Recent decades have brought environmental justice studies to a much broader analysis and new areas of concern. We take this increased depth and breadth of environmental justice further by considering restorative justice, with a particular emphasis on reconciliation efforts between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. Our focus is on the reconciliation efforts taken by the indigenous/non-indigenous jointmanagement structure of Uluṟu-Kata Tjuṯa National Park. Usinga framework of restorative justice within a bivalent environmental justice approach, we consider the current management policies at the (...) Park, particularly as it pertains to the controversial climb of the rock, Uluṟu. Our exploration of restorative environmental justice depends upon narrative analysis of embodied ecotourism affects in order to determine the capacity and obstacles of reconciliation efforts in the current management policy. Interviews with tourists from the Greater Sydney Metropolitan Area supply us with cases that provide affective experiences and a postcolonial narrative analysis of touring practices that we argue are imbued with nationalism and colonial naturalism that must be transformed in order to meet the requests of the Park’s traditional indigenous owners. We argue that restorative justice, within a bivalent environmental justice framework that already emphasizes other distributive and recognition measures, is vital for overcoming these obstacles for Australian environmental heritage. (shrink)

Recent decades have brought environmental justice studies to a much broader analysis and new areas of concern. We take this increased depth and breadth of environmental justice further by considering restorative justice, with a particular emphasis on reconciliation efforts between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. Our focus is on the reconciliation efforts taken by the indigenous/non-indigenous jointmanagement structure of Uluṟu-Kata Tjuṯa National Park. Usinga framework of restorative justice within a bivalent environmental justice approach, we consider the current management policies at the (...) Park, particularly as it pertains to the controversial climb of the rock, Uluṟu. Our exploration of restorative environmental justice depends upon narrative analysis of embodied ecotourism affects in order to determine the capacity and obstacles of reconciliation efforts in the current management policy. Interviews with tourists from the Greater Sydney Metropolitan Area supply us with cases that provide affective experiences and a postcolonial narrative analysis of touring practices that we argue are imbued with nationalism and colonial naturalism that must be transformed in order to meet the requests of the Park’s traditional indigenous owners. We argue that restorative justice, within a bivalent environmental justice framework that already emphasizes other distributive and recognition measures, is vital for overcoming these obstacles for Australian environmental heritage. (shrink)

The authors' aim is to provide a more complete picture of a non-anthropocentric relational ethics by addressing the failure to account for environmental justice. They argue that environmental ethics is always more than how discourses are layered over place, by situating moral agency through the body's affective repertoire of being-in-the-world. Empirical evidence for their argument is drawn from self-reflexive accounts of young Americans travelling to Ulu r u-Kata Tju t a National Park, Northern Territory, Australia as part of a study-group. (...) These reflexive travel narratives illustrate the dilemmas that even well-prepared visitors have in negotiating moral pathways invoked by the policy of reconciliation. (shrink)

Through case studies that highlight the type of information that is seldom reported in the news, Faces of Environmental Racism exposes the type and magnitude of environmental racism, both domestic and international. The essays explore the justice of current environmental practices, asking such questions as whether cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate analytic technique and whether there are alternate routes to sustainable development in the South.

Through case studies that highlight the type of information that is seldom reported in the news, Faces of Environmental Racism exposes the type and magnitude of environmental racism, both domestic and international. The essays explore the justice of current environmental practices, asking such questions as whether cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate analytic technique and whether there are alternate routes to sustainable development in the South.

In this pioneering new book, Sandra Harding and Robert Figueroa bring together an important collection of original essays by leading philosophers exploring an extensive range of diversity issues for the philosophy of science and technology. The essays gathered in this volume extend current philosophical discussion of science and technology beyond the standard feminist and gender analyses that have flourished over the past two decades, by bringing a thorough and truly diverse set of cultural, racial, and ethical concerns to (...) bear on questioning in these areas. Science and Other Cultures charts important new directions in ongoing discussions of science and technology, and makes a significant contribution to both scholarly and teaching resources available in the field. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Two dimensions of environmental justice Domestic environmental justice in the United States Global environmental justice Conclusions.

