Subjectivists, taking the “collapse” of the observation-interpretation contrast much too seriously, are led to imagine that even perceptual knowledge is active. And therefore subject dependent. Turning the tables on this popular trend, I argue that even conceptual knowledge is passive. Kant’s epistemology is conceptual. But if also active, then incoherent. If synthetic a priori truths are to follow upon our mental activity, they were neither true nor, far less, a priori before that activity. “A priori” and “active” are contradictory attributes (...) of knowledge. As, indeed, are “a priori” and “subject-dependent” to begin with. Nothing a priori can be dependent on anything except itself, and least of all on the human subject. Kant does consider the active aspect of thought. The difference is that for him the more active it becomes, the less it is to be trusted. For we are no longer in the province of the Understanding, and its necessary truths, but in the realm of Pure Reason and its dialectical antinomies. Cognition activists who take a liking to Kant have simply mistaken Reason for the Understanding. And Reason is to Kant “the seat of all transcendental illusion”. (shrink)

Most claims for the falsification of the Law of the Excluded Middle rest on confusion or can be circumvented. A few of them, however, cannot. I concentrate on two of those, cases involvin...

The Energy-Time Uncertainty (ETU) has always been a problem-ridden relation, its problems stemming uniquely from the perplexing question of how to understand this mysterious Δ t . On the face of it (and, indeed, far deeper than that), we always know what time it is. Few theorists were ignorant of the fact that time in quantum mechanics is exogenously defined, in no ways intrinsically related to the system. Time in quantum theory is an independent parameter, which simply means independently known (...) . In the early 1960s Aharonov (1961-64) and Bohm (1961-64) mounted a spirited attack against the ETU, which sealed its fate to the present date. By emphasising that time is always “well-defined” in quantum theory, they were led to the conclusion that no ETU should exist, a view shared by many in the 1990s, if Busch (1990) is to be believed. In a similar vein, I emphasize that (a) physical systems occupy a particular energy state at a particular instant of time, if at all; (b) even in absence of all time-measuring instruments, it is still trivially warranted that one can measure a system's energy as accurately as one pleases, and simply announce “The system's energy is exactly E NOW!”, a possibility which no quantum mechanics of any sort, or any physical theory whatsoever, can afford to tamper with or change, except circularly. One never loses one's own perception of time, when one measures the energy, a fact which no measurement conceivable can interfere with or affect. Both (a) and (b) uniquely entail that energy and time are compatible, if not indeed intimately interconnected, contrary to what the relevant uncertainty seems to affirm. In response to Aharonov's and Bohm's initial problem, I reinterpret ΔEΔt ≥ h , as directly derived from authentic quantum principles, without however having to assume a direct incompatibility between its related concepts, attributing their complementarity to conditions other than ordinarily assumed. (shrink)

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno's Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term "discontinuity", namely, Einstein's conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial 'discontinuity' of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno's Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein's, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

I unpack the contents of the motto that “meaning is use” in fivefold fashion and point to the elements it contains, which are open to an ideological exploitation, the main reason for its strong appeal among intellectual circles. I indicate how the sense of it, “where there is use, there is meaning”, has encouraged equalitarian accounts of meaning and truth . I then present and discuss Austin’s distinction between the Sentence and the Statement, which entails the presence of meaning preceding (...) the use, and directing it, and offer a new proof that Sentences are impossible to eliminate in any semantic scheme of things. Austin’s distinction, as explained and defended, refutes the contention that “meaning is use”. I proceed to his doctrine of Locution and Illocution, reflecting the previous, indicating by a series of examples, that illocutionary varieties, which are varieties but not variances , can never extend beyond the se-mantic scope generically contained in the original, content; that is to say, the Sentence. Those that do, and they are several, violate the rules of sense. I enumerate his vast differences with Wittgenstein, and proceed to defend Austin’s noted conservatism against the novelties endorsed by the former and his disciples. Charging Wittgenstein’s private language attack as circular, I conclude by marking their further contrast on the actual foundations of meaning and truth. (shrink)

The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither reducible to one another, (...) nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow. (shrink)

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither reducible to one another, (...) nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow. (shrink)

