This article intends to summarise the content of my book Insurgent Universality: An Alternative Legacy of Modernity and expand the meaning of the term ‘universality’. Universality is not defined in abstract legal terms or by juxtaposition vis-à-vis a common enemy. Instead, I clarify the meaning of a more concrete and open practice of universality through historical examples and theories that I excavate from social practices.

Marx's rethinking of the combination between absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value during the 1860s is very important in order to reconsider the co-presence of different forms of historical temporality and exploitation. Postmodernism presents a picture of a plurality of historical times in which the old lies beside the modern and the sweatshop beside the high-tech factory. Because it fails to provide an explanation of the relation between these forms, postmodernism produces a false image of an 'ahistorical' present. In this article (...) I want to show how the combination of differentials of surplus-value works and why a representation of a plurality of historical temporalities synchronised by the temporality of socially-necessary labour is the most adequate image to comprehend it. The theoretical task is to show how the mature categorial structure of Capital not only does not need an historicist philosophy of history, but is in fact incompatible with it. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Ahead of Print. What is the practice and the role of the historian? What does it mean to dig into marginalized and silenced histories? What does it mean to reactivate the contents of past insurgent moments? And who has the power to do it? These are some of the important questions that my generous interlocutors raise in their comments regarding the methodology, and the historiographical and political approach of my book. Indeed, Insurgent Universality outlines an (...) alternative historiography capable of reactivating the histories of the struggling oppressed by putting their past attempts of liberation at the service of political and social alternatives to the present. The task of my historiography is to present the past as a battlefield, which begins from the very political assumptions that often operate behind the historian's back, and to provide a new viewpoint from which other political trajectories of modernity can be disclosed. (shrink)

In this article I reply to three critics. Responding to Cinzia Arruzza, I argue that capital encounters a large spectrum of differences of gender, religion and ethnicity, as well as differences generated by racism. Capital is able to use these differences to its own profit in order to differentiate wages and intensities of exploitation and thereby divide the working class. Responding to Peter Osborne, I contend that my temporal-layered framework elucidates how capital organises and synchronises different temporalities according to the (...) dominant temporality of socially-necessary labour time. I combine Bloch’s idea of ‘multiversum’ and Benjamin’s idea of history in order to show how conflicting temporalities can disclose new political possibilities of liberation. Responding to Harry Harootunian, I articulate the relationship between my reading of Marx and the Postcolonial critique. (shrink)

The essay starts from the singularization and temporalization of political concepts, that originate a self-representation of modernity as hierarchically superior to pre-modernity. Such self-representation, in Massimiliano Tomba’s words, must be now pluralized not only in relationship with the many extra-European temporalities, but also with the multiple temporal layers of European history. The author’s proposal of working on «time differentials», i.e. on the trajectories that turn from the dominant course of modern history, founded on Western emancipation, individual rights and (...) modern property relations, underlies that, in order to reconfigure the concept of modernity, it is necessary to reconfigure the concept of history itself. (shrink)

The Cochabamba water war in 2000 was the first water war of the twenty-first century. During the mobilizations in Bolivia, a factory workers’ manifesto read: “We don’t want private property nor state property, but self-management and social property.” The social practices of many Cochabambinos and Cochabambinas did not defend water as an object. They supported forms of life in common and a way of practicing democracy in the politics of presence. They recalled traditional usos y costumbres, which have been reconfigured (...) in their encounter with other unprecedented practices, situations, and legal systems. Finally, the water war insurgents aimed to restore another practice of democracy and different property relations. Social property (propiedad social) was born in the social and political context of the water war mobilizations. In this article, I investigate social property as a practice that exceeds the current legal definition of ownership and discloses new legal forms of relationship with water. Methodologically, it is about extracting theory from practice – extracting from concrete social practices new concepts that require thinking about. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to re-read Marx’sEighteenth Brumaireby highlighting the political meaning of a materialist historiography. In the first part, I consider Marx’s historiographical and political intention to represent the history of the aftermath of the revolution of ’48 as a farce in order to liquidate ‘any faith in the superstitious past’. In the second part I analyse the theatrical register chosen by Marx in order to represent the Second Empire as a society without a body, a phantasmagoria (...) in which the Constitution, the National Assembly and law – in short, everything that the middle class had put up as essential principles of modern democracy – disappear. In the third part I argue that Marx does not elaborate a theory of revolution that is good for every occasion. What interests him is a historiography capable of grasping, in the various temporalities of the revolution, the chance for a true liberation. (shrink)

