Based on a survey of editors, publishers and staff members of 300 newspapers, this work documents the ethical confusion in the American press in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the Pentagon Papers controversy. It provides an analytical and historical framework to show how the press reached this point and argues for an ethical audit to give publications an independent check on their moral condition.

Seminal work in moral neuroscience by Joshua Greene and colleagues employed variants of the well-known trolley problems to identify two brain networks which compete with each other to determine moral judgments. Greene interprets the tension between these brain networks using a dual process account which pits deliberative reason against automatic emotion-driven intuitions: reason versus passion. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests, however, that the critical tension that Greene identifies as playing a role in moral judgment is not so much a tension between (...) reason and passion, but a tension between distinct forms of deliberative reasoning: analytic versus empathetic. In this paper we present results from several new studies supporting this alternative hypothesis. (shrink)

In a survey of newspaper staff members shows that, although implementation of public journalism projects is widespread at U.S. daily newspapers, tibe majority of jou!rnalists still adhere to traditional values in journalism practice and do not support public journalism values that depart from traditional journalism. Criticism of public journalism is that it poses a danger to traditional professional values of independence and objectivity. In the great majority of comparisons, we found thot journalists supporting certain public journalism practices were at least (...) as sensitive to traditional ethical concerns as those who did not support public journalism. (shrink)

A typical approach to semantics for relevance (and other) logics: specify a class of algebraic structures and take amodelto be one of these structures, α, together with some function or relation which associates with every formulaAa subset ofα. (This is the approach of, among others, Urquhart, Routley and Meyer and Fine.) In some cases there are restrictions on the class of subsets of α with which a formula can be associated: for example, in the semantics of Routley and (...) class='Hi'>Meyer [1973], a formula can only be associated with subsets which are closed upwards. It is natural to take apropositionof α to be such a subset of α, and, further, to take the propositional quantifiers to range over these propositions. (Routley and Meyer [1973] explicitly consider this interpretation.) Given such an algebraic semantics, we call (following Routley and Meyer [1973], who follow Henkin [1950]) the above-described interpretation of the quantifiers theprimaryinterpretation associated with the semantics. (shrink)

R. K. Meyer once gave precise form to the question of whether relevant implication can be defined in any modal system, and his answer was `no'. In the present paper, we extend S4, first with propositional quantifiers, to the system S4π+; and then with definite propositional descriptions, to the system S4π+ lp . We show that relevant implication can in some sense be defined in the modal system S4π+ lp , although it cannot be defined in S4π+.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eschatology, Sacred and Profane* PHILIP MERLAN LET ME BEGINthis paper with a double motto. The first is from a German poet, C. F. Meyer. It reads in my own translation: "We hosts of the dead ones--more numerous are we--than you who tread the earth and you who sail the sea." The second is a piece of statistical information for the correctness of which, however, I cannot vouchsafe. (...) It reads: "From the time when man first appeared, 77 billion people have been born. Thus, today's population of about 3 billion represents only 4 per cent of all men ever born" (Universitas 6 [1964], p. 423). With these two mottoes in mind let me proceed. Kant is one of the great representatives of the belief both in a goal to history and in progress. As he sees it, this goal is one world-wide society living under one law, which law coincides with the demands of morality, or as we could also say, in which legality and morality at least do not conflict. Kant is convinced that nature will by-and-by compel man to establish this world-wide society characterized, among other things, by eternal peace. Thus, Kant is an optimist with regard to the future. Yet, he is profoundly pessimistic with regard to the past. For him, history is one long chain of sufferings inflicted on man by man; and on the whole he has a very dim view of man's nature. The synthesis of his pessimism with his optimism is contained in a remarkable sentence which we find in one of his last writings--1793, when Kant was 69. The title is On the Adage--This May be Right in Theory, But Is Inapplicable to Practical Purposes, and here he says: When one contemplates the evil which in the course of history man has inflicted on man, one would be inclined to give up in despair. But there is one thought on the thinking of which our mind will cheer up. It is the thought: things will improve in the future. This kind of cheer will be entirely benevolent and unselfish, for this improvement will take place after we * I am indebted for the posthumous edition of this paper of my late husband Philip Merlan to Professor Frederick Sontag of Pomona College. My husband prepared this paper for, and read it to, various philosophical groups. In the course of these readings, he made numerous pencil additions. Thus, what Professor Sontag has done, is to change the tone to suit a printed presentation and to work the additions into the text as the logic of the arguments and notes seemed to dictate. Franciszka Merlan. [193] 194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY have been buried for a long, long time. We ourselves will not be able to harvest what we ourselves have helped to plant. (WW8, 273-13) In whose name did Kant speak? Who are the altruists who feel cheered up by the prospect of a goal which they themselves will not live to reach? No easy answer can be found in Kant's writings. However it would not be surprising if Kant, a Rousseauian in so many respects, retained some of Rousseau's belief in the innate goodness of man (in spite of his pietistic heritage which encourages him to see man as thoroughly corrupt). Thus, he expects everybody to be capable of this altruistic attitude. We all do then cheer up when we think of the prospects for mankind. This means that our altruism permits us in some way to participate in mankind's bright future, to reach the goal, if I may say so, in hope and expectation, though not physically. For Kant the problem of history was never in the center of his own interest, nor would he have admitted that it is of central importance for man. Hegel's attitude is quite different. Man's participation in history is Hegel's main topic. At this point let me remind you briefly of Hegel's fundamental ideas. The enlightenment and romanticism produced two highly characteristic interpretations of religion. According to the former, the kernel of every religion is morality. According to the latter, the... (shrink)

