Absolutely no one still believes that every physical interactionconsists of material bodies bumping into each other. Those who have tried to work out a completely mechanistic physics have been unable to explain common phenomena like liquidity, gravitation and magnetism. In fact, there is great reason to doubt that such a physics could ever account for attractive forces in general.

Absolutely no one still believes that every physical interactionconsists of material bodies bumping into each other. Those who have tried to work out a completely mechanistic physics have been unable to explain common phenomena like liquidity, gravitation and magnetism. In fact, there is great reason to doubt that such a physics could ever account for attractive forces in general.

Alleged cases of simultaneous causation have played a prominent role in the critique of various accounts of explanation/causation and in the formation of alternative accounts. It is argued that none of the stated cases are genuine instances of simultaneous causations, since they all violate the special theory of relativity (STR). The conditions a genuine case would have to meet in light of the restrictions imposed by STR are outlined.

The most recent challenge to the covering-law model of explanation charges that the fundamental explanatory laws are not true. In fact explanation and truth are alleged to pull in different directions. We hold that this gets its force from confusing issues about the truth of the laws in the explanation and the precision with which those laws can yield an exact description of the event to be explained. In defending this we look at Cartwright's major case studies and sketch an (...) amended covering-law model of explanation. (shrink)

The most recent challenge to the covering-law model of explanation (N. Cartwright, How the laws of Physics Lie) charges that the fundamental explanatory laws are not true. In fact explanation and truth are alleged to pull in different directions. We hold that this gets its force from confusing issues about the truth of the laws in the explanation and the precision with which those laws can yield an exact description of the event to be explained. In defending this we look (...) at Cartwright's major case studies and sketch an amended covering-law model of explanation. (shrink)

A commonplace thesis of the “new philosophy of science” is the view that the testing of a given theory is not a simple comparison of the theory with nature but also requires the comparison of the theory with competing theories. More specifically the version of the intertheoretic competition thesis that shall be examined is as follows:(ITC) In addition to comparing a theory with nature, a necessary condition for the rejection of a theory is the acceptance of an alternative theory.It is (...) Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that is responsible for the widespread popularity of (ITC).1,2…a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature. …the act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. (shrink)

There is a widely accepted ancient principle which holds that effects must occur as soon as possible after their causes. This paper takes this principle seriously and shows that if one believes there are causal chains then one is forced to accept the view that the temporal order is discrete or that some causally related events form a dense sequence.

The covering law model of explanation has a staying power not even to be outdone by Lazarus. For at least forty years, writer after writer has tried to put it in its grave for the last time. The most recent efforts come from Nancy Cartwright (1983). Her slant is at once modern and old fashioned. It is modern in that unlike the familiar charge that the covering law model lets in too much, her charge is that it does not let (...) in enough. It is old fashioned in that the soft spot she presses is one recognized by Hempel and Oppenheim in their classical essay. (1948, p. 248).Cartwright challenges the requirement that the sentences constituting the explanans (in particular the law or laws) must be true. (shrink)

The intertheoretic competition hypothesis (the rejection of a theory not only requires the comparison of the theory with nature but also the acceptance of an alternative theory) is a dogma of contemporary philosophy of science. I first attempt to reconstruct Thomas Kuhn's argument for the view. A central exegetical claim is that his argument rests on the Duhemian Thesis. I then show that the argument is inconclusive and suggest that there are vivid historical counterexamples to the competition hypothesis.

I show that what Quine calls 'pressing from above' is an argument for indeterminacy of translation that is generated by assuming the partial interpretation view of scientific theories. Furthermore, I argue that Quine's thesis should be understood as a reductio ad absurdum of partial interpretation and/or the view that the meaning of a term determines a unique extension for the term.

The focus of the paper is the ethical issues associated with the practice of dissecting animals in lower level college biology classes. Several arguments against dissection are explored. Furthermore, the issue is examined from the point of view of the instructor's academic freedom and the point of view of a student's moral autonomy. It is argued that even though the arguments against dissection fail, it is very important to respect the moral autonomy of students who oppose the practice. Often this (...) can be accomplished in a manner that is consistent with academic freedom and good science education. (shrink)

George Berkeley: Philosophy of Science George Berkeley announces at the very outset of Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous that the goals of his philosophical system are to demonstrate the reality of genuine knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the soul, and the ever-present guidance and care of God for us. He will do this in … Continue reading George Berkeley: Philosophy of Science →.

The received account of whistleblowing, developed over the last quarter century, is identified with the work of Norman Bowie and Richard DeGeorge. Michael Davis has detailed three anomalies for the received view: the paradoxes of burden, missing harm and failure. In addition, he has proposed an alternative account of whistleblowing, viz., the Complicity Theory. This paper examines the Complicity Theory. The supposed anomalies rest on misunderstandings of the received view or misreadings of model cases of whistleblowing, for example, the Challenger (...) disaster and the Ford Pinto. Nevertheless, the Complicity Theory is important for as in science the contrast with alternative competing accounts often helps us better understand the received view. Several aspects of the received view are reviewed and strengthened through comparison with Complicity Theory, including why whistleblowing needs moral justification. Complicity Theory is also critiqued. The fundamental failure of Complicity Theory is its failure to explain why government and the public encourage and protect whistleblowers despite the possibility of considerable harm to the relevant company in reputation, lost jobs, and lost shareholder value. (shrink)

This book includes a selection of contributions to the Iowa State University Symposium on agricultural bioethics in november 1987. The papers are grouped in the sections "Safety and regulatory issues", "Impact on scientific and industrial communities", "Public perceptions", "Economic prospects", "Social considerations" and "Ethical dilemmas".

