Maine de Biran’s concept of the embodied mind is most suitable to alert our consciousness today, while people are being exceedingly exposed to and submerged by comforting invasive virtual realities of metaverses that essentially minimize their _resistance_-potential to generate _will_ and _effort_.

From around the year 1900, the ideal of the equivalence of art (form) and nature (animated matter) was challenged when two concurring principles—homogeneous duration and heterogeneous moments—started to manifest themselves in the discrete attempts of artists to integrate being into art. As creative approaches to the perception and representation of nature, these diametrically opposed configurations find expression in the writings of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, mainly between 1889 and 1907. The notion of living forms in permanent transition, informed by (...) evolutionary theory, found its social expression in a growing urban dynamism. Subsequently, the obsolete epistemological Apollonian principle of a central perspective in painting, based on a timeless, static Newtonian space, gave way to the Dionysian ontological principle—radically questioning the unity of being and form in the creative process. Initially, this change was particularly evident in the paintings of Claude Monet and Paul Cézanne. While Monet envisions a homogeneous space of instantaneous time (the separate moment), Cézanne's distinctive Post-Impressionist dynamic representations of continuous becoming can be read as contemporary pictorial counterparts of the Bergsonian concepts of duration, memory, and vital force. Thus, Bergson's psycho-physiological principle of endurance, in which perceptions and memories of distinct physical phenomena interpenetrate multitudinously, gradually becomes a dominant feature in the works of numerous artists who inherit Monet's and, especially, Cézanne's aesthetic notions. (shrink)

The foundations of psychoanalysis in the German idealist concepts of the reflexive human self have been the subject of detailed investigations devoted to the intertwined processes of introspection,...

The European Legacy, Volume 16, Issue 7, Page 851-854, December 2011.