« Real politics » : Some remarks on justice and politics The focus of the article is on the foreclosure of justice from the constellation of modern political concepts, that is, the erosion which modernity operates concerning the conditions which would enable us to pose the question of justice. The failure of all modern attempts to formulate the right of resistance shows the collapse of the idea of justice, henceforth reduced to being either a purely formal procedure or the will (...) of majority. From this point of view, justice is merely the advantage of the stronger, as we can see in the position of Thrasymachus, already criticised by Plato. The essence of the crisis we are facing today involves more than just economics. It also involves law and politics. The moment is thus an opportunity to re-open the question of justice. To do so, we must go beyond the principle of majority decision. True politics, an idea which traverses Kant and Walter Benjamin, envisages the question of justice beyond the doxastic horizon. It re-opens the Socratic conflict between truth and opinion. The core of the problem hinges on the possibility of a real political change in this political form, the form of a modern democracy which represents itself as absolute and un-transcendable. (shrink)

Insurgent Universality offers a novel attempt to access history through a problematisation of the notion of universalism. Its main argument is based on three notions articulated in revolutionary events: temporalities, universality and insurgency. In this article we review their theoretical aspects, comment on their limitations, and outline potential reformulations.

The aim of Massimiliano Tomba’s Insurgent Universality is to return to Marxism’s original historical vocation by freeing it from the hegemony of the exchange system and the encompassing agency of value. At the heart of this project appears the recognition that time, space and thus history have been captured by capitalism and transformed into categories of its own to organise people and social relationships for capital’s programme of accumulation. In this way, capital has been able to hijack history (...) and invert it into a representation of the real, into a historical trompe-l’œil instead of ‘presentify(ing) the past’. In this regard contemporising the past is an act of intervening in history and actualising it rather than representing it. Through this operation Tomba is able to retrieve an inventory of repressed and forgotten histories, which will unveil the sources of an ‘alternate legacy of modernity’ and radical political possibilities for the present. (shrink)

What it means for conspiracy theories to become mainstream In debates about conspiracy theories, it is often claimed that conspiracy thinking is on the rise or has even become mainstream. In this article, I want to explore this claim conceptually, and argue that there are at least three ways to interpret the claim that ‘conspiracy thinking has become mainstream’. First, there is the individual level, where it is a matter of counting heads. Mainstream then means that the majority believes in (...) conspiracy theories. But there are two other levels. There is the institutional level, which is about whether conspiracy theories circulate within social institutions in an acceptable way. Is it acceptable to express conspiracy theories as a politician, scientist or journalist? Mainstream here means that dominant institutions in society view conspiracy thinking as an acceptable form of communication. Finally, there is the cultural level. Here the question is whether conspiracy thinking is a culturally acceptable way of speaking and thinking about society. Is it socially accepted as normal behavior, or is it rather a form of deviant behavior, accompanied by (informal) sanctions or demands for additional justification or proof? Mainstream here means that conspiracy thinking is seen as a normal way of speaking, without being accompanied by strange looks, shunning or the need to justify oneself as a conspiracy thinker. By making this distinction, we can think more clearly about whether conspiracy thinking is actually on the rise, and how we should deal with it. (shrink)

