This chapter addresses the relationship between Rorty's pragmatist philosophy and his view of literature and literary writing. It begins by examining the relationship between philosophy and literature, construed by Rorty in terms of the opposition between “normal,” professionalized, argument‐centered philosophical discourse and the kind of cultural criticism which emphasizes human finitude and contingency, seeking through the use of irony and literary inventiveness to transform our prevalent visions of what it means to be human. This humanist side of Rorty's argument is (...) further developed through the discussion of the role that literature plays in intellectual self‐formation and moral edification, by educating moral sensibility and providing transformational shifts of conceptual perspective. These dynamics of literary innovation are then shown to dovetail nicely with Rorty's naturalistic, evolutionary conception of cultural development as well as his views regarding the indispensable role of the personal, the private, and the unshared in producing genuine cultural innovation. (shrink)

This article offers a review of Richard Rorty’s attempts to come to terms with the role of religion in our public and intellectual life by tracing the key developments in his position, partially in response to the ubiquitous criticisms of his distinction between private and public projects. Since Rorty rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds, he is determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics. My suggestion is that, in this respect, Rorty’s position is (...) best construed as that of a humanist rather than a post-modernist. Ultimately, it appears that, in his view, the positive element of religion—i.e. the idea of religion as a social gospel—has been absorbed and transformed into a utopian striving which humanists associate with the ideal of democracy. Hence, in this regard, religion can be considered obsolete. Yet, without explicitly invoking the usual epistemic grounds, Rorty’s arguments for excluding religion from the public sphere remain rather thin, and an interest in reforming rather than excluding religion would have been more consistent with his general outlook. (shrink)

Despite the centrality of the idea of history to Dewey's overall philosophical outlook, his brief treatment of philosophical issues in history has never attracted much attention, partly because of the dearth of the available material. Nonetheless, as argued in this essay, what we do have provides for the outlines of a comprehensive pragmatist view of history distinguished by an emphasis on methodological pluralism and a principled opposition to thinking of historical knowledge in correspondence terms. The key conceptions of Dewey's philosophy (...) of history outlined in this paper -- i.e. historical constitution of human nature, constructivist ontology of historical events, as well as the belief that the proper form of historical judgments is underwritten by the category of continual change -- are discussed with a view to the current challenges in philosophy of history, e.g. the contest between naturalism and rationalism, objectivity and relativism, questions surrounding the function of narrative in history, and the relationship of history to the problems of identity and self-knowledge. The intended upshot of the essay is to suggest that Dewey's brief yet substantial analysis may be capable of supplying the guiding principles for articulating a viable and promising pragmatist (and naturalist) conception of historical knowledge. (shrink)

Overview of the pragmatist philosophy of history.

It is sometimes suggested that Collingwood's philosophy of history is decidedly anti-naturalist and argues for a complete separation between history and the natural sciences. The purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion and to argue that Collingwood's conception of the relationship between history and natural sciences is much more subtle and nuanced than such a view would allow for. In fact, there is little in Collingwood to offend contemporary naturalistic sensibilities reasonably construed. The impression that Collingwood's views are (...) incompatible with naturalism stems, in part, from an overly Kantian interpretation of the idea of rationality, as applied to historical agents, in terms of transcendentally fixed norms. This difficulty, however, does not arise if we opt for a more Hegelian interpretation of rationality in terms of continuity in thought, which Collingwood himself seemed to favor. Examining Collingwood's pronouncements on these topics leads one to the conclusion that, while objecting to the excesses of early naturalism, Collingwood saw no insurmountable obstacles to the reconciliation of science and history and their potential collaboration in some areas. (shrink)

This essay aims to adumbrate the relationship between ordinary language, history, and cognition in Joseph Margolis’ pragmatist account of the historical constitution of the human, cultural world. It emphasizes the important connections between his arguments for the essentially practical grounding of all forms of cognitive activity; the existential primacy of the historically evolved ordinary language in the formation of aptly socialized human persons as well as of productively functioning human societies; the transformational role of consciousness in history, including the history (...) of cognition; and the insuperable informality inherent in all philosophical attempts to justify our historically articulated norms of cognition and our way of life. Margolis’ analysis of these relationships claims to show that cultural tolerance and historical plasticity deserve to displace the philosophical ideas of invariance and fixity as the favored resources of conceptual and social stability. This recognition, on Margolis’s view, constitutes pragmatism’s distinctive promise and advantage. (shrink)

Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 4, Page 431-445, July 2022.