The two Heisenberg Uncertainties (UR) entail an incompatibility between the two pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p → -q) & (q → -p) or defineable as [(p → -q) & (q → -p)] ↔ r. The former kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact independent, and thus a matter of logic, the latter fact dependent, and thus (...) a matter of fact. The two types are therefore diametrically opposed. In spite of this, however, the existing derivations of the Uncertainties are shown here to entail both types of incompatibility simultaneously. ΔEΔt ≥ h is known to derive from the quantum relation E = hv plus the Fourier relation ΔvΔt ≥ 1. And the Fourier relation assigns a logical incompatibility between Δv = 0, Δt = 0. (Defining a repetitive phenomenon at an instant t → 0 is a self contradictory notion.) An incompatibility, therefore, which is fact independent and unconditional. How can one reconcile this with the fact that ΔEΔt exists if and only if h > 0, which latter supposition is a factual truth, entailing that a ΔE = 0, Δt = 0 incompatibility should itself be fact dependent? Are we to say that E and t are unconditionally incompatible (via ΔvΔt ≥ 1) on condition that E = hv is at all true? Hence, as presently standing, the UR express a self-contradicting type of incompatibility. To circumvent this undesirable result, I reinterpret E = hv as relating the energy with a period. Though only one such period. And not with frequency literally. (It is false that E = v. It is true that E = v times the quantum.) In this way, the literal concept of frequency does not enter as before, rendering ΔvΔt ≥ 1 inapplicable. So the above noted contradiction disappears. Nevertheless, the Uncertainties are derived. If energy is only to be defined over a period, momentum only over a distance (formerly a wavelength) resulting during such period, thus yielding quantized action of dimensions Et = pq, then energies will become indefinite at instants, momenta indefinite at points, leading, as demanded, to (symmetric!) ΔEΔt = ΔpΔq ≥ h's. (shrink)

The two Heisenberg Uncertainties (UR) entail an incompatibility between the two pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p → − q) & (q→ − p) or defineable as [(p →− q) & (q →− p)] ↔ r. The former kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact independent, and thus a matter of logic, the latter fact dependent, and (...) thus a matter of fact. The two types are therefore diametrically opposed. In spite of this, however, the existing derivations of the Uncertainties are shown here to entail both types of incompatibility simultaneously. Δ E Δ t ≥ h is known to derive from the quantum relation E = hν plus the Fourier relation Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1. And the Fourier relation assigns a logical incompatibility between Δ ν = 0, Δ t = 0. (Defining a repetitive phenomenon at an instant t → 0 is a self contradictory notion.) An incompatibility, therefore, which is fact independent and unconditional. How can one reconcile this with the fact that Δ EΔ t exists if and only if h > 0, which latter supposition is a factual truth, entailing that a Δ E = 0, Δ t = 0 incompatibility should itself be fact dependent? Are we to say that E and t are unconditionally incompatible (via Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1) on condition that E = hν is at all true? Hence, as presently standing, the UR express a self-contradicting type of incompatibility. To circumvent this undesirable result, I reinterpret E = hν as relating the energy with a period. Though only one such period. And not with frequency literally. (It is false that E = ν. It is true that E = ν times the quantum.) In this way, the literal concept of frequency does not enter as before, rendering Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1 inapplicable. So the above noted contradiction disappears. Nevertheless, the Uncertainties are derived. If energy is only to be defined over a period, momentum only over a distance (formerly a wavelength) resulting during such period, thus yielding quantized action of dimensions Et = pq, then energies will become indefinite at instants, momenta indefinite at points, leading, as demanded, to (symmetric!) Δ E Δ t = Δ p Δ q ≥ h’s. (shrink)

The classical response to Zeno’s paradoxes goes like this: ‘Motion cannot properly be defined within an instant. Only over a period’ (Vlastos.) I show that this ob-jection is exactly what it takes for Zeno to be right. If motion cannot be defined at an instant, even though the object is always moving at that instant, motion cannot be defined at all, for any longer period of time identical in content to that instant. The nonclassical response introduces discontinuity, to evade the (...) paradox of infinite proximity of any point of a distance with any ‘next’. But it introduces the wrong sort of discontinuity because, rather than assuming the discontinuity of motion, as Quantum Theory does, it assumes the discontinuity of space. Due then to the resulting spacetime disorder, though all else is certainly lost, the Tortoise now turns up at least as fast as Achilles and hence not even this much is rescued. Zeno rejects motion because he shows that a moving object must be where it is not. Hence motion, if to occur, must violate the Law of Contradiction (LNC). Applying the concept of quantum discontinuity, I produce an alternative. If an object is to move discontinuously between two boundary points, A and B, what actually obtains is, rather, that it is nowhere at all in-between A and B. And cannot therefore be at two places in-between A and B. And cannot therefore be where it is not. Thus, LNC is conserved. However, in these conditions, the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) fails. To mitigate the undesirability of this effect, I show that LEM fails because LNC holds. Thus, the resulting nonbivalent logic, which is also appropriate for quantized transitions of all kinds, will always turn up nonbivalent, because consistent. And this is not too bad, considering. (shrink)

The classical response to Zeno’s paradoxes goes like this: ‘Motion cannot properly be defined within an instant. Only over a period’ (Vlastos.) I show that this ob-jection is exactly what it takes for Zeno to be right. If motion cannot be defined at an instant, even though the object is always moving at that instant, motion cannot be defined at all, for any longer period of time identical in content to that instant. The nonclassical response introduces discontinuity, to evade the (...) paradox of infinite proximity of any point of a distance with any ‘next’. But it introduces the wrong sort of discontinuity because, rather than assuming the discontinuity of motion, as Quantum Theory does, it assumes the discontinuity of space. Due then to the resulting spacetime disorder, though all else is certainly lost, the Tortoise now turns up at least as fast as Achilles and hence not even this much is rescued. Zeno rejects motion because he shows that a moving object must be where it is not. Hence motion, if to occur, must violate the Law of Contradiction (LNC). Applying the concept of quantum discontinuity, I produce an alternative. If an object is to move discontinuously between two boundary points, A and B, what actually obtains is, rather, that it is nowhere at all in-between A and B. And cannot therefore be at two places in-between A and B. And cannot therefore be where it is not. Thus, LNC is conserved. However, in these conditions, the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) fails. To mitigate the undesirability of this effect, I show that LEM fails because LNC holds. Thus, the resulting nonbivalent logic, which is also appropriate for quantized transitions of all kinds, will always turn up nonbivalent, because consistent. And this is not too bad, considering. (shrink)

Subjectivists, taking the “collapse” of the observation-interpretation contrast much too seriously, are led to imagine that even perceptual knowledge is active. And therefore subject dependent. Turning the tables on this popular trend, I argue that even conceptual knowledge is passive. Kant’s epistemology is conceptual. But if also active, then incoherent. If synthetic a priori truths are to follow upon our mental activity, they were neither true nor, far less, a priori before that activity. “A priori” and “active” are contradictory attributes (...) of knowledge. As, indeed, are “a priori” and “subject-dependent” to begin with. Nothing a priori can be dependent on anything except itself, and least of all on the human subject. Kant does consider the active aspect of thought. The difference is that for him the more active it becomes, the less it is to be trusted. For we are no longer in the province of the Understanding, and its necessary truths, but in the realm of Pure Reason and its dialectical antinomies. Cognition activists who take a liking to Kant have simply mistaken Reason for the Understanding. And Reason is to Kant “the seat of all transcendental illusion”. (shrink)

There are two antithetical classes of Paradoxes, The Runner and the Stadium, impregnated with infinite divisibility, which show that motion conflicts with the world, and which I call Static. And the Arrow, impregnated with nothing, which shows that motion conflicts with itself, and which I call Dynamic. The Arrow is stationary, because it cannot move at a point; or move, and be at more points than one at the same time, so being where it is not. Despite their contrast, however, (...) both groups can be evaded, if motion is conducted over discrete points: (a) If no two points touch, there will be a step ahead, for there will now be nextness. And (b) if they do not touch, “here” and “there” (=not–here) will no longer be sufficiently proximal to have the body be where it is not. They will be separate. So the body is only where it is. Hence, both groups, despite their contrast, presuppose, each in its own way, the infinite proximity of any point with anynext. But the Dynamic group cannot survive what it needs. Suppose that “here” and “not–here” (i.e., “there”), are not discrete but infinitely proximal. Then Rest also would be self-contradictory. And it gets worse. For it takes two to make a contradiction, in this case, “here,” “not–here,” and their proximity. But, with regard to conditions of infinite proximity, “in the end there can be only one” (point), and hence no contradiction in the first place. The Dynamic paradoxes rest on a premise with which they are inconsistent. They need two of this, of which, in a different but just as equally vital connection, there can be only one. On the force of this remark, the Dynamic paradoxes, initially the stronger of the lot, actually turn out to be the weaker. (shrink)

