Taking as its point of departure a reflection on Abel Gance’s 1919 film J’accuse!, and drawing on George Bataille’s theory of sacrifice, as well as the work of the cultural historian Jay Winter, this paper argues that one of the legacies of the First World War in intellectual and cultural history is a deep skepticism regarding the relation between war and sacrifice. This skepticism, which has its roots in the struggle with the meaning of the war during the years 1914-1918, (...) retains its resonance today, however enduring and even inevitable its evocation may otherwise be in our understanding of the Great War and the conflicts endemic to European and world history since. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 25-41, January 2022.

This thorough study offers a lucid analysis of Czech philosopher Jan Patočka's thought, from the influences on his phenomenology to the impact of his politics. The book provides a nuanced grounding for current and future Patočka scholars.

Following up on his previous book, _Violence and Phenomenology_, James Dodd presents here an expanded and deepened reflection on the problem of violence. The book’s six essays are guided by a skeptical philosophical attitude about the meaning of violence that refuses to conform to the exigencies of essence and the stable patterns of lived experience. Each essay tracks a discoverable, sometimes familiar figure of violence, while at the same time questioning its limits and revealing sites of its resistance (...) to conceptualization. Dodd’s essays are readings as much as they are reflections; attempts at interpretation as much as they are attempts to push concepts of violence to their limits. They draw upon a range of different authors—Sartre, Levinas, Schelling, Scheler, and Husserl—and historical moments, but without any attempt to reduce them into a series of examples elucidating a comprehensive theory. The aim is to follow a path of distinctively episodic and provisional modes of thinking and reflection that offers a potential glimpse at how violence can be understood. (shrink)

This book pursues the problem of whether violence can be understood to be constitutive of its own sense or meaning, as opposed to being merely instrumental. Dodd draws on the resources of phenomenological philosophy, and takes the form of a series of dialogues between figures both inside and outside of this tradition. The central figures considered include Carl von Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernst Jünger, and Martin Heidegger, and the study concludes with an analysis of the (...) philosophy of Jan Patocka. (shrink)

This book pursues the problem of whether violence can be understood to be constitutive of its own sense or meaning, as opposed to being merely instrumental. Dodd draws on the resources of phenomenological philosophy, and takes the form of a series of dialogues between figures both inside and outside of this tradition. The central figures considered include Carl von Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernst Jünger, and Martin Heidegger, and the study concludes with an analysis of the (...) philosophy of Jan Patocka. (shrink)

In his reflections on inner time consciousness written in the years 1917–1918, Husserl makes use of an illustrative device he apparently developed in fits and starts between 1905–1911 2: the so-called “time-diagram.” It proves to be an important instrument for several of the texts published in Husserliana XXXIII, in particular Text Nr. 2: “Die Komplexion von Retention und Protention. Gradualitäten der Erfüllung und das Bewusstsein der Gegenwart. Graphische Darstellung des Urprozesses”. More, the diagram appears in these texts in a much (...) more refined and complete manner than anything found in Husserliana X, which in turn allows us to sharpen a number of questions that had already arisen with original 1928 publication of Husserl’s 1905 Zeitvorlesungen. (shrink)

This essay argues that the problem of the body is of central importance for Husserl's transcendental idealism.

This paper outlines an approach for comparing Edmund Husserl’s late historical-teleological reflections in the Crisis of the European Sciences with Michel Foucault’s archaeology of discursive formations in his Archaeology of Knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the notion of an “historical apriori.” The argument is that each conception of historical reflection complements the other by opening up a depth dimension that moves beyond the traditional limits of the philosophy of history. In Husserl, the concept of the lifeworld fixes the parameters (...) of a “deep history” as the horizon of anonymous subjective comportment, while in Foucault the concept of the archive delimits an alternative deep history of the anonymous production of discursive formations. Together, Husserl and Foucault represent two important moments of the radicalization of the theme of history in twentieth century philosophy, one seeking to extend the limits of transcendental philosophy, the other contesting the domain of the transcendental altogether. (shrink)