This chapter addresses the relationship between Rorty’s pragmatist philosophy and his view of literature and literary writing. It begins by examining the relationship between philosophy and literature, construed by Rorty in terms of the opposition between “normal,” professionalized, argument-centered philosophical discourse and the kind of cultural criticism which emphasizes human finitude and contingency, seeking through the use of irony and literary inventiveness to transform our prevalent visions of what it means to be human. This humanist side of Rorty’s argument is (...) further developed through the discussion of the role that literature plays in intellectual self-formation and moral edification, by educating moral sensibility and providing transformational shifts of conceptual perspective. These dynamics of literary innovation are then shown to dovetail nicely with Rorty’s naturalistic, evolutionary conception of cultural development as well as his views regarding the indispensable role of the personal, the private, and the unshared in producing genuine cultural innovation. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

The essay compares Peirce's pragmatist approach to the problem of perceptual experience as a fallible foundation of knowledge to a sophisticated empiricist take on the issue. The comparison suggests that, while empiricism can accommodate the idea of perception as fallible, theoretically laden, and containing conjectural elements, the cardinal difference between pragmatism and empiricism consists in the pragmatist insistence on the intrinsic intelligibility of experience, which also serves as the ultimate source of all forms of intelligibility; whereas empiricism retains a penchant (...) for fitting experiences into abstract conceptual schemes. (shrink)

Chauncey Wright was an early intellectual follower of Darwin, and a mentor to American pragmatists, C.S. Peirce and William James. Starting with the discussion of Wright’s interpretation of natural selection, the paper proceeds to outline the distinction he draws between theoretical (scientific) and practical consciousness and the way that this distinction plays out in his account of the development of human consciousness within the context of natural selection. Formulating the problem of reconfiguring the relationship between instrumental intelligence and detached theoretical (...) reason in the light of evolutionary thinking is then identified as central to understanding Wright’s intellectual legacy. (shrink)

The paper begins by introducing a heuristic distinction between the “dogmatist” and the “pragmatist” approaches to philosophy of history. Dogmatists tend to use history to exemplify and shore up their pre-existing philosophical convictions. Pragmatists, on the other hand, construe philosophy of history as a form of critical reflection on the actual historical practice, with epistemic criteria of proper practice emerging in the course of the research itself, not antecedently deduced from general philosophical considerations. The core of the paper discusses the (...) work of Paul Roth, which is treated both as a specimen of the pragmatist mode of argumentation, and as a philosophical vindication, in the context of history, of the central pragmatist contention that we cannot successfully define knowledge in terms of a relation to reality, where reality is somehow understood independently and in advance of us knowing it. It is argued that Roth’s skillful deployment of arguments emerging from the recent philosophy of science to expose naïve realism in philosophy of history as a vestige of the no-longer-tenable philosophical vision opens a way for thinking productively about history as a complex and evolving form of research practice. (shrink)

The purpose of the essay is to explore some points pertaining to Peirce’s conception of reality, with a special emphasis on the themes developed in his later writings (such as normativity, common sense, and the logic of signs). The resulting proposal advances a preliminary reading of some key issues (arising in connection with Peirce’s discussions of reality and truth), configured with a view to the socially sustainable, coordinated practices of inquiry that are intrinsically embedded in the biological and cultural dynamics (...) of the evolving sense of reasonableness in human practical and cognitive enterprises. (shrink)

The intention of this essay is to offer a reading of John Dewey’s recently found manuscript (considered lost for decades), Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, as a kind of philosophical history leading up to the formulation of the key problems to be addressed by the general framework of Dewey’s cultural naturalism. I argue, first, that cultural naturalism has direct implications for the way that we think about history, and that Dewey’s recently recovered manuscript reflects this in its conception of the (...) purpose and mode of historical reconstruction. Second, the essay presents a synoptic overview of the historically emergent thought-conditions structuring, according to Dewey’s narrative, the possibilities of the philosophical discourse of modernity. In conclusion, I argue that cultural naturalism allows us to move beyond these problems by a radical revision of the terms in which we construe the idea of “persons.” Specifically, instead of thinking about persons in terms of embodied minds, we should start thinking about them as participants in histories, carving their individual paths through the world of events, with their existence being essentially both temporal and social. I also suggest that this view of persons allows us to outline a promising account of the notion of human freedom, couched in terms of historical social agency. (shrink)

Despite offering many formulations of his controversial indeterminacy of translation thesis, Quine has never explored in detail the connection between indeterminacy and the conception of meaning that he supposedly derived from the work of Peirce and Duhem. The outline of such a conception of meaning, as well as its relationship to the indeterminacy thesis, is worked out in this paper; and its merits and implications are assessed both in the context of Quine’s own philosophical agenda, and also with a view (...) to a very different approach to meaning and understanding exemplified by the work of Gadamer. (shrink)

