The book is a reconstruction and detailed presentation (close to a commentary) of Aristotle's lost work On Ideas, based, in the main, on the testimony of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary to the Metaphysics; Alexander's text is included in the critical edition by D. Harlfinger.

This book is an attempt "to give a systematic account of the development of plato's theory of knowledge" (page vii). thus it focuses on the dialogues in which epistemological issues come to the fore. these dialogues are "meno", "phaedo", "symposium", "republic", "cratylus", "theastetus", "phaedrus", "timaeus", "sophist", "politicus", "philebus", and "laws". issues discusssed include the theory of recollection, perception, the difference between belief and knowledge, and mathematical knowledge. (staff).

CHAPTER I The Theory of Recollection I. SOCRATIC DOCTRINE IN THE EARLY DIALOGUES In Plato's early dialogues one of the most characteristic and at the same ...

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

In this paper I wish to examine the meaning of the doctrine of anamnesis, with particular regard to the role assigned in it to sense-experience. I shall argue that an empirical interpretation of the doctrine as it is presented in the Meno is false, and that Plato is not concerned at all in the Meno with the question of the role of sense-experience in recollection; that the doctrine of the Phaedo shows an inadequate appreciation of the problems involved in assigning (...) a role to sense-experience, and is seriously inconsistent with what Plato says elsewhere, in the Phaedo and in other dialogues, about the senses and sensible images; that the revised and more responsible presentation of this doctrine in the Phaedrus is self-contradictory; that misinterpretations of the theory of anamnesis are due principally to either misinterpretation or neglect of what is said about it in the Meno, the custom of taking Phaedo 73 c ff. as specially representative of Plato's doctrine. (shrink)

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

In the dialogues earlier than the Republic, Plato indicates in many ways his lack of confidence that any method of ethical analysis will lead to a discovery of the truth. The doubts which he expresses or implies have not always been given the attention which they deserve, and there has often been a reluctance to accept them as an expression of Plato's genuine conviction. There is, admittedly, some justification for this reluctance. Plato does not always seem to be consistent. In (...) his attitude towards the results attainable by the use of a method of joint inquiry, he is sometimes extremely optimistic, at other times sceptical; and it seems a not unreasonable explanation of his scepticism to ascribe it to his desire to preserve a consistent portrait of the ‘ignorant’ Socrates. Thus the hesitation and reserve with which Plato immediately qualifies his dogmatic presentation of the theory of νμνησις in the Meno is explicable as a concession to dramatic realism. His reference to the method discussed in the Phaedo as a δετερος πλος may be dismissed as ‘ironical’, as ‘the habitual playful selfdepreciation of Socrates’. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the development of Plato's views on method in the dialogues as far as the Republic can be traced more consistently if we accept Plato's doubts, as well as his optimism, about ethical analysis, as the expression of his genuine conviction. (shrink)