Husserl's idea of a self-enclosed region of pure consciousness, a transcendental subjectivity that is at once absolute being and a sense-giving synthesis of experience, has enjoyed few, if any, enthusiastic defenders. In a recent book on Husserl, David Bell struggles in vain to find anything of worth in Husserl's "transcendental ontology. ''1 To be sure, Bell is reading Husserl with Fregean eyes; yet much dissatisfaction can be found among continental thinkers as well. Jacques Derrida, for example, argues that the self-presence (...) requisite for conceiving of transcendental subjectivity as both origin and absolute being is in the end undermined by the results of phenomenological analysis itself, especially the reflections on the nature of time. Jan Pato~ka, the Czech philosopher, railed against what he saw to be Husserl's "prejudice" of subjectivism in the demand for a world-constituting activity on the part of subjectivity. One can find similar objections in the work of Roman Ingarden and Jean-Paul Sartre - that is, in the work of those who, one could say, benefited the most from Husserl's phenomenology. 2 So many have said so much, and in a multitude of convincing ways, that perhaps someone interested in Husserl can finally be content to focus on those aspects and achievements that are more or less independent of the claim that phenomenology is a "transcendental idealism," a rigorous science the region of investigation of which is an "absolutely functioning transcendental subjectivity.". (shrink)

ANYONE WHO DECIDES TO VENTURE FORTH AN ARGUMENT for the philosophical importance of hope owes a debt to Ernst Bloch. His seminal The Principle of Hope is a remarkable attempt to situate the theme of hope at the very center of the philosophical enterprise. Yet, The Principle of Hope is cited here only in order to mark the distance that separates the inquiry presented below from the strategy and, to some extent, the purpose of Bloch’s work. A basic conviction of (...) Bloch’s, however, will be affirmed here: the belief that hope represents a store of raw resources both for philosophical reflection and, above all, for life itself. For Bloch, these resources were ultimately political; their discovery makes possible for humans an experience of the primordial emergence of the future, that germinating presence of concrete possibility in subjective life that takes the form of what Bloch called the “not-yet-conscious.” Bloch’s purpose was to argue that political action can find a renewed inspiration and force in such subjective resources, and that the role of philosophy was to facilitate the assimilation of these subjective resources for the purpose of a renewal of the Western world in the aftermath of the catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century. In what follows, however, the question of the resources of hope—their value, accessibility, and applicability—will be approached from a particular perspective, one in which the question of the political significance of hope will be left open, at least for the purposes of this study. Instead, the purpose will be to highlight the outlines of what I take to be its specifically philosophical significance, which can be brought to bear and established before the complicated tasks of a philosophically inspired politics are shouldered. Even so, again in homage to Bloch, that such tasks can and must be shouldered is not something that I wish to call into question. (shrink)

_Religion, War and the Crisis of Modernity: A Special Issue Dedicated to the Philosophy of Jan Patočka_ _The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Ivan Chvatík, Nicolas de Warren, James Dodd, Eddo Evink, Ludger Hagedorn, Jean-Luc Marion, Claire Perryman-Holt, Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Michael Staudigl, (...) Christian Sternad, and Ľubica Učník. (shrink)

Is something like a true "philosophy of war"—understood as a coherent system of ideas, or a clearly articulated theoretical posture adequate to fully addressing the enduring chal-lenges of war on a properly philosophical register—at all possible? What follows is an attempt to outline, in four problems, the parameters of any future critique of a philosophy of war: the problem of categories, the problem of representation, the problem of violence, and finally the problem of peace. It is argued that within each (...) horizon delimited by these four problems philosophy encounters a potential limit, one that raises fundamental doubts regarding the cogency of any philosophy of war considered as a systematic enterprise. (shrink)

