Consciousness is perhaps the most puzzling problem we humans face in trying to understand ourselves. Here, eighteen essays offer new angles on the subject. The contributors, who include many of the leading figures in philosophy of mind, discuss such central topics as intentionality, phenomenal content, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to the study of consciousness.

The article provides an account of the unlikely revival of the medieval Just War Theory, due in large part to the efforts of Michael Walzer. Its purpose is to address the question: What is a just war theorist? By exploring contrasts between scholarly activity and forms of international activism, the paper argues that just war theorists appear to be just war criminals, both on the count of aiding and abetting aggression and on the count of inciting troops to commit war (...) crimes. (shrink)

Consciousness is perhaps the most puzzling problem we humans face in trying to understand ourselves. It has been the subject of intense study for several decades, but, despite substantial progress, the most difficult problems have still not reached any generally agreed solution. Future research can start with this book. Eighteen original, specially written essays offer new angles on the subject. The contributors, who include many of the leading figures in philosophy of mind, discuss such central topics as intentionality, phenomenal content, (...) knowledge of mental states, consciousness and the brain, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to the study of consciousness. (shrink)

Consciousness is perhaps the most puzzling problem we humans face in trying to understand ourselves. It has been the subject of intense study for several decades, but, despite substantial progress, the most difficult problems have still not reached any generally agreed solution. This text aims to act as a starting point towards future research.

On October 18-19, 2002, the Center for Philosophical Education at Santa Barbara City College hosted a symposium honoring Professor Adolf Grünbaum’s contributions to contemporary philosophy. This work, an outgrowth of that symposium, contains essays by leading philosophers on Grünbaum's vast influence on philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. The symposium participants have either significantly reworked their original papers or written entirely new ones for this special publication. A reprint of Grünbaum’s "The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology" further enriches the book. (...) A highlight of the present volume is an extended "Autobiographical-Philosophical Narrative" in which Grünbaum traces his intellectual journey, beginning with a poignant account of his early experiences with anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany and his initial queries about religious belief, continuing through the major milestones of his career, and concluding with his current interests. Also of great value is a complete bibliography of Grünbaum's published works. Besides Grünbaum, the contributors include Nancy Murphy, Bas C. van Fraassen, Michael Tooley, Steven Humphrey, Nancy Cartwright, and Edward Erwin. (shrink)

A step towards constructing an ethics of international activism is proposed by formulating a series of constraints on what would constitute morally permissible agency in the context that involves delivering services abroad, directly or indirectly. Perhaps surprisingly, in this effort the author makes use of the concept of ‘force multiplier’. This idea and its official applications have explanatory importance in considering the correlation between the post-Cold War phenomenal growth in the number of international non-governmental organizations and the emergence of the (...) US as the sole, unchallenged superpower. Four moral constraints useful for morally assessing international activism are formulated and defended. The final outcome is an argument in favor of an overarching duty for any activist-minded Westerner to go local, while developing nations are urged to closely regulate, even criminalize, activities by international activists and ‘human rights organizations’ on their territory when not in solidarity or in support of local movements. The position defended, urging the normative primacy of local over international activism, also finds support in Immanuel Kant’s Third Definitive Article for A Perpetual Peace. (shrink)

Having followed the literature on genocide since the beginning of 1990s I have been often struck that academic writing on genocide is very much like non-professional pursuits in youth sports: anything is considered 'a good try'. The French have a good phrase for what I mean here: n'importe quoi. Works exhibiting no sound methodology, replete with irrational claims without factual basis and beliefs about foreigners adopted on faith limited only by a 'the worse the better' criterion of plausibility dominate the (...) literature on genocide. My only consolation in confronting this literature has been that philosophers, for the most part, had not been the ones taking part in this orgy of nonsense. The book Genocide and Human Rights takes even that solace away as it purports to be 'a philosophical guide' to genocide. (shrink)

