Stiegler argued in Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise that we must refer to archi-cinema just as Derrida spoke of archi-writing. In this article he proposes that in principle the dream is the primordial form of this archi-cinema. The archi-cinema of consciousness, of which dreams would be the matrix as archi-cinema of the unconscious, is the projection resulting from the play between what Husserl called, on the one hand, primary and secondary retentions, and what Stiegler, on the (...) other hand, calls tertiary retentions, which are the hypomnesic traces of conscious and unconscious life. There is archi-cinema to the extent that for any noetic act – for example, in an act of perception – consciousness projects its object. This projection is a montage, of which tertiary retentions form the fabric, as well as constituting both the supports and the cutting room. This indicates that archi-cinema has a history, a history conditioned by the history of tertiary retentions. It also means that there is an organology of dreams. (shrink)

This text is a transcription of Rouvroy’s presentation on 7th October 2014 at the “Digital Studies” seminar series at the Centre Georges Pompidou. This seminar series, organised by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, question the influence of digital technologies on knowledge from an epistemological point of view and from the way they alter academic disciplines.

In the aftermath of the First World War, the poet Paul Valéry wrote of a "crisis of spirit", brought about by the instrumentalization of knowledge and the destructive subordination of culture to profit. Recent events demonstrate all too clearly that the stock of mind, or spirit, continues to fall. The economy is toxically organized around the pursuit of short-term gain, supported by an infantilizing, dumbed-down media. Advertising technologies make relentless demands on our attention, reducing us to idiotic beasts, no longer (...) capable of living. Spiralling rates of mental illness show that the fragile life of the mind is at breaking point. Underlying these multiple symptoms is consumer capitalism, which systematically immiserates those whom it purports to liberate. Returning to Marxʹs theory, Stiegler argues that consumerism marks a new stage in the history of proletarianization. It is no longer just labour that is exploited, pushed below the limits of subsistence, but the desire that is characteristic of human spirit. The cure to this malaise is to be found in what Stiegler calls a "pharmacology of the spirit". Here, pharmacology has nothing to do with the chemical supplements developed by the pharmaceutical industry. The pharmakon, defined as both cure and poison, refers to the technical objects through which we open ourselves to new futures, and thereby create the spirit that makes us human. By reference to a range of figures, from Socrates, Simondon and Derrida to the child psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, Stiegler shows that technics are both the cause of our suffering and also what makes life worth living. -- Publisher description. (shrink)

In this important new book, the leading cultural theorist and philosopher Bernard Stiegler re-examines the relationship between politics and aesthetics in our contemporary hyperindustrial age. Stiegler argues that our epoch is characterized by the seizure of the symbolic by industrial technology, where aesthetics has become both theatre and weapon in an economic war. This has resulted in a ‘symbolic misery’ where conditioning substitutes for experience. In today’s control societies, aesthetic weapons play an essential role: audiovisual and digital (...) technologies have become a means of controlling the conscious and unconscious rhythms of bodies and souls, of modulating the rhythms of consciousness and life. The notion of an aesthetic engagement, capable of founding a new communal sensibility and a genuine aesthetic community, has largely collapsed today. This is because the overwhelming majority of the population is now totally subjected to the aesthetic conditioning of marketing and therefore estranged from any experience of aesthetic inquiry. That part of the population that continues to experiment aesthetically has turned its back on those who live in the misery of this conditioning. Stiegler appeals to the art world to develop a political understanding of its role. In this volume he pays particular attention to cinema which occupies a unique position in the temporal war that is the cause of symbolic misery: at once industrial technology and art, cinema is the aesthetic experience that can combat conditioning on its own territory. This highly original work - the first in Stiegler’s Symbolic Misery series - will be of particular interest to students in film studies, media and cultural studies, literature and philosophy and will consolidate Stiegler’s reputation as one of the most original cultural theorists of our time. (shrink)

