6 found

Year:

  1. Chuck Stieg (2009). Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? Cogprints 51 (4):152-61.
    Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of (...)
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  2. Francesca M. Bosco, Livia Colle, Silvia De Fazio, Adele Bono, Saverio Ruberti & Maurizio Tirassa (2009). Th.O.M.A.S.: An Exploratory Assessment of Theory of Mind in Schizophrenic Subjects. Cogprints 18 (1):306-319.
    A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first vs. second order, first vs. third person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires (...)
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  3. Livia Colle, Francesca M. Bosco & Maurizio Tirassa (2009). The Complexity of Theory of Mind. Cogprints 18 (1):323-324.
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  4. Dr Steven Ravett Brown (2009). Reentrant Emergence. Cogprints.
    Emergent properties (EPs) are not causally reducible to the properties of a complex system’s elements. If a system’s properties cannot be reduced to those of any of its components, then that system is effectively a singular entity (SE). EPs are thus not properties of known complexes, but of SEs. A precise description of the parameters necessary to observe a physical system as an SE is thus necessary to establish under what conditions properties are understood as emergent. That description is provided (...)
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  5. Prof Antonella Carassa & Prof Marco Colombetti (2009). Joint Meaning. Cogprints.
    In this paper we want to reconcile two apparently conflicting intuitions: the first is that what a speaker means is just a function of his or her communicative intentions, independently of what the hearer understands, and even of the actual existence of a hearer; the second is that when communication is carried out successfully, the resulting meaning is, in some important sense, jointly construed by the speaker and the hearer. Our strategy is to distinguish between speaker’s meaning, understood as a (...)
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  6. Prof Max Velmans (2009). How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness. Cogprints.
    Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical (...)
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