International law makes it explicit that states shall not intervene militarily or otherwise in the affairs of other states; it is a central principle of the charter of the United Nations. But international law also provides an exception; when a conflict within a state poses a threat to international peace, military intervention by the UN may be warranted.. The Charter and other UN documents also assert that human rights are to be protected — but in the past the responsibility for (...) the protection of human rights has for the most part been allowed to rest on the government of the state where the violation of rights occurs. Not surprisingly in this context, the question of what protection should be provided by the UN or otherwise to individuals when their human rights are violated by their governments or with the complicity of their governments remains a contentious issue. Should the principle of respect for state sovereignty trump the principle of respect for human rights? Historically it has been allowed to do so, but recently it has been more and more widely argued that when states fail to respect the human rights of their citizens, they may be held accountable for their actions. Is military humanitarian intervention justifiable? And if so, under what circumstances? Those are the questions addressed in this collection of essays. The focus of the volume is on the abstract principles involved; though reference is sometimes made to specific cases, the essays here consist primarily of philosophical reflection on the abstract issues. (shrink)

Original essays by philosophers of language and philosophers of time exploring the semantics and metaphysics of tense.

This is an attempt to develop a more complete understanding of ``genocidalism of commission,'' or the genocidal use of ``genocide,'' defined stipulatively as ``the energetic attributions of ``genocide'' in less than clear cases without considering available and convincing opposing evidence and argumentation.'' Genocidalism is a widespread phenomenon regarding the discourse on international affairs in the advanced, liberal societies of the West, embedding a ``normative divide'' between the ways of attending to domestic (national) concerns and ways of attending to international issues. (...) I argue that genocidalism is morally wrong, explore its likely causes, and suggest possible ways of getting rid of this hateful practice. (shrink)

In this century technology, production, and their consequent environmental impact have advanced to the point where unrectifiable and uncontroIlable global imbalances may emerge. Hence, decisions made by existing human beings are capable of dramaticaIly affecting the welfare of future generations. Current controversy about environmental protection involves the question of whether our present obligations to future generations can be grounded in their present rights. Many philosophers would question the very intelligibility of the idea that future individuals might have present rights. They (...) do not see how a non-existing object could be said to have anything, let alone rights. Others see no obstacle to attributing properties to such objects. Thus, the controversy about the rights of future individuals shifted to a different, that is, ontological level. What is the proper method for resolving conflicts on this “deeper” level? This essay has two inter-dependent goals: (1) to suggest and assess a testing procedure for ontological claims, through the use of an example of conflicting ontological theses; and (2) to illuminate the concept of a right, through a discussion of the most general features of the requirements for the possible possession of rights. (shrink)

In this century technology, production, and their consequent environmental impact have advanced to the point where unrectifiable and uncontroIlable global imbalances may emerge. Hence, decisions made by existing human beings are capable of dramaticaIly affecting the welfare of future generations. Current controversy about environmental protection involves the question of whether our present obligations to future generations can be grounded in their present rights. Many philosophers would question the very intelligibility of the idea that future individuals might have present rights. They (...) do not see how a non-existing object could be said to have anything, let alone rights. Others see no obstacle to attributing properties to such objects. Thus, the controversy about the rights of future individuals shifted to a different, that is, ontological level. What is the proper method for resolving conflicts on this “deeper” level? This essay has two inter-dependent goals: (1) to suggest and assess a testing procedure for ontological claims, through the use of an example of conflicting ontological theses; and (2) to illuminate the concept of a right, through a discussion of the most general features of the requirements for the possible possession of rights. (shrink)

After a historically oriented discussion of the classical works on the methodology of science, and the most recent works on the subject of scientific discovery the following two questions are distinguished: Is there a logic of discovery? and Should philosophers of science be at all interested in the subject of scientific discovery? I argue that both those who advocate the methodological significance of scientific discovery and those who oppose this view only contribute to the current misformulation of the problem of (...) discovery. Both positions involve major confusions regarding the meaning of "discovery." They all, mistakenly, conceive of the scientific enterprise as comprising several logically distinct stages, one of which is discovery. I show that an appreciation of the proper meaning of "discovery" proves this conception wrong, and both establishes that scientific discovery is a legitimate subject for the philosopher of science and provides a new account of the scientific enterprise as a whole. (shrink)

