Online research in philosophy

Book Reviews Paul Abela, Kantian Review , FirstView Article(s).

Book Reviews Graham Bird, Kantian Review , FirstView Article(s).

Book Reviews David Landy, Kantian Review , FirstView Article(s).

The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant's moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act – a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant's theory, since the act (...) of attributing radical evil to one's freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance. (shrink)

Book Reviews Colin McQuillan, Kantian Review , FirstView Article(s).

Book Reviews Pablo Muchnik, Kantian Review , FirstView Article(s).

In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge (...) of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument is valid but its conclusion trivial. On the other, it is unsound on Kant's own view. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of , understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that Kant takes (...) intuitions to have a content in this sense, and, secondly, that Kant clearly takes the content of intuitions, so understood, to be distinct in kind from that possessed by concepts. I then show how my account can respond to the most serious objections to previous non-conceptualist interpretations. (shrink)

Book Reviews Howard Williams, Kantian Review , FirstView Article(s).