This paper presents an overview of the goals, structure, and results of an annual, week-long, summer philosophy institute for high school students. Inspired by other similar programs, the Summer Philosophy Institute of Colorado (SPI-CO) was designed for a culturally diverse group of students, aiming to expose college-track high school students to philosophy, to encourage students in lower-track classifications to pursue college, to offer advising to students on how to make college a reality, to expose both groups of students to critical (...) thinking skills, and to promote cultural diversity in philosophy as a discipline. After explaining why philosophy encourages students in education and why high school students are so well-primed to study it, the authors give a detailed overview of the structure of the institute, including schedule, lesson plan, texts and themes studied, funding, and student demography. The authors conclude by discussing an outreach program that grew out of the SPI-CO and a summary of the initial results of the program. (shrink)

In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.

Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis of (...) knowledge: S knows that p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p. The dominant terminology in the literature, also adopted here, is to call condition (3) the sensitivity condition and condition (4) the adherence condition. The sensitivity condition is intuitively appealing since it states that a subject does not know that p if she would believe that p even if p were false. Nozick used the sensitivity condition to accomplish two major tasks. First, he provided a solution to the Gettier problem by arguing that in Gettier cases subjects do not know since the sensitivity condition is violated. Second, he presented a controversial solution to the skeptical problem according to which we have external world knowledge but do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. This solution is available because sensitivity is not closed under known entailment. Quickly, criticism of the sensitivity condition emerged. First, most epistemologists regarded the price of abandoning knowledge closure as a price too high to pay. Second, it was noted that sensitivity leads to the counterintuitive consequence of precluding us from inductive knowledge since induction typically yields insensitive beliefs. The most dominant reaction to these problems was to replace sensitivity by the modal principle of safety, nowadays the most popular modal principle. However, sensitivity is not only important as a starting point of modal epistemology. Because of its intuitive attractiveness, many authors aimed at refining the original sensitivity account in order to avoid well-known problems. This has led to a second wave of sensitivity accounts. As of today, various sensitivity-based theories are on the market, including accounts that avoid closure failure, probabilistic interpretations of sensitivity and adherence, and contextualist approaches. There is thus a vivid and ongoing debate about the sensitivity principle in epistemology. (shrink)

Sensitivity and safety are modal concepts of knowledge. A person’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if in the closest possible world where p is false S does not believe that p. A person’s belief that p is safe if and only if in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief that p in the same way as in the actual world the belief continues to be true. Robert Nozick claims that sensitivity (...) is a necessary condition for knowledge. Ernest Sosa, Timothy Williamson and Duncan Pritchard argue among others that safety is necessary for knowledge. I shall contest both views by offering counterexamples of persons, to whom it is highly plausible to ascribe knowledge although their beliefs are neither sensitive nor safe. I conclude that neither sensitivity nor safety is a necessary condition for knowledge and that insensitive and unsafe knowledge exists. (shrink)

Dans son inventaire des « lieux théologiques », Melchior Cano ne faisait aucune place à l’expérience spirituelle, les « spirituels » ne paraissant même pas comme théologiens… La frontière qui, relayant une distinction paisible, s’était élevée entre théologie et spiritualité, sur la base d’une évolution de la théologie vers une scientificité et sous l’effet des interrogations du nominalisme, semble être devenue poreuse, sinon avoir disparu. De fait, la théologie contemporaine pense l’expérience croyante. La question pourrait se formuler ainsi : (...) où et comment peut se faire la prise en charge théologique de la vie spirituelle, du capital chrétien d’expérience spirituelle ? Est-ce par une discipline propre, la théologie spirituelle ? Qu’est-ce qui la caractériserait ? Pour réfléchir ainsi au devenir de la théologie spirituelle, on commencera par observer, avec quelques exemples d’élaborations théologiques significatives, comment la théologie contemporaine prend en compte la dimension expérientielle de la foi chrétienne. Mais prendre en compte cette part constitutive d’expérience, est-ce pour autant prendre en charge l’expérience spirituelle ? Si oui, une théologie spirituelle n’aurait plus de raison d’être ; si non, quelle est la vocation d’une telle théologie ?In his inventory of “theological loci”, Melchior Cano did not at all include spiritual experience and “spirituals” do not even appear in his listing as theologians… Following after a period of peaceful distinction, the border that has arisen between theology and spirituality - on the basis of an evolution of theology towards scientificity and under the influence of the questions raised by nominalism – seems now to have become porous, if not to have altogether vanished. In fact, contemporary theology reflects on believing experience. We could put the question this way: where and how can theology take charge of spiritual life, valorizing the Christian capital of spiritual experience ? Is it through a specific discipline, spiritual theology? What would characterize it ? In order to think through the way spiritual theology is developing, we shall begin by observing, thanks to a few examples of significant theological texts, how contemporary theology takes into account the experiential dimension of Christian faith. However, is taking into account this constitutive part of experience the same as taking charge of spiritual experience ? If so, a spiritual theology would no longer have a raison d’être; if not, what then is the task of such a theology ? (shrink)

Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan, on which we also (...) consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities. (shrink)

This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are (...) subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation. (shrink)

Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in (...) contrast is not sufficient for discrimination as there are cases of safety that are clearly instances of discrimination failure. The developed account of discrimination between objects will be extended to discrimination between kinds and between types. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit untersucht Improvisationsprozesse (creativity in performance) aus einer soziologischen Perspektive unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Dimensionen von Handeln, Interagieren und Wissen. Die Soziologie entwickelte in den letzten Jahren ein zunehmendes Interesse am Phänomen der Improvisation, wobei weniger die Resultate improvisatorischen Handelns im Zentrum standen, als vielmehr die Improvisationsprozesse selbst. Eine solche Fokussierung nimmt auch diese Untersuchung vor. Basierend auf der empirischen, qualitativen und vergleichenden Untersuchung von Free Jazz- und Flamenco-Praktiken sowie in Auseinandersetzung mit der bestehenden Improvisations-, Handlungs-, Interaktions- und Kreativitätsforschung (...) wird hier ein neuartiges Modell des Improvisierens vorgeschlagen, das die diesbezüglichen Handlungs- und Interaktionsprozesse erklärt und die Anschlussfähigkeit für weitere Bereiche der künstlerischen Praxis eröffnet. (shrink)

This book explores how Puerto Rico’s affective archive of Caribbean relations, comprised of historical-political figures and communitarian, activist, and artistic work, has envisioned and embodied decolonization and sovereignty in relation to the archipelagic and the sea, thus furthering emancipatory and reparatory horizons.

Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not consider the belief-forming method as sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as the discussed (...) cases suggest, then we face a generality problem. Our higher-level beliefs as formalized by Becker and Salerno turn out to be sensitive according to a wide reading of bootstrapping, but insensitive according to a narrow reading. This particular generality problem does not arise for the alternative accounts of process reliabilism and basis-relative safety. Hence, sensitivity accounts not only deliver opposite results given different formalizations of higher-level beliefs, but also for the same formalization, depending on how we interpret bootstrapping. Therefore, sensitivity accounts do not fail because they make higher-level knowledge impossible, as Vogel argues, and they do not succeed in allowing higher-level knowledge, as Becker and Salerno suggest. Rather, their problem is that they deliver far too heterogeneous results. (shrink)

That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...) doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. (shrink)

En el artículo se desarrollan algunas ideas asociadas al campo de la epistemología, ciencias cognitivas y ciencias de la educación desde una aproximación compleja. En este contexto, la noción de disonancia epistémica refiere a una interpretación crítica de algunos de los axiomas paradigmáticos que subyacen y legitiman, en sus diversos niveles y dimensiones, los modelos de desarrollo en la educación contemporánea.

The abstract structure of inquiry - the process of acquiring and changing beliefs about the world - is the focus of this book which takes the position that the "pragmatic" rather than the "linguistic" approach better solves the philosophical problems about the nature of mental representation, and better accounts for the phenomena of thought and speech. It discusses propositions and propositional attitudes (the cluster of activities that constitute inquiry) in general and takes up the way beliefs change in response to (...) potential new information, suggesting that conditional propositions should be understood as projections of epistemic policies onto the world.Robert C. Stalnaker is a professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.

This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method (...) used. Crucially, successfully checking whether p is true requires using a method that is sensitive with respect to p, i.e. a method that would not indicate that p, if p were false. In Part II, I use the distinction between knowing and checking to explain central puzzles about knowledge, particularly puzzles centering on knowledge closure, puzzles concerning bootstrapping and the skeptical puzzle. Moreover, the book clarifies a dispute about modal epistemology, concerning the application of the sensitivity principle. By arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not knowing, I explain where our persisting intuitions about sensitivity have their place in epistemology. (shrink)

A la memoria del maestro/filósofo Álvaro B. Márquez-Fernández La necesidad de seguir promoviendo temas “no” vistos de forma positiva por los grupos cerrados del poder, y aquellos que han hecho de la academia grupúsculos tradicionales, sistémicos y funcionales a los intereses de los de arriba, se constituye en una apuesta de ir a contracorriente de esos tipos de historias y asumir un compromiso ético-político en función de las luchas, los sentimientos y las emociones de los grupos de abajo.