In the wake of the Cold War a characteristic style of genocide narratives emerged in the West. For the most part, philosophers did not pay attention to this development even though they are uniquely qualified to address arguments and conceptual issues discussed in this burgeoning genocide genre. While ostensibly a response to a specific recent article belonging to the genre, this essay offers an outline of an ethics of genocide narratives in the form of four lessons on how not to (...) write about genocide. It is argued that to the extent that works on the subject of genocide are dominated by narrativism, genocidalism, activism, or extreme pacifism, they cannot properly be classified as scholarly endeavors and must be met with resistance per the requirements of academic ethics and proper scholarly methodology. (shrink)

In the debate between those who hold the tensed theory and those who hold the tenseless theory of time, Arthur Prior’s famous “Thank Goodness Argument” has had a special place. Initially designed to help tensers, it has seen its fortune change many times. In this paper the focus is on a methodological aspect of the argument. The purpose is to defend the “new reading” of the argument, which is intended to resolve an ontological issue by focusing on an epistemic fact, (...) against a recent charge by Nathan Oaklander that such an argument can be valid only if it is trivial, i.e., if “ceases to exist” contained in one of the premises had been already understood in the tensed sense. However, whether the argument is trivial or not depends also on whether the tensed reading is directly invoked or obtained only through the substitution of an extensional equivalent whose truth is not based on the presupposed truth of the tensed account. A possible extensional equivalent needed for the intended substitution is offered. It is based on the concept of in-the-world-inherent-modalities. (shrink)

This book offers a detailed account and analysis of the academic scandal regarding the honorary doctorate awarded to Professor Michael Walzer by Belgrade University and the events that followed.

This timely volume addresses urgent questions about the nature of war crimes, nationalism, ethnic cleansing and collective responsibility from a variety of moral, political and legal perspectives.

Economic sanctions are envisaged as a sort of punishment, based on what should be an institutional decision not unlike a court ruling. Hence, the conditions for their lifting should be clearly stated and once those are met sanctions should be lifted. But this is generally not what happens, and perhaps is precluded by the very nature of international sanctioning. Sanctions clearly have political, economic, military and strategic consequences, but the question raised here is whether sanctions can also have moral justification. (...) Illustrated by the example of international sanctions against Yugoslavia, the authors show how the process of escalating demands on a target country, inherent to the very process of sanctioning, can lead ultimately even to overt aggression. As a result of this logic of escalation, economic sanctions cannot be articulated properly in any law-like system. Economic sanctions have much more in common with war than legal punishment, and in fact represent a form of siege. As such, they cannot be ended simply on the basis of their initial rationale, for the very process of sanctions implementation opens up possibilities for setting new goals and a continuous redefinition of the goal that sanctions are seen to have. (shrink)

Sanctions such as those applied by the United Nations against Yugoslavia, or rather the actions of implementing and maintaining them, at the very least implicitly purport to have moral justification. While the rhetoric used to justify sanctions is clearly moralistic, even sanctions themselves, as worded, often include phrases indicating moral implication. On May 30, 1992, United Nation Security Council Resolution 757 imposed a universal, binding blockage on all trade and all scientific, cultural and sports exchanges with Serbia and Montenegro. In (...) addition to expressing the usual "concern' and "dismay" regarding various events, the language of this Resolution also includes, on three occasions, unmistakably moral language "deploring" failures in meeting the demands of earlier resolutions.' There is no question that sanctions have political, economic, military and trategic consequences for the sanctioned state, perhaps exactly as desired by the sanctioning party. However, the question raised in this essay is whether in addition to these consequences, sanctions also produce morally reprehensible consequences that undermine their often-cited moral justification. If so, international economic sanctions are an immoral means of achieving primarily political goals. Six morally significant consequences are: 1) The unethical, elevated susceptibility of the sanctioned to olitical (and other forms of) manipulation, 2) the inherent and unjust paternalism in the process of sanctioning, 3) the abandonment of strict moral criteria on virtually all levels of evaluation, primarily inside the sanctioned country, but also in sanctioning states best exhibited in the attitudes toward the sanctioned, 4) the general decline in moral consciousness, 5) the subsequent rise of many forms of violence within the sanctioned state in connection with the increase in lawlessness, and a general decline of expectations in all areas of life, and 6) the continual, arbitrary redefining of conditions for a final lifting of sanctions. In light of this moral phenomenology we shall argue that sanctions, lacking in moral justification, are simply a means for achieving the mentioned immoral goals. Furthermore, the argument will be that sanctions are a form of siege and, as such, an act of war, requiring the sort of justification that would be needed to justify a war. (shrink)