Peu de philosophes contemporains choisissent de faire vivre leurs outils critiques grâce au terreau d'une association, d'un collectif. C'est le cas de Bernard Stiegler, qui a fondé Ars Industrialis en 2005. Le manifeste de l'association, Réenchanter le monde (Flammarion, 2005 ; 7400 ventes en Champs), devait connaître un grand retentissement. Depuis, les travaux et contributions fleurissent (de l'économiste André Gréau au comédien Robin Renucci, en passant par les spécialistes des digital studies), et Ars Industrialis franchit un cap en (...) s'associant à des collectivités locales (Nantes) ou en nouant des partenariats internationaux (Grande-Bretagne, Allemagne). Cet ouvrage fournit une synthèse de tous ces travaux en proposant un vocabulaire philosophique à la fois ambitieux et accessible. Qu'est-ce le marketing - le psychopouvoir - et pourquoi est-il un des dangers majeurs de notre époque? En quoi la technique influence-t-elle des fonctions aussi capitales que la mémoire ou l'écriture? Quelle nouvelle vision de l'éducation devons-nous mettre à jour depuis l'avènement du numérique? Que sont la bêtise et l'intelligence? Comment aider la transformation de citoyens passifs et débordés en amateurs, acteurs et membres d'une communauté de goûts et de savoirs? Faire attention propose, dans ces courts essais-définitions, le manifeste d'une époque charnière qui voit définitivement s'éloigner le monde ancien, tout en souhaitant mettre les outils de l'extrême contemporain au service d'un nouvel humanisme. (shrink)

La métamorphose numérique des savoirs et de l'enseignement constitue un enjeu majeur du 21e siècle et se place au premier rang des priorités des universités et des organismes de recherche. De nouvelles conditions de publication, de certification et d'éditorialisation se mettent en place. Des règles et des méthodes pédagogiques inédites forment un processus dynamique qui doit pousser les institutions académiques, l'industrie et le monde économique à coopérer au-delà de la modernisation de la pédagogie ou du développement de compétences nouvelles. Mais (...) beaucoup d'initiatives apparaissent comme des tendances en vogue sujettes à tous les vents et contrevents médiatiques, et vite dépassées par la dernière nouveauté, à l'exemple des MOOC déjà remplacés par les SPOC. Bernard Steigler a fait appel aux meilleurs spécialistes mondiaux pour démontrer que ce n'est pas seulement la pédagogie qui est bouleversée mais ce sont les savoirs eux-mêmes, depuis la recherche de pointe jusqu'aux formes les plus élémentaires de l'enseignement. L'ouvrage dresse un panorama complet des technologies réflexives et contributives, analyse en profondeur le principe de gouvernementalité algorithmique considéré désormais comme "régime de vérité" et "tournant computationnel" de la société hyperindustrielle. Il propose une méthodologie novatrice de gestion de débats et de communautés, construite sur un autre modèle que celui des réseaux sociaux actuels. Cet ouvrage de référence pose les bases d'une nouvelle industrie éditoriale numérique et audiovisuelle. (shrink)

At the beginning of Western philosophy, Aristotle contrasted made objects, which did not have the source of their own production within themselves, with beings formed by nature. This distinction persisted until Marx, who conceived of the possibility of an evolution of the technical object. This philosophy developed while industrialisation was in the process of overthrowing the contemporary order of social organisation, which highlighted technology's new place in philosophical enquiry. Bernard Stiegler goes back to the beginning of Western philosophy (...) and revises the Aristotelian assessment, developing a complex argument whereby the technical object can be seen as having an essential, distinctive temporality and dynamic of its own. The author engages the ideas of Rousseau, Husserl, and Heidegger, the paleo-ontologist Leroi-Gourhan, the anthropologists Vernant and Detienne, the sociologists Weber and Habermas, and the systems analysts Maturana and Varela. (shrink)

Bernard Stiegler works systematically through the current crisis in education and family relations resulting from the mesmerizing power of marketing technologies. He contends that the greatest threat to social and cultural development is the destruction of young people's ability to pay critical attention to the world around them. This phenomenon, prevalent throughout the first world, is the calculated result of technical industries and their need to capture the attention of the young, making them into a target audience and (...) reversing the relationship between adults and children. _Taking Care_ exposes the carelessness of these industries and urges the reader to re-enter the "battle for intelligence" against the drive-oriented culture of short-term attention characteristic of the negative aspects of the new technologies. Long-term attention, Stiegler shows, produces retentions of cultural memory mandatory for social development—and for the counteracting of ADD and ADHD. Examining the history of education from Plato to the current quagmires in France and the United States, he tracks the notion of critical thinking from its Enlightenment apotheosis to its current eradication. Stiegler is unique in combining the most radical of theoretical constructs—such as "grammatization"—with quite traditional values, values he proposes we re-address in our not-so-brave new world. (shrink)

Bernard Stiegler interviewed by Ben Roberts, Jeremy Gilbert and Mark Hayward.

