It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...) still seems to be considerable potential for exchange and dialogue if the situation is compared with their intimate relationship in central strands of early realist phenomenology. The philosopher perhaps most representative of this ecumenical approach is Husserl’s early student Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). From the very early stages of his philosophical career, Hildebrand has developed one of the most original, comprehensive and nuanced accounts of emotions at whose core is a detailed examination of their connection to value. While his central concern with the ethical significance of our affective life is in many ways continuous with Scheler’s work and draws crucially on Reinach’s philosophy of mind, Hildebrand’s own reflections considerably expand on and substantially modify the picture of the ontology and normative role of emotions defended by these authors. In this article, I reconstruct Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject. (shrink)

Dietrich von Hildebrand seeks to pursue the idea that the discipline of phenomenology can offer a way of surmounting what Kant saw as the intrinsic limitations of human metaphysical enquiry. In this book review of the 2021 edition of Hildebrand’s What is Philosophy?, Hildebrand’s train of thought is reconstructed in some detail, from his opening remarks about knowing in general through to his account of the intuition of essences, the question of objectivity, and the overarching purpose of (...) philosophy. Hildebrand’s argument culminates in the claim that philosophy is not only the fundamental activity of a mind turned toward God, but is properly a preamble to religious faith. The review concludes by raising a number of objections to Hildebrand’s version of phenomenological realism. (shrink)

In a world in which emotions and feelings occupy a dominant place in daily human life and especially in decision-making circumstances, it is important for us to ask ourselves whether it is possible to talk about “new” ethics or “renewed ethics.” Actually, we do not face a re-creation of principles and values, but rather we face a need for deepening our understanding of human anthropology. Thinkers such as Dietrich von Hildebrand have proposed that affectivity can shed light on ethics (...) comprehension. By means of a study of some of the works of this contemporary philosopher, we state that ethics is the result of a harmony between a clear objective comprehension of reality and a straight comprehension of that reality within the sphere of an educated, formed and well-known affectivity of the human person, which would lead us beyond the common place understanding of ethics as something rigid and full of rules and restrictions. -/- En un mundo en el que las emociones y los sentimientos ocupan un lugar preponderante en la vida cotidiana de las personas y especialmente en las decisiones que toman, cabe preguntarnos si podemos hablar de una nueva ética o de una ética renovada. En realidad no nos enfrentamos a una recreación de nuevos principios y valores, sino a una necesidad de ahondar en la antropología de la persona humana. En esta profundización se ha revalorado el importante papel que juega la afectividad en la vida humana. Pensadores como Dietrich von Hildebrand han propuesto que la afectividad puede dar luces en la comprensión de la ética. A partir de un estudio de algunas de las obras de este filósofo contemporáneo proponemos que la ética vendría siendo el resultado de una armonía entre la clara comprensión objetiva de la realidad y una recta comprensión de dicha realidad dentro de una esfera afectiva educada, formada, y ante todo conocida por la propia persona, lo cual nos conduce más allá de una ética entendida muchas veces como algo rígido lleno de normas y restricciones. (shrink)

Alice von Hildebrand has written an appealing philosophical biography of his husband. The Sou! of a Lion' delivers an accurate alibí for going deeper in Hildebrand's Weltanschauung, what is a philosophical theory of things themselves and a personal attitude as well.

The first part of the paper focuses on the elements of von Hildebrand’s general and moral epistemology that can be related to Brentano’s philosophy. The salient concepts discussed are those of Kenntnisnahme (taking cognizance) and Stellungnahme (response). I explain their meaning and show their role in von Hildebrand’s critical assessment of Brentano’s conception of the acts of higher (or correct) love and hate. In the second part of the paper, I argue that von Hildebrand’s material ethics is (...) based on the basic ontological presupposition of Scheler’s material value ethics and that it is, therefore, to be considered a version of it, notwithstanding some quite basic differences from Scheler in other respects. In the third part of the paper, I discuss von Hildebrand’s most important analyses of the different epistemic acts through which values are given. The salient concepts are those of the seeing and feeling of values. (shrink)

The first part of the paper focuses on the elements of von Hildebrand’s general and moral epistemology that can be related to Brentano’s philosophy. The salient concepts discussed are those of Kenntnisnahme and Stellungnahme. I explain their meaning and show their role in von Hildebrand’s critical assessment of Brentano’s conception of the acts of higher love and hate. In the second part of the paper, I argue that von Hildebrand’s material ethics is based on the basic ontological (...) presupposition of Scheler’s material value ethics and that it is, therefore, to be considered a version of it, notwithstanding some quite basic differences from Scheler in other respects. In the third part of the paper, I discuss von Hildebrand’s most important analyses of the different epistemic acts through which values are given. The salient concepts are those of the seeing and feeling of values. (shrink)

