In the ordinary way of representing relations, the order of the relata plays a structural role, but in the states themselves such an order often does not seem to be intrinsically present. An alternative way to represent relations makes use of positions for the arguments. This is no problem for the love relation, but for relations like the adjacency relation and cyclic relations, different assignments of objects to the positions can give exactly the same states. This is a puzzling situation. (...) The question is what is the internal structure of relations? Is the use of positions still justified, and if so, what is their ontological status? In this paper mathematical models for relations are developed that provide more insight into the structure of relations “out there” in the real world. (shrink)

We study the logical structure of relations, and in particular the notion of occurrences of objects in a state. We start with formulating a number of principles for occurrences and defining corresponding mathematical models. These models are analyzed to get more insight in the formal properties of occurrences. In particular, we prove uniqueness results that tell us more about the possible logical structures relations might have.

Argument-places play an important role in our dealing with relations. However, that does not mean that argument-places should be taken as primitive entities. It is possible to give an account of relations in which argument-places play no role. But if argument-places are not basic, then what can we say about their identity? Can they, for example, be reconstructed in set theory with appropriate urelements? In this article, we show that for some relations, argument-places cannot be modeled in a neutral way (...) in V[A], the cumulative hierarchy with basic ingredients of the relation as urelements. We argue that a natural way to conceive of argument-places is to identify them with abstract, structureless points of a derivative structure exemplified by positional frames. In case the relation has symmetry, these points may be indiscernible. (shrink)

In this paper we study the termination behavior of Russell’s description elimination rewrite system. We discuss certain claims made by Kripke (2005) in his paper concerning the possible nontermination of elimination of descriptions.

How we talk about relations has a great influence on how we think about relations. By saying that Spain defeated the Netherlands we obviously say something entirely different from saying that the Netherlands defeated Spain. This makes many of us think that in the underlying relation itself one of the relata comes first and the other comes second. However, there are good reasons to view the order as a representational artifact. In this paper I present a new logic that allows (...) us to think and talk about relations in a coordinate-free manner. The logic is minimalistic in the sense that it has no predicates except equality, but its expressive power is the same as that of first-order predicate logic. (shrink)

A theory of relations is presented that provides a detailed account of the logical structure of relational complexes. The theory draws a sharp distinction between relational complexes and relational states. A salient difference is that relational complexes belong to exactly one relation, whereas relational states may be shared by different relations. Relational complexes are conceived as structured perspectives on states ‘out there’ in reality. It is argued that only relational complexes have occurrences of objects, and that different complexes of the (...) same relation may correspond to the same state. (shrink)

A new logic is presented without predicates—except equality. Yet its expressive power is the same as that of predicate logic, and relations can faithfully be represented in it. In this logic we also develop an alternative for set theory. There is a need for such a new approach, since we do not live in a world of sets and predicates, but rather in a world of things with relations between them.

De Nederlandse filosoof Cornelis Verhoeven hield zich intensief bezig met de klassieke filosofie. Hij was ook jarenlang leraar op een school voor voortgezet onderwijs en hoogleraar aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Bovendien was hij een begenadigd schrijver van prikkelende essays. Daaronder zijn er vele die gaan over het onderwijs. De waardigheid van het vak van leraar ging hem zeer ter harte. De centrale thema’s in zijn werk zijn verwondering en dankbaarheid, ontvankelijkheid en geduld, rust en stilte. Deze bieden een tegenwicht (...) tegen oprukkende verschijnselen als het activisme, de rusteloosheid en de nadruk op snelle resultaten in het onderwijs. Cornelis Verhoeven neemt afstand van de maakbaarheidsideologie en pleit voor het niet-planbare en niet-berekenbare dat de kern van onderwijs uitmaakt: een leraar en leerlingen die zich samen buigen over de zaken uit de wereld. Joop Berding presenteert in dit boek de onderwijsfilosofie van Cornelis Verhoeven. Bovendien gaat hij in gesprekken met onderwijsmensen na wat deze visie voor het onderwijs en de leraren van vandaag te betekenen heeft. Een verrassend actuele en stimulerende bijdrage aan het doorgaande gesprek over wat onderwijs is en kan zijn. (shrink)

Brouwer's papers after 1945 are characterized by a technique known as the method of the creating subject. It has been supposed that the method was radically new in his work, since Brouwer seems to introduce an idealized mathematician into his mathematical practice. A newly opened source, the unpublished text of a lecture of Brouwer from 1934, fully supports the conclusions of our analysis that: - There is no idealized mathematician involved in the method;- The method was not new at all;- (...) Brouwer uses an incomplete sequence, also known as choice sequence, in this method, which is special. The method does not take its place in the standard works on choice sequences. (shrink)

In this classic analysis, Leo Strauss pinpoints what is original and innovative in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.

