Machine generated contents note: ch. 1 The Cry of Rachel -- Maritain's 1942 Marquette Aquinas Lecture -- Maritain's The Person and the Common Good -- Camus's The Plague -- ch. 2 Joy -- Being as the Good and the Eruption of Willing -- Being and Philosophical Psychology -- An Ordinary Knowledge of God and Metaphysics -- Metaphysics as Implicit Knowledge -- Being and the Intellectual Emotions -- ch. 3 Quandoque Evils -- Aquinas's Rationale for the Corruptible Order -- The Corruptible (...) Order and Quandoque Evils -- Bracketing Quandoque Evils between Goods -- A Caveat in Understanding the Subject of the Consequent Good -- The Effect of Human Providence upon the Frequency of Quandoque Evils -- ch. 4 Natural Corruptions -- Death as a Natural Corruption -- Natural Corruption as Nondefinitive -- Ambiguity of "Praeter Intentionem" and "Per Accidens" -- God and the Evil of Punishment (Poena) -- Other Interpretations -- Abraham and Isaac -- Conclusion -- ch. 5 Preliminaries to Aquinas and the Contemporary Discussion -- C.G. III, 71: "If Evil Exists, God Exists" -- William Rowe on Cosmological Reasoning -- De Ver. X, 12, ad 10m: "If not God from Justice, then God from Some Other Effect" -- Summary of Aquinas on the Existence of Evil -- A Strategy -- ch. 6 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Personalist Theodicies -- Marilyn McCord Adams and "Horrendous Evils" -- William Hasker: Personal Satisfaction and World Approval -- John Hick: Creation as a Gymnasium for the Development of Our Virtues -- David Ray Griffin and the Denial of Genuine Evils -- The Brothers Karamazov -- Thomistic "Natural Desires" of the Human Person -- ch. 7 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Cosmological Theodicies -- Diogenes Allen and Suffering as an Experience of God -- David Hume and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, X and XI -- William Rowe and "Pointless Evils" -- J. L. Mackie and Further Objections to a Cosmological Theodicy -- Mackie's Fourth Criticism and Aquinas on the Causality of Human Choices -- Aquinas and Plantinga -- The Avoidance of Determinism -- The Avoidance of Divine Culpability -- A Thomistic Free Will Defense? -- Richard Swinburne: Nature as a Necessary Display Case for Our Knowledge of Good and Evil -- Bruce Reichenbach: Developing Plantinga and Swinburne -- ch. 8 Conclusion and Comparison to Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump -- Brian Davies's Apophatic Treatment of the Evil Problem -- Eleonore Stump and the Love of God -- The Consolation of Rachel. (shrink)

My article critically evaluates five key claims in Kerr’s interpretation of Aquinas’s De Ente et Essentia, ch. 4, proof for God. The claims are: the absolutely considered essence is a second intention, or cognitional being; à la John Wippel, the real distinction between essence and existence is known before the proof; contra David Twetten, Aristotelian form is not self-actuating and so requires actus essendi; the De Ente proof for God uses the Principle of Sufficient Reason; an infinite regress must (...) be eliminated before concluding to God. This author wonders if these questionable claims are traceable to the mindset of analytic philosophy which values precision and discreteness and so can fail to appreciate crucial paradoxes in Aquinas’s metaphysics. (shrink)

By providing a phenomenological presentation of Aquinas’s duplex operatio intellectus, the author argues that a reader is better equipped to understand where and when Aquinas arrives at the real distinction between essence and existence in the much disputed De Ente et Essentia, chapter four. “Phenomenological presentation” means an honest description of one’s own mental life as it conducts the duplex operatio. From phenomenological observations in the Thomistic texts, the author argues that a penetrative and rebounding movement of attention upon some (...) initially presented multiplicity characterizes the duplex operatio. When this dynamic is conducted upon the multiplicity of a real thing juxtaposed to itself cognitionally existing in sensation, the rebound of the secunda operatio presents the real existence in a sui generis relation of priority to the individual thing understood as existence neutral. Unfortunately, the rebound of attention is too quick to discern accurately the nature of the borderline between the attribute of existence and its subject, the individual thing. The attribute of existence may actuate the thing by shading into it or by remaining distinct from it. Fortunately, the phenomenological situation is sufficient to leave phenomenology and to initiate the third intellectual operation of reasoning. Reasoning concludes to a first cause of phenomenologically observable attributive existence. In this first cause existence is the thing itself. In order for this first cause to have its proper effect corresponding to what it is, the author argues that the second of the above two alternatives for phenomenologically observable attributive existence must be the true one. After linking these reflections to stages of De Ente, chapter 4, the author critically relates them to other interpretations of the text. These interpretations include those of Cahalan, McDonald, Wippel, Dewan, Patt, Kenny, and Owens. (shrink)

