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  1. Stefano Pred Elli (2001). You Just Can't Tell: An Analysis of the Non-Specific Use of Indexicals. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):103-118.
    In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as "you" in typical utterances of "you just can't tell". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.
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  2. Ahti Pietarinen (2001). Intentional Identity Revisited. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):147-188.
    The problem of intentional identity, as originally offered by Peter Geach, says that there can be an anaphoric link between an indefinite term and a pronoun across a sentential boundary and across propositional attitude contexts, where the actual existence of an individual for the indefinite term is not presupposed. In this paper, a semantic resolution to this elusive puzzle is suggested, based on a new quantified intensional logic and game-theoretic semantics of imperfect information. This constellation leads to an expressive intensional (...)
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  3. Peter M. Schuster (2001). Too Simple Solutions of Hard Problems. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):138-146.
    Even after yet another grand conjecture has been proved or refuted, any omniscience principle that had trivially settled this question is just as little acceptable as before. The significance of the constructive enterprise is therefore not affected by any gain of knowledge. In particular, there is no need to adapt weak counterexamples to mathematical progress.
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  4. Mark Textor (2001). Does the Truth-Conditional Theory of Sense Work for Indexicals? Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.
    The truth-conditional theory of sense holds that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as a theory of sense: if knowledge of a theory of truth for a language L is sufficient for understanding utterance of L-sentences, the T-sentences of the theory 'show' the sense of the uttered object-language sentences. In this paper I aim to show that indexicals create a serious problem for this prima facie attractive theoretical option. The so-called 'instantiation problem' is that a truth-theory (...)
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  5. Juan Barba (2001). Trees for Truth. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):71-99.
    This papers aims to analyse sentences of a self-referential language containing a truth-predicate by means of a Smullyan-style tableau system. Our analysis covers three variants of Kripke's partial-model semantics (strong and weak Kleene's and supervaluational) and three variants of the revision theory of truth (Belnap's, Gupta's and Herzberger's).
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  6. Jan Dejno — Ka (2001). Russell and MacColl: Reply to Grattan-Guinness, Wolenski, and Read. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):21-42.
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  7. Modal Logic (2001). Russell and MacColl: Reply to Grattan-Guinness, Wolen Ski, and Read. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):21-42.
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  8. Neil Tennant (2001). Game Theory and Conventiont. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):3-19.
    This paper rebuts criticisms by Hintikka of the author's account of game-theoretic semantics for classical logic. At issue are (i) the role of the axiom of choice in proving the equivalence of the game-theoretic account with the standard truth-theoretic account; (ii) the alleged need for quantification over strategies when providing a game-theoretic semantics; and (iii) the role of Tarski's Convention T. As a result of the ideas marshalled in response to Hintikka, the author puts forward a new conjecture concerning the (...)
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  9. Paul Tomassi (2001). Logic After Wittgenstein. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):43-70.
    Wittgenstein's later rejection of the externalist Tractarian picture of logic according to which all rationally analysable discourse is properly understood as truth-functional rules out any conception of logic as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', some conception of logic appears to survive even on Wittgenstein's later view. However, given his rejection of any conception of philosophical theory as explanatory or hypothetical, Wittgenstein seems to be forced into descriptivism. Despite these constraints, (...)
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