Par des suites de choix, nous comprenons des suites qui ne sont pas déterminées complètement par une loi arithmétique. Elles sont des objets caractéristiques de l’intuitionnisme de Brouwer. Nous prétendons qu’à partir de 1927, l’utilisation par Brouwer de suites de choix particulières n’est pas reconnu comme tel. Nous prétendons que l’utilisation de ces suites dans la méthode du sujet créatif, après la seconde guerre mondiale, n’a pas à être mis en relation avec l’utilisation de celles-ci dans les années vingt et (...) qu’elles sont mal interprétées. Nous montrons où se trouvent ces suites de choix dans l’œuvre de Brouwer et comment elles doivent être traitées. (shrink)

Par des suites de choix, nous comprenons des suites qui ne sont pas déterminées complètement par une loi arithmétique. Elles sont des objets caractéristiques de l’intuitionnisme de Brouwer. Nous prétendons qu’à partir de 1927, l’utilisation par Brouwer de suites de choix particulières n’est pas reconnu comme tel. Nous prétendons que l’utilisation de ces suites dans la méthode du sujet créatif, après la seconde guerre mondiale, n’a pas à être mis en relation avec l’utilisation de celles-ci dans les années vingt et (...) qu’elles sont mal interprétées. Nous montrons où se trouvent ces suites de choix dans l’œuvre de Brouwer et comment elles doivent être traitées. (shrink)

Argument-places play an important role in our dealing with relations. However, that does not mean that argument-places should be taken as primitive entities. It is possible to give an account of ‘real’ relations in which argument-places play no role. But if argument-places are not basic, then what can we say about their identity? Can they, for example, be reconstructed in set theory with appropriate urelements? In this article, we show that for some relations, argument-places cannot be modeled in aneutralway in (...) V[A], the cumulative hierarchy with basic ingredients of the relation as urelements. We argue that a natural way to conceive of argument-places is to identify them with abstract, structureless points of a derivative structure exemplified by positional frames. In case the relation has symmetry, these points may be indiscernible. (shrink)

Recent feminist philosophy of language has highlighted the ways that the speech of women can be unjustly impeded, because of the way their gender affects the uptake their speech receives. In this chapter, I explore how similar processes can undermine the speech of a different sort of speaker: Indigenous communities. This involves focusing on Indigeneity rather than gender as the salient social identity, and looking at the ways that group speech, rather than only individual speech, can be unjustly impeded. To (...) do this, I make use of the notion of ‘discursive injustice’ that has been developed by Quill Kukla, and, with reference to three case studies, show how discursive injustice can effectively derail the speech of Indigenous communities. (shrink)

Leo Strauss is known primarily for reviving classical political philosophy through careful analyses of works by ancient thinkers. As with his published writings, Strauss’s seminars devoted to specific philosophers were notoriously dense, accessible only to graduate students and scholars with a good command of the subject. In 1965, however, Strauss offered an introductory course on political philosophy at the University of Chicago. Using a conversational style, he sought to make political philosophy, as well as his own ideas and methods, understandable (...) to those with little background on the subject. Leo Strauss on Political Philosophy brings together the lectures that comprise Strauss’s “Introduction to Political Philosophy.” Strauss begins by emphasizing the importance of political philosophy in determining the common good of society and critically examining the two most powerful contemporary challenges to the possibility of using political theory to learn about and develop the best political order: positivism and historicism. In seeking the common good, classical political philosophers like Plato and Aristotle did not distinguish between political philosophy and political science. Today, however, political philosophy must contend with the contemporary belief that it is impossible to know what the good society really is. Strauss emphasizes the need to study the history of political philosophy to see whether the changes in the understanding of nature and conceptions of justice that gradually led people to believe that it is not possible to determine what the best political society is are either necessary or valid. In doing so, he ranges across the entire history of political philosophy, providing a valuable, thematically coherent foundation, including explications of many canonical thinkers, such as Auguste Comte and Immanuel Kant, about whom Strauss did not write extensively in his published writings. (shrink)