This paper pursues a Kantian critique of Husserl’s theory of moral consciousness as it is found in his lectures on ethics and other shorter pieces on political and moral philosophy from the interwar period. The critique centers on Kant’s conception of moral personality, arguing that Husserl fails to appreciate the force of this idea, subsequently leaving himself open to the charge of moral perfectionism. The paper ends with a positive assessment of Husserl’s thought, however, arguing that Husserl provides important resources (...) for understanding moral consciousness as a sensibility for the possible, adding an important dimension to approaches in ethics that tend to center exclusively on questions of motivation and principle. (shrink)

'Inner Life and Transcendental Philosophy' explores the interconnection between two difficult and ambiguous concepts from Husserl's later writings: "inwardness" (Innerlichkeit) and "instreaming" (Einströmen). "Inwardness" for Husserl refers not to some closed off sanctum or subjective point of observation, but a developed sensitivity to the life and movement of concepts, one that can be cultivated as the result of phenomenological reflection. "Instreaming" refers to the effect, or influence that knowledge of the transcendental dimension of experience has on everyday, non-transcendental life thanks (...) to this cultivated inwardness. The argument of this paper is that Husserl's discussion of the place, significance, and impact of transcendental philosophy represents a nuancedand sophisticated assessment of our dependency on concepts, and a healthy appreciation of the limits of our ability to govern this dependency with the aid of philosophy, even'transcendental' philosophy. (shrink)

Quel est le chemin qui, chez Husserl, nous mène de la logique formelle à celle transcendantale? S’agit-il de la voie kantienne qui va de la “logique générale” à celle “transcendantale” ou le caractère mathématique de la logique moderne interdit que celle-ci puisse jouer le rôle de “fil conducteur transcendantal”? Dans cet article, à la lumière de ce que l’on pourrait appeler la réciprocité entre passivité et logique, on avance la thèse selon laquelle c’est justement la logique mathématique qui pour Husserl (...) peut jouer un tel rôle. Chez Husserl, il y a en effet aussi bien une logique de la passivité qu’une passivité de la logique : non seulement ce qui est passif est synthétique et, en tant que tel, formellement déterminé, mais la logique, en tant que corpus de connaissances, est à son tour saturée par une passivité qui en assure le sens et la validité en tant que logique. C’est au point de croisement entre les deux, où l’une gouverne la force constitutive de l’autre et vice-versa, que l’on peut trouver le fil conducteur d’une enquête sur la possibilité d’une logique transcendantale à partir d’une réflexion sur la logique mathématique formelle. (shrink)

Quel est le chemin qui, chez Husserl, nous mène de la logique formelle à celle transcendantale? S’agit-il de la voie kantienne qui va de la “logique générale” à celle “transcendantale” ou le caractère mathématique de la logique moderne interdit que celle-ci puisse jouer le rôle de “fil conducteur transcendantal”? Dans cet article, à la lumière de ce que l’on pourrait appeler la réciprocité entre passivité et logique, on avance la thèse selon laquelle c’est justement la logique mathématique qui pour Husserl (...) peut jouer un tel rôle. Chez Husserl, il y a en effet aussi bien une logique de la passivité qu’une passivité de la logique : non seulement ce qui est passif est synthétique et, en tant que tel, formellement déterminé, mais la logique, en tant que corpus de connaissances, est à son tour saturée par une passivité qui en assure le sens et la validité en tant que logique. C’est au point de croisement entre les deux, où l’une gouverne la force constitutive de l’autre et vice-versa, que l’on peut trouver le fil conducteur d’une enquête sur la possibilité d’une logique transcendantale à partir d’une réflexion sur la logique mathématique formelle. (shrink)

IN HIS System des transzendentalen Idealismus, Schelling describes the philosophy of art as the “key stone” of the entire “arch” of the system. The purpose of the following essay is to explore why this is so, why Schelling’s idea of philosophy led him to take up the question of “art” not only as philosophically interesting, but as the key to understanding his system as a whole.

