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Forthcoming articles
  1. S. Nassir Ghaemi (forthcoming). What is Me?: What is Bipolar? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):67-68.
  2. Grant Gillett (forthcoming). Neuroethics, Neo-Lockeanism, and Embodied Subjectivity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):43-46.
  3. Drew Leder (forthcoming). Anorexia: A Disease of Doubling. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):93-96.
  4. Katherine J. Morris (forthcoming). Anorexia: Beyond the Body Uncanny. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):97-98.
  5. Nancy Nyquist Potter (forthcoming). Embodied Agency and Habitual Selves. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):75-80.
  6. Marya Schechtman (forthcoming). Misunderstandings Understood. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):47-50.
  7. Gerben Meynen (forthcoming). Compulsions, Compatibilism, and Control. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (4):343-345.
  8. Dan J. Stein (forthcoming). Philosophy and Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (4):339-342.
  9. Y. Michael Barilan (forthcoming). From Hope in Palliative Care to Hope as a Virtue and a Life Skill. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):165-181.
    For centuries, it has been held that communication of an ominous prognosis has the power to kill patients and that the cultivation of hope, even when deceitful, may expedite recovery (Faden, Beauchamp, and King 1986, 63). Today, truth is considered a higher value than the pleasantness of no-worry. Research shows that patients want to be told the truth and that informed patients do not die prematurely; rather, they fare better psychologically than those kept behind a veil of silence. We also (...)
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  10. Y. Michael Barilan (forthcoming). Hope and Friendship: Being and Having. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):191-195.
    In its first part, the paper explores the challenge of conceptualizing the Thomist theological virtue of hope in Aristotelian terms that are compatible with non-Thomist and even atheist metaphysics as well. I argue that the key concept in this endeavor is friendship—as an Aristotelian virtue, as relational value in Thomist theology, as a recognized value in supportive care and as a kind of ‘personal hope.’ Then, the paper proceeds to examine the possible differences between hope as a virtue and hope (...)
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  11. Hannah Bowden (forthcoming). A Phenomenological Study of Anorexia Nervosa. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):227-241.
    In this study, I seek to provide an accurate account of the subjective experience of the body in anorexia nervosa, and how this differs from nonpathological experiences of the body, while remaining neutral on the disorder’s causes. By applying an understanding of the body as found in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, I show how the insights provided by these philosophers can help to clarify the subjective experience of the disorder. I build up this account of the experience largely (...)
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  12. Hannah Bowden (forthcoming). "Too Fat" and "Too Thin": Understanding the Bodily Experience of Anorexia Nervosa. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):251-253.
  13. Edward Erwin (forthcoming). Thematic Affinities and Psychoanalysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):217-219.
    Dr. Lacewing’s paper is a very interesting one. We agree in part, but only in part. Lacewing (2012) rejects the general thesis that “causal inferences must always be justified on the basis of Mill’s canons” (p. 199). I agree, but so does his target, Adolf Grünbaum, as we shall see in a moment. But first there is a question about Grünbaum’s alleged reliance on Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference. This interpretation may not make a difference to Lacewing’s arguments, but (...)
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  14. Peter Fonagy (forthcoming). On Caution and Courage in Psychoanalytic Epistemology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):213-215.
    Michael Lacewing’s argument in this paper is impressive. His basic case is that research in social and clinical psychology threatens to undermine Hopkins’ (1988) well-known defense of psychoanalysis. This defense claims that psychoanalysis is an extension of, and as valid as, commonsense psychology. By questioning the reliability of commonsense psychological inferences, research in social and clinical psychology also challenges psychoanalytic validity. For, in extending commonsense psychology, psychoanalysis inherits its flaws. This is a fascinating contribution to arguments about psychoanalytic epistemology. Lacewing (...)
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  15. Barbro Fröding (forthcoming). Hope as a Virtue in an Aristotelian Context. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):183-186.
    Michael Barilan’s article “From Hope in Palliative Care to Hope as a Virtue and a Life Skill” is an interesting and informative contribution to the debate on the nature of ‘a good death.’ Broadly speaking, the author seeks to explore “the roles and meanings of promotion focus goals in human life” and how hope can aid in alleviating suffering (Barilan 2012, 171). The subject is topical and courtesy of being clinically active, Barilan is able to add a welcome perspective. Very (...)
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  16. Simona Giordano (forthcoming). Understanding Anorexia Nervosa: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Body and the Mirror. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):247-249.
  17. Michael Lacewing (forthcoming). Inferring Motives in Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):197-212.
    In this paper, I consider an argument offered by Hopkins (1988) regarding the nature and status of our everyday inferences from other people’s behavior to their motives and other mental states. (It may be that we recognize, rather than infer, immediate intentions and emotional states, for example, in bodily actions and facial expressions. But I am concerned with inferences that go beyond states that can be recognized immediately in this way.) Hopkins’ argument seeks to rebut the charge, leveled by Grünbaum, (...)
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  18. Michael Lacewing (forthcoming). Statistics, Desire, and Interdisciplinarity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):221-225.
