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Forthcoming articles
  1. Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson & Eddy Nahmias (forthcoming). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology:1-27.
    To address the underrepresentation of women in philosophy effectively, we must understand the causes of the loss of women after their initial philosophy classes. In this paper we challenge one of the few explanations that has focused on why women might leave philosophy at early stages. Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich (2014) offer some evidence that women have different intuitions than men about philosophical thought experiments. We present some concerns about their evidence and we discuss our own study, in which (...)
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  2. Marcus Arvan (forthcoming). How to Rationally Approach Life's Transformative Experiences. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting”, as well as in a forthcoming book, L.A. Paul uses the notion of transformative experience to challenge culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that if the problem Paul presents has no direct solution—if there is no way to defend the philosophically and culturally dominant approach to rational decision-making for (...)
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  3. Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo (forthcoming). Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    The Mind-Brain Identity Theory lived a short life as a respectable philosophical position in the late 1950s, until Hilary Putnam developed his famous argument on the multiple realizability of mental states. The argument was, and still is, taken as the definitive demonstration of the falsity of Identity Theory and the foundation on which contemporary functionalist computational cognitive science was to be grounded. In this paper, in the wake of some contemporary philosophers, we reopen the case for Identity Theory and offer (...)
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  4. Renatas Berniunas & Vilius Dranseika (forthcoming). Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno. Philosophical Psychology.
    In a paper in Philosophical Psychology, Nichols & Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article we attempt to evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity but rely on different concepts of a person and of identity of an individual. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no (...)
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  5. Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund (forthcoming). Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral thinking, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...)
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  6. Vivian Bohl (forthcoming). We Read Minds to Shape Relationships. Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading and it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. In (...)
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  7. Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke & Massimo Pigliucci (forthcoming). What Makes Weird Beliefs Thrive? The Epidemiology of Pseudoscience. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    What makes beliefs thrive? In this paper, we model the dissemination of bona fide science versus pseudoscience, making use of Dan Sperber's epidemiological model of representations. Drawing on cognitive research on the roots of irrational beliefs and the institutional arrangement of science, we explain the dissemination of beliefs in terms of their salience to human cognition and their ability to adapt to specific cultural ecologies. By contrasting the cultural development of science and pseudoscience along a number of dimensions (selective pressure, (...)
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  8. Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine (forthcoming). Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to (...)
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  9. Jason D'Cruz (forthcoming). Rationalization as Performative Pretense. Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    Rationalization in the sense of biased self-justification is very familiar. It’s not cheating because everyone else is doing it too. I didn’t report the abuse because it wasn’t my place. I understated my income this year because I paid too much in tax last year. I’m only a social smoker, so I won’t get cancer. The mental mechanisms subserving rationalization have been studied closely by psychologists. However, when viewed against the backdrop of philosophical accounts of the regulative role of truth (...)
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  10. Oisin Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism. Philosophical Psychology:1-26.
    Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions (...)
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  11. Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris. Philosophical Psychology:1-7.
    In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns.
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  12. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  13. Luis H. Favela (forthcoming). Discovering the Human Connectome. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  14. Adam Feltz (forthcoming). Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  15. Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan (forthcoming). An Error Theory for Compatibilist Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology:1-27.
    One debate in the experimental exploration of everyday judgments about free will is whether most people are compatibilists or incompatibilists. Some recent research suggests that many people who have incompatibilist intuitions are making a mistake; as such, they do not have genuine incompatibilist intuitions. Another worry is whether most people appropriately understand determinism or confuse it with similar, but different, notions such as fatalism. In five studies we demonstrate people distinguish determinism from fatalism. While people overall make this distinction, a (...)
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  16. Marco Fenici (forthcoming). Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation? Philosophical Psychology:1-25.
    I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities (SCAs) manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by (...)
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  17. Ellen Fridland & Richard Moore (forthcoming). Imitation Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology:1-25.
    Imitation reconsidered. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.942896.