Le numérique bouleverse les savoirs, et depuis quelques années a émergé le concept de digital humanities (humanités numériques), paradigme à travers lequel les sciences de l’homme et de la société prennent acte de ce devenir. Cet ouvrage, qui s’inscrit évidemment dans cette dynamique, pose cependant en principe que les digital humanities ne sont qu’une dimension de ce qu’il faut appréhender plus largement comme les digital studies, lesquelles concernent toutes les formes de savoirs, théoriques aussi bien que pratiques. Il soutient autrement (...) dit que le numérique constitue une mutation globale des savoirs sous toutes leurs formes (scientifiques, artistiques, politiques, sociaux au sens le plus large, pratiques dans tous les domaines) qui pose des questions épistémologiques fondamentales et radicalement nouvelles. Le contexte géopolitique de cette réflexion — qui a donné lieu à la constitution d’un réseau international par l’Institut de recherche et d’innovation (cf. digital-studies.org) — est l’émergence d’une industrie planétaire des savoirs pour laquelle l’Amérique du Nord tente de constituer ce que l’on appelle désormais un smart power. (shrink)

In 1944 Horkheimer and Adorno warned that industrial society turns reason into rationalization, and Polanyi warned of the dangers of the self-regulating market, but today, argues Stiegler, this regression of reason has led to societies dominated by unreason, stupidity and madness. However, philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century abandoned the critique of political economy, and poststructuralism left its heirs helpless and disarmed in face of the reign of stupidity and an economic crisis of global proportions. New (...) theories and concepts are required today to think through these issues. The thinkers of poststructuralism Lyotard, Deleuze, Derrida must be re-read, as must the sources of their thought, Hegel and Marx. But we must also take account of Naomi Klein’s critique of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School and her account of the ‘shock doctrine’. In fact, argues Stiegler, a permanent ‘state of shock’ has prevailed since the beginning of the industrial revolution, intensified by the creative destruction brought about by the consumerist model. The result has been a capitalism that destroys desire and reason and in which every institution is undermined, above all those institutions that are the products par excellence of the Enlightenment the education system and universities. Through a powerful critique of thinkers from Marx to Derrida, Stiegler develops new conceptual weapons to fight this destruction. He argues that schools and universities must themselves be transformed: new educational institutions must be developed both to take account of the dangers of digitization and the internet and to enable us to take advantage of the new opportunities they make available. (shrink)

Cinematic time -- The cinema of consciousness -- I and we : the American politics of adoption -- The malaise of our educational institutions -- Making (the) difference -- Technoscience and reproduction.

Même si Simondon, comme l'a bien relevé Jean-Hugues Barthélémy dans Penser la connaissance et la technique après Simondon, souligne le rôle de stabilisateur du transindividuel devolu à la technique, il n'analyse pas la dimension intrinsèquement technologique du pré-individuel. C'est pourquoi la religion, que Simondon origine pourtant dans la magie, n'est pas pensée depuis sa constitution profondément technique. Or, cette question revient la où Simondon s'avance du côté de la psychanalyse : la critique simondonienne de cette dernière n'a pas clairement formulé (...) l'objection qu'il faut lui adresser, à savoir qu'elle ne pense pas le role de la technique dans l'individuation, c'est-a-dire dans le désir. Even if Simondon, as Jean-Hugues Barthelemy well noted in Penser la connaissance et la technique apres Simondon (« How one may think knowledge and technique after Simondon » ) , indeed stresses the stabilization part played by the trans-individual granted as it may be to technique, yet the latter never analyzes the intrinsically technological dimension of the pre-individual. That is why religion, which Simondon originates however amid the magical, is no longer thought since its deeply technical constitution. Now such a question goes back to where Simondon moves towards psychoanalysis : the Simondon criticism of the latter never clearly formulated the objection that should be addressed to it, i. e. never taking into thought the part played by technique in individuation, i. e. within desire. (shrink)

Technics and Time 2: Disorientation continues Stiegler's interrogation of prosthetic and ortho-thetic memory in light of the crisis that arises when speed and delay are irreconcilable, the crisis of "human being" itself.