_Phenomenology, Architecture and the Built World_ is an introduction to phenomenological philosophy through an analysis of the phenomenon of the built world as an embodiment of human understanding. It aims to establish the value of phenomenological description in establishing the philosophical importance of architecture.

This paper explores the theme of sacrifice as it appears in the writings of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka from the 1970s on the subjects of history, metaphysics, and techno-civilization. The paper argues that the theme of sacrifice is best understood as part of an engagement with the problem of post-metaphysical philosophy, largely inspired by but also directed against the position of Martin Heidegger. These reflections are also best understood in relation to totalitarian resistance, exemplified by the self-immolation of Jan (...) Palach in the wake of the Soviet invasion in 1968, which remains a constant, if unacknowledged presence in the background of these writings. The conception of sacrifice that emerges, in contrast to mythico-religious forms, breaks with a reliance on patterns of exchange and reward in favor of an expression of metaphysical freedom, and in turn provides the fulcrum for Patočka’s commentary on the possibility of a “demythologized” Christianity. (shrink)

The thesis of the dissertation is that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the human body are important in assessing the claim that phenomenology provides the basis for a "transcendental idealism". The central role of these analyses is to reconcile the sense of consciousness as a world-creating transcendental synthesis and as an empirical self: if successful, Husserl's idealism could boast a sensitivity to the empirical that would significantly augment its plausibility. ;The argument begins by setting up the problem vis-a-vis the experience of (...) the other person. The issue at hand is how the body of the other person expresses the presence of a consciousness. Yet the question that guides the analysis is: if "consciousness" means a world-creating, transcendental synthesis , then in what sense can we speak of an empirical consciousness that belongs to the world, thus of a person standing before us ? Part of the answer, it is asserted, lies in the expressive nature of a person's body: that is, the human body is a concrete thing in the world that yet expresses the sense of consciousness as world-creating, thereby providing for it a "worldly", empirical manifestation. ;The main part of the dissertation is a presentation of Husserl's analyses of the human body, which is described as a threefold unity of extension, materiality, and time. An understanding of each of these dimensions provides a piece of the puzzle as to how the body of the other is expressive of consciousness. ;The study ends with the problem of phenomenology as a transcendental idealism. The conclusion is that, for Husserl, consciousness is the condition for the manifestation of the "world" only as an empirical, bodily consciousness. I believe the tenability of this position can be demonstrated through Husserl's phenomenology of the human body, where the body is understood as a special mode of the expression of consciousness. For these analyses, taken as a whole, lend to his idealism a subtlety that significantly boosts both its plausibility and the force of its presentation. (shrink)

What are we to make of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion? It is perhaps most remarkable in the boldness with which it re-engages the classical phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger; this was already the case with Marion’s 1989 Réduction et donation, and remains the case with two texts that have appeared in English since Being Given, In Excess and Prolegomena to Charity. Being Given, which originally appeared in 1997 in French under the title Etant donné: Essai d’une phénoménologie de la (...) donation, is Marion’s most sustained attempt to carry forward the promise of the earlier Reduction and Givenness, namely to make the phenomenality of the phenomenon once again the central question of phenomenological philosophy. The attempt here is thus not to go beyond phenomenology, but to return to its original insights, its fundamental accomplishments, in order to discover again, in a new form, what had been the driving force at its inception. (shrink)

What are we to make of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion? It is perhaps most remarkable in the boldness with which it re-engages the classical phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger; this was already the case with Marion’s 1989 Réduction et donation, and remains the case with two texts that have appeared in English since Being Given, In Excess and Prolegomena to Charity. Being Given, which originally appeared in 1997 in French under the title Etant donné: Essai d’une phénoménologie de la (...) donation, is Marion’s most sustained attempt to carry forward the promise of the earlier Reduction and Givenness, namely to make the phenomenality of the phenomenon once again the central question of phenomenological philosophy. The attempt here is thus not to go beyond phenomenology, but to return to its original insights, its fundamental accomplishments, in order to discover again, in a new form, what had been the driving force at its inception. (shrink)