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  18. Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attributions. Philosophical Psychology:1-11.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) present three experiments which they take to show that people judge patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mental capacity than the dead. They explain this result by claiming that people have implicit dualist or afterlife beliefs. This essay critically evaluates their experimental findings and their proposed explanation. We argue first that the experiments do not support the conclusion that people intuitively think PVS patients have less mentality than (...)
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  19. Kent Johnson (forthcoming). Maps, Languages, and Manguages: Rival Cognitive Architectures? Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    Maps, languages, and manguages: Rival cognitive architectures?. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.893814.
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  20. Derek Jones (forthcoming). Mindlessness. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  21. Michael Jungert (forthcoming). The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental, and Narrative Perspectives. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental, and Narrative Perspectives. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.881615.
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  22. Lukasz A. Kurowski (forthcoming). Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance: A Response to Rex Welshon's “Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity”. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon's position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon's definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon's proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account (...)
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  23. Derek Leben & Kristine Wilckens (forthcoming). Pushing the Intuitions Behind Moral Internalism. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    Moral Internalism proposes a necessary link between judging that an action is right/wrong and being motivated to perform/avoid that action. Internalism is central to many arguments within ethics, including the claim that moral judgments are not beliefs, and the claim that certain types of moral skepticism are incoherent. However, most of the basis for accepting Internalism rests on intuitions that have recently been called into question by empirical work. This paper further investigates the intuitions behind Internalism. Three experiments show not (...)
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  24. Eric Mandelbaum (forthcoming). The Automatic and the Ballistic: Modularity Beyond Perceptual Processes. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    Perceptual processes, in particular modular processes, have long been understood as being mandatory. But exactly what mandatoriness amounts to is left to intuition. This paper identifies a crucial ambiguity in the notion of mandatoriness. Discussions of mandatory processes have run together notions of automaticity and ballisticity. Teasing apart these notions creates an important tool for the modularist's toolbox. Different putatively modular processes appear to differ in their kinds of mandatoriness. Separating out the automatic from the ballistic can help the modularist (...)
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  25. Joseph McCaffrey (forthcoming). Reconceiving Conceptual Vehicles: Lessons From Semantic Dementia. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Reconceiving conceptual vehicles: Lessons from semantic dementia. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.827561.
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  26. Fritz J. McDonald (forthcoming). Cooperation and Its Evolution. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  27. Thaddeus Metz (forthcoming). How to Obtain Meaning in Life: The Roles of Self-Inflation, Self-Deception and World-Delusion. Philosophical Psychology.
    Part of a special Issue on Robert Trivers’ The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self‐Deception in Human Life, with some focus on the implication of self-deception and related mental states for meaning in life.
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  28. Stephen G. Morris (forthcoming). Commentary on “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism”. Philosophical Psychology:1-6.
    In “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” Deery, Davis, and Carey recommend that experimental philosophers employ a new methodology for determining the extent to which the folk are natural compatibilists about free will and moral responsibility. While I agree that the general methodology that the authors developed holds great promise for improving our understanding of folk attitudes about free will and moral responsibility, I am much less enthusiastic about some of the conclusions that they reached on (...)
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  29. Lilian O'Brien (forthcoming). Side Effects and Asymmetry in Act-Type Attribution. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Joshua Knobe's work has marshaled considerable support for the hypothesis that everyday judgments of whether an action is intentional are systematically influenced by evaluations of the action or agent. The main source of evidence for this hypothesis is a series of surveys that involve an agent either helping or harming something as a side effect. Respondents are much more likely to judge the side effect intentional if harm is involved. It is a remarkable feature of the discussion so far that (...)
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  30. Regina A. Rini (forthcoming). Feedback From Moral Philosophy to Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate (...)
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  31. Peter L. Samuelson & Ian M. Church (forthcoming). When Cognition Turns Vicious: Heuristics and Biases in Light of Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)—as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, (...)