There are two antithetical classes of Paradoxes, The Runner and the Stadium, impregnated with infinite divisibility, which show that motion conflicts with the world, and which I call Static. And the Arrow, impregnated with nothing, which shows that motion conflicts with itself, and which I call Dynamic. The Arrow is stationary, because it cannot move at a point; or move, and be at more points than one at the same time, so being where it is not. Despite their contrast, however, (...) both groups can be evaded, if motion is conducted over discrete points: (a) If no two points touch, there will be a step ahead, for there will now be nextness. And (b) if they do not touch, “here” and “there” (=not–here) will no longer be sufficiently proximal to have the body be where it is not. They will be separate. So the body is only where it is. Hence, both groups, despite their contrast, presuppose, each in its own way, the infinite proximity of any point with anynext. But the Dynamic group cannot survive what it needs. Suppose that “here” and “not–here” (i.e., “there”), are not discrete but infinitely proximal. Then Rest also would be self-contradictory. And it gets worse. For it takes two to make a contradiction, in this case, “here,” “not–here,” and their proximity. But, with regard to conditions of infinite proximity, “in the end there can be only one” (point), and hence no contradiction in the first place. The Dynamic paradoxes rest on a premise with which they are inconsistent. They need two of this, of which, in a different but just as equally vital connection, there can be only one. On the force of this remark, the Dynamic paradoxes, initially the stronger of the lot, actually turn out to be the weaker. (shrink)

History casts a spell on our minds more powerful than science or religion. It does not root us in the past at all. It rather flatters us with the belief in our ability to recreate the world in our image. It is a form of self-assertion that brooks no opposition or dissent and shelters us from the experience of time. So argues Constantin Fasolt in The Limits of History , an ambitious and pathbreaking study that conquers history's power by (...) carrying the fight into the center of its domain. Fasolt considers the work of Hermann Conring (1606-81) and Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313/14-57), two antipodes in early modern battles over the principles of European thought and action that ended with the triumph of historical consciousness. Proceeding according to the rules of normal historical analysis--gathering evidence, putting it in context, and analyzing its meaning--Fasolt uncovers limits that no kind of history can cross. He concludes that history is a ritual designed to maintain the modern faith in the autonomy of states and individuals. God wants it, the old crusaders would have said. The truth, Fasolt insists, only begins where that illusion ends. With its probing look at the ideological underpinnings of historical practice, The Limits of History demonstrates that history presupposes highly political assumptions about free will, responsibility, and the relationship between the past and the present. A work of both intellectual history and historiography, it will prove invaluable to students of historical method, philosophy, political theory, and early modern European culture. (shrink)

The Things We Do and Why We Do Them argues against the common assumption that there is a kind of thing called "action" which all reason-giving explanation of action are geared towards. Sandis explains why all theories concerned with the form which any such explanation must take fail from the outset, and shows how various debates on the nature of so-called motivating reasons only arise because the participants all share a number of mistaken views which follow from the basic assumption (...) under attack. In so doing, he urges philosophers and psychologists alike to stop asking whether the explanation of action is causal, and to focus instead on its multifarious objects. This book will appeal to anyone interested in motivational psychology, the reasons for which we act, and the philosophy of explanation in general. (shrink)

This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose (...) that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation,irrespectiveof the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger’s phenomenology, I argue that it is acore characteristicof the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into aspecific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible. (shrink)

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...) the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat--when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby (...) prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited. (shrink)

This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose (...) that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation, irrespective of the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger’s phenomenology, I argue that it is a core characteristic of the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into a specific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible. (shrink)

Our technological lifeworld has become an info-computational media populated by data and algorithms, an artificial environment for life and shared experiences. In this chapter, I tried to sketch three new assumptions for bioethics – it is hardly possible to substantiate ethical guidelines or an idea of normativity in an aprioristic manner; moral status is a function of data entities, not something solely human; agency is plural and thus is shared or sometimes delegated – in order to chart a proposal for (...) a posthuman bioethics. Posthuman is perhaps not the best expression available, but it covers the idea of a shift from a world centered on self-contained and exclusively human agency to a more comprehensive and relational way of thinking. The “posthuman” label should be understood as a rebuttal of biocentrism and anthropocentrism by moving closer to conceptions we encounter in population ethics or in discourse about biosocial and technical systems. Posthuman bioethics is “environmentalist” without losing the humanistic stance. The question regarding how suitable an infocentric bioethics is in practice remains to be settled. The moral principles in bioethics could be reconceived as relying on these new assumptions, in a postindividualistic manner that accepts formal primacy of causal digital artifacts in affording actions in a world of ambient algorithmic intelligence. (shrink)

