Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure representationalism fails to (...) offer a unified account of how representational content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and, second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure, underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference. (shrink)

Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the nonconceptual content extracted from (...) the environment correctly represents features of mind independent objects. With regard to the first condition, I have argued elsewhere that a part of visual processing, which I call “perception,” is theory-neutral and nonconceptual. In this paper, facing the second demand, I argue that a part of the nonconceptual content of perception presents properties that are the properties of mind independent objects. I claim first that nonconceptual content is the appropriate level of analysis of the issue of realism since it avoids the main problems besetting various types of analysis of the issue at the level of beliefs about the world. Then I claim that a subset of the nonconceptual content presents features of objects in the environment as they really are. (shrink)

I examine John Campbell’s claim that the determination of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative requires conscious visual object-based selective attention. I argue that although Campbell’s claim to the effect that, first, a complex binding parameter is needed to establish the referent of a perceptual demonstrative, and, second, that this referent is determined independently of, and before, the application of sortals is correct, this binding parameter does not require object-based attention for its construction. If object-based attention were indeed required then (...) the determination of the referent would necessarily involve the application of sortal concepts, since object-based attention initiates top-down cognitive effects on visual processing. I also examine Mohan Matthen’s claim that reference to objects is established only through the visual processing in the dorsal visual stream and argue that although it is true that processing in the dorsal stream can determine reference, a thesis that goes against Campbell’s view that the determination of the referent requires conscious attention, processing along the ventral visual stream can also establish the reference of perceptual demonstratives. It also claim that Matthen’s account of dorsal processing underestimates the kind of information processed along the dorsal stream and this has some implications regarding perceptual demonstratives reference fixing. (shrink)

Macpherson (2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, which holds that the phenomenal character of experience is either identical, or supervenes on, the nonconceptual content of experience (NCC). Her argument is that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the phenomenal experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond figure such differences in NCC do not explain the (...) gestalt switch. I examine Macpherson’s claims and argue that representationalism can account for the experience of ambiguous figures by explaining differences in the phenomenal content of experience by means of differences in the NCC of that same experience. The thrust of my argument is that Macpherson’s account of what happens when subjects, upon viewing a tilted A and an A, report their experience by using the concept-term “A”, mistakes seeph with seedox. If this confusion is cleared, then representationalism can offer a coherent account of the gestalt switch in the diamond/square figure on the basis of the NCC of that experience. (shrink)

: Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for object individuation, but it represents instead conglomerations of properties and (...) at some stage of visual processing it must interface with cognition and its conceptual capacities for the visual objects to be individuated. Or, they will have to hold that the imagistic, NCC of perception, allows for object individuation. I opt for the second thesis because I think there is strong empirical evidence that objects are individuated during early vision. I also think that early vision individuates objects by means of, what I had previously called nonconceptual perceptual demonstrative reference. I argue, first, why Fodor’s view that iconic NCC does not enable object individuation is false. I also argue, contra Fodor, that early vision allows the perception of the cardinality of sets of objects. Keywords : Early Vision; Analog Representations; Object Individuation; Arithmetic Cognition; Cardinality of Sets L'individuazione di oggetti mediante il contenuto iconico: come è rappresentata la numerosità nella rappresentazione iconica? Riassunto: Per Fodor le rappresentazioni percettive sono un sottoinsieme delle rappresentazioni iconiche, distinte dalle rappresentazioni simbolico/discorsive. Le rappresentazioni iconiche sono nonconcettuali e non supportano le abilità richieste dai concetti. Le rappresentazioni iconiche, per esempio, non supportano l'individuazione di oggetti. Se si pensa che la percezione o qualche sua parte abbia un contenuto nonconcettuale come immagine, si ci si imbatte nel seguente dilemma. O si accetta che il NCC non permetta di individuare oggetti, ma che rappresenti conglomerati di proprietà e che si interfacci con la cognizione e le sue capacità concettuali, per individuare gli oggetti visivi. O si dice che l'immagine, il NCC, della percezione consenta di individuare oggetti. Propendo per la seconda tesi, poiché penso che ci sia solida evidenza empirica per cui gli oggetti vengono individuati durante le prime fasi della visione, in cui l’individuazione avviene mediante quanto definito come riferimento dimostrativo del contenuto nonconcettuale percettivo. Chiarirò le ragioni per cui la concezione di Fodor, per cui il contenuto nonconcettuale iconico non supporta l’individuazione di oggetti, è falsa. Inoltre, contra Fodor, sosterrò che le prime fasi della visione permettono la percezione della cardinalità di insiemi di oggetti. Parole chiave: Prime fasi della visione; Rappresentazioni analogiche; Individuazione di oggetti; Cognizione aritmetica; Cardinalità degli insiemi. (shrink)