Owing in part to Rorty’s energetic promotional efforts, Davidson’s philosophy of language has received much attention in recent decades from quarters most diverse, creating at times a sense of an almost protean versatility. Conspicuously missing from the rapidly growing literature on the subject is a sustained discussion of the relationship between Davidson’s interpretive theory and history: an omission all the more surprising since a comparison between Davidson and Gadamer has been pursued at some length and now, it seems,abandoned—all without as (...) much as a mention of history, which does, of course,play a prominent role in Gadamer’s thought. The issue, moreover, is hardly negligible. Davidson understood his work as an attempt to reconcile the demands of rigorous naturalism with the Kantian picture of human rationality,thereby salvaging what he considered to be important and interesting features of the human world from mechanistic reduction. For many thinkers of the 20th century, including Dewey and Gadamer, the irreducibly human had to do with the historical being of mankind, with historicity as the unique mark of our species. Yet, Davidson has virtually nothing to say about history and, in fact, a recent study by Giuseppina D’Oro (2004b), comparing Collingwood and Davidson, concludes that Davidson’s model of interpretation results in a distorted picture of understanding, as judged by the standards of a historically informed interpretive practice. Examining the causes of their disagreement, then,should help us make some headway towards a clearer sense of what it means to understand historically, by gleaning some additional constraints that the requirement of historicity imposes upon an interpretive theory. We start with D’Oro’s criticism of Davidson and discuss the alternative account of interpretation she proposes. Afterwards, we turn to Collingwood to see if either account does justice to his central insights, ending with some suggestions about the conceptual adjustments required to accommodate them. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that Collingwood’s philosophy of history is decidedly anti-naturalist and argues for a complete separation between history and the natural sciences. The purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion and to argue that Collingwood’s conception of the relationship between history and natural sciences is much more subtle and nuanced than such a view would allow for. In fact, there is little in Collingwood to offend contemporary naturalistic sensibilities reasonably construed. The impression that Collingwood’s views are (...) incompatible with naturalism stems, in part, from an overly Kantian interpretation of the idea of rationality, as applied to historical agents, in terms of transcendentally fixed norms. This difficulty, however, does not arise if we opt for a more Hegelian interpretation of rationality in terms of continuity in thought, which Collingwood himself seemed to favor. Examining Collingwood’s pronouncements on these topics leads one to the conclusion that, while objecting to the excesses of early naturalism, Collingwood saw no insurmountable obstacles to the reconciliation of science and history and their potential collaboration in some areas. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Même s’il formule à diverses reprises sa thèse controversée de l’indétermination de la traduction, Quine n’a jamais examiné de près le lien entre l’indétermination et la conception de la signification qu’il aurait développée à partir des travaux de Peirce et de Duhem. Cet article esquisse le plan d’une telle conception de la signification dans sa relation à la thèse de l’indétermination et évalue les avantages et les implications de cette conception dans le contexte du programme philosophique de Quine (...) lui-même, ainsi que selon l’approche très différente de la signification et de la compréhension élaborée dans l’œuvre de Gadamer. (shrink)

Richard Rorty was one of the most committed and respected critics of the distinction between philosophy and literature. He urged philosophers to adapt an ironist stance, characterized by a double commitment to historicism and nominalism, thereby simultaneously abandoning their inveterate representationalism as well as their predilection for hypostasizing abstract concepts. The ensuing return to the individual and contingent was also supposed to facilitate the absorption of philosophy into the realm of literature proper. This brief essay focuses on some aspects of (...) the relationship between philosophy, literature, and history, highlighting thereby the role that theorizing of an abstract kind plays in the construction of fictional worlds—marking out a territory within the crafting of literature itself that draws on the non-nominalist mode of discourse usually favored by philosophers. (shrink)

Qui étaient les gnostiques? Simplement des hérétiques? Ou bien ont-ils, par leurs questionnements, contribué à la redéfinition de la religion monothéiste? Relevaient-ils du judaïsme, du christianisme, du mandéisme, du sabéisme, du manichéisme? Comment le mouvement gnostique a-t-il influencé le développement du christianisme dans l’Antiquité? L’Église a-t-elle rejeté ce mouvement? L’ouvrage de Serge Hutin répond à ces questions essentielles.