This popular reader has been vastly updated with ten stimulating new selections on the natural and the social sciences: feminism; postmodernism, relativism, and science; confirmation, acceptance, and theory; explanatory unification; and science and values. Retaining the best essays from the previous editions, the editors have added important new pieces to maintain this influential text's relevance.

This book is concerned with how we should think and act in our work, leisure activities, and time utilization in order to achieve flourishing lives. The scope papers range from general theoretical considerations of the value, e.g. 'What is a balanced life?', to specific types of considerations, e.g. 'How should we cope with the effects of work on moral decision-making?'.

Reliabilism has received its share of bad press of late both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of epistemic justification. We believe its credibility as a theory of knowledge may have been unjustly tarnished and we plan to defend it. However, we hasten to add that we shall defend reliabilism from attack only upon its credentials as a basis for a theory of knowledge. We shall not defend it as a theory of epistemic justification, although we do (...) believe that the latter is a worthy pursuit. (shrink)

This article argues that Frank B. Wilderson's political ontology can be read as both a critique and a radicalization of Giorgio Agamben's formal political-ontological framework constructed around the two extreme poles of sovereignty and bare life. Wilderson critiques and expands Agamben's framework by locating the zero point of political abjection not within bare life, which is still implicated within the ontological zone of Human being by way of an included exclusion, but within Black social death, which is cut off absolutely (...) from Human being. While such a political ontological framework provides an extremely powerful optic for the absolute ontological abjection of Black existence in relation to all other racial positions in the modern West, its absolute prioritization limits the scope of an analysis of power relations that might offer an account of racial positioning that is both broader than and resistant to the political ontology of Western race relations. In conclusion, turning to Fred Moten's Black optimism and Deleuze's and Guattari's account of micropolitics and lines of flight, the article argues for a pragmatics of resistance that finds its practical condition of possibility within the micropolitical field of power relations that marks an excess to the anti-Black macropolitics of political ontology. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy. Ricoeur's aim here is to explicate as fully as possible the hypothesis that has governed his inquiry, namely, that the effort of thinking at work in every (...) narrative configuration is completed in a refiguration of temporal experience. To this end, he sets himself the central task of determing how far a poetics of narrative can be said to resolve the "aporias"—the doubtful or problematic elements—of time. Chief among these aporias are the conflicts between the phenomenological sense of time and the cosmological sense on the one hand and the oneness or unitary nature of time on the other. In conclusion, Ricoeur reflects upon the inscrutability of time itself and attempts to discern the limits of his own examination of narrative discourse. "As in his previous works, Ricoeur labors as an imcomparable mediator of often estranged philosophical approaches, always in a manner that compromises neither rigor nor creativity."—Mark Kline Taylor, _Christian Century _ "In the midst of two opposing contemporary options—either to flee into ever more precious readings... or to retreat into ever more safe readings... —Ricoeur's work offers an alternative option that is critical, wide-ranging, and conducive to new applications."—Mary Gerhart, _Journal of Religion_. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy. Ricoeur's aim here is to explicate as fully as possible the hypothesis that has governed his inquiry, namely, that the effort of thinking at work in every (...) narrative configuration is completed in a refiguration of temporal experience. To this end, he sets himself the central task of determing how far a poetics of narrative can be said to resolve the "aporias"—the doubtful or problematic elements—of time. Chief among these aporias are the conflicts between the phenomenological sense of time and the cosmological sense on the one hand and the oneness or unitary nature of time on the other. In conclusion, Ricoeur reflects upon the inscrutability of time itself and attempts to discern the limits of his own examination of narrative discourse. "As in his previous works, Ricoeur labors as an imcomparable mediator of often estranged philosophical approaches, always in a manner that compromises neither rigor nor creativity."—Mark Kline Taylor, _Christian Century _ "In the midst of two opposing contemporary options—either to flee into ever more precious readings... or to retreat into ever more safe readings... —Ricoeur's work offers an alternative option that is critical, wide-ranging, and conducive to new applications."—Mary Gerhart, _Journal of Religion_. (shrink)

Redish builds on work on morality in economics, genetics, evolution, etc. and combines it with the latest research in neuroscientific decision-making to develop a coherent science of morality.

Although the mechanics of how the eye works are well understood, debate still exists as to how the complex machinery of the brain interprets neural impulses...

The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) (...) changing allostatic set points, (3) euphorigenic signals, (4) overvaluation in the planning system, (5) incorrect search of situation-action-outcome relationships, (6) misclassification of situations, (7) overvaluation in the habit system, (8) a mismatch in the balance of the two decision systems, (9) over-fast discounting processes, and (10) changed learning rates. These vulnerabilities provide a taxonomy of potential problems with decision-making systems. Although each vulnerability can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each vulnerability also implies a characteristic symptomology. Different drugs, different behaviors, and different individuals are likely to access different vulnerabilities. This has implications for an individual's susceptibility to addiction and the transition to addiction, for the potential for relapse, and for the potential for treatment. (shrink)

1. Plan de la antropología filosófica contemporánea -- 2. El hombre como tema y como problema -- 3. Estructura interna del hombre -- 4. El hombre como ser definido -- 5. El hombre en cuanto uno-de-tantos, particular, individuo, singular y persona -- 6. La función del cuerpo -- 7. Concepciones del espíritu -- 8. La concepción del hombre según Scheler -- 9. El plan de la antropología filosófica en Heidegger -- 10. El hombre en el existencialismo francés.

Los orígenes; o, La crítica indefinada. -- La era presocrática y la exploración estética. -- Platón; o, El poeta contra la poesía. -- Aristóles; o, De la fenomenología literaria.