R. K. Meyer once gave precise form to the question of whether relevant implication can be defined in any modal system, and his answer was `no'. In the present paper, we extend $\mathbf{S4}$, first with propositional quantifiers, to the system $\mathbf{S4\pi}+$; and then with definite propositional descriptions, to the system $\mathbf{S4\pi}+^{lp}$. We show that relevant implication can in some sense be defined in the modal system $\mathbf{S4\pi}+^{lp}$, although it cannot be defined in $\mathbf{S4\pi}+$.

The essays in this volume are all concerned with the arguments about law as a system of rule-based decision-making,particularly the ideas advanced by legal philosopher Frederick Schauer. Schauer's work has not only helped revive interest in legal formalism but has also helped relocate arguments about the relationship between posited rules and morality. The contributors to this volume, themselves distinguished theorists, have concentrated on three aspects of Schauer's work: the nature of jurisprudential description; his theory of presumptive positivism; and the application (...) of his theory of rule-based decision-making to other areas of legal and moral thought. Contributors: Larry Alexander, Brian Bix, Philip Bobbitt, Marianne Constable, Michael C. Dorf, Jeremy Elkins, Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Leo Katz, Jason Johnston, Dennis Patterson. (shrink)

In contemporary moral philosophy, philosophers turn to biological research of primatology. Their interest in this biological discipline is based on the assumption that insights from primatology may help explaining morality. This paper goes further into the question of how an explanation of the genesis of our morality may rest on considerations about a psychological altruism among primates. For that, in addition to the recent considerations of Philip Kitcher (1), it proves to be fruitful to refer to David Hume's explication (...) of the genesis of morality (2). In the last section of this paper (3), we can then turn to the question of whether, and if so how, these considerations about the genesis of our morality might bear insights into the validity of moral judgements. German Moralphilosophen setzen sich in jüngster Zeit verstärkt mit der Biologie, und zwar mit Primatologen und deren Forschungen auseinander. Dem liegt die Annahme zugrunde, daß die in der Primatologie gewonnenen Einsichten helfen, moralische Phänomene zu erklären. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern eine Erklärung der Genese unserer Moral von einem psycholo gischen Altruismus unter Primaten ausgehen kann. Hier erweist es sich als hilfreich, zusätzlich zu den zeitgenössischen Überlegungen Philip Kitchers (1) auf David Humes Erklärung der Genese unserer Moral zurückzukommen (2). Im letzten Abschnitt dieses Beitrags (3) geht es dann um die Frage, was sich aus diesen Überlegungen zur Genese unserer Moral für deren Geltung ergibt. (shrink)