Sont ici rassemblés dix-sept textes qui reflètent un travail délibérément orienté sur plusieurs champs du savoir. Celui de la philosophie, ses œuvres et ses auteurs, antiques et modernes, comme Augustin, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant ou Derrida. Celui de la littérature, et sa critique, comme Blanchot, Duras ou Deguy. Celui du religieux, comme l'exorcisme avec le Malleus maleficarum, la cruentation avec Ranchin, le miracle avec Augustin, ou la Bible et langue hébraïque avec Spinoza. Enfin celui du cinéma, avec les voix fantômes de (...) Duras, les spectres de Farocki, la question des genres d'Akerman, les utopies de Kluge, et la fin du monde de Bela Tarr. Tous ces textes sont philosophiques, dans leur effort de pensée, dans le but de faire l'expérience d'une écriture de la pensée, d'une invention d'un langage de la pensée ou du regard. Ils cherchent à penser le travail de la lettre, dans un livre, une croyance religieuse, un événement surnaturel, une pratique déviante, une voix narrative, la description d'un personnage, un plan-séquence, etc. Chacun d'eux se concentre sur un détail qui aurait pu passer inaperçu. En somme, ces textes proposent des argumentations précises, analysent des récrits et décryptent des séquences, dans le désir d'en poursuivre l'écriture par le seul jeu de la pensée."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Various four- and three-valued modal propositional logics are studied. The basic systems are modal extensions BK and BS4 of Belnap and Dunn's four-valued logic of firstdegree entailment. Three-valued extensions of BK and BS4 are considered as well. These logics are introduced semantically by means of relational models with two distinct evaluation relations, one for verification and the other for falsification. Axiom systems are defined and shown to be sound and complete with respect to the relational semantics and with respect to (...) twist structures over modal algebras. Sound and complete tableau calculi are presented as well. Moreover, a number of constructive non-modal logics with strong negation are faithfully embedded into BS4, into its three-valued extension B3S4, or into temporal BS4, BtS4. These logics include David Nelson's three-valued logic N3, the four-valued logic N4 bottom, the connexive logic C, and several extensions of bi-intuitionistic logic by strong negation. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas never commented on the Song of Songs. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate, however, that he meditated on it and absorbed it, so that the words of the Song are for him a familiar repertoire and a theological source. His work contains numerous citations of the Song, not counting his borrowings of vocabulary and images from it. In total, there are 312 citations of the Song in Aquinas's corpus, along with citations of the Song that (...) are found in citations that Aquinas makes of other authors (as for example in the Catena aurea). Understanding the purpose and placement of these citations significantly enriches our understanding of Aquinas as a theologian, biblical exegete, and spiritual master. The book contains an Appendix listing and contextualizing each citation. The study of the citations of the Song especially illuminates Aquinas's spiritual doctrine. By citing the Song, Aquinas emphasizes the spiritual life's path of dynamic ascent, through an ever increasing participation in the mystery of the nuptial union of Christ and the Church through love. The Song also highlights the eschatological tension or yearning present in the spiritual life, which is ordered to the fullness of beatific vision. Although Aquinas's theology is highly "intellectual," by citing the Song he brings out the affective character of the spiritual life and conveys the centrality of love in the soul's journey toward Christ. He also draws together contemplation and preaching through his use of the Song. (shrink)

While attention to research integrity has been growing over the past decades, the processes of signalling and denouncing cases of research misconduct remain largely unstudied. In this article, we develop a theoretically and empirically informed understanding of the causes and consequences of reporting research misconduct in terms of power relations. We study the reporting process based on a multinational survey at eight European universities. Using qualitative data that witnesses of research misconduct or of questionable research practices provided, we aim to (...) examine actors’ rationales for reporting and not reporting misconduct, how they report it and the perceived consequences of reporting. In particular we study how research seniority, the temporality of work appointments, and gender could impact the likelihood of cases being reported and of reporting leading to constructive organisational changes. Our findings suggest that these aspects of power relations play a role in the reporting of research misconduct. Our analysis contributes to a better understanding of research misconduct in an academic context. Specifically, we elucidate the processes that affect researchers’ ability and willingness to report research misconduct, and the likelihood of universities taking action. Based on our findings, we outline specific propositions that future research can test as well as provide recommendations for policy improvement. (shrink)

