The definition of the sophist as "image-maker" allows Plato to add to the novelties he presents in the _Sophist_ two topics he hadn't deepened in his previous dialogues: (a) a "definition" of being (247e) and (b) the influence this position will have on the relationship between image and truth. From a first definition of the image proposed by Theaetetus in 240a we deduce that, even if it is not true, it is "really" (_óntos_) an image, which does not coincide with (...) the devalued or secondary reality that Plato had always attributed to this notion, from which all truth was absent. This conclusion, indeed, astonishes Theaetetus, attached to the Platonic "orthodoxy". This astonishment is not present in the orthodox version of the text of the passage 240a-c of the _Sophist_, which inherits from a modification of the widespread text from 1851. Once the original version is restored, the definition of the fact of being proposed in 247e justifies the "really real" character of the image, which respects the condition required to everything that "possesses" being: the possibility of acting or being affected. Indeed, the image is "affected" by the model, that it tries to imitate, because the model "affects" it. The image, even if it is not true, is real. (shrink)

La Déesse de Parménide annonce toujours que les δόξαι sont un produit humain. Mais il y a un point qui n'a pas été en général remarqué dans les études consacrées à l'étude des δόξαι: elles décrivent une activité humaine qui consiste a expliquer la réalité par la présence de principes opposés, et qui est toujours en rapport avec la "nomination". Il y avait à l'époque de Parménide une école qui correspondait à ce portrait robot, ou s'agit-il d'un collage de Parménide? (...) Quoi qu'il en soit, il est attesté la présence d'une branche du Pythagorisme qui se caractérisait, précisément, pour "placer" des noms sur les choses. (shrink)

The adventure of philosophy began in Greece, where it was gradually developed by the ancient thinkers as a special kind of knowledge by which to explain the totality of things. In fact, the Greek language has always used the word onta , "beings," to refer to things. At the end of the sixth century BCE, Parmenides wrote a poem to affirm his fundamental thesis upon which all philosophical systems should be based: that there are beings. In By Being, It Is (...) , Nestor-Luis Cordero explores the richness of this Parmenidean thesis, which became the cornerstone of philosophy. Cordero's textual analysis of the poem's fragments reveals that Parmenides' intention was highly didactic. His poem applied, for the first time, an explicative method that deduced consequences from a true axiom: by being, it is . To ignore this reality meant to be a victim of opinions. This volume explains how without this conceptual base, all later ontology would have been impossible. This book offers a clear and concise introduction to the Parmenidean doctrine and helps the reader appreciate the imperative value of Parmenides's claim that "by being, it is." "This thorough and controversial book will certainly be valued highly by the international community of scholars devoted to the study of ancient philosophy as well as by educated readers worldwide." --Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Georgetown University " By Being, It Is offers a meticulous discussion of one of the most puzzling theses in the history of philosophy. It is a highly challenging piece of work from a philosophical viewpoint, an outstanding model of philological work, and a contribution that causes anyone interested in philosophical matters to reflect." --Marcelo D. Boeri, National Council for Scientific and Technological Research, Argentina "Parmenides' importance consists in the fact that he represents an absolute beginning in history, and particularly in the history of thought. We can understand why, for more than twenty years now, N.L. Cordero has devoted tremendous efforts to understanding the few verses that remain to us of this Poem. The result is the present book, characterized by its completeness and its rigor. It is an essential work on a seminal author." --Luc Brisson, National Council for Scientific Research, France. (shrink)

En 1795, G.G. Fülleborn publia un travail sur Parménide dans lequel, pour la première fois, on proposa un arrangement des fragments du Poème en deux parties, l’ Alétheia (fr. 1 à 8.50 DK) et la Dóxa (fr. 8.51 à 18 DK). L’auteur avoue s’être inspiré de Simplicius, et cette division devint canonique. Or, le critère utilisé par Simplicius est une conséquence de la « platonisation » de Parménide, esquissée déjà par Aristote, qui trouve chez l’Éléate la dichotomie « sensible / (...) intelligible ». Conséquence : il y aurait dans le Poème une théorie sur l’être et aussi sur les apparences. Il suffit de regarder ce que Parménide lui-même établit comme « vérité » et ce qu’il considère comme « dóxa » pour réfuter ce schéma et trouver dans le Poème une place pour les textes « physiques », qui ne correspondent pas à la « doxa », étant donné qu’ils ne sont ni trompeurs ni décevants. (shrink)

Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l'argumentation de Parménide à propos de l'inexistence du non- être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c'est la langue grecque qui, du fait d'identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d'exprimer « ce qui n'est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n'est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l'ont précédé et il découvre (...) que, mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non- être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non- être relatif : l' Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l'Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité. When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides' argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Creek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since tbe false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that wbich is not » exists, Plato examines the théories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness — on which he shares Parmenides' judgement —, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of prédication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Différent. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the définition of every reality. (shrink)

Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l’argumentation de Parménide à propos de l’inexistence du non-être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c’est la langue grecque qui, du fait d’identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d’exprimer « ce qui n’est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n’est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l’ont précédé et il découvre que, (...) mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non-être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non-être relatif : l’Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l’Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité.When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides’ argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Greek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since the false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that which is not » exists, Plato examines the theories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness – on which he shares Parmenides’ judgement –, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of predication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Different. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the definition of every reality. (shrink)

Resumen En 1795, un filólogo de origen kantiano, G.G. Fülleborn, agrupó en dos "partes" los fragmentos recuperados del Poema de Parménides: "la Verdad" y "la Doxa". Con pequeñas modificaciones, esta estructura se convirtió en clásica y se acepta hoy en forma unánime. Sin embargo, una lectura de cada fragmento en forma aislada no justifica dicha división, la cual se basa en una interpretación de Simplicio influida por Aristóteles, quien encuentra ya en Parménides un esbozo del dualismo platónico entre lo "sensible" (...) y lo "inteligible", inexistente en éste. Analizo aquí en forma crítica el criterio que emplea Fülleborn, anacrónico para el caso de un pensador preplatónico.In 1795 G.G. Fülleborn, a philologist of Kantian origin, grouped in two "parts" the recovered fragments of the Poem of Parmenides -"the Truth" and "the Doxa". With small modifications, this structure became classic and is accepted unanimously today. However, a reading of each fragment in an isolated way does not justify such division, which is based on an interpretation of Simplicius influenced by Aristotle, who finds already in Parmenides a sketch of the Platonic dualism between the "sensible" and the "intelligible", not actually present in the latter. This work analyzes critically the criterion used by Fülleborn, which is anachronistic in the case of a preplatonic thinker. (shrink)

La dificultad de captar el pensamiento de Parménides llevó a los intérpretes ya en la Antigüedad a encarar su filosofía según esquemas de pensamiento posteriores. Fue el caso de Aristóteles, cuya interpretación fue heredada por su discípulo Teofrasto y por sus comentadores, especialmente Simplicio. Simplicio, neoplatónico y aristotélico a la vez, propuso una interpretación, fuertemente dualista, que no se encuentra en las citas recuperadas. En 1789 G.G.Fülleborn, inspirándose en Simplicio, propuso una división del Poema en dos “partes”, aceptada hoy en (...) forma unánime, y que debe ser revisada y rechazada con urgencia. (shrink)

Towards the end of fragment 1 of his Poem, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that a priori explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the Poem, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous (...) conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the Poem that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has “Platonised” the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the “opinions” (which are only points of view) to the “appearances” (in the Platonic sense of the term). (shrink)

À la ligne 35 du fr. 8 de son Poème, Parménide aurait dit, selon le texte transmis par Simplicius : « Sans l'être dans lequel il se trouve exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. » La difficulte qui consisterait à placer le penser dans l'être disparaît si l'on adopte le texte transmis par Proclus : « Sans l'être, grâce auquel il est exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. » Line 35, fr. 8 of his Poem, Parmenid is said (...) to have said, according to the text handed down by Simplicius : « Were it not for the being in which it is expressed, you will never find thinking. » The difficulty of resting thought in the being disappears if one adopts Proclus' text: « Without the being, through which it expresses itself, you never find thought. ». (shrink)

À la ligne 35 du fr. 8 de son Poème, Parménide aurait dit, selon le texte transmis par Simplicius : « Sans l'être dans lequel il se trouve exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. » La difficulte qui consisterait à placer le penser dans l'être disparaît si l'on adopte le texte transmis par Proclus : « Sans l'être, grâce auquel il est exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. ».

In order to confirm that the sophist is a manufacturer of illusions, Plato argues that it is necessary to refute Parmenides’s thesis which states that there is only – as Plato interprets it – the absolute being. Most likely an echo of this thesis is found in Antisthenes, whom Plato seems to allude to in the _Sophist, _for whom “what is, is true”. This conception of truth is known as “ante-predicative” or ontological, and, according to Heidegger, would be original. It (...) is not the case. From Homer to Parmenides, truth was always attributed to a speech or thought, never to a “being”. The “ante-predicative” conception of truth was a creation of philosophy, which probably began with Parmenides and continued with Antisthenes. When Plato refutes it, in the second part of the _Sophist, _only returns to the past, because he makes speech the “place” of truth. (shrink)

Platón sostiene que, para confirmar que el sofista es un fabricante de ilusiones, hay que refutar la tesis de Parménides que afirma que sólo existe – según Platón lo interpreta – el ser absoluto. Muy probablemente un eco de esta tesis se encuentre en Antístenes, a quien Platón parece aludir en el Sofista, para quien “lo que es, es verdadero”. Esta concepción de la verdad se conoce como “ante-predicativa” u ontológica, y, según Heidegger, sería originaria. No es así. Desde Homero (...) y hasta Parménides, la verdad fue siempre atribuida a un discurso o a un pensamiento, jamás a un ente. La concepción “ante-predicativa” de la verdad fue una creación de la filosofía, que probablemente comenzó con Parménides y continuó con Antístenes. Cuando Platón la refuta, en la segunda parte del Sofista, no hace sino regresar al pasado, pues hace del discurso el “lugar” de la verdad. (shrink)

