy of mind. -/- Following an introduction by Sandra Lapointe, fourteen specially commissioned chapters by an international team of contributors discuss key topics, thinkers, and debates, including: -/- German idealism, Bolzano, Johann Friedrich Herbart, Ernst Mach, Helmholtz, Nietzsche, William James, Sigmund Freud, Brentano’s early philosophy of mind, Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Husserl, and Natorp. -/- Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, continental philosophy, and the history of philosophy, Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century is also a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology, religion, and literature. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy is once again in a methodological frame of mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in metaphysics, whose practitioners and historians are actively reflecting on the nature of ontological questions, the status of their answers, and the relevance of contributions both from other areas within philosophy and beyond. Such reflections are hardly new: the debate between Willard van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap about how to understand and resolve ontological questions is widely seen as a turning point in (...) twentieth-century analytic philosophy. And indeed, this volume is occasioned by the fact that the deflationary approach to metaphysics advocated by Carnap in that debate is once again attracting considerable interest and support. Eleven original essays by many of today's leading voices in metametaphysics aim to deepen our understanding of Carnap's contributions to metaontology and to explore how this legacy might be mined for insights into the contemporary debate. (shrink)

The scope and method of logic as we know it today eminently reflect the ground-breaking developments of set theory and the logical foundations of mathematics at the turn of the 20th century. Unfortunately, little effort has been made to understand the idiosyncrasies of the philosophical context that led to these tremendous innovations in the 19thcentury beyond what is found in the works of mathematicians such as Frege, Hilbert, and Russell. This constitutes a monumental gap in our understanding of the central (...) influences that shaped 19th-century thought, from Kant to Russell, and that helped to create the conditions in which analytic philosophy could emerge. -/- The aim of Logic from Kant to Russell is to document the development of logic in the works of 19th-century philosophers. It contains thirteen original essays written by authors from a broad range of backgrounds—intellectual historians, historians of idealism, philosophers of science, and historians of logic and analytic philosophy. These essays question the standard narratives of analytic philosophy’s past and address concerns that are relevant to the contemporary philosophical study of language, mind, and cognition. The book covers a broad range of influential thinkers in 19th-century philosophy and analytic philosophy, including Kant, Bolzano, Hegel, Herbart, Lotze, the British Algebraists and Idealists, Moore, Russell, the Neo-Kantians, and Frege. (shrink)

This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano's views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions in a deductive system. I go (...) into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano's views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano's theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account oï a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano's antagonistic relationship to Kant directly shaped his own views. (shrink)

Les études colligées dans le présent ouvrage ont pour objet les Recherches logiques de Edmund Husserl. La plupart de ces études sont issues du colloque "Les Recherches logiques d'Edmund Husserl, origines et postérité de la phénoménologie (1900/1)" qui a eu lieu à Montréal au mois de mai 2001. Le prétexte à cet événement était de marquer le centenaire de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie par une réflexion sur sa signification actuelle, ses origines et sa postérité. L'ouvrage contient (...) douze études qui examinent divers aspects des Recherches logiques de Husserl. (shrink)

Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call "subjective consequence", i.e., the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and "objective consequence", i.e., grounding however allows for an interpretation according to which Bolzano advocates an "explicativist" conception of proof: proofs par excellence are those that reflect the (...) objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of demonstration. (shrink)

This volume portrays the Polish or Lvov-Warsaw School, one of the most influential schools in analytic philosophy, which, as discussed in the thorough introduction, presented an alternative working picture of the unity of science.

Kant -- Decomposition -- Meaning and analysis -- A substitutional theory -- Analyticity -- Consequence -- Justification and proof -- A priori knowledge -- Things, collections and numbers -- Frege -- Husserl, logical psychologism, and the theory of knowledge.

In the course of the last few decades, Bolzano has emerged as an important player in accounts of the history of philosophy. This should be no surprise. Few authors stand at a more central junction in the development of modern thought. Bolzano's contributions to logic and the theory of knowledge alone straddle three of the most important philosophical traditions of the 19th and 20th centuries: the Kantian school, the early phenomenological movement and what has come to be known as analytical (...) philosophy. This paper identifies three Bolzanian theoretical innovations that warrant his inclusion in the analytical tradition: the commitment to ‘logical realism’, the adoption of a substitutional procedure for the purpose of defining logical properties and a new theory of a priori cognition that presents itself as an alternative to Kant's. All three innovations concur to deliver what counts as the most important development of logic and its philosophy between Aristotle and Frege. In the final part of the paper, I defend Bolzano against a common objection and explain that these theoretical innovations are also supported by views on syntax, which though marginal are both workable and philosophically interesting. (shrink)

S. Lapointe s'interroge sur l'analyse logique, sur les différents procédés d'analyse qui en découlent et sur l'importance que l'on doit y accorder en philosophie. Avec des textes de B. Bolzano et E. Kant.