Hinge Epistemology is rapidly becoming one of the most exciting areas of epistemology and Wittgenstein studies. In connecting these two fields it brings a revived energy to both, opening them up to fresh developments. The essays in this volume extend the subject in terms of both depth and breadth. They present new voices and challenges within hinge epistemology. They explore new applications and directions of hinge epistemology, particularly as it relates to the philosophy of mind, society, ethics, and the history (...) of ideas. (shrink)

A system of logic usually comprises a language for which a model-theory and a proof-theory are defined. The model-theory defines the semantic notion of model-theoretic logical consequence (⊨), while the proof-theory defines the proof- theoretic notion of logical consequence (or logical derivability, ⊢). If the system in question is sound and complete, then the two notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent. The concept of full formalization is a more restrictive one and requires in addition the preservation of the standard (...) meanings of the logical terms in all the admissible interpretations of the logical calculus, as it is proof-theoretically defined. Although classical first-order logic is sound and complete, its standard formalizations fall short to be full formalizations since they allow non-intended interpretations. This fact poses a challenge for the logical inferentialism program, whose main tenet is that the meanings of the logical terms are uniquely determined by the formal axioms or rules of inference that govern their use in a logical calculus, i.e., logical inferentialism requires a categorical calculus. This paper is the first part of a more elaborated study which will analyze the categoricity problem from its beginning until the most recent approaches. I will first start by describing the problem of a full formalization in the general framework in which Carnap (1934/1937, 1943) formulated it for classical logic. Then, in sections IV and V, I shall discuss the way in which the mathematicians B.A. Bernstein (1932) and E.V. Huntington (1933) have previously formulated and analyzed it in algebraic terms for propositional logic and, finally, I shall discuss some critical reactions Nagel (1943), Hempel (1943), Fitch (1944), and Church (1944) formulated to these approaches. (shrink)

The link between language and thought formed a major new exploration of twentieth-century philosophy. Languages nuance our ideas and perceptions. Though from various angles, Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein forged new ways of understanding the relationship between our views of the external world and our culturally and linguistically pre-determined modes of expression. Another giant in this field of exploration is the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica (1909-1987), who has so far remained generally unknown to the Western World because of the Iron Curtain. (...) The Romanian Sentiment of Being (Sentimentul românesc al ființei), first published in Romanian in 1978, is a philosophical work at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of language. The title of this book may be deceptive. "Romanian" does not mean ethnically circumscribed; it does not limit ontology to nationality but rather reflects on how language can carry ontological thought. The Romanian Sentiment of Being invites the readers to meditate on the fundamental theme of being and how it is expressed in a culture in time. This being in time marks the tension between moment and eternity, captured in the fairytale "Ageless Youth and Deathless Life" ("Tinerețe fără batrânețe și viață fără de moarte"), which Noica interprets in detail. The translation of the story will be found in the appendix. Noica also analyzes one of the most famous poems in Romanian, Mihai Eminescu's "The Evening Star" ("Luceafărul"), and readers will find its translation in the appendix. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to defend Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics against what I call the radical hermeneutic critique, specifically the critique developed in Robert Bernasconi’s article “’You Don’t Know What I’m Talking About’: Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal” (1995). Key to this critique is the claim that Gadamer’s account does not rise to the ethical task of embracing the alterity of the Other, but instead reduces it to a projection of one’s self. The implication is therefore that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (...) has to be rejected on ethical grounds, as it does not appreciate but assimilates the alterity of the Other. In contrast to this radical hermeneutic critique, I argue that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics can accommodate an Other that is not assimilated but appreciated, on the condition that the unique status of a dialogue with the Other as a person is no longer neglected, as Gadamer does, but instead truly distinguished from a dialogue with the Other as a text. (shrink)

This paper argues that there was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory before 1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner 'philosophy of psychology') than there has been since. This is in part because Anscombe influenced the formation of 'virtue theory' as yet another position within normative ethics, and her work contributed to the fashioning of 'moral psychology' as an altogether distinct (and now increasingly empirical) branch of moral philosophy.