Beloff, elder statesman of the international parapsychological community, presents the fruits of his life-long struggle to come to terms with the paranormal. These take the form of 16 selected essays in chronological order, spanning a period of more than twenty years. These essays deal with topics such as the nature of psi phenomena, their credibility and their diverse philosophical and scientific implications. No subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The article begins with a discussion about what might constitute consciousness in entities other than oneself and the implications of the mind-brain debate for the possibility of a conscious machine. While referring to several other facets of the philosophy of mind, the author focuses on epiphenomenalism and interactionism and presents a critique of the former in terms of biological evolution. The interactionist argument supports the relevance of parapsychology to the problem of consciousness and the statistical technique of meta-analysis is cited (...) in support of this position. (shrink)

The paper argues that there are effectively only two tenable theories of the mind?brain relationship: ?epiphenomenalism? and ?radical dualism? (interactionism). So long as account is taken only of the conventional sciences, the odds are heavily stacked in favour of epiphenomenalism. However, once the findings of parapsychology are admitted to consideration, a very different situation obtains. It is here argued that parapsychology only makes sense within a dualist metaphysic.

Two questions are examined (a) the differences between creative and uncreative individuals and (b) the differences between artists and scientists. It is concluded that while divergent thinking is a necessary feature of the creative process alike in art and in science the scientific intellect exemplifies more the convergent type. Contrary to what most authorities have said it is here argued that creativity depends more upon the presence of a certain inborn flair than upon personality dynamics.

Abstract An attempt is made to examine the main principles that underlay the ?Rhinean? school of parapsychology. Five such principles are discussed: (1) that psi can best be assessed using quantitative measures and forced?choice tests; (2) that psi is a function of the unconscious with the implication that objective performance alone is important, not the state of mind of the subject; (3) that psi ability is, to some degree, present in everyone; (4) that only those problems deserve attention for which (...) an unambiguous answer is attainable, with the implication that survival research should be shelved indefinitely and (5) that psi is non?physical. These five principles are then reviewed from our present vantage point and all are found to require qualification to a greater or lesser extent. Some critics, however, want to go further and allege that Rhine led psychical research into a blind alley and that the time has come to revert to the earlier investigative tradition. This, we contend, is defeatist, the more especially since the advent of computers has greatly extended the scope and power of the experimental approach. Despite its inherent difficulties, it remains the indispensable mainstay of our continuing efforts to make sense of the paranormal. (shrink)

_Two positions on the mind-body problem are here_ _compared:__Materialism__, which is here taken to mean the thesis_ _that mind plays no part in the determination of behaviour so that,_ _for all the good it does us, we might just as well have evolved as_ _insentient automata, and_ _Ineractionism_ _which is here taken as its_ _contradictory._.

John Beloff is one of our foremost authorities in parapsychology. He is credited with an instrumental role in the acceptance of parapsychology into academia. On April 21 and 22, 2000, a two-day international conference was held by the Koestler Parapsychology Unit of the Psychology Department at the University of Edinburgh to celebrate Beloff's eightieth birthday. Most of the essays in this work were presented at this conference honoring John Beloff. All of the contributors have published (...) a number of articles in mainstream philosophy and their essays promote Beloff's greatest interest--a philosophical interaction with parapsychology. The book is divided into three sections and each section has three papers. The papers in the first section, "Parapsychology, Philosophy and the Mind," explore "the mind-brain problem," parapsychology and the principle of closure, and a cross-cultural perspective on dualism and the self. The second section, "Parapsychology, Self and Survival," looks at parapsychological phenomena and the sense of self, chrysalid therapy, and the problem of super psi. The third section, "Parapsychology, Religion and Spirituality," features papers that discuss parapsychology and how it relates to Hume's view of miracles, to religion, and to the origin of the Copernican hypothesis. (shrink)

In the very first issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, dualist John Beloff discusses the problem of how interactions may occur between the supposedly different realms of mind and matter. It is indeed the case that meta-analyses covering many years of research give very strong support to the reality of psi phenomena . Historical analysis has shown, however, that the results of some of the stronger paradigms are subject to a decline effect after an initial successful period (...) of ten to twenty years. And even if the reality of the phenomena stand up against time, a proper use of the available data -- as opposed to Beloff's selective use of it -- would at least complicate the naive interactionist picture and in fact argue against the dualist perspective. (shrink)

The wearable technology field, including terms and areas such as wearable computing and fashionable technology, has been evolving at the cross-section of various disciplines including science, technology, arts, augmented reality, design, cybernetics, ergonomics and fashion. As an example, the research community in wearable computing has been carrying out profound work in understanding and defining many key principles in the field. According to these researchers, the wearable computer is understood as a kind of extension of the body, which enables it to (...) perform tasks that would not otherwise be possible, such as being in several places at the same time.1This is an example of one of the approaches currently existing in this multifaceted field. The field also contains other detectable approaches, each with their own distinct aim. These approaches vary from developing solutions to engineering problems to developments in fashion and design and further to more conceptual approaches in addressing the field with what the author refers to as a playful attitude. When one investigates various projects in the wearable field more closely one can detect at least three clearly distinct approaches. The first approach is to follow the general guidelines for wearable computing development and objectives defined during the 1990s. The second approach sometimes called fashionable technology, to some extent follows similar directives as the first approach, but, in addition, it is strongly related to traditions and expectations in the areas of fashion and textile. The third approach has self-defined aims, which are partially contradictory to the general goals prevailing in the field. This third approach has been left almost without a notice in publications emerging from the field as well as in other theoretical writings concerned of art and technology. Until now the wearable technology field has been discussed primarily as one unified area striving towards similar goals.This article investigates this third approach. It asks how and why some of the projects in the field seem to differ from the general goals persisting in the field, and examines what the possible motivations and intentions behind this alternative approach are. Lastly, the article introduces the Hybronaut as a concept related to the author's practice and research. (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.

For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.

Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...) But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to. (shrink)

Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...) normative requirements with reasons. (shrink)

This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.

This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.

This study provides a comprehensive reinterpretation of the meaning of Locke's political thought. John Dunn restores Locke's ideas to their exact context, and so stresses the historical question of what Locke in the Two Treatises of Government was intending to claim. By adopting this approach, he reveals the predominantly theological character of all Locke's thinking about politics and provides a convincing analysis of the development of Locke's thought. In a polemical concluding section, John Dunn argues that liberal and (...) Marxist interpretations of Locke's politics have failed to grasp his meaning. Locke emerges as not merely a contributor to the development of English constitutional thought, or as a reflector of socio-economic change in seventeenth-century England, but as essentially a Calvinist natural theologian. (shrink)

John Hyman explores central problems in philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. His approach to the dimensions of human action culminates in an original analysis of the relation between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.

This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The essays (...) seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression. (shrink)