Inspired by a discussion about whether John Paul II grounded human dignity in a Kantian way, viz., emphasizing the person as an end unto itself, the author considers: (1) the relations between Kant and Aquinas on the topic of the philosophical basis of human dignity, and (2) John Paul II’s remarks on Kant’s ethics. He concludes that: (1) both Kant and Aquinas ground human dignity upon human freedom, but both understand the human freedom differently; (2) for Kant, human (...) freedom is self-legislating and so exercised without rational direction; (3) the Thomistic notion of freedom is compatible with rational direction which consists, e.g., in the human understood as an intellector of being or as a willer of the good, though neither seem to be exploited by Wojtyla. (shrink)

In this powerfully argued book, Knasas engages a debate at the heart of the revival of Thomistic thought in the twentieth century. Richly detailed and illuminating, his book calls on the tradition established by Gilson, Maritain, and Owen, to build a case for Existential Thomism as a valid metaphysics. Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists is a comprehensive discussion of the major issues and controversies in neo-Thomism, including issues of mind, knowledge, the human subject, free will, nature, grace, and the (...) act of being. Knasas also discusses the Transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, Rahner, Lonergan, and others as he builds a carefully articulated case for completing the Thomist revival. (shrink)

In this incisive study, John F. X. Knasas grounds the ideal of tolerance in Aquinas’s natural law ethics and connects the virtue of civic tolerance to the concept of being. If God is the source of being, argues Knasas, then we are the articulation of being, and it is in this capacity that we recognize our bond with other people and thus acknowledge our duty to be tolerant of one another. An important contribution to practical metaphysics and (...) the philosophical foundations of political theory, _Thomism and Tolerance_ will appeal to philosophy scholars and students at the undergraduate and graduate level. (shrink)

Over the years I have written a number of articles critiquing Transcendental Thomism both from philosophical and from textual points of view. In the course of these articles, I have made comments on Bernard J. F. Lonergan’s epistemology. These comments have caught the eye of Jeremy D. Wilkins, and have provoked his article, “A Dialectic of ‘Thomist’ Realisms: John Knasas and Bernard Lonergan.” The violence of Wilkins’s reaction leads me to believe that despite the passing nature of my (...) comments, they are sufficiently incisive to have cut a nerve. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that no reader of Wilkins would come away with any accurate grasp of my understanding of Lonergan, my reasons for it, and the precise point of contention between us. So, both for the record and the benefit of calm discussion of this influential figure, I would like to provide my hermeneutic of Lonergan and to pinpoint my trouble with him. To this end, I will repeat some descriptions of Lonergan from a recently published monograph, Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), and then address the criticisms of Wilkins. (shrink)

In this powerfully argued book, Knasas engages a debate at the heart of the revival of Thomistic thought in the twentieth century. Richly detailed and illuminating, his book calls on the tradition established by Gilson, Maritain, and Owen, to build a case for Existential Thomism as a valid metaphysics.Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists is a comprehensive discussion of the major issues and controversies in neo-Thomism, including issues of mind, knowledge, the human subject, free will, nature, grace, and the act (...) of being. Knasas also discusses the Transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, Rahner, Lonergan, and others as he builds a carefully articulated case for completing the Thomist revival. (shrink)

Among Thomists the standard practice is to show the openness of human nature to beatitude from the speculative side. The intellectual desire to know the richness of the notion of being, the ratio entis, becomes the desire to know the creator who as esse subsistens embodies the intelligible heart of being. I want to try the same strategy but from the practical side. I believe that more people experience a desire to love than a desire to know. Few have noticed (...) that Aquinas’s first practical principle “Good ought to be done” is, as I will explain, a call to be respectful and solicitous of ourselves and others as intellectors of being. Hence, fidelity to this principle illustrates a connection between being and love so that the greater is the concentration of being, then the greater is the concentration of love. A subsistent instance of being should be a subsistent instance of love. In his metaphysics Aquinas attains the creator as subsistent being. Hence, contact with that instance would strengthen in an unparalleled way the human’s fidelity to the first practical principle. Does this contact in fact occur? That philosophical question raises the religious possibility. In its parade of saints, Christianity provides tantalizing evidence that that contact is realized. (shrink)