Jusqu'à maintenant, il semble qu'on n'ait pas établi de lien entre le rejet par Bolzano de la notation quantificationnelle des propositions universelles de la logique traditionnelle et l'articulation inédite de sa notion de validité universelle. C'est ce que je veux faire ici. En particulier, dans la mesure où l'analyticité est un cas spécial de la validité universelle, j'ai l'intention de défendre l'idée qui veut que la notion bolzanienne d'analyticité cherche à résoudre des problèmes qui sont intrinsèquement liés à la théorie (...) traditionnelle de la quantification universelle tels qu'ils surviennent, notamment avec le traitement kantien de l'analyticité. It seems that the connection between Bolzano's rejection of the traditional quantificational notation for universal propositions and the articulation of his notion of universal validity has remained, until today, perfectly unnoticed. In this paper, I will show that there is such a connection. Particularly, since analyticity is a special case of universal validity, my intention is to show that the problems to which Bolzano's perfectly original account of analyticity seeks to find an answer are intrinsically related to the traditional conception of universal quantification as it arises in the context of Kant's treatment of analyticity. (shrink)

Themenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & Kant Gastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra Lapointe Sandra Lapointe: Introduction Sandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians Nicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions Waldemar Rohloff: From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano Weitere Artikel/Further Articles Christian Damböck: (...) Wilhelm Diltheys empirische Philosophie und der rezente Methodenstreit in der analytischen Philosophie Bernd Prien: Socially Constituted Actions and Objects Daniel Enrique Kalpokas: Two Dogmas of Coherentism Jon Cogburn & Jeff W. Roland: Strong, therefore Sensitive. Misgivings about DeRose’s Contextualism Andre Abath: Brewer’s Switching Argument Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Amadeus Magrabi: The Value of Feelings for Decision-Making Stefan Reining: Do Pain-Accompanying Emotions Mislead Us?—Considerations in the Light of Reactive Dissociation Phenomena Peter Königs: Patriotism. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Emotions Besprechungsaufsatz/Review Essay Christopher Gauker: What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge’s Theory of Perception Diskussion/Discussion Georg Brun: Adequate Formalization and De Morgan’s Argument Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

Bolzano fut le premier philosophe à établir une distinction explicite entre les procédés déductifs qui nous permettent de parvenir à la certitude d’une vérité et ceux qui fournissent son fondement objectif. La conception que Bolzano se fait du rapport entre ce que nous appelons ici, d’une part, « conséquence subjective », à savoir la relation de raison à conséquence épistémique et, d’autre part, la « conséquence objective », c’est-à-dire la fondation , suggère toutefois que Bolzano défendait une conception « explicativiste (...) » de la preuve : les preuves par excellence sont celles qui reflètent l’ordre de la fondation objective. Dans cet article nous faisons état des problèmes liés à une telle conception et argumentons en faveur d’une démarcation plus stricte entre la préoccupation ontologique et la préoccupation épistémologique dans l’élaboration d’une théorie de la preuve.Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call “subjective consequence”, i.e. the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and “objective consequence”, i.e. grounding however suggests that Bolzano advocated an “explicativist” conception of proof : proofs par excellence are those that reflect the objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of proof. (shrink)

In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately conflates the two notions. I argue further that Kant's views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assumptions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in (...) his successors. In the second part of the paper I focus on Bolzano's criticism of the Kantian position and his redefinition of the notion of form. I argue that while what contemporary, post-Tarskian philosophers generally understand as the formality of logic ought to be traced back to Bolzano there are also important differences between the two positions. (shrink)

This book offers new perspectives on the history of analytical philosophy, surveying recent scholarship on the philosophical study of mind, language, logic and reality over the course of the last 200 years. Each chapter contributes to a broader engagement with a wider range of figures, topics and disciplines outside of philosophy than has been traditionally associated with the history of analytical philosophy. The book acquaints readers with new aspects of analytical philosophy’s revolutionary past while engaging in a much needed methodological (...) reflection. It questions the meaning associated with talk of 'analytic' philosophy and offers new perspective on its development. It offers original studies on a range of topics – including in the philosophy of language and mind, logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics – and figures whose relevance, when they is not already established as in the case of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, are just now beginning to become the topic of mainstream literature: Franz Brentano, William James, Susan Langer as well as the German and British logicians of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

RusnockPaul* * and ŠebestíkJan. _ Bernard Bolzano: His Life and His Work. _Oxford University Press,2019. Pp. xxxiii + 667. ISBN: 978-0-19-882368-1 ; 978-0-19-255683-7 ; 978-0-19-255684-4. doi.org/ 10.1093/oso/9780198823681.001.0001.

Philosophy and the Historical Perspective contains fourteen chapters, each of which is an attempt to enrich our conception of the relationship of analytical philosophy to history. Some chapters seek insight from the philosophical canon: Robert Pippin offers an insightful discussion of Hegel's historiographical methodology, and Brian Leiter presents aspects of Nietzsche's. Many of the chapters set research agendas that would deserve entire volumes. For instance, van Ackeren asks whether there are transhistorical philosophical problems, and Thomas Grundmann what philosophical progress looks (...) like. Christof Rapp casts doubt on the idea that hard-core... (shrink)

_Themes from Ontology, Mind and Logic_ is a tribute to Peter Simons’s formidable contribution to contemporary philosophy. With themes ranging from metaphysics to phenomenology, it offers insights into some of today’s most significant philosophical questions.