RESUMEN ¿Por qué cuando Platón quiere justificar su definición del sofista como un «fabricante de imágenes», se apoya sobre dos versos auténticos de Parménides que aluden, sin duda alguna, al camino recorrido por los «mortales que nada saben»? ¿Quiere acaso sugerir que esos «mortales», que son en realidad «fabricantes de opiniones», son un antecedente de los sofistas, que son «fabricantes de imágenes»? ABSTRACT Why, when Plato wants to justify his definition of the sophist as an "image maker", he quotes two (...) authentic verses of Parmenides that undoubtedly allude to the path taken by the "mortals who know nothing"? Does he want to suggest that these "mortals", who are actually "opinions makers" are ancestors of the sophists, who are "image makers"? (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the "object" of study of the first philosophers was the φύσις. Even though the term appears for the first time in Heraclitus, the early answers to the question "what is the 'being' of τὰ ὄντα" present already it as a source of active and dynamic life, according to the etymology of φύσις. This is the meaning in Homer (Od. X.303), and this is also the case of water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), and the γόνιμα contained in the φύσις (...) ἄπειρον (Anaximander, apud Ps.-Plutarch). The φύσις of Heraclitus inherits this meaning, because, for him, reality, "changing, is at rest" (fr. 84a). (shrink)

O estabelecimento moderno do texto do poema de Parmênides, ao apresentá-lo em uma certa ordem de fragmentos, induziu os intérpretes à divisão de sua doutrina em “Verdade“ e “Opinião”. Lançando dúvidas quanto a essa ordenação e questionando a leitura do poema em duas “partes”, o autor procura desvincular os testemunhos que tratam dos astros de qualquer suposta doutrina parmenídica das doxai.

Even if Plato never claimed to be a ‘historian of philosophy’, there are in his dialogues many references to previous philosophers. Apart from his works on the Sophists, which do not claim to faithfully expose the ‘philosophy’ of their authors, we find in Plato’s dialogues comments and sometimes quotations from the Presocratics, from Thales to Philolaos. In some cases, Plato adds the name of the quoted philosopher, but sometimes he leaves to the reader the task of finding out who the (...) commented or quoted author is. This is the case with Melissos in a passage of the Sophist (244b), where his name is not quoted, but an anonymous monistic philosopher expounds a literal quotation of the philosopher: ἓν μόνον ἔστιν (fr. B 8.1 DK). (shrink)

Un dialogue est un logos (discours, propos, argument) qui va d'un interlocuteur a un autre. Cet echange d'idees, s'il veut etre fructueux, s'appuie sur un principe tres simple: comme le dialogue n'est pas un monologue, on dialogue avec quelqu'un; et on dialogue sur quelque chose. C'est le cas des travaux qui composent ce volume. L'interlocuteur privilegie est Pierre Aubenque. Ses travaux, son activite en tant qu'enseignant, ses prises de position sur des sujets tres divers ont suscite, de la part de (...) ses disciples, collegues et amis, une veritable envie de dialoguer avec lui, un desir de suivre son exemple (car Pierre Aubenque a toujours dialogue avec les Anciens, notamment avec Aristote). Les auteurs de ces reflexions ont ainsi voulu demontrer que le dialogue instaure pendant plus de vingt ans par le Directeur du centre Leon Robin (Universite de Paris IV), reste toujours ouvert. (shrink)

Introducción, traducción y notas de C. Eggers Lan y V. E. Juliá. Revisada por A. del Pozo Ortiz.

RESUMEN Una vez que el foco de la reflexión pasa de las teorías ideales a la aplicación de la justicia social, centrada en las instituciones de las sociedades democráticas, se requiere prestar especial atención a los estilos de vida. Estos tienen una alta incidencia en cómo la justicia es realizada y afectan tanto a la desigualdad económica como a la disponibilidad de los recursos naturales. En nuestras sociedades es posible establecer restricciones a los estilos de vida, especialmente en aquellos casos (...) en que, por el efecto de algunas dinámicas sociales, aquellos se desacoplan de las concepciones del bien. Se defiende que, en tales casos, la base normativa que permite exigir el respeto a los estilos de vida se disuelve y por ello es posible justificar su restricción. ABSTRACT Now that the focus of reflection has shifted from ideal theories to the application of social justice, centered on the institutions of democratic societies, it is necessary to pay special attention to lifestyles, since they not only influence the realization of justice, but also have an effect on economic inequality and the availability of natural resources. In our societies, it is possible to place restrictions on lifestyles, especially in those cases in which, influenced by certain social dynamics, they disengage from conceptions of the good. The article argues that, in those cases, the normative base grounding the demand that lifestyles be respected is dissolved, thus justifying their restriction. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)