_Resumen_ En una entrevista de la segunda edición de _Crítica de la razón latinoamericana, _Castro-Gómez plantea un debate entre dos técnicas historiográficas que se disputaban legitimidad: Historia de las ideas y Genealogía de las prácticas. Según él mismo, el primer proyecto _nace muerto_, pues se trata de historiar las creencias de América Latina a través de ideas de una élite académica. En adición, asevera que la Genealogía de las prácticas es la historiografía más adecuada, pues ella revela la cosmovisión contingentemente (...) construida de cada grupo humano a partir de experiencias particulares. No obstante, se argumentará que, lejos de ser antitéticas, ambas formas de historiar pueden complementarse. El presente trabajo es el intento de dicha complementación a través de un caso particular: la incursión del marxismo en el Perú. _Palabras clave: _Marxismo, Genealogía de las prácticas, Historia de las ideas, Foucault, Castro-Gomez. (shrink)

Uno de los factores fundamentales para comprender la problemática de la paz es el de la memoria. Un presupuesto de este artículo es que dicha memoria se realiza en el lenguaje, especialmente en el lenguaje articulado, que es el medio por el que se hace púbica y se despliega, no sólo la expresión de un pasado, sino también las perspectivas que orientan nuestras argumentaciones para el presente y el futuro. Cuando hablo de lenguaje, propongo que de lo que se trata, (...) no son sólo de palabras, sino de sintagmas, es decir del habla desplegada en una época, y en contextos biográficos y comunidades interpretativas de cada uno y de cada comunidad. Dos factores a considerar en esta definición de nociones, categorías y conceptos son lo imaginario y la ideología, que están relacionados con la educación y las condiciones de vida, colectivas e individuales.Otro asunto que hay que considerar son los contextos o niveles de diversa escala y poder, entre ellos, los contextos contemporáneos, es decir la escala macro-estructural ─escala preferida de quienes piensan que la paz no es posible─, que interviene decisivamente en la formulación de las posibilidades no sólo de la paz, sino de la memorialización, la que puede ser sometida a políticas públicas y privadas de diverso alcance.En este artículo se abordan los problemas asociados a las posibilidades de formulación de las políticas de paz en su nivel intermedio, es decir las que median entre las escalas macro y micro, con especial énfasis en las últimas, que es donde la memoria, la acción colectiva y la autoreflexividad pueden aportar. (shrink)

The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of (...) rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles. (shrink)

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types (...) of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation. (shrink)

Robert B. Brandom is one of the most original philosophers of our day, whose book Making It Explicit covered and extended a vast range of topics in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language--the very core of analytic philosophy. This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out. A tour of the earlier book's large ideas and relevant details, Articulating Reasons offers an easy entry into two of the main themes of Brandom's (...) work: the idea that the semantic content of a sentence is determined by the norms governing inferences to and from it, and the idea that the distinctive function of logical vocabulary is to let us make our tacit inferential commitments explicit. Brandom's work, making the move from representationalism to inferentialism, constitutes a near-Copernican shift in the philosophy of language--and the most important single development in the field in recent decades. Articulating Reasons puts this accomplishment within reach of nonphilosophers who want to understand the state of the foundations of semantics. Table of Contents: Introduction 1. Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism 2. Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning 3. Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism 4. What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any? 5. A Social Route from Reasoning to Representing 6. Objectivity and the Normative Fine Structure of Rationality Notes Index Displaying a sovereign command of the intricate discussion in the analytic philosophy of language, Brandom manages successfully to carry out a program within the philosophy of language that has already been sketched by others, without losing sight of the vision inspiring the enterprise in the important details of his investigation ' Using the tools of a complex theory of language, Brandom succeeds in describing convincingly the practices in which the reason and autonomy of subjects capable of speech and action are expressed. --J'rgen Habermas. (shrink)

The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different one. Regardless of whether we allow (...) backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals, some instances of induction yield insensitive beliefs whereas others yield sensitive ones. These results are too heterogenous for providing a plausible sensitivity-account of inductive knowledge. Induction remains a serious problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge. (shrink)