Finally available in English, Príhonský's New Anti-Kant is an inescapable book for anyone interested in Kant's Critical philosophy. It provides a concise and systematic recapitulation of Bolzano's insightful, trenchant criticisms of Kant, and provides a fresh window into historical developments in 19th century post-Kantian philosophy.

Dans La crise des sciences européennes Husserl entreprenait de démontrer les causes de l’échec de ce qu’il appelle d’une manière générale «l’objectivisme physicaliste» de manière à établir les avantages de la méthode phénoménologique. L’expédient qu’il choisissait à cet effet consistait en une «méditation historique et critique». Pour le profane, le produit est plus ou moins convaincant: les réflexions de Husserl demeurent pour la plupart superficielles et n’ont d’historiques à vrai dire que le fait que les philosophes dont il est question (...) appartiennent au passé. Avec Husserl et la philosophie analytique, Richard Cobb-Stevens reprend tacitement le programme de la Krisis, mais cette fois selon la perspective d’un interprète ayant une solide connaissance tant de l’œuvre de Husserl que des problématiques et des textes appartenant à la plus récente incarnation du «positivisme»: la tradition logico-analytique. Il s’agit de la traduction de Husserl and Analytical Philosophy publié chez Kluwer en 1990. (shrink)

L'une des doctrines traditionnelles qui a le plus stimulé les deux premières générations de philosophes analytiques est l'idée kantienne d'une distinction entre jugements analytiques et synthétiques. À cet égard, l'ardeur philosophique fut d'ailleurs si grande que dès le début des années cinquante on était parvenu au constat qu'elle ne survivrait pas au XXe siècle. Ce fut d'abord la notion de jugement synthétique a priori qui tomba sous la critique que lui adressaient les membres du Cercle de Vienne. Quelques années plus (...) tard, Quine s'attaquait à la dichotomie entre jugements analytiques et synthétiques avec le résultat que la distinction elle-même se vit chassée du champ de la sémantique et de l'épistémologie. Or, contre toute apparence, la question ne semble pas être définitivement réglée. L'objectif premier de Jocelyn Benoist dans son livre L'a priori conceptuel consiste à explorer la possibilité de réhabiliter une certaine notion de synthèse a priori. Cette notion proviendrait d'une lecture bolzanienne de la conception husserlienne de l'a priori matériel, c'est-à-dire d'une lecture faite à la lumière de la théorie des «propositions conceptuelles pures» que présente Bernard Bolzano dans sa Théorie de la science. (shrink)

Les Archives-Husserl de Louvain en Belgique furent fondées en 1939, un an après la mort de Husserl, à la suite du sauvetage spectaculaire des quelque 40000pages de manuscrits qu’avait laissées derrière lui le fondateur de la phénoménologie. Ces manuscrits de recherche, ébauches d’articles, fragments inédits, notes de cours,etc. sont rédigés dans la variante développée par Husserl d’un code sténographique, le Gabelsberger, frappé d’obsolescence après la Première Guerre mondiale, et le travail d’édition des œuvres complètes de Husserl dans la collection Husserliana—chez (...) Nijhoff jusqu’en 1988 et depuis chez Kluwer—constitue, pour les raisons qu’on imagine facilement, une entreprise laborieuse et de longue haleine. La nouvelle collection Husserliana Materialien a, semble-t-il, été conçue au début du nouveau millénaire en vue d’accélérer le processus par lequel les écrits de Husserl sont rendus accessibles au public philosophique. Cette décision est d’autant plus opportune qu’après plus d’un demi-siècle d’activité, les Archives-Husserl n’ont pas encore atteint l’objectif visé et ce bien qu’on ne prévoie publier qu’un cinquième environ du matériau dont on dispose. Il y a bien sûr un prix à payer, car les Materialien obéissent à une politique éditoriale simplifiée. L’introduction de l’éditeur ne s’aventure point, contrairement à ce qui est le cas dans les Husserliana, au-delà d’une description de l’agencement, de la condition et de la petite histoire des feuillets réunis. On doit, comme c’est au demeurant aussi fâcheusement le cas dans les Husserliana, renoncer entièrement à l’index rerum et, dans le cas qui nous intéresse ici, se contenter d’un index des noms propres, malheureusement incomplet. Mais la différence essentielle consiste toutefois en ceci que les Materialien ne contiennent pas les remarques éditoriales exhaustives qu’on retrouve dans les Husserliana. Les remarques critiques se limitent à des notes de bas de pages qui ont pour but de rendre compte des modifications jugées les plus importantes—Husserl retravaillait souvent plusieurs fois un même manuscrit—et des références textuelles. L’exégète scrupuleux se retrouve donc à la merci de l’éditeur et peut-être aura-t-il raison de penser qu’il y perd au change. (shrink)