This new translation of four revised radio interviews, conducted in December 2002 at France Culture with Elie During, is the best introduction to Stiegler's Time and Technics series. This collection includes a new interview conducted specially for this volume and an interview with Artpress from 2001. In Philosophising By Accident, Stiegler introduces some of the key arguments about the technical constitution of the human and its relation to politics, aesthetics and economics. He reads philosophical texts from the perspective (...) of his controversial thesis about the three types of memory and speaks about concepts central to his later works, such as synchrony/diachrony, grammatisation and the industrial temporal object. (shrink)

These lectures outline the project of a general organology, which is to say an account of life when it is no longer just biological but technical, or when it involves not just organic matter but organized inorganic matter. This organology is also shown to require a modified Simondonian account of the shift from vital individuation to a three-stranded process of psychic, collective and technical individuation. Furthermore, such an approach involves extending the Derridean reading of Socrates's discussion of writing as a (...) pharmakon, so that it becomes a more general account of the pharmacological character of retention and protention. By going back to Leroi-Gourhan, we can recognize that this also means pursuing the history of retentional modifications unfolding in the course of the history of what, with Lotka, can also be called exosomatization. It is thus a question of how exteriorization can, today, in an epoch when it becomes digital, and in an epoch that produces vast amounts of entropy at the thermodynamic, biological and noetic levels, still possibly produce new forms of interiorization, that is, new forms of thought, care and desire, amounting to so many chances to struggle against the planetary-scale pharmacological crisis with which we are currently afflicted. (shrink)

How I became a philosopher -- To love, to love me, to love us.

Today’s question concerning technology involves asking about both the post-pandemic world and the post-data-economy world, in a situation where resentments and scapegoats are easily generated. We c...

This article addresses the question under what conditions it is still possible to think in today’s era of the Anthropocene, in which the human has become the key factor in the evolution of the biosphere, considering the fact, structurally neglected by philosophy, that thinking is thoroughly conditioned by a technical milieu of retentional dispositives. The Anthropocene results from modern technology’s domination of the earth through industrialization that is currently unfolding as a process of generalized, digital automation, which tends to eliminate (...) reflection and to block any genuine questioning of its own development, producing a state of generalized entropy at all levels—ecological, psychic, social, economic, and, in particular, the noetic or thinking. The radical undermining of the very possibility of thinking and questioning, thought by Martin Heidegger in terms of Enframing, should be understood as a pharmacological situation that calls for a therapeutic reversal of the toxicity of current digital technologies into a remedial instrument for realizing a negentropic turn beyond the Anthropocene and toward the Neganthropocene. This requires that thinking starts to understand itself as caring, i.e., as a taking care of itself by taking care of the technical pharmaka that thoroughly constitute and condition it and that can render human life as noetic life both deeply unlivable and profoundly worthwhile. (shrink)

This article attempts an organological and pharmacological re-interpretation of the later Heidegger’s understanding of modern technology as a provocative mode of revealing of beings, in particular of its central notions of Gestell [enframing] Gefahr [danger], Kehre [turning] and Ereignis [event]. Although these notions in principle allow us to think what is at stake currently in the Anthropocene as the age of total automation, generalized toxicity of the technical milieu and post-truth calling for a radical bifurcation, they need to be reframed (...) and re-imagined in terms of the process of exosomatization issuing from humanity’s original and necessary default of origin and situated within the perspective of entropy and negentropy, both unthought by Heidegger. Only thus will it become possible to really think and take care of what Heidegger called the danger of technology and its turning into the event as the destiny of enframing. This also requires a rethinking of Aristotle’s theory of four causes as it is invoked by Heidegger in his analysis of technology, in particular the efficient and final causes, in terms of what Deleuze called quasi-causality, here understood as the need and the obligation for mortals to make their fault come true, i.e., to make it truly happen or make it advene in truth, out of the experience of the danger as the ordeal of the necessary default. Thus becoming the anti-anthropic cause of anthropic toxicity, humans would restore final causality as quasi-causality and inaugurate, as neganthropos, the bifurcation into the Neganthropocene. (shrink)

This text is an excerpt from the introduction to Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit (Vol. 2) by Bernard Stiegler, translated into English by Daniel Ross © Polity Press, Cambridge 2012.