This research paper focuses on the comprehensive description and analysis of the structure of judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Despite the growing interest in examining the rhetorical and linguistic aspects of legal texts, the genre structure of judgments has remained a little-explored area. While headings and paragraph enumeration provide a systematic reference system for citation and cross-referencing they do not reveal the dynamic relations between individual text chunks in judgments. The current analysis combines Swales (...) and Bhatia's genre theory with Hoey's approach to patterning in discourse and corpus linguistics analyses. The findings show that the complexity of CJEU judgments extends beyond surface-level information with linguistic expressions playing a crucial role in highlighting dynamic relations and discourse patterning. The results reveal how the structure of CJEU judgments has changed over time and point to the intratextual relations between different sections. Additionally, the study provides a detailed description of the textual organisation of CJEU judgments in terms of move structures and conventionalised discourse patterns. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive treatment in recent decades of silence and silencing in psychoanalysis from clinical and research perspectives, as well as in philosophy, theology, linguistics, and musicology.

How can performance transform places of urban renewal and regeneration? What does performance contribute to the creation of community? These are some of the questions addressed in this study of the relationship of performance to urban space. Marrying theory with a series of international case studies of performance practice and interviews with practitioners, this interdisciplinary study examines how space is performatively produced to create a sense of 'placeness'. Case studies are drawn from Canada, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the UK and (...) Spain. (shrink)

In this paper, the authors first emphasise the connection that exists between bioethics and law. However, special attention is given to the link between bioethics and human rights, which share the idea of protecting similar values, especially the protection of life and human dignity. Identifying the interdependence and interrelation of these concepts is a prerequisite for further exploration of how and in what context the European Court of Human Rights decides on bioethical issues it encounters when ruling on classical human (...) rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Once the important features that determine the relationship between bioethics and human rights are identified, these features will be practically examined through the group of cases in which the Court has addressed the issue of mandatory vaccination, which has been in the public spotlight in recent years. (shrink)

There is a widespread belief in Hinduism that Vyāsa, the alleged editor of the Vedas and author of the Mahābhārata, is identical with Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma-sūtra. The identification of these two mythic characters, however, originated between 800–980 CE, after the likes of Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, and Bhāskara, but before Vācaspati Miśra, Prakāśātman, Sarvajñātman, and Yāmuna. The purpose of this paper is to understand how and why such identification took place. The argument developed here is that the Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa identity (...) was invented by the author of or community behind the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as part of a complex of self-representation strategies. The Bhāgavata intentionally makes itself a work of Vedānta, indeed the Brahma-sūtra itself, over which it builds a new soteriology that is centered on the idea of bhakti. Two factors in particular stand out in light of the Bhāgavata’s Vedāntic background: Vyāsa’s paradigmatic character as the preserver of old dharma and the innovator, visionary, of new soteriologies; and the image of Vyāsa’s son Śuka as the model ascetic and ideal candidate for the new soteriological vision, through whom the Bhāgavata community chose to represent itself. (shrink)

