ABSTRACTPreviously depressed individuals experience disturbances in affect. Affective disturbances may be related to visual mental imagery, given that imagery-based processing of emotional stimuli causes stronger affective responses than verbal processing in experimental laboratory studies. However, the role of imagery-based processing in everyday life is unknown. This study assessed mental imagery in the daily life of previously and never depressed individuals. Higher levels of visual mental imagery was hypothesised to be associated with more affective reactivity to both negatively and positively valenced (...) mental representations.This study was the first to explore mental imagery in daily life using experience sampling methodology. Previously depressed and matched never depressed individuals participated in this study. Momentary affect and imagery-based processing were assessed using the “Imagine your mood” smartphone application. Participants recorded on average 136 momentary reports ove... (shrink)

The role of chance in historiography is a major question for the analysis of cultural transformations. Its main subject are the transformations of contingentia itself, which has undergone substantial changes in its mythical forms (as Tyche or Fortuna) as well in its historical expressions in philosophy, theology, politics, sciences, literature and art.

Beschreibung des Lebens- und Denkweges des dänischen Philosophen und religiösen Schriftstellers Sören Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) als den eines Weges auf der Suche nach sich selbst.

Aristotle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: 'the soul is the entelechy of a natural body that serves as its instrument'.

Filosofisch-historische bijdrage aan de discussie over de christelijke identiteit van de Vrije Universiteit.

CHAPTER ONE A 'DREAMING KRONOS' IN A LOST WORK BY ARISTOTLE In the following study we shall be concerned with the interpretation of dreams. ...

In animal husbandry in The Netherlands, as in a wide variety of other societal areas, we see an increased awareness of the fact that progress cannot be attained anymore by simply repeating the way we modernized this sector in the decades before, due to the multiplicity of the problems to be dealt with. The theory of reflexive modernization articulates this macro-social phenomenon, and at the same time serves as a prescriptive master-narrative. In this paper, I analyse the relationship between Feenberg's (...) instrumentalization theory and reflexive design; that is, the approach of doing reflexive modernization. Feenberg's analytical distinction between primary and secondary instrumentalization is useful in highlighting the way social and political values are inscribed into technological arrangements, but is not meant as a method. Reflexive design, on the other hand, is meant to be a reflective and deliberative method that aims to articulate, assess and reintegrate hitherto unquestioned values and presuppositions into new designs of production systems. Reflexive design thus may be seen as a conscious strategy of making explicit the separate stages of instrumentalization in advance, instead of criticizing the implicit embedding of dominant values in technological artefacts once they have been realized. The approach is illustrated with a case from animal husbandry. (shrink)

Background In the ethical and clinical literature, cases of parents who want treatment for their child to be withdrawn against the views of the medical team have not received much attention. Yet resolution of such conflicts demands much effort of both the medical team and parents. Objective To discuss who can best protect a child9s interests, which often becomes a central issue, putting considerable pressure on mutual trust and partnership. Methods We describe the case of a 3-year-old boy with acquired (...) brain damage due to autoimmune-mediated encephalitis whose parents wanted to stop treatment. By comparing this case with relevant literature, we systematically explored the pros and cons of sharing end-of-life decisions with parents in cases where treatment is considered futile by parents and not (yet) by physicians. Conclusions Sharing end-of-life decisions with parents is a more important duty for physicians than protecting parents from guilt or doubt. Moreover, a request from parents on behalf of their child to discontinue treatment is, and should be, hard to over-rule in cases with significant prognostic uncertainty and/or in cases with divergent opinions within the medical team. (shrink)

Proclus was one of the major Greek philosophers of late Antiquity. In his metaphysics he developed and systematized problems of Plato's thought, such as participation; transcendence - immanence; causation - participation - return; henads and monads; first and second causality. Before and after his works had been translated into Latin, Proclus influenced the Christian West through the _Liber the causis_, a Latin translation of an anonymous Arab version of Proclus' _Elementatio theologica_.

The work _De spiritu_ is an important but neglected work by Aristotle. It clearly shows for the first time that Aristotle assumed a special body as the ‘instrument’ of the soul. By means of this soul/body the soul forms the visible body of plants, animals and human beings.

This book addresses the metaphysics of Armstrongian states of affairs, i.e. instantiations of naturalist universals by particulars. The author argues that states of affairs are the best candidate for truthmakers and, in the spirit of logical atomism, that we need no molecular truthmakers for positive truths. In the book's context, this has the pleasing result that there are no molecular states of affairs. Following this account of truthmaking, the author first shows that the particulars in (first-order) states of affairs are (...) bare particulars. He then argues that the properties in states of affairs are simple, non-relational and concrete universals. Next, he argues that (material) relations in states of affairs are external relations. Lastly, he argues that a state of affairs is unified by a distinctive formal relation without giving rise to Bradley’s regress. (shrink)

