The phrase, ‘political obligation’, is far more popular in English than in other European languages. Whether this may be due to historical circumstances, or to a peculiar bent of the English mind, is a fascinating question; but it is not the one which I propose to discuss here today. I am mentioning it only to explain the choice of my subject, a subject which would probably sound rather uncommon to an Italian audience, but which, I am sure, has a familiar (...) ring to English ears. My subject, I would like to emphasise, is the nature of political obligation; my approach will be analytical rather than historical; and indeed, let me say at once that this lecture is a kind of examen de conscience in which I am myself involved, since I feel personally responsible for having introduced the phrase into my own native language, and for having used it during a life-time as if its meaning were self-evident, without ever raising the questions which I want to raise today. (shrink)

We all know of course more or less what the answer of the historian would be if we turned to him alone for enlightenment. He would, to be sure, begin by pointing out that throughout Western history the two notions of legality and legitimacy have played an important part in political thought, providing as it were two of its most solid pillars. Without reaching as far back as the Greeks, the historian would probably recall to our attention the distinction, current (...) in Medieval and Renaissance thought, between the two criteria for establishing the rightfulness of political power. Power, in order to be "just," must be both legitimate and law-abiding. Accordingly, the unjust ruler or tyrant may be defined ex parte exercitii as well as ex defectu tituli. His rule can be unjust for the manner in which it is exercised, if he does not keep within the bounds of legality. But it can also be unjust, and is inevitably so, if it lacks that proper "title" which confers legitimacy upon it. The quest for that title, namely for the ultimate foundation of authority, has long been the main concern of political theory. Some among us are old enough to remember the time when dynastic legitimacy was still an accepted doctrine in Europe. In our day, legitimacy is rarely invoked, and does not seem to be any longer an intelligible political principle. Yet there is still one European statesman who does not hesitate to use it as a prop for his political doctrine, if he has any. Shortly after his accession to power, President de Gaulle made the startling claim that "for twenty years" he had been "the incarnation of national legitimacy." Some of his recent actions seem clearly to evince the view which he once candidly expounded to an American visitor: that "legitimacy does not depend on legality, and legality is not necessarily a proof of legitimacy.". (shrink)

Employing the tools of logical analysis, Åquist presents a very careful, though cumbrously formalistic, reassessment of Price's Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, a treatise which he considers as the best in its field before Sidgwick and Moore.--A. P. D. M.

The authors ably demonstrate the value and relevance of sophisticated conceptual analysis in law. Such concepts as cause, reason, consequence, condition, opportunity, and explanation are carefully investigated. The use of the causal notions in the Anglo-American tradition of tort, contract, and criminal law, as well as in continental theories, is examined in detail. A book of importance which carries out English analysis in a subtle and exciting way. It is sure to be one of the lasting contributions of the recent (...) analytic movement.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

The substance and development of Eddington's "scientific epistemology" are presented in close parallelism with the philosophy of Kant. The author argues that Kant was far more successful in displaying the philosophical structure of Newtonian physics than Eddington is in showing the philosophy behind quantum mechanics and relativity.--A. P. D. M.

More than half of the book is devoted to what is almost a catalogue exposition of Western moral philosophy from Kant to Nowell-Smith. Although the author claims in the preface to have included "suitable references to Indian points of view, including the Buddhist," what references there are are usually too general, and never fully explained to be of any use to Western readers. Exposition tends to be disjointed, and the English leaves much to be desired. On the whole there is (...) much eclecticism and little originality.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

Topics in the standard introductory logic course are all covered, with emphasis on the understanding of concepts rather than the development of skills in symbolic manipulation. Exposition is informal and rich in illustrations from reasoning in ordinary life. Exercises are also drawn from ordinary discourse, but they often call for the application of symbolic techniques. In combining accuracy and sophistication with simplicity and liveliness of style, the book is indeed a pedagogic success. --A. P. D. M.

M. Piguet believes that philosophy is, in a strict sense, a compromise between science and art. In the course of establishing this thesis he makes some interesting suggestions on the question of ordinary language. For him this idiom is the "culture language"; it embodies the cultural experience of an age; it can be neither technical nor colloquial; it is the language of the honnête homme. It is also the basic "translation language" with which all other technical and artistic idioms must (...) be ultimately coordinated.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

The place of scientific results, the role of scientific method, and the impact of the scientific temper in ethical theory are surveyed. The concept of an "existential perspective of an ethical theory"--"its view of the world and its properties, man's nature and condition, insofar as these enter into its understanding of moral processes and moral judgments"--is sketched and used to clarify the diversity of ethical approaches. Edel promises, but does not here develop, a scientific ethics based on the behavioral sciences.--A. (...) P. D. M. (shrink)

This little volume shows a remarkable familiarity with both continental and Anglo-American literature on the subjects of probability and induction. Discussion is both expository and critical. The author argues in favor of a psychological-pragmatic interpretation of the principle of induction and the theory of confirmation.--A. P. D. M.

In this posthumously published work the author deplores the decline in standards of rigor and clarity in recent German philosophy. A return to Socratic methods and to Brentano's early conception of a "phenomenal psychology" is urged.--A. P. D. M.

Meanings are construed by analogy with offices. But in contrast with similar views, offices are seen as "entities." In the final analysis all offices are reduced to that of stating facts. If the latter thesis were adequately defended the book would mark another reversal of philosophical thinking. But the author limits himself to reviving, restating, and modifying earlier positivist attempts to reduce all meaning to description.--A. P. D. M.