1. Bd. Die Kategorie des Seinszusammenhanges und die Einheit des Seins.

English summary: It was not until the publication of Schelling''s Munich and Berlin lectures that we learned the decisive source for his theory of an identity of identity or identity doubled in itself. Schelling referred to what he called an older logic that was still acquainted with the figure of reduplication, for instance in Leibniz and Wolff. Philosophers in this tradition employed this term to refer to the specification of an aspect under which the subject-term is being considered. An often (...) quoted example: As consul, Fabius Maximus has authority over his father, but as son he stands under his fathers authority. Schelling gave the following turn to reduplication: Nature as nature does not coincide with the mind; and the mind as mind does not coincide with nature. Both have different truth conditions, so as to integrate an essential moment of difference into the identity formula. There is an X, however, which is strictly (seamlessly) identical with itself (the absolute subject = X) while transitively being both of them in turn; and it is only via X that the relata (nature and mind) are indirectly identified with each other: X is B and X is A (and X is strictly identical to itself). In addition to this, Schelling held a view of predication as kind of identification. He became acquainted with this view at the Tubingen Seminary through his teacher Gottfried Ploucquet. This insight helps us understand why Schelling reasonably thought that the identity-formula A=A is the genuine matrix of all veridical judgments. Taken together with his conviction that judging (Kant''s relative position) is a minor (or inferior) form of existential being (Kant''s absolute position) sheds light on why in 1806 Schelling made the radical contention in his Aphorisms: The strict sense of being (absolutely posited seamless self-sameness) is taken over by the looser sense of the copulative is which identifies subject and predicate; yes, this copula alone is existence itself and nothing else. Why should Schelling''s conception of nature-mind identity interest recent philosophers of mind? Because Schelling presents an ontologically neutral solution: Identity is a symmetrical relation that does not favor mind or matter, and prevents the idealistic reduction of nature to the mind. Nor can we conceive of the nature-mind identity as a fact inwardly disclosed to the mind (McGinn, Levine). Consciousness remains an enigma for itself; so does its identity with nature. Schelling teaches us that identity theories are not justified by self-evidence, but by an inference to the best explanation. German description: Nie ist genau erklart worden, was Schelling unter Identitat von Natur und Geist verstand. Dabei hat er sein reifes Denken Identitatssystem genannt und sich zeitlebens um kein zweites Problem begrifflich ahnliche Muhe gegeben. Da er aber seine Uberlegungen in Schriften verpackte, deren grosser systematischer Ausgriff sie schier erdruckte, ist, was er bis hinein in die Weltalter-Periode daruber herausfand, kaum eigens gewurdigt oder auch nur klar benannt worden. Die Schellingliteratur arbeitete entweder historisch oder liess sich vom Systemgedanken oder einzelnen in die Augen springenden Problemen blenden (z. B. Natur, Organismus, Freiheit, Existenz). Dabei ist Schellings Starke in einzelnen entscheidenden Argumenten versteckt, die, waren sie bekannt, die gegenwartige, auch analytische Diskussion durchaus zu inspirieren vermochten. Wir konnen heute urteilen, dass schon der junge Schelling in seiner Schrift Form der Philosophie eine differenzsensitive Form der Identitat im Sinn hatte, die er in den kommenden Jahrzehnten immer genauer auszubuchstabieren unternahm. Seine eigentlichen Quellen hat er kunstvoll verborgen. Es sind erstens die Identitatstheorie der Pradikation seines Universitatslehrers Ploucquet, die den Stiftlern in Tubingen eingeblaut wurde und die ihre merkwurdige Fixierung auf die ganz unkantische Auffassung vom Urteil als Subjekt-Pradikat-Identifikation (mit quantifiziertem Pradikator) erklart. Und zweitens Schellings Entdeckung einer alteren Logik, die mit der Figur der reduplicatio arbeitete. - So auch das Absolute: Als Geist ist es nicht Natur (und umgekehrt; Aussagen uber beide haben unterschiedliche Wahrheitsbedingungen), aber Geist und Natur werden beide vom Absoluten gewesen (transitiv ins Sein gehoben), und dies Absolute ist im striktest denkbaren Sinne mit sich identisch. So lasst sich die Schelling''sche Formel von der Identitat der Identitat und Differenz dem gesunden Menschenverstand vermitteln und Schellings aufrichtiger Jugendgedanke (Marx) aktualisieren. Er schneidet respektabel ab im Wettbewerb mit allerlei heutigen Leib-Seele-Identitatstheorien. (shrink)

Da nur der einzelne Mensch, nicht aber etwas ihn (seinen individuellen Leib im Sinne Jean Amérys) Überschreitendes frei sein kann, darum, so lautet Sartres logisch nicht zu widerlegendes Urteil, kann keinem Objekt eine in diesem selbst angelegte Fähigkeit, Entscheidungen zu fällen, zugesprochen werden. Wenn ein Subjekt einem ihm Äußeren – etwa Gott, der Natur, dem Staat, dem Kapital oder dem Schönen, dem Glück oder sonst etwas –, eine derartige Autonomie zuschreibt, belügt es sich, meint Sartre: um der Angst vor seiner (...) Freiheit Herr zu werden und sich für seine Taten nicht verantwortlich fühlen zu müssen. Wenn man Adornos Ästhetik dieser Subjektbestimmung konfrontiert, läßt sich jedoch zeigen, daß, so sehr Sartre logisch im Recht sein mag, die Kritik im Grunde darauf zielen muß, genau jenes für Sartre Unmögliche dennoch zur Darstellung zu bringen: um die Verkehrungen erkennen zu können, dank derer das Kapital als automatisches Subjekt, als Souverän, agieren kann. (shrink)

This volume documents for the first time the enormous variety of diverging interpretations and presents a text-oriented analysis of antinomy and its resolution ...