Increasing public concern for the welfare of fish species that human beings use and exploit has highlighted the need for better understanding of the cognitive status of fish and of their ability to experience negative emotions such as pain and fear. Moreover, studying emotion and cognition in fish species broadens our scientific understanding of how emotion and cognition are represented in the central nervous system and what kind of role they play in the organization of behavior. For instance, on a (...) macro neuro-architecture level the brains of fish species look dramatically different from those of mammals, while such a dramatic difference does not (always) occur at the level of emotion- and cognition-related behavior. Here, therefore, we discuss the evidence of emotion and cognition in fish species related to underlying neuro-architecture and the role that emotion and cognition play in the organization of behavior. To do so we use a framework encompassing a number of steps allowing a systematic approach to these issues. Emotion and cognition confer on human and non-human animals the capacity to compliment and/or override immediate reflexes to stimuli and so allow a large degree of flexibility in behavior. Systematic research on behavior that in mammals is indicative of emotion and cognition has been conducted in only a few fish species. The data thus far indicate that in these species brain-behavior relationships are not fundamentally different from those observed in mammals. Furthermore, data from other studies show evidence that behavior patterns related to emotion and cognition vary between fish species as well within fish species, related to sex and life history stage for example. From a welfare perspective, knowledge of such variability will potentially help us to design optimal living conditions for fish species kept by humans. (shrink)

Increasing public concern for the welfare of fish species that human beings use and exploit has highlighted the need for better understanding of the cognitive status of fish and of their ability to experience negative emotions such as pain and fear. Moreover, studying emotion and cognition in fish species broadens our scientific understanding of how emotion and cognition are represented in the central nervous system and what kind of role they play in the organization of behavior. For instance, on a (...) macro neuro-architecture level the brains of fish species look dramatically different from those of mammals, while such a dramatic difference does not (always) occur at the level of emotion- and cognition-related behavior. Here, therefore, we discuss the evidence of emotion and cognition in fish species related to underlying neuro-architecture and the role that emotion and cognition play in the organization of behavior. To do so we use a framework encompassing a number of steps allowing a systematic approach to these issues. Emotion and cognition confer on human and non-human animals the capacity to compliment and/or override immediate reflexes to stimuli and so allow a large degree of flexibility in behavior. Systematic research on behavior that in mammals is indicative of emotion and cognition has been conducted in only a few fish species. The data thus far indicate that in these species brain-behavior relationships are not fundamentally different from those observed in mammals. Furthermore, data from other studies show evidence that behavior patterns related to emotion and cognition vary between fish species as well within fish species, related to sex and life history stage for example. From a welfare perspective, knowledge of such variability will potentially help us to design optimal living conditions for fish species kept by humans. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers:A Core Text of "Aristotelian Dualism"Abraham P. Bos (bio)1. A Non-Platonic Dualism in Aristotle's Lost WorksThe Soul of a Mortal on Earth is not "At Home," says Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus. The story about the mantic dream of the expatriate Eudemus and his expectation that he "will return home"1 is well known. It makes clear that, in Aristotle's view, the death of the human (...) individual should be interpreted as the soul's "return to its homeland."2 This is strongly suggested by "the revelation of Silenus" which Plutarch (first century CE) passes down in a literal quotation from the Eudemus.3 It contains the theme of human life on earth as a punishment (timôria). The motif of human life as a punishment is central to two texts by Iamblichus (250-325 CE) and Augustine (354-430 CE), which are usually connected with Aristotle's Protrepticus.4 I want to examine these texts in more detail here. My intention in the following exposition is to propose a non-Platonistic explanation of these texts. In my opinion they have wrongly been read as testimonies of a "Platonistic" phase in Aristotle. The existence of such a phase in Aristotle's development has never been proved. Besides, the interpretation of these texts suffered from the fact that [End Page 289] Aristotle's De anima had also been explained in an unhistorical way since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE.2. Revising the Modern View of AristotleWe have to make a different assessment of Aristotle's contribution to the discussion on the soul compared with what was current until recently. For after W. Jaeger5 and F. Nuyens6, modern scholars became inclined to leave Aristotle's dialogues out of consideration, because they regarded them as "Platonizing." But a fundamental correction is necessary on this point.7 Jaeger led modern Aristotle studies in a wrong direction by assuming a sharp distinction between Aristotle's lost dialogue Eudemus and his surviving treatise De anima. Although nowadays Jaeger's theory for many scholars is something of a dead horse, nevertheless a real alternative has not been proposed. We still have to get rid of the consequences of the Jaegerian paradigm and develop a unitary interpretation of Aristotle's entire oeuvre. Even more consistently than O. Gigon has already done,8 we should assume that Aristotle's lost works and his surviving biological writings and De anima did not propose two (or more) different psychological theories but one and the same. Because this one Aristotelian psychology was a non-Platonistic but nevertheless dualistic psychology, we have much more reason than could be recognized in the past to assume Aristotelian influence on this discussion.On one essential issue Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato: the soul,9 more particularly the indissoluble bond of the soul with a body. Aristotle radically and [End Page 290] consistently argued for the distinction between nous and psychè.10 For Aristotle the nous-in-act is always wholly incorporeal. But he considered it characteristic of the soul that it cannot carry out its functions "without body."11However, the crucial question is: what body does Aristotle mean when he says that the soul cannot perform its specific activities "without body"? Jaeger and Nuyens were wholly convinced that Aristotle was referring to the visible, external body of a human being, animal, or plant. Hence they saw a yawning gap between Aristotle's views in De anima and his position in the dialogue the Eudemus. In the Eudemus Aristotle had clearly argued that the soul can perform its own functions very well, indeed better, without the galling and oppressive visible body.12 But in De anima II 1, in his famous definition of "the soul," Aristotle says that the soul is inextricably bound up with a "sôma physikon organikon."13 Jaeger and Nuyens, following an almost unanimous tradition since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE, interpreted this sentence in the sense that the soul is the formal principle or entelechy of an "organic body" or a "natural body equipped with organs," i.e., the visible body... (shrink)