Aujourd'hui nous vivons un nouveau stade de la longue histoire de l'évolution technique de l'humanité : le stade du capitalisme hyperindustriel. Depuis le XXe siècle, l'homme n'a cessé de vivre les bouleversements des conditions de la temporalité, c'est-à-dire aussi bien de son individuation. Ce nouveau stade induit déjà une profonde transformation de nos existences. Loin de disparaître, l'industrialisation se poursuit et se renforce, elle investit de nouveaux champs, invisibles, qui vont des nanostructures jusqu'aux fondements neurologiques de l'insconscient, en passant par (...) les biotechnologies : les champs de l'hypermatériel, où la matière est toujours déjà une forme, où la forme est toujours déjà une information et où l'" immatériel " apparaît pour ce qu'il est : une fable qui enfume les esprits. Bernard Stiegler formule à nouveaux frais les enjeux des technologies culturelles et cognitives, mais aussi des biotechnologies et des nanotechnologies. Elles ne vont pas sans péril pour l'humanité, pour le " devenir non inhumain " de l'espèce humaine, comme il l'écrit. Demain, l'homme sera-t-il désemparé de lui-même, de sa conscience et de sa libido, ou saura-t-il exister avec les technologies de l'hypermatériel? S'il se laisse subsumer, s'il laisse son désir être capté par les puissantes machines et réseaux qui cherchent déjà à instaurer un psychopouvoir, l'une des conséquences pourrait bien être l'auto-destruction du capitalisme, déjà bien engagé sur cette pente. Bernard Stiegler n'est pas un technophobe. Il n'en est que plus autorisé à nous alerter. (shrink)

1. L'immense régression -- 2. La lec̨on de Greta Thunberg.

In this article, I would like to show that, concerning this era of ubiquitous technology and its teleologics, the stakes concern the constitution of a new milieu of psychic and collective individuation, which is at least as radically new as the writing of language was in its time; second, I attempt to show that what is at stake relates to the way technology changes the télos, that is, the rule of ends which shape the social organization of collective desire as (...) a system of care and remedies; and, third, I argue that this era requires a new libidinal economy, if we admit that there can be no télos without desire. I will argue that new ubiquitous digital networks operating as new technical associated milieus have fundamental effects for symbolic and psychical associated milieus, and thus for new ways of being. (shrink)

Même si Simondon, comme l’a bien relevé Jean-Hugues Barthélémy dans Penser la connaissance et la technique après Simondon, souligne le rôle de stabilisateur du transindividuel dévolu à la technique, il n’analyse pas la dimension intrinsèquement technologique du pré-individuel. C’est pourquoi la religion, que Simondon origine pourtant dans la magie, n’est pas pensée depuis sa constitution profondément technique. Or, cette question revient là où Simondon s’avance du côté de la psychanalyse : la critique simondonienne de cette dernière n’a pas clairement formulé (...) l’objection qu’il faut lui adresser, à savoir qu’elle ne pense pas le rôle de la technique dans l’individuation, c’est-à-dire dans le désir.Even if Simondon, as Jean-Hugues Barthélémy well noted in Penser la connaissance et la technique après Simondon, indeed stresses the stabilization part played by the trans-individual granted as it may be to technique, yet the latter never analyzes the intrinsically technological dimension of the pre-individual. That is why religion, which Simondon originates however amid the magical, is no longer thought since its deeply technical constitution. Now such a question goes back to where Simondon moves towards psychoanalysis : the Simondon criticism of the latter never clearly formulated the objection that should be addressed to it, i.e. never taking into thought the part played by technique in individuation, i.e. within desire. (shrink)

If performativity means that to say stupid things is to do stupid things, then today stupidity is a very large problem, both within and outside philosophy, stemming, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, from a prostitution of the Aufklärung. But understanding stupidity seems almost to require becoming stupid oneself, as evidenced by Derrida's misunderstanding of Deleuze on just this topic, the former failing to grasp that the latter's account is founded on Simondon's theory of individuation, and on the difference between specific (...) individuation and psychic individuation. This failure comes despite the fact that différance itself must be understood as individuation, and thus what both Deleuze and Derrida help us to think, without quite managing to think it themselves, is that stupidity must be understood in terms of that psychic being who is pharmacologically and technologically capable of being disindividuated. (shrink)

This interview is articulated around the following theses: capitalism must first be understood as a « libidinal economy » ; this libidinal economy is exhausted by the hyper-industrialization of contemporary capitalism : industrially treated desire leads to the destruction of desire ; whence the necessity of inventing a new form of public authority which can reactive, stimulate desire. Ecological damage is indeed the consequence of a symbolic poverty, a poverty of the forms of life and practices. The only response to (...) such damage is to propose a genuine ecology of mind. (shrink)

Pour Bernard Stiegler, le revenu universel d’existence est une condition de démarrage d’un processus de transformation bien plus vaste de notre économie à moyen et long terme. Mais ce revenu de base n’est pas suffisant en tant que tel, et peut même s’avérer dangereux si sa mise en place ne sert que de prétexte à l’ uberisation intégrale de la société. Sortir d’une économie entropique, destructrice de l’environnement et de nos singularités, pour construire peu à peu une économie (...) qu’il qualifie à l’inverse de « néguentropique », suppose non seulement un revenu d’existence, mais surtout un revenu contributif et l’extension progressive à toute la population de la possibilité d’accéder au régime des intermittents du spectacle. (shrink)

