THIS paper consists essentially of three parts. The first part argues the case for construing Nietzsche's remarks about Übermenschlichkeit as endorsing some specific set of character traits, of "virtues" if you like. To be an Übermensch, on this reading, is to possess or exhibit certain traits of character, traits which in the typical case are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity, and self-perfection. An Übermensch, construed in this way, expresses Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal, of what human beings (...) should or might be like. In this sense Nietzsche merely continues the ancient project of articulating the human ideal, the conception of human perfectibility. Although Nietzsche's answer may appear to be shockingly different, the project of articulating a human ideal is scarcely radical. The project qua project is no different than that of Plato or Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant. For Plato, the philosopher-king represents the ideal of human self-perfection; for Aristotle megalopsychic man conjoined with the life of contemplation; for the Stoics apatheia and right reason; for Spinoza the intellectual amor dei was a necessary and perhaps a sufficient condition for human liberation; for Kant, the genuinely moral person qualifies as the human ideal, the person whose actions are always and only governed by the categorical imperative, although Kant would probably have called such a will a "holy" will rather than a human one. (shrink)

First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The doctrine is unquestionably Nietzsche’s most puzzling, and it has been interpreted in two distinguishable ways: as a cosmology or an ethical imperative. The cosmological basis of the doctrine can be found only in Nietzsche’s literary estate, the Nachlass, in notes not designated for publication. The normative import of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, on the other hand, finds articulation in virtually every work written by Nietzsche after 1881. It is of some importance to note in this connection that all (...) Nietzsche scholars have taken the cosmological formulation to be the clear one, mistakenly I believe, and have ignored the fact that Nietzsche himself suppressed it. (shrink)

Descartes' place in history, by L. J. Lafleur.--A central ambiguity in Descartes, by S. Rosen.--Doubt, common sense and affirmation in Descartes and Hume, by H. J. Allen.--Some remarks on logic and the cogito, by R. N. Beck.--The cogito, an ambiguous performance, by J. B. Wilbur.--The modalities of Descartes' proofs for the existence of God, by B. Magnus.--Descartes and the phenomenological problem of the embodiment of consciousness, by J. M. Edie.--The person and his body: critique of existentialist responses to Descartes, (...) by P. A. Bertocci. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's fame and influence are based, for the most part, on his first work, Being and Time. That this was to have been the first half of a larger two-volume project, the second half of which was never completed, is well known. That Heidegger's subsequent writings have been continuous developments of that project, in some sense, is generally acknowledged, although there is considerable disagreement concerning the manner in which his later works stand related to Being and Time. Heidegger scholars (...) are deeply divided over that question. Some maintain that there is a sharp thematic cleavage in Heidegger's thought, so that the later works either refute or, at best, abandon the earlier themes. Others maintain that even to speak of a shift or a "reversal" in Heidegger's thinking is mistaken and argue, in conse quence, that his thinking develops entirely consistently. Lastly, there are those who admit a shift in emphasis and themes in his works but introduce a principle of complementarity - the shift is said to repre sent a logical development of his thi.nking. Too often the groups re semble armed camps. (shrink)

This reading of Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy divides into three unequal parts. The first section glosses Heidegger’s construal of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche as the metaphysics of presence, as ontotheology, as Being’s own historic destiny, a destiny of Seinsvergessenheit; and it glosses Heidegger’s construal from within the standard canons of historiography, from the perspective of today’s conventional wisdom. In brief and unsurprisingly, viewed from the strict constructionist standpoint—viewed as a “straight” reading of philosophy’s history—Heidegger’s interpretation cannot (...) stand. The fact that it is an historical misreading proves to be stunningly uninteresting, however, and fails to account for its influence. So an altogether different approach to Heidegger’s reading is proposed in the second section of this paper. Turning the historical tables, the tables of influence, Heidegger’s appropriation of the tradition, his deconstruction of it, is construed—in Bloom’s terms—as poetic misprision, as a strong misreading, one which responds to its own imperatives. The temptation to construe the straight reading /strong misreading distinction as like the “historical” vs. “philosophical” distinction in reading the history of philosophy is entertained briefly. It is later urged that we give up altogether the distinction in kind between historical and philosophical readings of the history of philosophy; for that distinction makes sense only if we accept the picture of philosophy as an enterprise whose business it is to confront a reasonably fixed list of issues within a timeless neutral matrix: To give up this picture is to give up the distinction at the same time. These two readings of Heidegger—strict constructionist straight reading and deconsructionist strong misreading—appear irreconcilable; so an attempt is made in section III to trope this difference in readings. Specifically, the incommensurability of the two perspectives, the two readings of philosophy’s history, is analyzed in terms of the difference between normal and abnormal discourse. Abnormal discourse, like Kuhn’s “revolutionary science,” may well be tomorrow’s normal discourse; but in exploring this suggestion further some important points of contrast between Kuhnian and Heideggerian readings emerge. In Kuhn’s reading of, for example, the history of science the question whether the normal science of the day is to be supplanted by the new paradigm may be decided by a complex gestalt-switch, a reorientation occasioned by anomalous cases, a reexamination of data hitherto ruled out by the discourse of the day. Kuhn’s “revolutionary” paradigms drive practitioners back upon data; but Heidegger’s metahistorical reading of the history of philosophy does not drive us back to data, back to the texts. This raises the question of the sense in which Heidegger’s abnormal discourse ever could become normal discourse, ever could function as a new paradigm. I conclude, with Rorty, that Heidegger’s metahistory of philosophy cannot be institutionalized as some abnormal discourse can and that, in consequence, Heideggerians who approach the history of philosophy as if he had found the key to unlock its mysteries—or its horrors, if you prefer—are confused about Heidegger’s discourse, confused about its possibilities in a way that he himself was not. (shrink)

First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.