_The Opportunity Gap_ aims to shift attention from the current overwhelming emphasis on schools in discussions of the achievement gap to more fundamental questions about social and educational opportunity. The achievement gap looms large in the current era of high-stakes testing and accountability. Yet questions persist: Has the accountability movement—and attendant discussions on the achievement gap—focused attention on the true sources of educational failure in American schools? Do we need to look beyond classrooms and schools for credible accounts of disparities (...) in educational outcomes? The essays in this book reintroduce the overlooked central issue in educational inequity: the lack of opportunity that many social groups face in our common quest for educational attainment. In a series of wide-ranging and carefully nuanced essays, _The Opportunity Gap_ casts much-needed light on the vexed relationship between society and education—and on the crucial, persistent role that education plays in addressing social ills. Contributors include Gilberto Q. Conchas, Raewyn Connell, Pat English-Sand, Linda May Fitzgerald, Patresa Hartman, Jeff Howard, Mieko Kamii, Rafa M. Kasim, Christopher Kliewer, Robert A. LeVine, Sarah E. LeVine, Jodi Meyer-Mork, Robert Parris Moses, Sonia Nieto, Donna Raschke, Stephen W. Raudenbush, Ray C. Rist, Beatrice Schnell-Anzola, Irene Serna, Susan McAllister Swap, and Amy Stuart Wells; with an afterword by Ronald F. Ferguson. (shrink)

Ulrich Meyer defends a novel theory about the nature of time, and argues against the consensus view that time and space are fundamentally alike. He presents the first comprehensive defense of a 'modal' account, which emphasizes the similarities between times and possible worlds in modal logic, and is easily reconciled with the theory of relativity.

The official model of explanation proposed by the logical empiricists, the covering law model, is subject to familiar objections. The goal of the present paper is to explore an unofficial view of explanation which logical empiricists have sometimes suggested, the view of explanation as unification. I try to show that this view can be developed so as to provide insight into major episodes in the history of science, and that it can overcome some of the most serious difficulties besetting the (...) covering law model. (shrink)

In this work, the prominent political philosopher Philip Pettit embarks on a massive undertaking to offers major new accounts of the foundations of the state and the nature of justice. In doing so Pettit builds a new theory of what the state is and what it ought to be, addresses the normative question of how justice serves as a measure of the success of a state, and the way it should operate in relation to its citizens and other people.

A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive (...) to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options. (shrink)

How Galileo created the problem of consciousness -- Is there a ghost in the machine? -- Can physical science explain consciousness? -- How to solve the problem of consciousness -- Consciousness and the meaning of life.

What's the Use of Philosophy? aims to answer the question posed in its title, whether the questioner intends to dismiss philosophy, or seeks a positive answer. The first three chapters explore the grounds for dismissal. Chapter 1 expresses skepticism about the value of much professional Anglophone philosophy, while recognizing virtues in work often viewed as peripheral. Chapter 2 studies a philosophical subfield, the philosophy of science, arguing that, while its condition may be better than the norm, it is far from (...) perfect. In Chapter 3, a more systematic critique is offered, in the form of a pathology report. Its diagnosis identifies six justifiable philosophical impulses that, when pursued obsessively, generate distortions and diseases: clarity becomes a fetish, formalism becomes obfuscation, "intuition" is given burdens it cannot bear, appeals to the a priori sprinkle fairy dust on controversial claims, ideas grabbed from other fields are used in cartoon forms, and questions no longer relevant are treated as if they were "timeless." Chapter 4 attempts to identify the legitimate goals of philosophy. It sees value in attempts to respond to questions arising from the difficulties of the age, in attempts to reform methods of inquiry, and, above all, in the construction of syntheses capable of helping people as they struggle to make sense of their lives. Philosophy is renewed when these traditional goals once again become central to its discussions. The final chapter responds to a frequently voiced worry in a letter to young philosophers who wonder how they can align their aspirations with the hyper-professionalism expected of them. (shrink)

