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Forthcoming articles
  1. Jonas Åkerman (forthcoming). Infelicitous Cancellation: The Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicature Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-10.
    This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: First, that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a (...)
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  2. Chad Carmichael (forthcoming). Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    The special composition question is the question ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things (no matter how apparently unrelated) compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new “series-style” answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen’s objections. (...)
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  3. Charles B. Cross (forthcoming). A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic , conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in (...)
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  4. Franca D'Agostini (forthcoming). Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, by Scott F Aikin. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  5. Theodore J. Everett (forthcoming). Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In (...)
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  6. Marion Godman (forthcoming). The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’–such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable properties in common (...)
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  7. Ned Markosian (forthcoming). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    This paper argues for including stuff in one's ontology. The distinction between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different ontologies of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure stuff ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. Eleven different reasons for including stuff in one's ontology are given . Then five objections to positing stuff are considered and rejected.
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  8. Robin McKenna (forthcoming). Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The target of this paper is the ‘simple’ knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is constituted by a single epistemic rule of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p’ . My aim is to argue that those who are attracted to a knowledge account of assertion should prefer what I call the ‘complex’ knowledge account, according to which assertion is constituted by a system of rules all of which are, taken together, constitutive of assertion. (...)
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  9. Robert Nola (forthcoming). A Review of “Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique”, by Seidel, Markus. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  10. Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). The A Posteriori Armchair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    A lot of good philosophy is done in the armchair, but is nevertheless a posteriori. This paper clarifies and then defends that claim. Among the a posteriori activities done in the armchair are assembling and evaluating commonplaces; formulating theoretical alternatives; and integrating well-known past a posteriori discoveries. The activity that receives the most discussion, however, is the application of theoretical virtues to choose philosophical theories: the paper argues that much of this is properly seen as a posteriori.
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  11. Luis R. G. Oliveira (forthcoming). Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-6.
    Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends crucially on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this crucial assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
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  12. Rik Peels (forthcoming). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing (...)
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  13. Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming). What Not to Multiply Without Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.
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  14. Keith Allen (forthcoming). Hallucination And Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of giving a positive (...)
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  15. Peter Balint (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  16. Ermanno Bencivenga (forthcoming). Realizing Reason: A Narrative of Truth and Knowing, by Danielle Macbeth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  17. Andrea Borghini (forthcoming). A Critical Introduction to Skepticism by Allan Hazlett. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  18. Jennifer Corns (forthcoming). The Social Pain Posit. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    Although discussion of social pain has become popular among researchers in psychology and behavioural neuroscience, the philosophical community has yet to pay it any direct attention. Social pain is characterized as the emotional reaction to the perception of the loss or devaluation of desired relationships. These are argued to comprise a pain type and are explicitly intended to include the everyday sub-types grief, jealousy, heartbreak, rejection, and hurt feelings. Social pain is accordingly posited as a nested type of pain encompassing (...)
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  19. Damon Crockett (forthcoming). Surface Colour is Not a Perceptual Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of computational output of the perceptual system. (...)
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  20. Oisín Deery (forthcoming). The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Libertarians claim that our experience of free choice is indeterministic. They think that, when we choose, our choice feels open in a way that would require indeterminism for the experience to be accurate. This claim then functions as a step in an argument in favour of libertarianism, the view that freedom requires indeterminism and we are free. Since, all else being equal, we should take experience at face value, libertarians argue, we should endorse libertarianism. Compatibilists, who think that freedom is (...)
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  21. Matt Duncan (forthcoming). I Think, Therefore I Persist. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
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  22. Mary Louise Gill (forthcoming). How Aristotle Gets by in Metaphysics Zeta, by Frank A. Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  23. Theodore Gracyk (forthcoming). Critique of Pure Music, by James O. Young. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  24. Mario Graziano (forthcoming). Genetics and Philosophy by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  25. Michael LeBuffe (forthcoming). A Sentimentalist Theory of Mind, by Slote, Michael Oxford. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  26. Graham Oppy (forthcoming). Analysis of Existing: Barry Miller's Approach to God, by Kremer, Elmar J. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  27. James I. Porter (forthcoming). The Poetics of Phantasia: Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics, by Anne Sheppard. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  28. Sagar Sanyal (forthcoming). Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits, Agar, Nicholas. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  29. Emma Wood (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, by Olson, Jonas. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  30. Moira Gatens (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  31. Nomy Arpaly (forthcoming). Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, by Neil Levy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  32. Saba Bazargan (forthcoming). Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition . Such accounts problematically focus on ‘the moment of crisis’: i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, (...)
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  33. Jc Beall (forthcoming). Eco-Logical Lives: The Philosophical Lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood, by Hyde, Dominic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  34. Paul Bloomfield (forthcoming). Knowing What To Do: Imagination, Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics, by Chappell, Timothy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  35. Bridget Clarke (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  36. Richard Colledge (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  37. Christopher Cowie (forthcoming). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If (...)
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  38. Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett (forthcoming). Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...)
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  39. Frederique de Vignemont (forthcoming). Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014] and Klein [forthcoming]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain (...)