    I am very grateful to both Edward Erwin and Peter Fonagy for their thoughtful and engaging comments. I do not have space to deal fully with all the issues they raise, but I will try to clarify some key points at which perhaps I implied more than I intended, or failed to be clear. Erwin states that I claim the following principle is a method for inferring causes: “if X is causally relevant to the occurrence of Y, then the incidence (...)
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  19. Dorothée Legrand (forthcoming). Objects and Others: Diverting Heidegger to Conceptualize Anorexia. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):243-246.
    According to Bowden (20121), anorectics’2 bodily experiences are characterized by a “corporealization,” which has notably been described as follows: “The exchange with the environment is inhibited, excretions cease; processes of . . . shrinking, and drying up prevail” (Fuchs 2005, 99). What is described here is melancholia, but a similar characterization would be applicable to anorexia. I think, however, that the notion of ‘corporealization’ is not fine-grained enough to capture the specificity of anorexic/pathological bodily experiences. To develop this point, I (...)
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  20. Daniel Munday (forthcoming). Hope as Virtue: Opens Up a New Space for Exploring Hopefulness at the End of Life and Raises Some Interesting Questions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):187-189.
    Barilan’s (2012) essay “From Hope in Palliative Care to Hope as a Virtue and a Life Skill” provides a novel way of exploring hope as experienced by people at the end of life. He proposes that hope can be usefully seen as an Aristotelian virtue; something to be “conscientiously chosen” as a “habit of behavior, perceptiveness and mental response, holistically considered” (Barilan 2012, 166). Hope coalesces with other virtues, particularly courage, in the terminally ill, to enable human flourishing even at (...)
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  21. Matthew Broome (forthcoming). Reality, Realness, and the Natural Attitude. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):115-118.
  22. Peter Fifield & Matthew Broome (forthcoming). Intimations of Immortality. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):141-144.
  23. Philip Gerrans (forthcoming). Experience and Expectations: Bayesian Explanations of the Alternation Between the Capgras and Cotard Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):145-148.
  24. Richard G. T. Gipps (forthcoming). The Indefinability and Unintelligibility of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):91-95.
  25. Mike Gorski (forthcoming). Karl Jaspers on Delusion: Definition by Genus and Specific Difference. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):79-86.
  26. Mike Gorski (forthcoming). The Real Definition of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):97-101.
  27. Giovanni Stanghellini (forthcoming). Jaspers on "Primary" Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):87-89.
  28. Somogy Varga (forthcoming). Realness, Expression, and the Role of Others. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):123-126.
  29. Garry Young (forthcoming). Delusions of Death and Immortality: A Consequence of Misplaced Being in Cotard Patients. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):127-140.
  30. Garry Young (forthcoming). In Defense of Misplaced Being and the Interactionist Account. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):149-152.
  31. Miles Clapham (forthcoming). Psychiatric Power and Its Reversals: Can We Keep Practice Humane? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):63-65.
  32. Grant Gillett (forthcoming). Foucault and Current Psychiatric Practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):59-61.
  33. Douglas W. Heinrichs (forthcoming). Can Any One Theory of Emotion Really Do? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):17-19.
  34. John Iliopoulos (forthcoming). Foucault's Notion of Power and Current Psychiatric Practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):49-58.
  35. John Iliopoulos (forthcoming). Foucault, the Logic of Psychiatric Power, and Its Paradoxes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):67-69.
  36. Mike W. Martin (forthcoming). Psychotherapy as Cultivating Character. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):37-39.
  37. Duff R. Waring (forthcoming). The Virtuous Patient: Psychotherapy and the Cultivation of Character. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):25-35.
  38. Duff R. Waring (forthcoming). Psychotherapy Through the Prism of Moral Language. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):45-48.
  39. Kelleher Michael J. (forthcoming). Commentary on "Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Psychiatrist". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (2):145-149.
  40. Dr Jerome Kroll (forthcoming). Essay Review: The Historiography of the History of Psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (3):267-275.
  41. Dr Timothy Kendall (forthcoming). Commentary on "Beyond Liberation". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):15-17.
  42. Dr Andrew Moore, Tony Hope & K. W. M. Fulford (forthcoming). Mild Mania and Well-Being. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (3):165-177.
  43. Professor Lennart Nordenfelt (forthcoming). Mild Mania and the Theory of Health: A Response to "Mild Mania and Well-Being". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (3):179-184.
  44. Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Transformative Suffering and the Cultivation of Virtue. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
    Anastasia Scrutton offers an attractive account of two Christian theologies of depression and argues, cogently and compellingly, that forms of potentially transformative theologies are therapeutically and philosophically superior. My double aim here is to try to cash out the operative notion of 'transformation' by focusing on two features: first its multimodal character (ethical, aesthetic, existential, spiritual) and, second, the theme of a realisation of 'dependence', 'grounding', or of being 'anchored' in the world. I suggest that these two themes of multimodality (...)
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  45. F. R. Murray & M. C. Almy (forthcoming). The Impact of Piagetian Theory on Education. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.