This book provides a unique, cogent, engaging account of environmental determinism that has long been much needed in the classroom and beyond." -- Andrew Sluyter, Associate Professor, Louisiana State University, USA This book pulls together major critiques of contemporary attempts to explain nature-society relations in an environmentally deterministic way. After defining key terms, it reviews the history of environmental determinism's rise and fall within geography in the early twentieth century. It discusses the key reasons for the doctrine's rejection and presents (...) alternative, non-deterministic frameworks developed within geography for analyzing the roles played by the environment in human affairs. The authors examine the rise in recent decades of neo-deterministic approaches to such issues as the demarcation of regions, the causes of civilizational collapse in prehistory, today's globally uneven patterns of human well-being, and the consequences of human-induced climate change. In each case, the authors draw on the insights and approaches of geography, the academic discipline most conversant with the interactions of society and environment, to challenge the widespread acceptance that such approaches have won. The book will appeal to those working on human-environmental research, international development and global policy initiatives. William B. Meyer is Associate Professor of Geography at Colgate University, USA. He is the author of several previous books, including Human Impact on the Earth, Americans and Their Weather: A History, and The Progressive Environmental Prometheans. His research interests include urban geography, environmental history, and the history of environmental thought. Dylan M.T. Guss works in the technology investment sector. (shrink)

Engineers are traditionally regarded as trustworthy professionals who meet exacting standards. In this chapter I begin by explicating our trust relationship towards engineers, arguing that it is a linear but indirect relationship in which engineers “stand behind” the artifacts and technological systems that we rely on directly. The chapter goes on to explain how this relationship has become more complex as engineers have taken on two additional aims: the aim of social engineering to create and steer trust between people, and (...) the aim of creating automated systems that take over human tasks and are meant to invite the trust of those who rely on and interact with them. (shrink)

Gerechtigkeit findet nicht nur zwischen Zeitgenossen statt - auch das Handeln früher lebender Menschen kann Ansprüche und Pflichten gegenwärtig und zukünftig lebender Menschen begründen. Der Autor entwickelt die Theorie einer historischen Gerechtigkeit auf der Basis der Pflichten zwischen den Generationen. Pluspunkte: Darstellung eines zentralen Themas aktueller politischer, ethischer und gesellschaftlicher Debatten Diskussionsgrundlage für Philosophen, Politikwissenschftler sowie interessierte Laien zeigt praktizierbare Lösungsansätze auf.

This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl’s concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation designates the unique phenomenal (...) character of this structure as it is experientially lived through. The way experience hangs together is itself a phenomenal feature of experience. (shrink)

An esteemed philosopher discusses his theory of universal freedom, describing how even those who are members of free societies may find their liberties curtailed and includes tests of freedom including the eyeball test and the tough-luck test.

This paper has two goals: (1) to defend a particular response to the problem of resultant moral luck and (2) to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we could have avoided. Cases of overdetermination threaten to undermine the claim that we are only responsible for what we could have avoided. To deal with this issue, I will motivate a particular way of responding to the problem of resultant moral luck. I defend the view that one's degree (...) of responsibility is immune to moral luck but the scope of events for which one is responsible is subject to moral luck. I will then argue that this view allows us to explain away certain intuitions about responsibility and overdetermination (as well as similar intuitions regarding Frankfurt Cases). As a result, the claim that we are only responsible for what we could have avoided becomes significantly more plausible. (shrink)

Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation (...) of the difference in content between the Capgras and Cotard delusions. That explanation treats them as alternative rationalizations of essentially the same phenomenology. I show, however, that once we distinguish the phenomenology (and the neuroetiology), a one-stage model is adequate. In the final section I make some more general remarks on the oneand two-stage models. (shrink)

Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet, it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This new book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning.

Y a-t-il une seule et unique morale dont on puisse se prévaloir aujourd'hui? Les réflexions philosophiques sur la morale se sont toujours combattues, remplacées, démenties au fil du temps, tout en étant chacune valable. Le stoïcisme, la morale de la vertu, le recours à la loi morale, l'utilitarisme sont autant de courants qui irriguent encore notre façon de penser. Mais laquelle de ces "visions" choisir? Et pourquoi choisir celle-là plutôt qu'une autre? Michel Meyer opère ici un retournement de la (...) pensée traditionnelle sur l'éthique. C'est parce que l'homme est un problème pour l'homme qu'il y a des réponses qu'on appelle la morale. Michel Meyer ne part plus des sujets éthiques (Moi, l'Autre) comme référents moraux, mais de la distance, plus ou moins grande, entre les individus. C'est la variation de cette distance qui influence nos choix quant au bien et au mal, à ce que l'on recherche ou à ce que l'on veut fuir ou éviter, et qui fera qu'on sera tantôt stoïcien, tantôt utilitariste ou kantien. Le positionnement des sujets les uns par rapport aux autres conduit à agir de telle ou telle manière, donc à adopter tel ou tel type de conduite morale et à juger ce qui est bien ou mal de façon différente. Le problème moral, c'est l'Autre comme problème, auquel il convient de répondre selon la distance qui nous sépare, nous divise ou nous rapproche, et auquel on répond toujours d'ailleurs, parce qu'il constitue une menace, un appel à l'aide, ou encore la nécessité de coopérer. Sans chercher à édicter de nouvelles règles ou de nouveaux préceptes, Michel Meyer replace les grandes théories morales, comme celles d'Aristote, de Kant, de Mill ou encore de Hume, dans un espace philosophique virtuel qui est leur espace de validité. Avec le concept de distance entre les êtres, il nous offre ainsi une approche nouvelle et synthétique de la morale. (shrink)

Can one coherently integrate Darwin's view of evolution with an affirmation of the value of existence? In this fresh, lean, and substantive volume, William Meyer addresses this important question. By carefully analyzing Darwin's own writings and by drawing on the philosophical perspectives of William James, Alfred North Whitehead, and others, Meyer persuasively redirects the cultural conversation about Darwin away from the retrospective question of origins toward the prospective question concerning the ultimate significance of evolutionary life. As James recognized, (...) the question about the reality of God is more critical for the forward-looking question of value than it is for the backward-looking question of origins. Darwin was a theist in search of a better theism, and because theology had not yet caught up to him, he became increasingly agnostic and caught between his mechanistic understanding of nature, on the one hand, and his affirmation of the value and beauty of the world, on the other. Whitehead's philosophy of organism offers a way to integrate Darwin's evolutionary insights with his affirmation of the grandeur of nature. Meyer's clearly written and richly argued book enables us to integrate our evolutionary understanding of the world with our experience of value within it. (shrink)

Are humans free, or are we determined by our genes and the world around us? The question of freedom is not only one of philosophy’s greatest conundrums, but also one of the most fundamental questions of human existence. It’s particularly pressing in societies like ours, where our core institutions of law, ethics, and religion are built around the belief in individual freedom. Can one still affirm human freedom in an age of science? And if free will doesn’t exist, does it (...) make sense to act as though it does? These are the issues that are presented, probed, and debated in the following chapters. A dozen experts―specialists in medicine, psychology, ethics, theology, and philosophy—grapple with the multiple and often profound challenges presented by today’s brain science. After examining the arguments against traditional notions of free will, several of the authors champion the idea of a chastened but robust free will for today, one that allows us still to affirm the value of first-person experience. (shrink)

Wisdom is peculiarly abstract, ineffable, and yet perennial. It is also temporal, stretching forwards as well is backwards in time. Wisdom is often treated as the outcome of life experience, reflection, discipline, and equanimity. Capturing the Ineffable aims to establish wisdom as an area if inquiry within anthropology and an analytic account of wisdom and its role and focus in anthropology. In addition to developing theories for an anthropology (and excavation) of wisdom, this volume argues collectively that anthropology is especially (...) well suited to engage in questioning what it is that is called wisdom, and how wisdom, as a concept, and an enacted activity, functions in metaphysical and interpersonal experiences, values, and judgements. The contributors include many key US and UK thinkers. (shrink)

Meyers examines the question of personal autonomy. She observes the effects of childrearing practices and sexual biases, and reflects upon the results in women. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The early nineteenth century saw the demise of the Italian-Atlantic tradition of republicanism and the rise of classical liberalism. A distinct Franco-German tradition of republicanism emerged from the time of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, which differs from the older way of thinking associated with neo-republicanism. This chapter examines the key differences between the Italian-Atlantic and Franco-German traditions of republicanism and places them in a historical context. It first considers classical republicanism and how the ideological ideal of equal freedom as (...) nondomination differs from the twin institutional ideals of a mixed constitution and a contestatory citizenry. It then looks at the classical liberal opposition that arose in response to Italian-Atlantic republicanism. It also discusses the views of Kant and Rousseau about freedom and the role of the citizenry, as well as their theory of the constitution. The absolutist opposition in Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes to the institutional ideals of republicanism is also explored. (shrink)