La crise écologique actuelle prend ses racines dans une histoire faite de possibles, parfois aboutis, d'échecs et de renoncements. Près de deux siècles de politiques environnementales que Serge Audier synthétise ici à la lumière des entraves et des infléchissements qui les ont forgées, les empêchant encore aujourd'hui de répondre efficacement à l'urgence toujours plus criante. Depuis la fin du XXe siècle, des signaux d'alarme écologiques ne cessent de retentir : réchauffement climatique toujours plus incontrôlable, destruction exponentielle et dramatique de (...) la biodiversité, déforestations accélérées, pollutions diverses, " plastification " des mers, etc. Pourtant, les défenseurs de la cause écologique peinent à véritablement convaincre l'ensemble de la société ainsi que les décideurs économiques et politiques de la nécessité d'un changement urgent de modèle. Pourquoi les forces politiques, de droite mais aussi de gauche, n'ont-elles pas su ou voulu prendre en charge le défi écologique? C'est à cette question que s'intéresse ce livre de Serge Audier, qui offre une ample fresque inédite sur les racines philosophiques, idéologiques et politiques de la crise actuelle. Au croisement de l'histoire et de la philosophie, cette généalogie intellectuelle examine les logiques doctrinales et politiques qui, depuis près de deux siècles, ont présidé aux prises de position et aux programmes en matière environnementale, à leurs réussites comme à leurs nombreux échecs. L'auteur montre notamment pourquoi, dans de nombreuses régions du monde, la logique socio-économique, politique et culturelle dominante est allée dans le sens d'un modèle productiviste qui a provoqué une destruction accélérée et sans précédent du milieu naturel. Parallèlement, il soulève la question des " possibles " non aboutis ou non réalisés, et invite à (re)découvrir des voies alternatives - entre anarchisme et socialisme - qui ont cherché à articuler critique sociale et critique écologique du capitalisme, dans l'horizon d'une " cité écologique " à venir. (shrink)

Alors que monte la prise de conscience du péril environnemental, les obstacles à une véritable mutation écologique des sociétés contemporaines restent massifs et les modèles alternatifs peinent à s'imposer. Les traditions intellectuelles de la gauche semblent souvent impuissantes à apporter des réponses. Pire, n'ont-elles pas contribué, par leur culte des "forces productives", à l'impasse actuelle? La généalogie intellectuelle proposée par Serge Audier revient sur des évidences trompeuses, notamment celle qui voudrait que les mouvements émancipateurs n'aient abordé que très tardivement (...) les enjeux écologiques. On redécouvre certes peu à peu des voix minoritaires qui, de Henry D. Thoreau à William Morris, avaient manifesté très tôt un souci inédit de la nature. Mais en les érigeant en héros solitaires, on contribue à occulter une nébuleuse beaucoup plus large et méconnue qui, entre socialisme et anarchisme, a esquissé les traits d'une "société écologique". L'objectif de ce livre est d'exhumer et de reconstituer une pensée sociale de la nature et de l'émancipation, construite aux marges du "grand récit" socialiste et républicain. De fait, cette tendance dissidente a été ignorée, marginalisée, voire combattue par les courants hégémoniques, qui ont souvent vu dans l'écologie un conservatisme traditionaliste ou un romantisme réactionnaire... Si les "ennemis" de la "société écologique" se trouvent bien entendu du côté des forces du capitalisme, il serait faux et dangereux d'oublier qu'ils font aussi partie de l'histoire même de la gauche et du socialisme dans ses orientations majoritaires, encore prégnantes."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

En 1517, il y a cinq cents ans, la réforme de Luther fracture l'Europe. La même année, les conquistadores espagnols s'en prennent au Mexique, qu'ils colonisent et christianisent. Ils y introduisent aussi notre façon d'écrire l'histoire. Les vainqueurs ignorent tout des sociétés indigènes. Or pour imposer leur loi, ils doivent impérativement connaître les coutumes et donc le passé des vaincus. Mais que sont l'histoire et le temps dans l'esprit des Indiens? Le temps n'est pas encore une valeur universelle. Comment les (...) Espagnols formatés dans une Europe chrétienne où l'histoire est chronologique et orientée auraient-ils pu concevoir et accepter la cosmologie méso-américaine? Civilisés contre barbares? En quelques décennies, la machine à remonter le temps des envahisseurs s'emploie à capturer les mémoires des sociétés amérindiennes pour leur fabriquer un passé qui puisse être rattaché au patrimoine antique de la chrétienté. Du côté des Indiens, le souvenir de leur monde au sein duquel les êtres, les choses et les dieux étaient liés se dilue avec le passage des générations même si, dans les codex ou dans les mystérieux cantares, subsistent quelques pans secrets de leur mémoire. Serge Gruzinski propose ici une exploration inédite des débuts de l'expansion coloniale et nous explique comment, sur le terrain, religieux et Indiens se mettent à écrire l'histoire du monde. (shrink)