This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor (...) does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision. (shrink)

Examines the nature of cognitive penetrability hypothesis, which holds that our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. Assesses both cognitive penetrability and impenetrability and explores their philosophical consequences.

Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory stores nonconceptual content , in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; the content of visual states is stored in memory only if and when (...) object-centered attention modulates visual processing and this modulation signifies the onset of the conceptualization of that content; only categorical high-level information that characterizes conceptual content and not metric and precise iconic information that characterizes NCC can be stored in visual memory for long periods; and if NCC were stored in visual memory then this would allow recognitional judgments pertaining to NCC—one could recognize the precise shade of a color that one had seen before. However NCC does not allow such recognitional judgments. (shrink)

The assumption that the onset of puberty is a context-sensitive marker of a reproductive strategy is tested by comparing parental and filial childhood context and somatic development in West and East Germany. Sixty-eight mother-daughter dyads and 35 father-son dyads were taken from two samples of families from Osnabrück in West Germany and Halle in East Germany. According to the observed context discontinuity between the generations in the male dyads, linear regression models show that no indicator of male sexual maturation was (...) influenced significantly by the somatic development of the father. Instead of an inherited timing of maturation, antecedent distal factors like socioeconomic childhood context variables and critical life events lead to an acceleration of male sexual maturation. Finally we test the effect of two different conditions of childhood context continuity on daughter’s age at menarche with maternal age at menarche controlled. Linear regression models show that mother’s age at menarche predicts daughter’s age at menarche only under the condition of contextual continuity between generations, which was the case in the West German sample only. In East Germany, where mother’s age at menarche had no significant effect, the amount of variance explained by childhood context variables was almost the same. These results indicate the context sensitivity of somatic development which seems to follow an evolutionary rationale. (shrink)

This collection of case studies in public management bridges the gap between mainstream CSR - confined to the for-profit corporations - and the vast bodies of workers and organizations that make up government and its public administration. The variety and discretion of managerial endeavours in public management calls for accountability and responsibility of government beyond current legal instruments: The book argues that CSR must be brought to bear with government. In government in fact, knowledge management is not a linear process, (...) but the result of working with passion of the parts, implying discretionary behaviour and creativity which in turn imply choice and responsibility. Cases ranging from the USA to Central America, New Zealand and Europe all confirm the complex nature of public management, entailing partnership synergy for disaster recovery, the intertwined link between management and new technology and mindfulness at individual level. The cases are set in a framework by theoretical essays on bureaucratic behaviour and unknown stakeholders. Public-sector management has long drawn upon principles, tools, and techniques developed in the private sector, aiming to infuse bureaucracies with touches of efficiency and productivity. But good governance is also central to good management. This fascinating, wide-ranging volume shows how ideas from the Corporate Social Responsibility movement apply to the governance and administration of public agencies. A series of detailed and informative case studies, written by researchers and practitioners with deep knowledge of their industries and agencies, explores the challenges of managing public and government agencies in a socially responsible manner. The book offers a nuanced and balanced portrait that calls for greater public involvement and oversight in keeping public organizations on track. Highly recommended! Peter G. Klein University of Missouri Norwegian School of Economics and Mises Institute Here are six compelling case studies that reveal the relevance, even the imperative, of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the public sector. In doing so, the authors simultaneously expand the role of CSR and provide us with a refreshed concept of government and public management. The authors then lay the theoretical groundwork for their observations in ways that enrich our understanding of both CSR and the evolving roles of government in our lives. This is "must reading" for corporate officers and for public managers. Thomas R. Sexton Stony Brook University, NY College of Business and School of Professional Development. (shrink)

