H.P. Grice is known principally for his influential contributions to the philosophy of language, but his work also includes treatises on the philosophy of mind, ethics, and metaphysics--much of which is unpublished to date. This collection of original essays by such philosophers as Nancy Cartwright, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, and P.F. Strawson demonstrates the unified and powerful character of Grice's thoughts on being, mind, meaning, and morals. An introductory essay by the editors provides the first overview of Grice's work.

AI-driven decisions can draw data from virtually any area of your life to make a decision about virtually any other area of your life. That creates fairness issues. Effective regulation to ensure fairness requires that AI systems be transparent. That is, regulators must have sufficient access to the factors that explain and justify the decisions. One approach to transparency is to require that systems be explainable, as that concept is understood in computer science. A system is explainable if one can (...) provide a human-understandable explanation of why it makes any particular prediction. Explainability should not be equated with transparency. To address transparency and characterize its relation to explainability, we define transparency for a regulatory purpose. A system is transparent for a regulatory purpose (r-transparent) when and only when regulators have an explanation, adequate for that purpose, of why it yields the predictions it does. Explainability remains relevant to transparency but turns out to be neither necessary nor sufficient for it. The concepts of explainability and r-transparency combine to yield four possibilities: explainable and either r-transparent or not; and not explainable and either not r-transparent or r-transparent. Combining r-transparency with ideas from the Harvard computer scientist Cynthia Dwork, we propose four requirements on AI systems. (shrink)

There is now a body of evidence suggesting that the occurrence and course of schizophrenia are affected by a variety of environmental factors. _The Environment of Schizophrenia_ draws upon our knowledge of these factors in order to design innovations that will decrease its incidence and severity, while enhancing the quality of life for sufferers and their relatives. Examining environmental forces operating at the individual, domestic and broad societal levels, Richard Warner proposes feasible interventions such as: * education about (...) obstetric risks * marketing effective psychosocial treatments * business enterprises set up to employ people with mental illness * cognitive-behavioral therapy for psychosis The Environment of Schizophrenis suggests practical ways to create a better world for those who suffer from this serious illness and for those who are close to them. It will prove fresh and stimulating reading for mental health managers and policy makers, as well as psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, mental health advocates, and communications specialists. (shrink)

When is an indirect report of what a speaker meant correct? The question arises in the law. The Contract Law case of Spaulding v. Morse is a good example. Following their 1932 divorce, George Morse and Ruth Morse entered into a trust agreement in 1937 for the support of their minor son Richard. In that agreement, George promised to “pay to [Spaulding as] trustee in trust for his said minor son Richard the sum of twelve hundred dollars per (...) year, payable in equal monthly installments on the first day of each month until the entrance of Richard D. Morse into some college, university or higher institution of learning beyond the completion of the high school grades, and thereupon, instead of said payments, amounting to twelve hundred dollars yearly, he shall and will then pay to the trustee payments in the sum of twenty-two hundred dollars per year for a period of said higher education but not more than four years.” Richard graduated from high school on February 5, 1946 and, in the post-WWII continuation of the draft, was inducted into the army the following day. The question in the case is whether George, by the words of the trust agreement, meant that he would pay $1,200 per year for Richard’s support while he was in the army. Is that a correct indirect report of what George meant?The explanation I offer assumes Gricean analysis of speaker meaning, and it emphasizes the role of speaker meaning typically plays in solving coordination problems. A coordination problem is a situation “in which each person wants to participate in a group action but only if others also participate.” A classic example is a political protest: “each person might want to take part in an antigovernment protest but only if there are enough total protesters to make arrests and police repression unlikely.” Coordination problems arise in more mundane settings as well – in Spaulding v. Morse, for example. Ruth and George want to mutually agree on Richard’s support: Ruth wants to commit to an arrangement only if George does, and vice versa for George. In 1937, George and Ruth solved the problem through speaker meaning. By signing the trust agreement, George, with Ruth as his audience, meant that he obligated himself to a particular support agreement. When Ruth signed, she, with George as her audience, meant that she accepted the agreement. In general, parties often solve coordination problems through speaker meaning. If, for example, enough people can communicate their commitment to participate in the protest to enough people, the protest will take place.The account assigns a central role to the fact that speaker meaning facilitates coordination by creating relevant common knowledge. Common knowledge is “the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows X, A knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum.” Common knowledge facilitates coordination: “Actors coordinate when they have evidence for common knowledge, and refrain from coordinating when they do not.”. (shrink)