Commonsense ontology often conflicts with the ontology of our best scientific and philosophical theories. However, commonsense ontology, and commonsense belief systems in general, seems to be remarkably efficient and cognitively fundamental. In cases of contrast, it is better to find a way to reconcile commonsense and ”theoretical” ontologies. Given that commonsense ontologies are typically expressed within natural language, a classical procedure of reconciliation is semantical. The strategy is that of individuating the ”ontologically problematic” expressions of natural language and paraphrasing the (...) sentences in which they appear in a (formal) language whose commitments are compatible with those of our best theories. We believe that this strategy of reconciliation, though quite standard, especially in the philosophical literature, is problematic: for a start, it forces us to conclude that the ”real content” of our commonsense expressions and beliefs is different from what it appears. Commonsense ontology becomes just an illusion. We will thus propose an alternative approach: according to our view, a commonsense ontology is reconciled with a theoretical ontology in case it is shown that the explanation of why we believe in the existence of a problematic entity is compatible with our best theories. We will call this kind of reconciliation ”epistemic”. The advantage of an epistemic reconciliation is that commonsense ontology is treated in its own right and could be taken prima facie. Another advantage of the view is that epistemic reconciliation can be analysed through the notion of explaining away: a commonsense ontology is epistemically reconciled with a theoretical ontology if and only if the problematic entities of the commonsense ontology are explained away by ”respectable” entities of the theoretical ontology. In the final part of the paper, we sketch a formal analysis of explaining away. (shrink)

Avatar, a passionate movie about empathy, features characters who, in various ways, are able to experience the world through the eyes of another or, as the saying goes, to “put themselves into another's shoes”. But, concealed beneath a surface of ecological pantheism, a contradiction lies at the heart of the movie's portrayal of empathy. On the one hand, in ordinary empathy access to another person's mind is mediated by our perception of her unique embodied identity. On the other hand, Avatar (...) introduces us to a seemingly more direct way to connect with the minds of others: tsaheylu – “the bond”. Mirror neurons are one of the most significant scientific discoveries of the last fifteen years. Mirror neurons testify that empathy, as usually experienced by terrestrial creatures like us, is nothing like a direct mental access. (shrink)

Jax Teller, Clay Morrow, and the other members of SAMCRO are first and foremost bikers and mechanics who fix bikes. Many bikers experience riding as therapeutic, since a good ride can help a suffering soul to forget the worries of life. Martin Heidegger argues that practical skills, such as the ones Tig needs to repair bikes, are the most fundamental form of knowledge. Many bike owners don't feel confident when they have to do repairs and finally face the dreaded encounter (...) with the un‐ready‐to‐hand. In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance Robert Pirsig notes, that many bike owners are afraid to get their hands dirty with engine oil. Caring for a piece of technology is exactly the opposite of treating it instrumentally. As Pirsig explains, even fixing a mechanical problem can become an occasion of participation, unity, and reconciliation with the world. (shrink)

My discussion of Massimiliano Tomba's Insurgent Universality focuses on intertwined themes of historicism, normativity, and revolution that I find particularly generative. By drawing them together I hope to trace out important parts of the book's conceptual infrastructure, especially the way it uses insurgent moments of the past to conceptualize alternative modernities. My particular focus is the sense in which Tomba hopes to “reactivate” important aspects of past insurgent moments. In the end, I argue that his arguments actually (...) go much farther to displace universalism than he credits them. Agreeing with the spirit of Tomba's work rather than its letter, I believe that he provides us with good grounds to focus on insurgent multiplicities rather than insurgent “universality.”. (shrink)

Reevaluates Western and Chinese philosophical traditions to question the boundaries of entrenched conceptual frameworks.

According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative (...) counting requires the relativization either of quantifiers, or of identity, or of the is one of relation. However, some of these relativizations do not deliver the expected results, and others rely on problematic assumptions. In another broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about concepts or sets. The most promising development of this approach is prima facie connected with a violation of the so-called Coreferentiality Constraint, according to which an identity statement is true only if its terms have the same referent. Moreover - even provided that the problem with coreferentiality can be fixed - the resulting analysis of cardinality ascriptions meets several difficulties. (shrink)