According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. (...) All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, (...) concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science and action theory. (shrink)

Ανέκδοτα ψηφίσματα από τη Λάρισσα (3) Συνεχίζοντας τις δΰο προηγούμενες δημοσιεύσεις που αφορούσαν σε ψηφίσματα της Λάρισσας (BCH 128-129 (2005), p. 377-417 ; BCH 130 (2006) [20081, Ρ· 435-483), παρουσιάζουμε εδώ μια τρίτη στήλη, η οποία φέρει τρία κείμενα: δύο ψηφίσματα της Λάρισσας, που ψηφίστηκαν κατά τη διάρκεια της στρατηγείας του Παυσανία, υιού του Θρασυμήδη από τις Φέρες (περίπου 130/129 π. Χ.), το ένα για έναν Αθηναίο φιλόσοφο και το άλλο για τρεις πολίτες της Κω· ένα τρίτο ψήφισμα προέρχεται από (...) τη Συνομοσπονδία των Μολοσσών και ανταμοίβει δικαστές από τη Λάρισσα, οι οποίοι εστάλησαν στην Ήπειρο για να διαιτητεύσουν σε μια διαμάχη μεταξύ Μολοσσών και Ακαρνάνων. Τα κείμενα αυτά, γραμμένα σε θεσσαλική διάλεκτο, η οποία την εποχή εκείνη χρησίμευε στη μεταγραφή εγγράφων της καγκελλαρίας των ελληνιστικών πόλεων σε μια γλώσσα που χάνει προοδευτικά τη συνοχή και την ιδιομορφία της και καταλήγει να διατηρεί μόνο μια «θεσσαλίζουσα» απόχρωση, έχουν αξία για την ιστορία της Λάρισσας, αφού αναφέρονται στην πνευματική ζωή και σε ορισμένες εκφάνσεις των πολιτικών ή οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων των Λαρισσαίων στο δεύτερο μισό του 2ου αι. π. Χ. (shrink)

In many countries consumers have shown an increasing interest to the way in which food products are being produced. This study investigates Chinese consumers’ attitudes towards different pig production systems by means of a conjoint analysis. While there has been a range of studies on Western consumers’ attitudes to various forms of food production, little is known about the level of Chinese consumers’ attitudes. A cross-sectional survey was carried out with 472 participants in 6 Chinese cities. Results indicate that Chinese (...) consumers prefer industrial pig production systems, where traditional pig breeds are raised, over large-scale and small family farms. Farms with maximum attention to food safety, which furthermore can provide lean meat with consistent quality, are also preferred. Imported pig breeds and tasty but variable meat were rejected. A 3-cluster solution found that consumers from cluster 1 focus almost exclusively on the food safety aspect. Consumers from cluster 2 show weak overall attitudes to pig production systems in general. Cluster 3 stands out by being very positive about industrial, large-size farms and consistent quality. From a Chinese consumer’s perspective, the industrial approach seems to represent values such as achievement and evolution, as well as quality and safety, since pig production is moving away from low-cost, low-quality, and low-safety family-scale systems. A complex set of rural and environmental development, quality aspects, and food safety measures are challenges that must be met by the stakeholders of pig production systems in China. (shrink)