Paul Grice is widely seen as a champion of the view that communication is an exercise in rational coordination through acts of speaker meaning. Since Grice, a central question has been “[h]ow much of this coordination derives from interlocutors’ specific knowledge of one another as people? How much exploits their knowledge of language itself?” Grice is seen as emphasizing the explanatory centrality of “interlocutors’ specific knowledge.” This picture overlooks Grice’s 1968 article “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning,” in which (...) he explains communication through the utterance of sentences (and words and phrases) by appealing to an internalized syntax and semantics. This appears to put Grice squarely on the “knowledge of language itself” side of the explanation of communication. Is Grice right? Does an appeal to internalized syntax and semantics play a premier role in explaining communication through the utterance of sentences? If it does, what explanatory role is left for “interlocutors’ specific knowledge of one another”? I outline Grice’s position in “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning” and compare it to Stephen Schiffer’s position in his 2015 article “Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar,” which also assigns a central role in explaining communication to an internalized syntax and semantics. I then turn to what explanatory role remains for “interlocutors’ specific knowledge of one another.” I turn to Schiffer’s account of speaker meaning in his 1972 book Meaning, where he defines speaker meaning in terms of common knowledge (the recursive belief state of knowing, knowing we know, knowing we know we know, and so on). I show how to incorporate a common-knowledge-based account of speaker meaning into Schiffer’s 2015 appeal to an internalized syntax and semantics, and then I show how to use the resulting account to assign a substantive explanatory role “interlocutors’ specific knowledge of one another.”. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Demands of Political Legitimacy The Received View Persons Courts and Persons References Further Reading.

Reasons and reasoning were central to the work of Paul Grice, one of the most influential and admired philosophers of the late twentieth century. In the John Locke Lectures that Grice delivered in Oxford at the end of the 1970s, he set out his fundamental thoughts about these topics; Aspects of Reason is the long-awaited publication of those lectures. This immensely rich work, powerfully evocative of the mind of its author, will refresh and illuminate discussions in many areas of contemporary (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Capone and Bucca offer a socio-pragmatic analysis of President Trump’s utterance, ‘I hope you will let Flynn go’ to show that Trump illicitly tried to persuade Comey to drop the investigation of Flynn. I do not dispute that claim. Instead, I offer an overview of their argument—with one potential point of disagreement. Capone and Bucca assume, As pragmatic investigators typically do, that speakers have determinate intentions and reason in complex ways about how to realize those intentions. I suggest that speakers (...) may not have determinate intentions and may not engage in the complex types of reasoning pragmatics typically attributes to them. I do not suggest that this point undercuts Capone and Bucca’s claims; rather, it suggests that their emphasis on a normative component in pragmatic analysis is correct, and suggests that a focus on the normative component supports their claims. (shrink)

Suppose a speaker S and an audience A are in a communication coordination problem. That is, for some proposition p, they each prefer that S mean that p and that A believe p in response. How do they coordinate their thought and action to solve the problem? The Gricean answer is that they reason their way to the solution. Pragmatics makes a similar assumption. “Pragmatics involves perception augmented by some species of ‘ampliative’ inference … a sort of reasoning”. There are (...) two objections. The first is that it is not plausible to attribute such reasoning to speakers and audiences. The second objection grants, for the sake of argument, that speakers and audiences reason in the required ways. The objection is that this is not sufficient to solve coordination problems since a speaker and an audience may not know how each has reasoned. The problem is well-known in game theory, which typically solves it by assuming the parties’ preferences are common knowledge. Common knowledge is the recursive belief state in which people are know something, know they know it, know they know they know it, ad infinitum. I propose a similar solution. When people interact as speaker and audience, common knowledge arises from their perceptions of each other as fulfilling the roles of speaker and audience. The account of how common knowledge arises entails Grice’s general characterization of conversational implicatures. More precisely, it entails speakers and audiences involved in communication coordination problems typically commonly know that a relevant instance of the conditions holds. The common knowledge approach requires attributing reasoning to speakers and audiences, but it keeps those attributions to a plausible minimum. Thus the common knowledge approach is a viable alternative to current approaches that attribute extensive reasoning to speakers and audiences.A common knowledge-based approach to pragmatics would answer at least the following question: What informative generalizations are possible about the role of contexts in generating common knowledge relevant to conversational implicatures? The question is important. “Much has been learned about these domains of psychology from a focus on the problem of altruistic cooperation and the mechanisms of reciprocity. We hope that comparable insights are waiting to be discovered by psychologists as they investigate the problem of mutualistic cooperation, and the mechanisms of common knowledge are—as we might say—put out there”. (shrink)

In the keynote essay, David Chalmers proposes that we explain consciousness by a non-reductive theory of experience which adds new basic principles to the laws of nature. This essay endorses Chalmers’ proposal but argues -- contrary to Chalmers -- that the principles of such a theory interfere with purely physical laws, since the principles entail violations of physical conservation laws. The essay argues that the qualified incorrigibility of the mental nonetheless provides compelling reason to opt for a non-reductive theory.

This chapter contains sections titled: What Is Pragmatism? Foundationalist versus Nonfoundationalist Views of the Law Pragmatism and Legitimacy Rejecting the Demand References.