This book examines the different areas of knowledge, traditions, and conceptual resources that contributed to the building of Max Planck's theory of radiation. It presents an insightful comparative analysis that not only sheds light upon a fundamental chapter in the history of modern physics, but also enlarges our understanding of how theoreticians work. Coverage offers a deep investigation into the technical aspects behind the theory and extends in time the notion of quantum revolution. It also presents a full-fledged discussion of (...) the combinatorial part of Planck's theory and places emphasis on the epistemological role of mathematical practices. By painstakingly reconstructing both the electromagnetic and the combinatorial part of Planck's black-body theory, the author shows how some apparently merely technical resources, such as the Fourier series, effectively contributed to shape the final form of Planck's theory. For decades, historians have debated the conditions of possibility of Max Planck's discovery as a paradigmatic example of scientific revolution. In particular, the use of combinatorics, which eventually paved the way for the introduction of the quantum hypothesis, has remained a puzzle for experts. This book presents a fresh perspective on this important debate that will appeal to historians and philosophers of science. (shrink)

Scritto complesso, compatto e volutamente non sistematico - all'acme della carriera accademica e dell'attività filosofica di Robert Spaemann (1927 - 2018) -, Persone. Sulla differenza tra 'qualcosa' e 'qualcuno' (1996) non è solo un capolavoro del grande pensatore tedesco, ma è innanzitutto una pietra miliare nella filosofia del Novecento sul realismo delle persone. La sua acuta riflessione sa pro-vocare e destare l'uomo di oggi alla 'grande questione' ch'egli da sempre è a se stesso, ponendolo di fronte al senso autentico del (...) suo essere-persona che, dentro i drammi e i rinnegamenti delle persone reali e dentro le traversìe della storia è stato prima obliato dal modo d'esistere dell'uomo moderno, per poi scorrere come fiume carsico nei meandri della travagliata storia della personologia, con un concomitante imporsi, nella forma mentis oggi imperante, della 'dialettica di naturalismo e spiritualismo'. Si offre qui uno studio rigoroso e inedito della filosofia delle persone di Spaemann - miniera ricchissima tutta da scavare -, che prende sul serio la domanda esistenzialmente decisiva sull'enigma della persona, per arrischiare una comprensione della realtà personale che ognuno di noi è, lasciandoci guidare dal 'Socrate tedesco' in un avvincente percorso che raccoglie a piene mani l'eredità e le sfide della tradizione filosofica e restituisce al lettore precisi segnavìa del senso, cioè della vettorialità fondamentale tracciata nell'essere-persona e, resi memori dell'origine e della meta, del senso di marcia a ognuno di noi affidato come compito per divenire le persone uniche che già siamo e sempre più saremo. (shrink)

This volume includes some of the papers from the second and third instalments of the series Festival Bruniano, held in Geneva in 2015 and in Tours and Wittenberg in 2018, respectively. By picking up the baton from the inaugural edition of 2014 and the two preparatory colloquia that preceded it in 2013, this volume aims to discuss Giordano Bruno's contribution to sixteenth-century ideas by focusing on some theological, moral, and legal-political aspects of his philosophy. Starting from a re-evaluation of Christianity (...) after Luther's Reformation, the four sections of this volume pay special, but not exclusive, attention to Bruno's later philosophical teaching, including his Wittenberg period and the 'Frankfurt trilogy'."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In this short paper we consider Linnebo's thin/thick dichotomy: first, we show that it does not overlap with the very common one between abstract/concrete objects; second, on the basis of some difficulties with the distinction, we propose, as a possible way out, to move from thin/thick objects to thin/thick concepts.

The article analyzes, at different levels, the relationship between war and borders. The question of the borders may provide an interesting point of view. At stake, in “new wars” is not the path of interstate frontiers but different borders developments. To analyze these dynamics the article emphasizes the useful relationship between two different bibliographies, on one hand the strategic literature about “new wars”, on the other hand the territorial and regional studies analyzing the new form of political, economic and juridical (...) spatiality. The aim is to catch the types of non homogeneous territorialities striated by flux spaciality, scaling and rescaling processes and different regimes of temporality and mobility, at stake in the “new wars”. (shrink)

