8 found

Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1. Lilly M. Russow (forthcoming). Merleau-Ponty and the Myth Of Bodily Intentionality. Noûs 22:35-47.
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  2. Lieven Decock & Igor Douven (forthcoming). What Is Graded Membership? Noûs.
    It has seemed natural to model phenomena related to vagueness in terms of graded membership. However, so far no satisfactory answer has been given to the question of what graded membership is nor has any attempt been made to describe in detail a procedure for determining degrees of membership. We seek to remedy these lacunae by building on recent work on typicality and graded membership in cognitive science and combining some of the results obtained there with a version of the (...)
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  3. Nathan Hanna (forthcoming). Moral Luck Defended. Noûs.
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  4. Rory Madden (forthcoming). The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject. Noûs.
    What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a (...)
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  5. Jonathan McKeown‐Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster (forthcoming). Conjuring Ethics From Words. Noûs.
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  6. Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Conscious Action/Zombie Action. Noûs.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, (...)
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  7. Jennifer Wang (forthcoming). The Modal Limits of Dispositionalism. Noûs.
    Dispositionality is a modal notion of a certain sort. When an object is said to have a disposition, we typically understand this to mean that under certain circumstances, the object would behave in a certain way. For instance, a fragile object is disposed to break when dropped onto a concrete surface. It need not actually break - its being fragile has implications that, so to speak, point beyond the actual world. According to dispositionalism, all modal features of the world may (...)
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  8. R. J. Gómez (forthcoming). Review of the Second Edition of Scientific Progress. [REVIEW] Noûs.
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