Online research in philosophy

In recent years, commentators have devoted increasing attention to Hegel’s conception of conscience. Prominent interpreters like Frederick Neuhouser have even argued that many points of contact can be found between Hegel’s conceptions of conscience and moral subjectivity and historical and contemporary liberalism. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of an under-examined 1830 addition to the Philosophy of Spirit concerning the relation between religion and the state which proves particularly resistant to the kind of liberal interpretation of conscience which Neuhouser (...) provides. I assess the significance of Hegel’s argument for the “inseparability” of ethical and religious conscience for liberal interpretations. I conclude by arguing that we can identify a kind of consistency between the Philosophy of Right and the later writings and lectures, but that Hegel’s conception of conscience is incompatible with contemporary political liberalism. (shrink)

The ethical theory discoverable in Hegel’s writings assigns, on Dean Moyar’s reading, an important role to the idea of conscience. Hegel’s discussion of conscience presents a theory of practical reasoning which requires that one be able to nest the particular purposes that motivate one’s actions in the objective purposes that have normative status insofar as they prevail in the institutions of modern ethical life. Those norms are legitimized by the fact that the institutions in question, most especially the state, predicate (...) themselves on their recognition of the rights of the particular individual. Individuals are not simply passive in relation to ethical, institutional norms. Individual moral deliberation plays a key role in the ethical development of society. Nonetheless, the norms that the state requires the individual to recognize do seem to be, in the last analysis, beyond appeal. Hegel makes, and Moyar presents, a powerful case for this position. Nonetheless, pacifist arguments present this position with a serious challenge. (shrink)

Although many scholars have recognized the pivotal importance that the notion of conscience plays in Hegel’s thought, much of the scholarship surrounding this notion has remained piecemeal. Dean Moyar’s book Hegel’s Conscience breaks new ground on this subject in offering a comprehensive analysis of the indispensable role that conscience plays in Hegel’s philosophy, demonstrating not only its foundational place for Hegel’s approach to ethics, but also the contemporary relevancy of Hegel’s account for understanding the performative character of practical reason. Despite (...) the novelty and intellectual rigor of Moyar’s position, my essay “Translating Convictions into a Clear Conscience” argues that in confining his approach to a “cognitivist” interpretation of conscience, Moyar ends up neglecting the richness and existential depth of Hegel’s discussion. And so although Moyar’s interpretation is clear, succinct, and plausible, it accomplishes this by overlooking much of Hegel’s original phenomenological fidelity to the actual experience of conscience. (shrink)

In this summary I introduce the interpretive framework for Hegel's Conscience and then provide an overview of the book’s six chapters.

In this response I first address the criticisms of omission by discussing some of the elements of the original project that were excluded in the final version (section 1). In section 2 I respond to Howard’s criticism that I assume too much transparency in conscience. In section 3 I discuss the problem of evil and the transition in the Phenomenology of Spirit from conscience to religion. I focus here especially on the distinction between Objective and Absolute Spirit, and on how (...) that distinction plays out differently in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. In section 4 I take up the specifically political issues of conscience, responding to Speight’s suggestion that conscience should have a transformative role and to De Nys’s query about the State’s relationship to dissenting moral and religious views. Finally, in section 5 I take up the issues of whether I and Hegel do justice to the range of uses of conscience and whether or not the Hegelian view is too optimistic about modernity. (shrink)

Dean Moyar’s Hegel’s Conscience represents a set of achievements that I discuss in three sections: (1) the meaning of conscience in everyday moral discourse, (2) the interpretation of Hegel’s treatment of conscience, and (3) the importance of Hegel’s view of conscience for contemporary ethical/political discussion.

Hegel’s view of India is famously negative, and postcolonial scholarship has been largely dominated by a view of Hegel as little more than a chauvinist. This paper argues that this interpretation is one-sided and overly simplistic. Most approaches to Hegel on India focus on the well-known lectures on the philosophy of history, imposing an overly teleological reading upon Hegel’s view of cultural difference. In contrast, I demonstrate the ambiguity of Hegel’s conception of India through a close reading of Hegel’s little-known (...) essay on the Bhagavad-Gītā (Über die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata von Wilhelm von Humboldt). Hegel believed that the Bhagavad-Gītā was India’s paradigmatic text, and he used this essay as a platform for discussing Indian thought in general. In distinction to Bradley Herling’s interpretation of the Gītā essay, I contend that here Hegel has an unexpectedly positive view of Indian thought, but only insofar as it appears to reflect his own. (shrink)