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Forthcoming articles
  1. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein (forthcoming). A Bayesian Model of Knightian Uncertainty. Theory and Decision.
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  2. Steffen Andersen, Amalia Di Girolamo, Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau (forthcoming). Risk and Time Preferences of Entrepreneurs: Evidence From a Danish Field Experiment. Theory and Decision.
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  3. Vera Angelova, Olivier Armantier, Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart (forthcoming). Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence. Theory and Decision.
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  4. Krzysztof R. Apt & Sunil Simon (forthcoming). A Classification of Weakly Acyclic Games. Theory and Decision.
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  5. Takao Asano & Hiroyuki Kojima (forthcoming). An Axiomatization of Choquet Expected Utility with Cominimum Independence. Theory and Decision.
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  6. Thomas Åstebro, José Mata & Luís Santos-Pinto (forthcoming). Skewness Seeking: Risk Loving, Optimism or Overweighting of Small Probabilities? Theory and Decision.
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  7. Fernando V. Bonassi, Rafael B. Stern, Cláudia M. Peixoto & Sergio Wechsler (forthcoming). Exchangeability and the Law of Maturity. Theory and Decision.
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  8. Jeffrey V. Butler, Luigi Guiso & Tullio Jappelli (forthcoming). The Role of Intuition and Reasoning in Driving Aversion to Risk and Ambiguity. Theory and Decision.
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  9. Sébastien Courtin, Mathieu Martin & Issofa Moyouwou (forthcoming). The $$Q$$ Q -Majority Efficiency of Positional Rules. Theory and Decision.
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  10. Sébastien Courtin & Bertrand Tchantcho (forthcoming). A Note on the Ordinal Equivalence of Power Indices in Games with Coalition Structure. Theory and Decision.
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  11. James C. Cox, Glenn W. Harrison, Elisabet Rutström & Vjollca Sadiraj (forthcoming). Introduction to FUR XV Special Issue. Theory and Decision.
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  12. Daniela Di Cagno, Tibor Neugebauer, Carlos Rodriguez-Palmero & Abdolkarim Sadrieh (forthcoming). Recall Searching with and Without Recall. Theory and Decision.
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  13. Conal Duddy (forthcoming). Condorcet's Principle and the Strong No-Show Paradoxes. Theory and Decision.
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  14. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem (forthcoming). Politicians, Governed Versus Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation. Theory and Decision.
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  15. Piers Fleming & Daniel John Zizzo (forthcoming). A Simple Stress Test of Experimenter Demand Effects. Theory and Decision.
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  16. Werner Güth (forthcoming). Collectively Ranking Candidates Via Bidding in Procedurally Fair Ways. Theory and Decision.
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  17. Frank Huettner (forthcoming). A Proportional Value for Cooperative Games with a Coalition Structure. Theory and Decision.
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  18. Kohei Kawamura (forthcoming). Confidence and Competence in Communication. Theory and Decision.
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  19. Jean-François Laslier & Bernard Walliser (forthcoming). Stubborn Learning. Theory and Decision.
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  20. Ralf Morgenstern, Marcus Heldmann & Bodo Vogt (forthcoming). Differences in Cognitive Control Between Real and Hypothetical Payoffs. Theory and Decision.
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  21. Robert Nau (forthcoming). Risk-Neutral Equilibria of Noncooperative Games. Theory and Decision.
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  22. Erwin Ooghe (forthcoming). Partial Compensation/Responsibility. Theory and Decision.
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  23. Robert J. Reilly & Douglas D. Davis (forthcoming). The Effects of Uncertainty on the WTA–WTP Gap. Theory and Decision.
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  24. Vjollca Sadiraj (forthcoming). Probabilistic Risk Attitudes and Local Risk Aversion: A Paradox. Theory and Decision.
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  25. Evan Sadler (forthcoming). Minimax and the Value of Information. Theory and Decision.
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  26. Klaas Schulze (forthcoming). General Dual Measures of Riskiness. Theory and Decision.
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  27. Peter Stone (forthcoming). Introducing Difference Into the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision.
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  28. Jacques Thépot (forthcoming). Negative Agency Costs. Theory and Decision.
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  29. Lukas Angst & Karol Jan Borowiecki (forthcoming). Delegation and Motivation. Theory and Decision:1-31.