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  32. Max Seeger (forthcoming). Authorship of Thoughts in Thought Insertion: What is It for a Thought to Be One's Own? Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    In thought insertion, subjects experience thoughts which they claim not to be their own. What they claim, it is typically said, is that the thought is not theirs in the sense that they are not the agent or author of the thought. But what does it mean to be the agent or author of a thought? The most intuitive idea is that for a thought to be one's own means for the thought to causally originate within the subject. I defend (...)
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  33. Hamid Seyedsayamdost (forthcoming). On Gender and Philosophical Intuition: Failure of Replication and Other Negative Results. Philosophical Psychology:1-32.
    On gender and philosophical intuition: Failure of replication and other negative results. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.893288.
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  34. Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    In this paper I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3 I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent’s long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4 I contrast the absence or (...)
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  35. Jesse S. Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming). Scrupulous Agents. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients: perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.
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  36. Kevin Patrick Tobia (forthcoming). Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.871618.
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  37. Kevin Patrick Tobia (forthcoming). The Effects of Cleanliness and Disgust on Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    Recent experimental studies report the influence of disgust and cleanliness manipulations on moral judgment, yet little attention has been given to interpreting these studies together or developing models of the causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment. I propose considerations for the causal modeling of these effects. The conclusions are not decisive in favor of one theory of disgust and cleanliness, but suggest several distinct causal roles of disgust and cleanliness-type manipulations. The incorrect views are those that (...)
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  38. Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). What is This Cognition That is Supposed to Be Embodied? Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among (...)
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  39. Yochai Ataria (forthcoming). Where Do We End and Where Does the World Begin? The Case of Insight Meditation. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    This paper examines the experience of where we end and the rest of the world begins, that is, the sense of boundaries. Since meditators are recognized for their ability to introspect about the bodily level of experience, and in particular about their sense of boundaries, 27 senior meditators (those with more than 10,000 hours of experience) were interviewed for this study. The main conclusions of this paper are that (a) the boundaries of the so-called “physical body” (body-as-object) are not equivalent (...)
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  40. Leon Ciechanowski (forthcoming). Inner Experience and Neuroscience: Merging Both Perspectives. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    Inner Experience and Neuroscience: Merging Both Perspectives. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.811575.
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  41. Sam Clarke (forthcoming). The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  42. Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from (...)
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  43. Valentina Cuccio & Marco Carapezza (forthcoming). Is Displacement Possible Without Language? Evidence From Preverbal Infants and Chimpanzees. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Is displacement possible without language? Evidence from preverbal infants and chimpanzees. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.829648.
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  44. Marco Fenici (forthcoming). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804645.
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  45. Justin C. Fisher (forthcoming). Pragmatic Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    Pragmatic experimental philosophy. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.870546.
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  46. Rocco J. Gennaro (forthcoming). Misrepresentation, Empty HOTs, and Intrinsic HOTs: A Reply to Pereplyotchik. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
    Misrepresentation, empty HOTs, and intrinsic HOTs: A reply to Pereplyotchik. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838819.
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  47. Michael E. Hasselmo (forthcoming). Remembering by Index and Content: Response to Sarah Robins. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    In her review of my book How we remember: Brain mechanisms of episodic memory, Sarah Robins highlights my example of the problem of interference between memories accessed by content-addressable memory. However, she points out the difficulty of solving this problem with index-addressable representations such as time cells or arc length cells. Namely, the index-addressable memory requires knowing the unique index in advance in order to perform effective retrieval. This is a difficult problem, but should be solvable by forming bi-directional associations (...)
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  48. Aaron Kagan (forthcoming). On Emotions: Philosophical Essays. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  49. Colin Klein (forthcoming). Reliability in Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meta-Meta Analysis. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    Reliability in Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meta-Meta Analysis. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838818.
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  50. Hugh LaFollette & Michael L. Woodruff (forthcoming). The Limits of Haidt: How His Explanation of Political Animosity Fails. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    The limits of Haidt: How his explanation of political animosity fails. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838752.