Consider the proposition, “Neither the motion of a body nor the action of a force affects space and time themselves”. We rejected this proposition when, in accepting the general theory of relativity, we accepted that the movement of a body or the action of a force affects the curvature of space-time. Compare the following proposition: “p and if and only if or ”. We think this is logically true; at least, most of us do. Some don’t, on empirical grounds—claiming that (...) we should interpret quantum mechanics as showing that the left-hand side can be true when the right-hand side is false. The idea is that the motions of bodies and actions of forces not only affect space-time relations, they also, as it were, affect logical relations as well. I think evidence from quantum mechanics—like empirical evidence generally—cannot possibly show that the equivalence fails to hold. I am convinced that I know a priori that p and if and only if or. My aim here is to explain the basis of this conviction. (shrink)

This book builds on the idea that pragmatics and philosophy are strictly interconnected and that advances in one area will generate consequential advantages in the other area. The first part of the book, entitled ‘Theoretical Approaches to Philosophy of Language’, contains contributions by philosophers of language on connectives, intensional contexts, demonstratives, subsententials, and implicit indirect reports. The second part, ‘Pragmatics in Discourse’, presents contributions that are more empirically based or of a more applicative nature and that deal with the pragmatics (...) of discourse, argumentation, pragmatics and law, and context. The book presents perspectives which, generally, make most of the Gricean idea of the centrality of a speaker’s intention in attribution of meaning to utterances, whether one is interested in the level of sentence-like units or larger chunks of discourse. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There is limited guidance about whether and how to provide psychological assessment results to research participants. This paper considers several ethical challenges associated with offering individual research results in psychological assessment research. Additionally, the process used to return individual results within a study examining neurodevelopmental effects of anesthesia exposure in children and adolescents is described. Almost all participants requested to know if results were concerning; however, only around a third of those with concerning findings sought additional feedback. Ongoing research (...) and guidance are necessary to establish evidence-based practices and manage challenges that may emerge when disclosing such results. (shrink)

Tragedy and Redress in Western Literature: A Philosophical Perspective, by GaskinRichard. New York and London: Routledge, 2018. Pp. ix + 412.

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 715-716, August 2012.

W. B. Yeats's great celebration of the human imagination, ‘Byzantium’, of which these are the first and last verses, is concerned with the tension, reconciliation and movement between two types of sensibility, the sensual and the spiritual, that of natural life and that of transcendent symbol, in this poem imaged as ‘the fury and the mire of human veins’ and as ‘bird or golden handiwork . . . of changeless metal’. In it, as Richard Ellmann puts it, ‘the teeming (...) images, “that dolphin-torn, that gong-tormented sea”, flood up to the marbles of Byzantium itself, where they are at last brought under control by “the golden smithies of the Emperor”’ – himself, inter alia , an image of poet. (shrink)

© Mind Association 2017Exactly how radical change in commitments on matters of fundamental concern is possible has been a problem since at least Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus and Augustine's rejection of Pelagianism and defence of divine grace. If an act of will is required to accept the offer of grace, then isn’t something important left to us to do? And if so, can or does reason play any role in such radical change? If so, how? Martin (...) class='Hi'>Warner takes on these large questions in The Aesthetics of Argument. One modest way in which he gets his account started is to note, following Susan Haack, that ‘the intuition … that there is such a thing as favourable but not conclusive evidence … is stronger than … [the intuition] that there is such a thing as “inductive implication”’. That is, we apparently do make... (shrink)

H.P. Grice is a distinguished philosopher predominantly known for his influential contributions to the philosophy of language, but that is only one strand in a rich tapestry of ideas bearing on the philosophy of mind, ethics, and metaphysics as well. Some of the essays in this collection of original papers by leading philosophers edited by Grandy and Warner develop Grice's earlier work in the philosophy of language, but most of them discuss or present his newer and less-known work. Together (...) they demonstrate the unified and powerful character of his thoughts on being, mind, meaning, and morals. An introductory essay provides some of the first overview of Grice's thought, and makes explicit some of the relations among the essays. Grice's substantial response is followed by nineteen contributed papers whose authors include Donald Davidson, Stephen Schiffer, John Searle, and P.F. Strawson. The Times Literary Supplement writes of Grice: 'the only leader of whom it is true that the level of the discipline would be raised if most philosophers took him as a model of how to think and write.' This paperback edition replaces the hardback, published March 1986. (shrink)

In ‘Davis on Enjoyment: A Reply’, Richard Warner replies to three objections against his ‘Enjoyment’ that I raised in my ‘A Causal Theory of Enjoyment’, and concludes that one of my examples in fact demonstrates a serious deficiency of my own account. I argue that Warner’s replies to my objections are unsatisfactory, and that his objection to my account had a ready solution.