    We investigate the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal–agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, (...)
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  30. Luís Fernando Brands Barbosa & Gil Riella (forthcoming). A Note on Equivalent Comparisons of Information Channels. Theory and Decision:1-12.
    Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, 2011) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them.
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  31. Achille Basile, Maria Gabriella Graziano & Marialaura Pesce (forthcoming). On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information. Theory and Decision:1-27.
    The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main models of differential information economies, providing in this framework a natural competitive equilibrium notion which satisfies the fair criterion. The analysis is conducted allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition.
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  32. Ruth Ben-Yashar (forthcoming). The Generalized Homogeneity Assumption and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision:1-5.
    The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.
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  33. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan (forthcoming). On the Significance of the Prior of a Correct Decision in Committees. Theory and Decision:1-11.
    The current note clarifies why, in committees, the prior probability of a correct collective choice might be of particular significance and possibly should sometimes even be the sole appropriate basis for making the collective decision. In particular, we present sufficient conditions for the superiority of a rule based solely on the prior relative to the simple majority rule, even when the decisional skills of the committee members are assumed to be homogeneous.
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  34. Peter Brooks, Simon Peters & Horst Zank (forthcoming). Risk Behavior for Gain, Loss, and Mixed Prospects. Theory and Decision:1-30.
    This study extends experimental tests of (cumulative) prospect theory (PT) over prospects with more than three outcomes and tests second-order stochastic dominance principles (Levy and Levy, Management Science 48:1334–1349, 2002; Baucells and Heukamp, Management Science 52:1409–1423, 2006). It considers choice behavior of people facing prospects of three different types: gain prospects (losing is not possible), loss prospects (gaining is not possible), and mixed prospects (both gaining and losing are possible). The data supports the distinction of risk behavior into these three (...)
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  35. Susumu Cato (forthcoming). Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Revisited. Theory and Decision:1-17.
    This paper aims to reexamine the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of social choice. A generalized notion of independence is introduced to clarify an informational requirement of binary independence which is usually imposed in the Arrovian framework. We characterize the implication of binary independence.
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  36. Esat Doruk Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu (forthcoming). Implementing Equal Division with an Ultimatum Threat. Theory and Decision:1-14.
    We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh (...)
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  37. Sujoy Chakravarty & Jaideep Roy (forthcoming). Attitudes Towards Risk and Ambiguity Across Gains and Losses. Theory and Decision.
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  38. John Duffy & Félix Muñoz-García (forthcoming). Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences. Theory and Decision:1-31.
    This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players’ concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.” In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in (...)
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  39. Sean Duffy, Tyson Hartwig & John Smith (forthcoming). Costly and Discrete Communication: An Experimental Investigation. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-23.
    Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment designed to capture this feature of communication. The messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world; however, the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. Here the sender learns the state of the world, then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and (...)
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  40. Jan Heufer (forthcoming). A Geometric Approach to Revealed Preference Via Hamiltonian Cycles. Theory and Decision:1-13.
    It is shown that a fundamental question of revealed preference theory, namely whether the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) implies the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP), can be reduced to a Hamiltonian cycle problem: A set of bundles allows a preference cycle of irreducible length if and only if the convex monotonic hull of these bundles admits a Hamiltonian cycle. This leads to a new proof to show that preference cycles can be of arbitrary length for more than (...)
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  41. Yoshio Kamijo & Takumi Kongo (forthcoming). Properties Based on Relative Contributions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utilities. Theory and Decision.
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  42. Edi Karni, Moshe Leshno & Sivan Rapaport (forthcoming). Helping Patients and Physicians Reach Individualized Medical Decisions: Theory and Application to Prenatal Diagnostic Testing. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-17.
    This paper presents a procedure designed to aid physicians and patients in the process of making medical decisions, and illustrates its implementation to aid pregnant women, who decided to undergo prenatal diagnostic test choose a physician to administer it. The procedure is based on a medical decision-making model of Karni (J Risk Uncertain 39: 1–16, 2009). This model accommodates the possibility that the decision maker’s risk attitudes may vary with her state of health and incorporates other costs, such as pain (...)