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  51. Martha Lang (forthcoming). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  52. Charles Lassiter (forthcoming). Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity, and Human Artifice. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  53. Stephan Lau & Mario Wenzel (forthcoming). The Effects of Constrained Autonomy and Incentives on the Experience of Freedom in Everyday Decision-Making. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    The present study examines the influence of constrained autonomy and incentives on the experience of freedom in decision-making in everyday settings. We tested the prediction that both factors constitute independent influences on the experience of freedom against the alternative that an incentive might outbalance the influence of a constraint. The experimental setting incorporated a decision about whether to continue a psychological experiment. The choice set of the participant was either restricted or not (constraint) and the tasks announced were either attractive (...)
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  54. P. D. Magnus & Ron McClamrock (forthcoming). Friends with Benefits! Distributed Cognition Hooks Up Cognitive and Social Conceptions of Science. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, (...)
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  55. C. D. Meyers (forthcoming). Brains, Trolleys, and Intuitions: Defending Deontology From the Greene/Singer Argument. Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    Brains, trolleys, and intuitions: Defending deontology from the Greene/Singer argument. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.849381.
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  56. Ramesh Kumar Mishra (forthcoming). Listening Through the Native Tongue: A Review Essay on Cutler's Native Listening: Language Experience and the Recognition of Spoken Words. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Speech perception has been a very productive and important area in psycholinguistics. In this review easy, I discuss Cutler's new book on native language listening. Cutler argues for a theory of speech perception, where all speech perception is accomplished by competence in native speech. I review this book and attempt to situate its main contributions in the broader context of cognitive science.
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  57. Jennifer Nado (forthcoming). Philosophical Expertise and Scientific Expertise. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...)
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  58. Søren Overgaard & John Michael (forthcoming). The Interactive Turn in Social Cognition Research: A Critique. Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    The interactive turn in social cognition research: A critique. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.827109.
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  59. David Pereplyotchik (forthcoming). Some HOT Family Disputes: A Critical Review of The Consciousness Paradox by Rocco Gennaro. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Some HOT family disputes: A critical review of The Consciousness Paradox by Rocco Gennaro. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838817.
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  60. Matthew Stuart Piper (forthcoming). The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience by Jesse J. Prinz. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience by Jesse J. Prinz. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838829.
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  61. Sarah Robins (forthcoming). A Mechanism for Mental Time Travel? A Critical Review of Hasselmo's How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
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  62. Andrea Schiavio (forthcoming). Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and Language. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  63. Jeff Sebo (forthcoming). Multiplicity, Self-Narrative, and Akrasia. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    Multiplicity, self-narrative, and akrasia. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.827567.
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  64. Itay Shani (forthcoming). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804045.
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  65. Ben Sheredos (forthcoming). Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  66. Jurģis Šķilters (forthcoming). Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  67. Paulo Sousa & Carlos Mauro (forthcoming). The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    The evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.843057.
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  68. Yohtaro Takano (forthcoming). Mirror Reversal of Slanted Objects: A Psycho-Optic Explanation. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Mirror reversal of slanted objects: A psycho-optic explanation. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.819279.
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  69. Adam Tuszyński (forthcoming). Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  70. Bas van der Vossen (forthcoming). In Defense of the Ivory Tower: Why Philosophers Should Stay Out of Politics. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    Many political theorists, philosophers, social scientists, and other academics engage in political activism. And many think this is how things ought to be. In this essay, I challenge the ideal of the politically engaged academic. I argue that, quite to the contrary, political theorists, philosophers, and other political thinkers have a prima facie duty to refrain from political activism. This argument is based on a commonsense moral principle, a claim about the point of political thought, and findings in cognitive psychology.
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  71. Christine Vitrano (forthcoming). In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  72. Sam Wilkinson (forthcoming). Delusions, Dreams, and the Nature of Identification. Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    Delusions, dreams, and the nature of identification. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.830351.
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  73. Philip Woodward (forthcoming). Introspection and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  74. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  75. John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
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  76. Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
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  77. P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
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