Building on dissatisfaction with current approaches that entail a superficial conception of the firm’s moral agency, this article has two broad theoretical underpinnings. First, it refers to the Catholic Social Thought’s view of the enterprise as a community of work, which leads to place stress on the possibility of creating ‘organizational humanizing cultures’ that revolve around the principles of human dignity and the common good and allow organizational members to flourish. Second, the article draws on the perspective of the sociologist (...) Philip Selznick to emphasize the key role of ‘institutional leadership’ in the formation and maintenance of a moral organizational character, also suggesting that these processes involve an influence on the development of employees’ moral identity conceived as a driver of moral agency. On these theoretical grounds, the article’s central argument is articulated by claiming that human resource management can provide essential support for the development of organizational humanizing cultures. In particular, it is highlighted how human resource management professionals may operate as institutional leaders who contribute to the embedding of moral identities in the organizational context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:About and Beyond Comorbidity:Does the Crisis of the DSM Bring on a Radical Rethinking of Descriptive Psychopathology?Massimiliano Aragona (bio)Keywordscomorbidity, nosography, phenomenology, philosophy of scienceThe problem of psychiatric comorbidity is part of a series of difficulties of the current diagnostic system which at once were considered as a consequence of the way the system itself is organized (Aragona 2006). It was then believed that a Kuhnian reformulation of the (...) contemporary debate on the problems of the psychiatric diagnosis was very useful because it allowed clarification in a comprehensive picture of the many rivulets of conceptual research in that field.In their comments Zachar (2009) and Banzato (2009) seem to agree with my analysis of psychiatric comorbidity (Aragona 2009a) when it stresses that abnormally high frequencies of co-occurrence are to be explained, in important respects, as a consequence of the way mental disorders are operationalized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; also showing the importance of conceptual clarification to deal with this sort of only apparently pure factual problems). On the contrary, they are both unconvinced of the appropriateness and/or fruitfulness of the use of the Kuhnian technical terms and theory in this context.It could be said that the major aim of the paper was to let clinicians understand the effect of conceptual decisions on what would otherwise seem as a simple empirical finding (in this case, high levels of comorbidity), and that this result seems to be achieved in any case, thus minimizing the importance of a disagreement about the philosophical terms as a pure terminological dispute. Nevertheless, in my work the Kuhnian model had a significant role in the clarification of this matter and it also suggests to the reader a range of possible consequences that are not trivial (Zachar, for example, says to be skeptical about the possibility of a crisis and also about the possibility that a new paradigm could eliminate what I call the [End Page 29] comorbidity anomaly). As a consequence, some of the Kuhnian concepts that seemed to be at odds in this context have to be considered in detail to justify my analysis and its consequences. For reasons of space, I avoid a point-by-point reply to all the comments and I concentrate my discussion on three main points. First, I discuss the background of Kuhn's definition of terms such as anomaly and paradigm, as well as my own reasons for using them. In doing so the details of the psychiatric items under study that I wanted to highlight through the use of these philosophical concepts should emerge more clearly. Second, I discuss the problem of having distinguished between artifactual and real comorbidity. Third, I reconsider some of these problems, looking for their implications for future psychopathological research.Anomalies and ParadigmsBanzato (2009) stresses that comorbidity cannot be a truly Kuhnian anomaly because it is an anticipated side effect of the initial setup of the DSM, and not some unexpected discovery that violates the paradigm-induced expectation. This is a basically correct account of the most known version of Kuhnian anomalies; that is, the tale of some evident nature's failure to conform to clear paradigm expectations, which immediately forces researchers to recognize its importance as a possible source of crisis. However, as is the case for many other Kuhnian terms, he discussed anomalies in several scripts and there are other possible versions of its meaning. In particular, Kuhn (1977, XVII) highlighted that only in very rare cases are anomalies completely unexpected and come out of blue to announce an imminent crisis that leads to a large revolution. More frequently, scientific revolutions are much more smaller, like the discovery of oxygen, and in these cases the process is so gradual that historians find it difficult to say exactly when a discovery was made and who did it. Even in these much smaller cases the usual prelude to changes of this sort is the awareness of anomaly, but here anomalies are not extraordinary events; rather, they are "countless discrepancies between theory and experiment [that] during the course of his career, every natural scientist again and again notices and passes by" (Kuhn... (shrink)