The text of the Politics itself establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Aristotle’s best city is, in the philosopher’s own terms, an aristocracy: in Books III and IV Aristotle defines aristocracy as the regime that aims at the best, has virtue as its mark, does not allow citizenship to artisans and wage-earners, and distributes offices by merit. Books VII and VIII unequivocally attribute all these essential characteristics of aristocracy to Aristotle’s best city. In addition, his conception of the virtue of the (...) citizens of this polis conforms to the traditional aristocratic interpretation of the term. Aristotle – citizenship – kaloskagathos – aristocratic virtue. (shrink)

This study in progress addresses the question of how market competition affects corporate social performance. An empirical analysis is described designed to shed light on recent theoretical developments on the relation between market structure and stakeholder responsiveness and to inform on the old debate between Friedman and Corporate Social Responsibility.

An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...

To maximize brain plasticity after stroke, several rehabilitation strategies have been explored, including the use of intensive motor training, motor imagery, and action observation. Growing evidence of the positive impact of virtual reality (VR) techniques on recovery following stroke has been shown. However, most VR tools are designed to exploit active movement, and hence patients with low level of motor control cannot fully benefit from them. Consequently, the idea of directly training the central nervous system has been promoted by utilizing (...) motor-imagery (MI) based brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). To date, detailed information on which VR strategies lead to successful functional recovery is still largely missing, and very little is known about how to optimally integrate BCI and VR paradigms for stroke rehabilitation. The purpose of this study was to examine the efficacy of a BCI-VR system using a MI paradigm for post-stroke upper limb rehabilitation on functional assessments, and related changes in MI ability and brain imaging. To achieve this, a 60 years old male chronic stroke patient was recruited. The patient underwent a 3-week intervention in a clinical environment, resulting in 10 BCI-VR training sessions. The patient was assessed before and after intervention, as well as on a one-month follow-up, in terms of clinical scales and brain imaging using functional MRI (fMRI). Consistent with prior research, we found important improvements in upper extremity scores (Fugl-Meyer) and identified increases in brain activation measured by fMRI that suggest neuroplastic changes in brain motor networks. This study expands on the current body of evidence as more data are needed on the effect of this type of interventions not only on functional improvement but also through brain imaging to study the effect of the intervention on plasticity. (shrink)

The book under review treats sociology as a science that identifies and reconceptualizes problems already defined by others. Such definitions are viewed to be dependent on conditions that the book calls “membership orders”. The book argues that the sociological observer should look for and observe from the boundaries that keep “members” and “non-members”, along with their corresponding views of problems, apart. The review essay approaches the book with the dual question, “Who describes the reality in which it is determined that (...) social situations are treated as problematic by those involved?” And “Who determines whose problem is the problem considered relevant in each case?” The essay discusses the answers given by the authors to these questions with the help of their conceptualization, data, and object constitution. Similarities and differences are highlighted in comparison with Luhmann’s theory. For illustration purposes, the authors’ theory is applied to law. (shrink)

Albertus Magnus’ alchemy is a subject that has attracted the attention of the scholars since the early decades of the 20th century. Yet, the research that has been conducted this far is characterised by its non philosophical character. As a matter of fact, the previous studies approached Albertus’ alchemy either in terms of history of science or of intellectual history. In this paper, I focus on Albertus’ definition of alchemical transmutation that is found in his De mineralibus and I analyze (...) it in terms of his theory of creation and of his theory of matter. Therefore, I show whether a re-creation of a metal is in accordance with Albertus’ philosophy and congruently I bring forth the Aristotle Graecus and the Aristotle Latinus that are found as background in his alchemical theory of transmutation. Ultimately this paper aims to show that the aforementioned theory is not an arbitrary statement from Albertus’ part, but the result of a serious philosophical endeavour. (shrink)