The paper aims to present a critical evaluation of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s account of value. This account is von Hildebrand’s most important and original contribution, not just to general value theory but to philosophy as such. I first present this account by explaining, in detail, his analysis of the so-called categories of importance. Then I critically examine the philosophical originality and merit of von Hildebrand’s account of value. I do so by arguing against his claim that value, (...) in the sense of the important in itself, is not in the centre of “traditional ethics”. (shrink)

In this article, I present and analyze Dietrich von Hildebrand’s explanation of how acting against one’s better knowledge is possible. I do so by comparing it to Plato’s analysis of the same problem. By this comparison, I seek to show the specificity of von Hildebrand’s approach to the phenomenon which, since Aristotle’s time, has been known as “akrasia.”.

It is generally accepted that truth is a norm of belief and that, whatever else this might mean, it implies that a person is obligated to believe a proposition only if it is true. Yet this seems to conflict with the norms by which friends form beliefs about each other. For instance, if friends are required to practice interpretive charity in the formation of their beliefs about each other, obligations to believe propositions that are false might arise. In this paper, (...) I assume that there is some such obligation of interpretive charity, and I investigate whether it may be reconciled with the truth-norm. I take for my starting point an account of interpretive charity from the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand, which I develop by critical retrieval of related works by Max Scheler and Gabriel Marcel. The paper concludes that Marcel’s thought on fidelity and reflection is best suited to complete von Hildebrand’s account in such a way as to achieve the sought-after reconciliation of the norms of truth and friendship. (shrink)

In what follows, I would like to trace Dietrich von Hildebrand’s thinking on the nature of axiological properties. Hildebrand begins his analysis from the phenomenology of what we experience as important and distinguishes three categories of importance: the subjectively satisfying, the value and the objective good of the person. He then moves on to metaphysical analysis to clarify whether the categories describe properties of objects and concludes that the foundation of all importance is value, the intrinsic preciousness. He (...) also examines the families of values and the relations between being and value. This analysis has an important completion in the investigation of the types of oughtness, which allow us to understand the foundation of norms. Hildebrand’s value theory makes it possible to address some crucial metaphysical problems, in particular the question of whether good ultimately triumphs. The epistemological premise of Hildebrand’s perspective, however, is the thesis that man experiences not only facts, but also values. (shrink)

In his Aesthetics, Dietrich von Hildebrand analyzes an interesting form of beauty adhering to audible and visible things that he calls second order beauty. In this paper, I will attempt to develop something which von Hildebrand recognizes, but which he himself does not fully develop: the religious significance of second order beauty. In particular, I wish to show that an aesthetic experience of this second order beauty can engender an encounter with God not in the “abstract,” but rather (...) as a concrete, individual, living person. (shrink)

In his Aesthetics, Dietrich von Hildebrand analyzes an interesting form of beauty adhering to audible and visible things that he calls second order beauty. In this paper, I will attempt to develop something which von Hildebrand recognizes, but which he himself does not fully develop: the religious significance of second order beauty. In particular, I wish to show that an aesthetic experience of this second order beauty can engender an encounter with God not in the “abstract,” but rather (...) as a concrete, individual, living person. (shrink)

I explore the personalism embedded in von Hildebrand’s moral philosophy, and then I explore the personalism in his later account of love. I claim that his personalism was significantly developed in his later work, and that it can be still further developed by us. I begin by explaining what Hildebrandian value-response is, and then I proceed to show how he subsequently qualified this foundational concept, first in his Ethics but especially in his late work, The Nature of Love, and (...) here especially through the concept of Eigenleben that was introduced in that work. I am particularly interested in showing why the personalism of von Hildebrand’s thought is enriched through this concept. (shrink)

I explore the personalism embedded in von Hildebrand’s moral philosophy, and then I explore the personalism in his later account of love. I claim that his personalism was significantly developed in his later work, and that it can be still further developed by us. I begin by explaining what Hildebrandian value-response is, and then I proceed to show how he subsequently qualified this foundational concept, first in his Ethics but especially in his late work, The Nature of Love, and (...) here especially through the concept of Eigenleben that was introduced in that work. I am particularly interested in showing why the personalism of von Hildebrand’s thought is enriched through this concept. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second‐person engagement in the constitution of first‐person‐plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face‐to‐face “I‐thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the (...) constitutive primacy of first‐person plural over first‐person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”. (shrink)