Among Thomists the standard practice is to show the openness of human nature to beatitude from the speculative side. The intellectual desire to know the richness of the notion of being, the ratio entis, becomes the desire to know the creator who as esse subsistens embodies the intelligible heart of being. I want to try the same strategy but from the practical side. I believe that more people experience a desire to love than a desire to know. Few have noticed (...) that Aquinas’s first practical principle “Good ought to be done” is, as I will explain, a call to be respectful and solicitous of ourselves and others as intellectors of being. Hence, fidelity to this principle illustrates a connection between being and love so that the greater is the concentration of being, then the greater is the concentration of love. A subsistent instance of being should be a subsistent instance of love. In his metaphysics Aquinas attains the creator as subsistent being. Hence, contact with that instance would strengthen in an unparalleled way the human’s fidelity to the first practical principle. Does this contact in fact occur? That philosophical question raises the religious possibility. In its parade of saints, Christianity provides tantalizing evidence that that contact is realized. (shrink)

Among Thomists the standard practice is to show the openness of human nature to beatitude from the speculative side. The intellectual desire to know the richness of the notion of being, the ratio entis, becomes the desire to know the creator who as esse subsistens embodies the intelligible heart of being. I want to try the same strategy but from the practical side. I believe that more people experience a desire to love than a desire to know. Few have noticed (...) that Aquinas’s first practical principle “Good ought to be done” is, as I will explain, a call to be respectful and solicitous of ourselves and others as intellectors of being. Hence, fidelity to this principle illustrates a connection between being and love so that the greater is the concentration of being, then the greater is the concentration of love. A subsistent instance of being should be a subsistent instance of love. In his metaphysics Aquinas attains the creator as subsistent being. Hence, contact with that instance would strengthen in an unparalleled way the human’s fidelity to the first practical principle. Does this contact in fact occur? That philosophical question raises the religious possibility. In its parade of saints, Christianity provides tantalizing evidence that that contact is realized. (shrink)

Among Thomists the standard practice is to show the openness of human nature to beatitude from the speculative side. The intellectual desire to know the richness of the notion of being, the ratio entis, becomes the desire to know the creator who as esse subsistens embodies the intelligible heart of being. I want to try the same strategy but from the practical side. I believe that more people experience a desire to love than a desire to know. Few have noticed (...) that Aquinas’s first practical principle “Good ought to be done” is, as I will explain, a call to be respectful and solicitous of ourselves and others as intellectors of being. Hence, fidelity to this principle illustrates a connection between being and love so that the greater is the concentration of being, then the greater is the concentration of love. A subsistent instance of being should be a subsistent instance of love. In his metaphysics Aquinas attains the creator as subsistent being. Hence, contact with that instance would strengthen in an unparalleled way the human’s fidelity to the first practical principle. Does this contact in fact occur? That philosophical question raises the religious possibility. In its parade of saints, Christianity provides tantalizing evidence that that contact is realized. (shrink)

My article confronts three of Spinoza’s four arguments against free will in God with Aquinas’s contrary position in the Summa contra Gentiles, Book I. Spinoza’s three arguments come from his Ethics, props. XVII and XXXII. First, since free choice is always exclusive, free choice in God would leave unactualized power in God. Second, if God’s will could be different without entailing divine mutability, then a divine voluntarism would reign. Third, if God has freedom of will but his willing is his (...) essence, the God’s essence could be otherwise. I note that these pitfalls open by assuming that the divine will bears upon creatures directly and immediately. I then show that since for Aquinas, God wills creatures by principally willing himself, none of Spinoza’s criticisms follow. (shrink)

My article confronts three of Spinoza’s four arguments against free will in God with Aquinas’s contrary position in the Summa contra Gentiles, Book I. Spinoza’s three arguments come from his Ethics, props. XVII and XXXII. First, since free choice is always exclusive, free choice in God would leave unactualized power in God. Second, if God’s will could be different without entailing divine mutability, then a divine voluntarism would reign. Third, if God has freedom of will but his willing is his (...) essence, the God’s essence could be otherwise. I note that these pitfalls open by assuming that the divine will bears upon creatures directly and immediately. I then show that since for Aquinas, God wills creatures by principally willing himself, none of Spinoza’s criticisms follow. (shrink)

My target is Kenny’s claim that if God can be thought not to be in the same manner as men or phoenixes, then God too is an essence/existence composite. I argue that our ignorance about the existence of the phoenix and our ignorance about God do not have the same bases and so they do not lead to the same conclusion, namely, a distinction between thing and existence in both cases. The notion of the phoenix is existence neutral because it (...) is reflective of conceptual notes that have to be existence neutral in order to be in existential multiplicities. Our notion of subsistent existence is not existence neutral but it is composed of a formed intention of existence that gives it an independence from the context of the second operation in which it was formed. The first case leads to a situation involving a distinction between essence and existence. Knowledge of the existence of the phoenix adds something over and beyond the essence of the phoenix. In the second case, knowledge of the existence of subsistent existence does not do that because existence is what the formed intention here is of. What knowledge of subsistent existence adds does not belong to it. It belongs to us. It adds our second operation knowledge of the esse of sensible things and our reasoning from that to subsistent existence. (shrink)