Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1. Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). Utility Monsters for the Fission Age. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Robust Virtue Epistemology as Anti-Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    If epistemic contextualism is correct, then knowledge attributions do not have stable truth-conditions across different contexts. John Hawthorne (2004), Timothy Williamson (2005), and Patrick Rysiew (2012) argue that this unstable picture of knowledge attributions undermines the trans-contextual role that knowledge reports play in storing, retrieving, and transmitting useful information. I argue that there are several ways to stabilize the truth-conditions for ‘know’ across conversational contexts, which allows knowledge reports to serve a trans-contextual role. In particular, I use the technique of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Trogdon Kelly (forthcoming). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse-grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this paper I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Luke Manning (forthcoming). No Identity Without an Entity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim 'Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow' is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox, of representations that seem to include denials of commitment (implicitly, here), to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and to be (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Andrew Naylor (forthcoming). Justification and Forgetting. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a notion of memorial justification. But it is not the traditional notion according to which something in the present—some memory impression, ostensible recollection, or memory experience—makes one’s belief that p prima facie justified. Instead, what makes one’s present belief that p prima facie justified, according to MJP, is that which provided one (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lilian O'Brien (forthcoming). &Quot;causalism and Deviance&Quot;. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the `right' kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the `wrong' kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the `right' (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Advantages of Propositionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This paper defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Paula Sweeney (forthcoming). Future Contingents, Indeterminacy and Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In Facing the future, Belnap et al reject bivalence and propose double time reference semantics to give a pragmatic response to the following assertion problem: how can we make sense of assertions about future events made at a time when the outcomes of those events are not yet determined? MacFarlane (2003, 2008) employs the same semantics, now bolstered with a relative-truth predicate, to accommodate the following apparently conflicting intuitions regarding the truth-value of an uttered future contingent: at the moment of (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Two Kinds of Stakes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes (world) track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes (attitude) track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes or relies on the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Janet Broughton (forthcoming). Necessity and Physical Laws in Descartes's Philosophy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    I argue that although in his earlier work descartes thought of the laws of motion as "eternal truths," he later came to think of them as truths whose necessity is of a different type.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar (forthcoming). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Stephen Foster (forthcoming). On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Joseph Grange (forthcoming). Moore, the Skeptic, and the Philosophical Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Paul Hoffman (forthcoming). Cartesian Passions and Cartesian Dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes retains the Aristotelian doctrine that when an agent acts on a patient, the action of the agent is one and the same as the passion in the patient. However, unlike his Aristotelian predecessors who located the agent's action in the patient, Descartes locates the agent's action in the agent. I examine briefly his motives for modifying, but not abandoning this doctrine. My central claim is that his use of this doctrine implies that he thinks there are modes straddling mind (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Kate Nolfi & Unc Chapel Hill (forthcoming). How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation