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Forthcoming articles
  1. Charles L. Barzun (forthcoming). Metaphysical Quietism and Functional Explanation in the Law. Law and Philosophy:1-21.
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  2. Stefano Bertea (forthcoming). A Foundation for the Conception of Law as Practical Reason. Law and Philosophy:1-34.
    This essay discusses a foundation of the connection argued to exist between law and practical reason that has proved to be highly influential and debated in contemporary legal philosophy – Alexy’s. After reconstructing Alexy’s conception of practical reason as well as its foundation, I criticise the weak transcendental-pragmatic argument Alexy uses to ground the authority of practical reason. This argument, I argue, can only show why occasionally, as opposed to necessarily, we ought to follow the guidance of practical reason, and (...)
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  3. William T. Braithwaite (forthcoming). The Common Law and the Judicial Power: An Introduction to Swift-Erie and the Problem of Transcendental Versus Positive Law. Law and Philosophy.
     
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  4. George Duke (forthcoming). The Planning Theory and Natural Law. Law and Philosophy:1-28.
    The practical, normative dimension of planning is a plausible source of the ‘family resemblances’ noted by a number of legal theorists between Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory and natural law jurisprudence. Foremost among these resemblances is Shapiro’s contention that the law, necessarily, has a moral aim. The moral aim thesis is at first glance surprising given Shapiro’s intention to defend exclusive legal positivism and unequivocal rejection of what he takes to be the core commitments of natural law theory. Shapiro’s claim, however, (...)
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  5. Alon Harel (forthcoming). The Duty to Criminalize. Law and Philosophy:1-22.
    The state has a duty to protect individuals from violations of their basic rights to life and liberty. But does the state have a duty to criminalize such violations? Further, if there is a duty on the part of the state to criminalize violations, should the duty be constitutionally entrenched? This paper argues that the answer to both questions is positive. The state has a duty not merely to effectively prevent violations of our rights to life and liberty, but also (...)
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  6. Adam Hill (forthcoming). Stability, Assurance, and the Concept of Legal Guidance. Law and Philosophy:1-31.
    Legal theorists standardly hold that stability is one of eight necessary conditions for legal guidance. We lack an adequate explanation, however, of why, exactly, stability is necessary in order that law possess the capacity to guide behavior. Standard explanations, which rely on a claim about reasonable expectations, fail to connect the concepts of stability and legal guidance. In this paper, I argue that, according to the leading conception of legal guidance, stability is, in fact, not necessary in order for law (...)
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  7. Win-Chiat Lee (forthcoming). The Judgeship of All Citizens: Dworkin's Protestantism About Law. Law and Philosophy:1-31.
    This article gives an account of what Ronald Dworkin calls ‘the protestant attitude’ towards law. Dworkin’s protestantist claim that the interpretive attitude towards law is to be taken not only by judges, but also by ordinary citizens is explained and defended. The account of Dworkin’s protestantism about law in this article is not based on his more general protestantist view about the interpretation of social practices, but, rather, on the nature of authoritative statements of the law in Dworkin’s theory of (...)
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  8. Phillip Montague (forthcoming). Specification and Moral Rights. Law and Philosophy:1-16.
    In this paper, I offer objections to an approach to formulating principles referring to moral rights that has come to known as “specification.” These objections (which are directed at all forms of specification, including one recently defended by Hallie Liberto) focus on rights-principles in their role as premises of inferences to conclusions regarding the moral rights of individuals in particular situations. I argue on practical grounds that specified principles have no useful role to play in such inferences, and on theoretical (...)
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  9. Mathijs Notermans (forthcoming). Social Peace as Conditio Tacita for the Validity of the Positive Legal Order. Law and Philosophy:1-27.
    My article investigates the paradoxical dualism in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in which exists on the one hand a strict distinction and on the other hand a necessary relation between Is and Ought. I shall further try to answer the question whether Kelsen’s pure theory tacitly assumes in the conditions for validity of the positive legal order a basic value and underlying condition, namely, that of ‘social peace’. In order to answer that question, I will first sketch why Kelsen (...)
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  10. Stanley L. Paulson & Bert van Roermund (forthcoming). Corrigendum:[Kelsen, Authority and Competence: An Introduction]. Law and Philosophy.
     
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  11. Anthony R. Reeves (forthcoming). Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion. Law and Philosophy:1-42.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is (in fact) bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it (...)
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  12. Frederick Schauer (forthcoming). Free Speech on Tuesdays. Law and Philosophy:1-22.
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  13. Sarah Sorial (forthcoming). Hate Speech and Distorted Communication: Rethinking the Limits of Incitement. Law and Philosophy:1-26.
    Hate speech is commonly defined with reference to the legal category of incitement. Laws targeting incitement typically focus on how the speech is expressed rather than its actual content. This has a number of unintended consequences: first, law tends to capture overt or obvious forms of hate speech and not hate speech that takes the form of ‘reasoned’ argument, but which nevertheless, causes as much, if not more harm. Second, the focus on form rather than content leads to categorization errors. (...)
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