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  43. Klemens Keldenich & Marcus Klemm (forthcoming). Double or Nothing?! Small Groups Making Decisions Under Risk in “Quiz Taxi”. Theory and Decision:1-32.
    This paper investigates the behavior of contestants in the game show “Quiz Taxi” when faced with the decision whether to bet the winnings they have acquired on a final “double or nothing” question. The decision in this natural experiment is made by groups of two or three persons. This setup enables the decision-making process to be studied with regard to group and communication characteristics. The contestants show fairly risk averse behavior. There is also a significant heterogeneity in attitude to risk. (...)
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  44. Matthew R. Kelley & Robert J. Lemke (forthcoming). Gender Differences When Subjective Probabilities Affect Risky Decisions: An Analysis From the Television Game Show Cash Cab. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-18.
    This study uses the television show Cash Cab as a natural experiment to investigate gender differences in decision making under uncertainty. As expected, men are much more likely to accept the end-of-game gamble than are women, but men and women appear to weigh performance variables differently when relying on subjective probabilities. At best men base their risky decisions on general aspects of their previous “good” play (not all of which is relevant at the time the decision is made) and at (...)
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  45. Chen Li, Zhihua Li & Peter P. Wakker (forthcoming). If Nudge Cannot Be Applied: A Litmus Test of the Readers' Stance on Paternalism. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-19.
    A central question in many debates on paternalism is whether a decision analyst can ever go against the stated preference of a client, even if merely intending to improve the decisions for the client. Using four gedanken-experiments, this paper shows that this central question, so cleverly and aptly avoided by libertarian paternalism (nudge), cannot always be avoided. The four thought experiments, while purely hypothetical, serve to raise and specify the critical arguments in a maximally clear and pure manner. The first (...)
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  46. E. F. McClennen & P. Found (forthcoming). Dutch-Books and Money Pumps. Theory and Decision.
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  47. Andre de Palma, Nathalie Picard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer (forthcoming). Individual and Couple Decision Behavior Under Risk: The Power of Ultimate Control Who Controls the Mouse Controls the Outcome of Joint Choice, Forthcoming In. Theory and Decision.
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  48. Frank Riedel & Linda Sass (forthcoming). Ellsberg Games. Theory and Decision:1-41.
    In the standard formulation of game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices and study the consequences for the basic results on normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. (...)
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  49. Darryl A. Seale, William E. Stein & Amnon Rapoport (forthcoming). Hold or Roll: Reaching the Goal in Jeopardy Race Games. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-32.
    We consider a class of dynamic tournaments in which two contestants are faced with a choice between two courses of action. The first is a riskless option (“hold”) of maintaining the resources the contestant already has accumulated in her turn and ceding the initiative to her rival. The second is the bolder option (“roll”) of taking the initiative of accumulating additional resources, and thereby moving ahead of her rival, while at the same time sustaining a risk of temporary setback. We (...)
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  50. Christian Thöni (forthcoming). Inequality Aversion and Antisocial Punishment. Theory and Decision:1-17.
    Antisocial punishment—punishment of pro-social cooperators—has shown to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood. This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. The model by Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3): 817–868, 1999) allows to derive conditions under which antisocial punishment occurs. With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I evaluate the (...)
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  51. Rudolf Vetschera & D. Marc Kilgour (forthcoming). Fair Division of Indivisible Items Between Two Players: Design Parameters for Contested Pile Methods. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-26.
    Contested Pile methods are two-phase procedures for the fair allocation of indivisible items to two players. In the Generation Phase, items over which the players’ preferences differ widely enough are allocated. “Contested” items are placed in the Contested Pile, which is then allocated in the Splitting Phase. Each phase can be carried out using several different techniques; we perform a comprehensive analysis of the resulting design variants using a computational model. The properties of fairness and efficiency, generally achieved in the (...)
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  52. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao (forthcoming). Multi-Task Agency with Unawareness. Theory and Decision:1-26.
    The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into multi-dimensional Principal–Agent theory. We introduce two key parameters to describe the problem, the extent and the effect of unawareness, show under what conditions it is optimal for the Principal to propose an incomplete or a complete contract, and characterize the incentive power of optimal linear contracts. If Agents differ in their unawareness, optimal incentive schemes can be distorted for both aware and unaware Agents, because, different from standard contract theory, the single-crossing property (...)
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