The Laozi expounds a thoroughgoing and sustained criticism of government and society. In this paper, I will demonstrate that although this criticism is addressed to the ancient Chinese state, it can also have some validity for the modern state of today. I will first briefly discuss the metaphysical grounds of this criticism and stress that the ruler should use wuwei in governing. Then, I will examine the Laozi’s criticism of the oppressive governments that use unnatural governing through youwei which increases (...) the state disorder, as well as how this criticism is supported by its metaphysical grounds. Third, I will show that the selfish desires may significantly contribute to the state disorder and that the only one to be blamed for the arousing of them is the ruler. At last, I will attempt to show that this criticism may also to a certain extent be directed toward today’s modern state. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christian Ethics and Commonsense Morality: An Intuitionist Account by Kevin JungAleksandar S. SantracChristian Ethics and Commonsense Morality: An Intuitionist Account Kevin Jung NEW YORK AND LONDON: ROUTLEDGE, 2014. 202 PP. $145.00In Christian Ethics and Commonsense Morality: An Intuitionist Account, Kevin Jung boldly constructs and defends a commonsense morality of intuition as a plausible ethical theory against both postmodern constructivist ethical systems and narrow objectivist theories. Following the antifoundationalist (...) ethical methods of postmodern approaches to reality and morality in chapter 1 and a moderate defense of realism in chapter 2, Jung attempts to save both objectivity and de-feasibility of moral realistic accounts, offering some modern reinterpretations of moral realism in chapters 3 and 4. All these forms of Wittgensteinian conceptions of realism unsatisfactorily lead to infinite regress in justifying claims because they are grounded only in the wishes, interests, and sentiments of the individual culture and society (60).After a brief introduction to the unique role of emotions in ethical theories, his investigation leads to reconciliation between objectivist naturalistic ethics [End Page 192] and theological forms of ethical theories. Theological ethicists can remain committed to intuitionism (objectivist and naturalistic forms of common morality) refined by particular religious expressions of morality (112). Intuitionism, broadly defined in chapter 7, is described as "initial appearances" (118); moral truths, according to Jung's intuitionist account, are "mediately self-evident" (128), not "immediately," because it still requires careful reflection and cognitive searching for objectivist grounds of morality. Jung's affirmation of the plausibility of intuitionism seems to be a final blow to all forms of postmodern and skeptical accounts of antifoundationalist forms of ethical theories; he successfully defends an intuitionist account of morality against its naturalist and religious critics.The last chapter offers three types of relationship between commonsense morality and Christian morality. The identity model reduces Christian morality to commonsense morality. The two-tier model considers Christian morality to be a superior form of morality with instrumental value of commonsense morality. And, finally, integration, Jung's favorite model, considers commonsense morality as neither identical nor subordinate but central to Christian morality (163). With this he affirms that Christian morality is unique not because of differences in moral beliefs but because "it is fully committed to recognizing the oneness of humanity and the universally accessible nature of basic moral truths for all human beings" (166). Jung's reflection is exceptionally insightful. Building the case as a good lawyer, he leads us to the defenseless nature of constructivist postmodern moral theories and their revisions as well as to a commitment of Christian morality to the objective commonsense morality. On this view, even heroic moral acts based on obedience to God (such as Christian sacrificial love) might be compatible with commonsense morality. It is surprising, however, that Jung never consulted or quoted Bernard Gert's account of the common morality, especially when discussing differences between moral duty and ideals (167). Additionally, Jung's argument that Christian morality is unexceptional since moral knowledge can be obtained through multiple sources in which God also reveals his will (178) does not sufficiently probe into the distinctiveness of God's sometimes radical demands of Jews/Christians (e.g., Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac), which come not from intuitionist accounts of objective natural reason or common sense but from faith. Christian saints are not heroes of general moral example but heroes of faith, a qualitatively different realm of human experience. Still, audiences interested in all aspects of ethics will greatly benefit from this superb engagement with recent discussions. [End Page 193]Aleksandar S. SantracWashington Adventist UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In this article I will discuss the anarchist and non-anarchist interpretations of the Laozi and argue that the political philosophy of the Laozi does not completely conform to Western anarchism. Thus, firstly I will give a brief introduction to Western anarchism. Then I will present the strongest arguments of the anarchist interpretation and try to find their mistakes and refute them. Finally I will try to give an acceptable non-anarchist interpretation of the political philosophy of the Laozi. In doing steps (...) 2 and 3, I will base my arguments in a way that is consistent with the text of the Laozi itself. Thus, I hope that this article will bring a deeper understanding of the political philosophy of the Laozi and break with the widely spread opinion that the Laozi propounds an anarchist theory. (shrink)