The present article puts forward a behavioral disinhibition hypothesis stating that, often, at least some levels of behavioral disinhibition are needed to overcome people’s inhibition to intervene in dilemmatic situations in which they have to choose between different actions with good reasons for each of the actions involved. Results reported indeed show that people to whom disinhibited behaviors were salient or people with stronger predispositions toward behavioral disinhibition were more likely to intervene in trolley and footbridge dilemmas.

This paper is a commentary to a paper by Erik Paredis (2011). It is firstly argued that the theories of technology, as distinguished by Feenberg, cannot adequately explain the different interpretations of the role of technology in the transition towards sustainability, as Paredis argues. Secondly, the basic argument of Paredis is countered that transition research is fundamentally handicapped by its constructivists roots to discriminate between options. Finally it is argued that a third strand of transition research exists that is explicitly (...) interventionist, and that nurtures specific technology in context. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ . This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. (...) As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity. (shrink)

In this paper I will reconsider the doxographical text about Aristotle in Clement of Alexandria's Protrepticus 5.66.4: οδν δ ομαι χαλεπν νταθα γενμενος κα τν κ το Περιπτου μνησθναι· κα γε τς αρσεως πατρ, τν λων ο νοσας τν πατρα, τν καλομενον ‘πατον’ ψυχν εναι το πντος οεται· τουτστι το κσμου τν ψυχν θεν πολαμβνων ατς ατ περιπερεται. γρ τοι μχρι τς σελνης ατς διορζων τν πρνοιαν, πειτα τν κσμον θεν γομενος περιτρπεται, τν μοιρον θεο θεν δογματζων.

In this paper I will reconsider the doxographical text about Aristotle in Clement of Alexandria'sProtrepticus5.66.4:οὐδ⋯ν δ⋯ οἶμαι χαλεπ⋯ν ⋯ντα⋯θα γεν⋯μενος κα⋯ τ⋯ν ⋯κ το⋯ Περιπ⋯του μνησθ⋯ναι· κα⋯ ⋯ γε τ⋯ς αἱρ⋯σεως πατ⋯ρ, τ⋯ν ὅλων οὐ νο⋯σας τ⋯ν πατ⋯ρα, τ⋯ν καλο⋯μενον ‘ὕπατον’ ψυχ⋯ν εἶναι το⋯ π⋯ντος οἴεται· τουτ⋯στι το⋯ κ⋯σμου τ⋯ν ψυχ⋯ν θε⋯ν ὑπολαμβ⋯νων αὐτ⋯ς αὑτῷ περιπε⋯ρεται. ⋯ γ⋯ρ τοι μ⋯χρι τ⋯ς σελ⋯νης αὐτ⋯ς διορ⋯ζων τ⋯ν πρ⋯νοιαν, ἔπειτα τ⋯ν κ⋯σμον θε⋯ν ⋯γο⋯μενος περιτρ⋯πεται, τ⋯ν ἄμοιρον θεο⋯ θε⋯ν δογματ⋯ζων.

Historisch-filosofische studie over het verloop van de confrontatie tussen het joods-christelijke gedachtengoed en de Griekse filosofie.

Er is de laatste decennia nogal wat te doen over de metafoor en haar functie. En vaak wordt daarbij verwezen naar een belangrijke tekst van de Griekse filosoof Aristoteles. Ik wil in het hierna volgende nagaan wat Aristoteles over de metafoor zegt. Ik begin met de hierboven bedoelde passage in haar verband zo letterlijk mogelijk te vertalen. Dan bezie ik verder wat Aristoteles met de metafoor die hij als voorbeeld gebruikt, doet en vervolgens bezien we wat Aristoteles verder over de (...) ‘overdracht’ zegt, en wat enkele geleerden zeggen over Aristoteles-en-de-metafoor. Tenslotte stel ik de vraag of, afgezien van Aristoteles, er reden is om te denken dat de metafoor een ‘cognitief extra’ heeft boven een mededeling in normale bewoordingen, en speciaal de wat soms genoemd wordt ‘levende’ metafoor. Ik zelf kan daar niet van overtuigd raken. (shrink)