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  40. Phil Dowe (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  41. Nir Fresco (forthcoming). Information-How. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    The distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that has long been debated in the epistemological literature. This distinction can, arguably, be better understood in terms of a more fundamental distinction between information-how and information-that. Information-how is prescriptive and informs a cognitive agent about which action can be performed to achieve a particular outcome. Information-that is descriptive and informs the agent about events, objects, and states of affairs in the world. Since the latter has received more attention in the epistemological literature, this article (...)
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  42. Joshua Gert (forthcoming). Fine-Grained Colour Discrimination Without Fine-Grained Colour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
    René Jagnow [2012] argues that David Rosenthal's theory of consciousness cannot account for certain experiences that involve colours so fine-grained that we do not and cannot have concepts of them. Jagnow claims that an appeal to comparative concepts such as being slightly darker than cannot help Rosenthal, since, in order to apply such concepts, we would already need to be conscious of two distinct fine-grained colours. The present paper contests this claim. It appeals to the Cornsweet illusion and some other (...)
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  43. Daniel Greco (forthcoming). Epistemological Open Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument . This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is still (...)
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  44. Nicole Hassoun (forthcoming). Eternally Separated Lovers: The Argument From Love. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-11.
    A message scribbled irreverently on the mediaeval walls of the Nonberg cloister says this: ‘Neither of us can go to heaven unless the other gets in.’ It suggests an argument against the view that those who love people who suffer in hell can be perfectly happy, or even free from all suffering, in heaven. This paper considers the challenge posed by this thought to the coherence of the traditional Christian doctrine on which there are some people in hell who are (...)
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  45. Soraj Hongladarom (forthcoming). A Review of “Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life”, by Pereboom, Derk. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  46. Mark Jago (forthcoming). Properties, by Douglas Edwards. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  47. Jens Johansson (forthcoming). Review of Robert E. Goodin, On Settling (Princeton UP, 2012). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  48. Michael D. Kirchhoff (forthcoming). Species of Realization and the Free Energy Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    This paper examines, for the first time, the relationship between realization relations and the free energy principle in cognitive neuroscience. I argue, firstly, that the free energy principle has ramifications for the wide versus narrow realization distinction: if the free energy principle is correct, then organismic realizers are insufficient for realizing free energy minimization. I argue, secondly, that the free energy principle has implications for synchronic realization relations, because free energy minimization is realized in dynamical agent-environment couplings embedded at multiple (...)
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  49. Lisa Leininger (forthcoming). Presentism and the Myth of Passage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Presentism is held by most to be the intuitive theory of time, due in large part to the view's supposed preservation of time's passage. In this paper, I strike a blow against presentism's intuitive pull by showing how the presentist, contrary to overwhelming popular belief, is unable to establish temporal change upon which the passage of time is based. I begin by arguing that the presentist's two central ontological commitments, the Present Thesis and the Change Thesis, are incompatible. The main (...)
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  50. Eden Lin (forthcoming). The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism and subjectivism . Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever (...)
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  51. G. R. McLean (forthcoming). A Review of “The Handbook of Virtue Ethics”, Ed., van Hooft, Stan. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  52. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (forthcoming). Articulating Medieval Logic, by Parsons, Terence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  53. Greg O'Hair (forthcoming). Realism, Science, and Pragmatism, by Westphal, Kenneth R., Ed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-2.
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  54. Jens David Ohlin (forthcoming). A Review of “The Morality of Defensive War”, Eds., Fabre, Cécile, and Seth Lazar. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  55. Timothy Pawl (forthcoming). A Review “Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects”, Ed. Gould, Paul M. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  56. Jaroslav Peregrin (forthcoming). What Logics Mean: From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics, by James W. Garson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  57. Andrew Rotondo (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  58. Andrew Rotondo (forthcoming). Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues . This amounts to a fascinating and disturbing kind of intellectual scepticism. A crucial piece of the sceptical argument, however, is that our opponents on such topics are epistemic peers. In this paper, I examine the reasons for why we might think that our opponents really are such peers, and I argue that those reasons are either too weak or too (...)
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  59. Andrea Scarantino (forthcoming). Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-25.
    By virtue of what do alarm calls and facial expressions carry natural information? The answer I defend in this paper is that they carry natural information by virtue of changing the probabilities of various states of affairs, relative to background data. The Probabilistic Difference Maker Theory of natural information that I introduce here is inspired by Dretske's [1981] seminal analysis of natural information, but parts ways with it by eschewing the requirements that information transmission must be nomically underwritten, mind-independent, and (...)
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  60. Anita Silvers (forthcoming). Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, by Mackenzie, Catriona, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  61. Richard Stillman (forthcoming). Unique Best Deserver Theory and Arguments From Misclassification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    It is a core commitment of Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism that an utterance is 1-necessary iff it is a priori. But Jeff Speaks's Argument from Misclassification proves that, on a natural interpretation, E2D assigns necessary 1-intensions to many utterances that speakers deem a posteriori. Given that 1-intensions are meant to formalize a speaker's own understanding of the words she utters, this proof raises serious difficulties for E2D. In response, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber point out that the Argument from Misclassification presupposes a controversial (...)
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  62. Justin Sytsma (forthcoming). A Review of “Intuition”, by Chudnoff, Elijah. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  63. Zhiheng Tang (forthcoming). Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential (...)
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  64. Markos Valaris (forthcoming). Attention, by Wayne Wu. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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