It often happens that a binary relation R defined on a topological space \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document} lacks a continuous utility representation; see, e.g.,. But under an appropriate choice of a second topology τ∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\tau ^{*}$$\end{document} on \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, the existence of a semicontinuous utility representation on the bitopological space \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} (...) \begin{document}$$$$\end{document} can be ensured. On the other hand, the traditional notion of weak utility representation as defined by Peleg cannot be used to characterize the generalized optimal choice set, which requires binary relations that allow cycles. The main result in this paper states that for any generalized upper tc-semicontinuous, separable, pairwise spacious and consistent binary relation R defined on a bitopological space \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document} and any subset D of X, there exists a utility function which characterizes the generalized optimal choice set of R in D in terms of the maxima of this function. (shrink)

We characterize the existence of semicontinuous weak utilities in a general framework, where the axioms of transitivity and acyclicity are relaxed to that of consistency in the sense of Suzumura (Economica 43:381–390, 1976). This kind of representations allow us to transfer the problem of the existence of the ${{\mathcal{G}}{\mathcal{O}}{\mathcal{C}}{\mathcal{H}}{\mathcal{A}}}$ set of a binary relation to the easier problem of getting maxima of a real function. Finally, we show that the maxima of these representations correspond to the different levels of satiation (...) that each of individual has (an individual reaches his or her level of satiation when an increase of consuming an alternative product/service brings no increase in utility). (shrink)

The impact of incidental emotions on decision making is well established. Incidental emotions can be differentiated on several appraisal dimensions, including certainty-uncertainty. The present research investigates the effect of certainty-uncertainty of incidental emotions on hedonic forecasting. The results of four experimental studies indicate that uncertainty associated incidental emotions, such as fear and hope, compared with certainty emotions, such as anger and happiness, amplify predicted utility. This amplification effect is confirmed for opposite utility types; uncertainty associated emotions, when compared with their (...) certainty counterparts, lead to an overprediction of positive utilities and to an underprediction of negative utilities. In line with the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; 2001), this effect is mediated by the prediction task uncertainty, providing evidence for a carryover process of the incidental emotion. The effect of task uncertainty on predicted utility is, in turn, partly mediated by attention to the task, suggesting that an affective adaptation process (AREA model; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008) lies behind the amplification of forecasts. Taken together, these findings extend the impact of certainty-uncertainty to the context of hedonic forecasting and further corroborate the impact of incidental emotions in judgement and decision making. (shrink)

We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...) type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties. (shrink)

Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain‐specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard‐wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top‐down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and (...) observation and I argue that although Churchland is right that observation involves top‐down processes, there is also a substantial amount of information in perception which is theory‐neutral. I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top‐down character of perception. Finally, I discuss the possibility of an off‐line cognitive penetrability of perception. (shrink)

Άπό τήν Πάτρα, ρωμαϊκή ἀποικία τοῦ Αὐγούστου, προέρχεται μιά σειρά ἐπιτύμβιων στηλῶν πού μαρτυροῦν τήν τέλεση ἀγώνων μονομάχων στήν πόλη κατά τήν αὐτοκρατορική περίοδο. Οἱ παραστάσεις καί οἱ ἐπιγραφές τους θυμίζουν ἐκεῖνες ἀνάλογων μνημείων τοῦ ἐλληνικοῦ κόσμου τῆς ανατολῆς · συνιστοῦν, ὡστόσο, ἕνα πρωτότυπο καί ἄξιο προσοχῆς στοιχεῖο τῆς κοινωνικῆς καί πολιτιστικῆς ζωῆς τῆς πόλης στήν παραπάνω περίοδο.

La forteresse de Dierum, située sur le sommet d'un contrefort (1.450 m) du Haut-Olympe, faisait partie intégrante du système très élaboré de la défense macédonienne sur les frontières Sud du royaume et, par son emplacement stratégique, permettait le contrôle de toutes les voies d'accès qui, venant du Sud et de l'Ouest, conduisaient vers la plaine côtière. Cette forteresse est mentionnée chez Tite-Live (44, 3, 3) dans son récit sur la marche de l'armée romaine du consul Q. Marcius Philippus lors des (...) événements de la troisième guerre de Macédoine. (shrink)