Die vorliegende Arbeit, die als Diplom-Arbeit verfasst und im September 1980 bei Johannes Agnoli eingereicht wurde, war das Resultat einer Auseinandersetzung mit Michel Foucault, der man sich in Berlin Ende der 1970er Jahren nur schwer entziehen konnte. »Jeder Aussage, gleichgültig, ob sie als Affirmation, als Kritik oder als Negation gemeint ist, liegt ein positiver Gehalt zugrunde. Die Reflexion auf diesen, meist unbewußten Gehalt gibt anderen erst die Möglichkeit, aber auch sich selbst, abgegebene Urteile auf ihren Wirklichkeitsgehalt hin zu überprüfen. Letzteres (...) will nichts anderes besagen, als daß ein konsequent durchgeführter Skeptizismus sich über die eigene Positivität ebenso hinwegtäuscht, wie jede Form von Partikularismus (Empirismus, wissenschaftlicher Rationalismus und auch der Positivismus à la Foucault) darüber stolpert – und hiermit benenne ich das versteckte Problem in Foucaults Machtbegriff auf allgemeinster Ebene – daß auch noch so vereinzelte Aussagen immer auf eine, in letzter Instanz positiv beschreibbare Totalität verweisen. Die weitgehende Mißachtung dieses Aspektes einer jeden Reflexion auch im Marxismus ist der Punkt, den ich für die Entstehung der Krisen des Marxismus (mit-)verantwortlich mache.«. (shrink)

T. 1. Wortschatz -- T. 2. Überlieferung, Textkritik, Grammatik.

People everywhere search for answers by using the resources of their traditions. They wish to do so in a legitimate way, and so they consult official institutions, specialists, and skilled individuals for their opinions; regardless of religious or cultural contexts, the common aim of these experts is to produce security, unity, and trust. Therefore, the norm-finding processes in Islamic and Western contexts share fundamental similarities: the problem of finding a final ground for judgment, the strategies of constructing coherence and of (...) organizing consensus, and the difficulties of obtaining legitimacy. What makes one debate "Islamic" and the other one "Western" is the different semantic materials, the different authorities, the different languages, and the different juridical frameworks. In my comparison of Muslim and Western discourses and practices, I conclude that Muslim and non-Muslim scholars tend to overemphasize the uniqueness of Muslim legal and practical responses to bioethical challenges, because they restrict their purview to legal opinions, ignoring larger dynamics of legitimization. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Freiburg (Breisgau), Universitèat, 1996.

This book presents a vivid argument for the almost lost idea of a unity of all natural sciences. It starts with the "strange" physics of matter, including particle physics, atomic and quantum mechanics, cosmology, relativity and their consequences (Chapter 1), and it continues by describing the properties of material systems that are best understood by statistical and phase-space concepts (Chapter 2). These lead to entropy and to the classical picture of quantitative information, initially devoid of value and meaning (Chapter 3). (...) Finally, "information space" and dynamics within it are introduced as a basis for semantics (Chapter 4), leading to an exploration of life and thought as new problems in physics (Chapter 5). Dynamic equations - again of a strange (but very general) nature - bring about the complex familiarity of the world we live in. Surprising new results in the life sciences open our eyes to the richness of physical thought, and they show us what can and what cannot be explained by a Darwinian approach. The abstract physical approach is applicable to the origins of life, of meaningful information and even of our universe. [T]itle presents a vivid argument for a unity of all natural sciences. This unity engenders the 'complex familiarity' of the world in which we live and which can be described in 'strangely simple' theoretical terms, leading to new insights into the mysterious phenomenon of life. (shrink)

Science and the humanities share the same kit of working tools, called the world's literature. While the author of this article deals mainly with the scientific and mathematical literature, the reader probably gravitates towards some other branches, but such distinctions were hardly made in the Middle Ages. The American philosopher, Wallace Stevens, in his book The Necessary Angel remarks that at the time of Aristotle, the Greek language had no word to signify literature. The reason is surely that literature had (...) long since been too universal an element in Greece to require a name. We have no name for the smell of air. This all-pervading power of literature is apparent already two generations before Aristotle, when Socrates made his defence against leading the youth of Athens towards atheism. Plato's Apology tells us how Socrates taunted his accuser: “Have you such a low opinion of the judges, that you fancy them so illiterate as not to know these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras which are full of them? And so, my word, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when they can be bought in the book-market for one drachma at most…” (a coin today worth 1.4 pence!). (shrink)