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  1. Stamatios Gerogiorgakis (2013). [Review of] Jon Williamson/Federica Russo (Eds.), Key Terms in Logic, London: Continuum, 2010. [REVIEW] Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:384-386.
  2. Ansten Klev (2013). Form of Apprehension and the Content-Apprehension Model in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy/Philosophiegeschichte Und Logische Analyse 16:49-69.
    An act’s form of apprehension (Auffassungsform) determines whether it is a perception, an imagination, or a signitive act. It must be distinguished from the act’s quality, which determines whether the act is, for instance, assertoric, merely entertaining, wishing, or doubting. The notion of form of apprehension is explained by recourse to the so-called content–apprehension model (Inhalt-Auffassung Schema); it is characteristic of the Logical Investigations that in it all objectifying acts are analyzed in terms of that model. The distinction between intuitive (...)
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  3. Filip Mattens (2013). Strange Objects, Counterfeits and Reproduction: Clues for Analyzing Perceptual Experience in the Different Senses. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16.
  4. Sean McAleer (2013). Friendship, Perception, and Referential Opacity in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:362-374.
    This essay reconstructs and evaluates Aristotle's argument in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 that the happy person needs friends, in which Aristotle combines his well-known claim that friends are other selves with the claim that human perception is meta-perceptual: the perceiving subject perceives its own existence. After exploring some issues in the logic of perception, the essay argues that Aristotle's argument for the necessity of friends is invalid since perception-verbs create referentially opaque contexts in which the substitution of co-referential terms fails.
     
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  5. Philip J. Walsh (2013). Husserl's Concept of Motivation: The Logical Investigations and Beyond. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:70-83.
    Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project, even if it is not essen- tial for defining expression in the First Investigation. For Husserl, motivation is a relation between mental acts whereby (...)
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