The Leo Strauss transcript project -- Editor's introduction: Strauss, Nietzsche, and the history of political philosophy -- Editorial headnote -- Introduction: Nietzsche's philosophy, existentialism, and the problem of our age -- Restoring nature as ethical principle: Zarathustra, prologue -- The creative self: Zarathustra, part 1, 1-8 -- The true individual as the highest goal: Zarathustra, part 1, 9-15 -- Postulated nature and final truth: Zarathustra, part 1, 16-22 -- Truth, interpretation, and intelligibility: Zarathustra, part 2, 1-12 -- Will to power (...) and self-overcoming: Zarathustra, part 2, 15-20 -- Summary and review: fusing Plato and the creative self -- Greek philosophy and the Bible; nature and history: Zarathustra, part 2, 20-22 -- Eternal recurrence: Zarathustra, part 2, 21; part 3, 1-13 -- Survey: Nietzsche and political philosophy -- The goodness of the whole, Socratic and Heideggerian critiques: Zarathustra, part 4-12 -- Creative contemplation: Zarathustra, part 3, 13 -- Restoring the sacred and the final question: Zarathustra, part 4. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

In recent years, animal welfare has become an important element of sustainable production that has evolved along with the transformation of animal production systems. Consumer attitudes towards farm animal welfare are changing around the world, especially at emerging markets of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Survey-based research on consumer attitudes towards farm animal welfare has increased. However, the geographical coverage of studies on consumer attitudes and perceptions about farm animal welfare has mostly been limited to Europe, and North America. Until (...) now, Latin American consumers’ attitudes towards animal welfare have not been well studied. Despite the fact that Mexico, Chile and Brazil belong to the same region, there are marked differences between these countries in terms of their economical and geographical characteristics among other factors. Those differences potentially have an impact on consumer attitudes towards animal welfare and livestock production systems in general. Given the evidence from the literature review, it seems advisable that Latin American producers and food industry who engage in animal welfare-enhancing practices should clearly label their products with information on the type of husbandry system to reach those consumers who want to make an informed choice. Therefore, there are some aspects that need to be studied and cannot be worked separately in order to promote and understand consumer attitudes towards dairy and beef systems, such as geography, economic development, and politics. (shrink)

The far reaching changes in man's social and personal life taking place in our lifetime underline the need for a sound ethical evaluation of our rights and duties and of human behaviour both on the individual level and in the political society. On many issues judgments of value vary widely and a consultation of the thought of Thomas Aquinas on the basic questions will be helpful, the more since he is not only one of the greatest philosophers but also succeeded (...) in integrating in his moral philosophy the wisdom of the ancients, in particular of Aristotle and the Stoa. This book presents Aquinas's thought on such central questions as man's happiness, how to determine the morality of our actions, the natural law and the main virtues, as well as on the common good, war, human labour, love and friendship. Throughout the book the intellectual character of this moral philosophy is pointed out and problems are set in a historical perspective. (shrink)

Levinas : o la filosofía de la consolación -- Primero hay que saber vivir.

Natural right and the historical approach -- Natural right and the distinction between facts and values -- The origin of the idea of natural right -- Classic natural right -- Modern natural right : Hobbes ; Locke -- The crisis of modern natural right : Rousseau ; Burke.

Michael Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argument challenges earlier accounts of arguing assumed in formal and informal logic. His account of emotional, visceral, and kisceral modes of arguing rejects the assumption that all arguments must be treated as instances of one “logical mode.” This paper compares his alternative modes to other modes proposed by those who have argued for visual, auditory, and other “multimodal” modes of arguing. I conclude that multi-modal and multimodal (without the hyphen) modes are complementary. Collectively, they represent (...) an important attempt to radically expand the scope of informal logic and the argumentation that it studies. (shrink)

An examination of Leo Strauss's 1948 notebook and other writings on the Euthyphro, Plato's dialogue on piety, using close analysis and line-by-line commentary.