The Philosophy of Death Reader presents a collection of classic readings from across the centuries and the continents. Organised around central metaphysical questions from whether soul is immortal to what can experience death, it brings together pivotal readings from ancient, modern and contemporary philosophers. The twenty-four readings require no background in philosophy. Featuring writings from Vedanta, the ancient Greeks, the Buddhist tradition, Christian eschatology, and recent analytic philosophy, they flow thematically and cover: - Key metaphysical topics including immortality, rebirth and (...) the after - Scientific perspectives on biology and the brain - Axiological questions surrounding old age, the soul and how to live with mortality Accompanied throughout by editor's notes, introductory material, and discussion questions, this cross-cultural reader draws themes together, encourages further study and introduces a broad range of philosophical thinking about death. (shrink)

Much of what Richard Rorty has to say about the triumph of American liberalism is largely accepted and unquestioned by a wide variety of scholars. Yet there are inconsistencies in Rorty's work, and his defense of liberalism does not depend on familiar Enlightenment assumptions about reason, human nature, historical progress, and the like. So argues Markar Melkonian, who critically examines Rorty's brand of liberalism stripped of its Enlighenment rationales. Melkonian initially compares Rorty's social and political views with (...) his alleged progenitor, John Dewey, showing that there are significant differences between the two, notably their respective conceptions of freedom and democracy and their accounts of how to harmonize personal freedom with public responsibility. Then Melkonian makes the case that the existing liberal democracies Rorty wants to defend bear little resemblance to Rorty's own liberal utopia, in which "the quest for autonomy is impeded as little as possible by social institutions." Melkonian asserts that at the end of the American century, Rorty's private role as ironist and his public role as apologist for existing liberal democracies are not so much incommensurable in principle as they are incompatible in fact. (shrink)

Whatever common sense may be, it includes much else besides practically confirmed truisms. InCommon Sense: A Political History, Sophia Rosenfeld describes the backstories of modern common sense, locating its origins in debates among small groups of professors, publishers and pamphleteers in several cities on both sides of the Atlantic during the Age of Revolutions. From the eighteenth century on, champions and enemies of the rising ‘middling’ classes have brandished common sense as an ‘unspectacular instrument’ of non-coercive regulation, to promote or (...) oppose the sovereignty of ‘the people’ by hitching their conflicting claims to an unassailable guarantor of truth. After taking a beating in the first decades of the twentieth century, common sense has been resuscitated and reconstituted, to sell all manner of goods and policies. As a description of the roles that common sense has played in the modern phenomenon of populism, Rosenfeld’s book casts doubt on Hannah Arendt’s claim that common sense is what true democracy creates. At the same time,Common Sense: A Political Historycorroborates and fills out Antonio Gramsci’s account of good sense and politics. (shrink)

A sympathetic reviewer has noted that the best a critic of Rorty can do is to compare his views invidiously to alternative views. Taking this advice to heart, I contrast Rorty's social and political views to Dewey's, and then to an alternative account which I elaborate. My standards of comparison are two liberal ideals than which, according to Rorty, none others are higher. These are: amelioration of suffering, and leaving people alone to pursue their own visions of personal perfection. ;In (...) Chapter One, I point out that there are significant differences between Rorty and his alleged progenitor, Dewey, notably when it comes to their respective conceptions of how to harmonize personal freedom with public responsibility. Unlike Dewey, Rorty advocates abandoning the attempt to fuse the public realm of altruism and the private realm of sublimity by means of one all-encompassing theory. ;In Chapter Two, I argue that the existing liberal democracies Rorty is concerned to defend bear little resemblance to his democratic utopia, in which "the quest for autonomy is impeded as little as possible by social institutions." I introduce an alternative vocabulary, according to which political institutions, broadly conceived, traverse nearly the entire length and breadth of the private sphere in the north Atlantic democracies. ;In Chapter Three, I argue that existing liberal democracies fare little better with reference to Rorty's public ideal of ameliorating suffering than they did with reference to his private ideal of making room for self making. Then I suggest an alternative setup which I believe to be more promising for purposes of ameliorating suffering. ;In the final chapter, I argue that Rorty's private role as ironist and his public role as self-described apologist for bourgeois liberal democracy are not so much incommensurable as they are incompatible. The better he fulfills one role, I argue, the more seriously he compromises the other. (shrink)

The study examined the impact of students’ absolute age-position at the time of testing by grade level and gender on their achieved level of mathematics, reading and science performance. An analysis was conducted based on a sample of 11,500 15-year-old pupils in the United Arab Emirates who participated in the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment 2012 study. In support of an absolute age-position effect it was found that the youngest age-at-test student grouping demonstrated significantly lower levels of mathematics, reading (...) and science performance than their older peers. It was also shown that grade level had a significant influence on the demonstration of functional knowledge by same-aged students. Lastly, the female students attained significantly higher levels of mathematics, reading and science performance than their male counterparts. (shrink)

This study examines the influence of a dimension of a strategic organizational change context—namely informational distance—on employees’ justice expectations and their behavioral intentions toward the change. Drawing on research from organizational justice and from construal level theory, we hypothesize that informational distance, i.e., the extent to which employees feel knowledgeable about the coming change, affects the relative influence of the anticipatory justice facets and anticipatory overall justice in predicting support for change. Consistent with the hypotheses, results from participants of a (...) merger suggest that when employees feel less knowledgeable about the future change, overall anticipatory justice predicts their intention to cooperate with the change. However, when employees feel more knowledgeable about the future change, anticipatory justice facets predict intention to cooperate. Implications for research on organizational justice and change as well as considerations for practice are discussed. (shrink)

The study of ethical decision-making has made significant advances, particularly with regard to the ways in which different types of processing are implicated. In recent decades, much of this advancement has been driven by the influence of dual-process theories of cognition. Unfortunately, the wealth of findings in this context can be confusing for management scholars and practitioners who desire to know how best to encourage ethical behavior. While some studies suggest that deliberate reflection leads to more ethical behavior, other studies (...) find, in contrast, that intuitive decision-making leads to more ethical results. The goal of this integrative conceptual review is to help make sense of such apparently contradictory findings by identifying the moderating influences that lead to more versus less ethical decisions, whether they are made via intuitive or deliberative processes. Based on our integrative review of moderators from different disciplines and eras, we develop a taxonomy that can aid researchers in the task of identifying when similar constructs have been studied under different names. We organize our findings concerning these influences in accordance with four emergent moderator categories—psychological, situational, social, and physiological. This work helps us identify patterns of moderating factors across both intuitive and deliberative ethical decision-making, gaps that suggest future research directions and practical implications. (shrink)