This is a book both sober and optimistic, both analytical and humane. In the course of a virtual reinstatement of a Socratic ethics, it is claimed that: analytic philosophy can decide moral issues, at least indirectly, by clarifying the relevant concepts; moral philosophers are wrong in saying that there can be no argument about generally accepted standards; our failure to resolve cases of ultimate ethical disagreement is only a measure of our ignorance of the human machine, and confusion about our (...) shared purposes; students of moral concepts cannot be neutral with respect to morals--analytic philosophers should not disguise their role as social reformers.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

Meaning is interpreted in terms of distributional regularities in the corpus of a language; synonymy in terms of contrastive and non-contrastive sets of morphemic environments. For this blending of philosophical analysis and empirical linguistics, however, no defense is offered, though in the course of his sketch the author registers subtle and unconventional insights into key concepts and issues in philosophy of language.--A. P. D. M.

In refutation of Cajetan, the sixteenth century commentator who is still considered an authority on Thomas' doctrine of analogy, it is argued that "the analogy of names is, for St. Thomas, a logical intention, and in speaking of it we must observe the general rule that the logical and real orders must not be confused. St. Thomas does not see any peculiar significance of analogy for metaphysics--apart, i.e., from the significance it has for science and ordinary discourse." The thesis is (...) closely argued for and painstakingly documented.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

A collection of essays on the nature of science, concept formation, causality and counterfactuals, and the theory of real numbers. The argument is in the form of an exposition and critique of classical and recent literature; but more programmatic remarks are registered, and more promissory notes issued, than are made good.--A. P. D. M.

A series of brief discussions of such key topics of analytic philosophy as qualities vs. grammatical variables, descriptions, the problem of perception, the notion of proposition and determinism. The views of Carnap and Strawson receive special attention and are, on the whole, sympathetically appraised.--A. P. D. M.

This controversial book professes to be a "critical account of Linguistic Philosophy and a study of Ideology." It is clearly written and abounds with entertaining aphorisms. Philosophically important objections against the Oxford School are developed in the first hundred pages. The rest is highly repetitious, and, aside from rhetorical effects and remarks on the psychology and sociology of the movement, contribute little to a "refutation" of Linguistic Philosophy. As an alternative to Linguistic Philosophy, the book only vaguely hints to a (...) "clean," "non-oblique," and "non-insinuated" form of naturalism.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

A series of four lectures given in Athens during the author's tenure of a Fulbright Fellowship. The intention is to introduce Athenian public to three classical American philosophers, as well as to contemporary trends. The author sees interesting parallels between Emerson and the Byzantine Mystics and predicts that the interest of Americans in Ancient Greek philosophy will lead to closer studies of Byzantine philosophy. The chief defect of the book is its willingness to sacrifice content for coverage. Presentation is cursory (...) and often by terms which are misleading in themselves and particularly unfortunate when rendered into modern Greek.--. (shrink)

A series of four lectures given in Athens during the author's tenure of a Fulbright Fellowship. The intention is to introduce Athenian public to three classical American philosophers, as well as to contemporary trends. The author sees interesting parallels between Emerson and the Byzantine Mystics and predicts that the interest of Americans in Ancient Greek philosophy will lead to closer studies of Byzantine philosophy. The chief defect of the book is its willingness to sacrifice content for coverage. Presentation is cursory (...) and often by terms which are misleading in themselves and particularly unfortunate when rendered into modern Greek.--. (shrink)

Topics in the standard introductory logic course are all covered, with emphasis on the understanding of concepts rather than the development of skills in symbolic manipulation. Exposition is informal and rich in illustrations from reasoning in ordinary life. Exercises are also drawn from ordinary discourse, but they often call for the application of symbolic techniques. In combining accuracy and sophistication with simplicity and liveliness of style, the book is indeed a pedagogic success. --A. P. D. M.

Classical metaphysics from Plato to English empiricism arises out of the bad syntax and bad semantics of the Greek language. Phenomenology and existentialism arise out of similar excesses in German. The thesis, familiar to English readers, that all metaphysicians are duped by the poor logical form of ordinary language, is argued against an impressive command of the history of philosophy and with a degree of vehemence reminiscent of adolescent logical empiricism.--A. P. D. M.

In this posthumously published work the author deplores the decline in standards of rigor and clarity in recent German philosophy. A return to Socratic methods and to Brentano's early conception of a "phenomenal psychology" is urged.--A. P. D. M.

A critical note on Christopher Bartel and Jack M. C. Kwong, ‘Pluralism, Eliminativism, and the Definition of Art’, Estetika 58 (2021): 100–113. Art pluralism is the view that there is no single, correct account of what art is. Instead, art is understood through a plurality of art concepts and with considerations that are different for particular arts. Although avowed pluralists have retained the word ‘art’ in their discussions, it is natural to ask whether the considerations that motivate pluralism should lead (...) us to abandon art talk altogether; that is, should pluralism lead to eliminativism? This paper addresses arguments both for and against this move. We ultimately argue that pluralism allows one to retain the word ‘art’, if one wants it, but only in a loose, conversational sense. The upshot of pluralism is that talk of art in general cannot be asked to do theoretical and philosophical work. (shrink)