L’Anthropocène est un « Entropocène », c’est-à-dire une période de production massive d’entropie précisément en cela que les savoirs ayant été liquidés et automatisés, ce ne sont plus des savoirs, mais des systèmes fermés, c’est-à-dire entropiques. Le nouveau critère de redistribution qu’il s’agit de mettre en œuvre dans l’économie du Néguanthropocène doit être fondé sur une capacité de désautomatisation qu’il faut ressusciter.

In this brief essay Stiegler synthesizes his critical approach to Simondon’s philosophy of individuation. He states his debt toward Simondon’s concept of a systemic indeterminacy in the processes of transindividual individuation, and focusses on his underdeveloped intuition concerning the role played by technics in anthropogenic processes. Situating himself in the phenomenological lineage of Husserl through Derrida, Stiegler explains his own “pharmacological” understanding of “technical individuation” as, at the same time, the intrinsic condition of individuation and the inevitable risk (...) of disindividuation defining the political as such. On this basis he critically extends Simondon’s understanding of religion and psychanalysis. This allows him to move beyond the political optimism implicit in Simondon’s “theoretical indecision” concerning the binding power of technical individuation yet relying on his very study of the question of individuation, which “is political through and through.”. (shrink)

Ours is an age of general automation. The factory that produced proletarians now extends to the biosphere; consequently, disautomatization is needed, which is the real meaning of autonomy. Autonomy and automatism must be reconceived as a composition rather than an opposition. Knowledge depends on hypomnesic automatisms that open up the possibility of what Socrates called “thinking for oneself”; digitalization thus requires a new epistemology that entails questions of political and libidinal economy. Today, automatization serves the autonomization of technics more than (...) noetic autonomy, but reconceiving the latter necessarily involves reconsidering the meaning and character of desire. Greta Thunberg’s diagnosis of the irresponsibility of the generation before hers exposes the fact that the knowledge necessary to combat the consequences of contemporary technological development has been destroyed. The only possible counter to this irresponsibility lies in the reconstitution of knowledge, understood as the means by which humans struggle against entropy and anthropy. (shrink)

If performativity means that to say stupid things is to do stupid things, then today stupidity is a very large problem, both within and outside philosophy, stemming, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, from a prostitution of the Aufklärung. But understanding stupidity seems almost to require becoming stupid oneself, as evidenced by Derrida's misunderstanding of Deleuze on just this topic, the former failing to grasp that the latter's account is founded on Simondon's theory of individuation, and on the difference between specific (...) individuation and psychic individuation. This failure comes despite the fact that différance itself must be understood as individuation, and thus what both Deleuze and Derrida help us to think, without quite managing to think it themselves, is that stupidity must be understood in terms of that psychic being who is pharmacologically and technologically capable of being disindividuated. (shrink)

This article examines Aby Warburg’s enterprise as an anamnesis, as a question of memory in exosomatisation in relation to the pharmakon. Here the pharmakon is considered as a ‘support’ in relation to questions of ‘care’ and as a therapeutics, prescribing the way by which such a pharmakon can become or remain curative, rather than toxic. The discussion looks at how the pharmakon makes possible the transmission of the condition of knowledge, that is: as a preindividual milieu that contains, retains and (...) re-activates traumatypes, providing opportunities for bifurcations in the future. Warburg’s employment of photographic montage is considered as an exploration of pharmacological possibilities inherent to tertiary retentions and providing the condition for revenance. Such revenance is proposed as the return of the serpent in absentia: as a new form of tertiary retention that today appears as digital tertiary retention. At stake is the libido’s economisation, interactivity and algorithmic governmentality all of which effect the faculties for dreaming, imagination and knowledge. (shrink)

This article examines Aby Warburg’s enterprise as an anamnesis, as a question of memory in exosomatisation in relation to the pharmakon. Here the pharmakon is considered as a ‘support’ in relation to questions of ‘care’ and as a therapeutics, prescribing the way by which such a pharmakon can become or remain curative, rather than toxic. The discussion looks at how the pharmakon makes possible the transmission of the condition of knowledge, that is: as a preindividual milieu that contains, retains and (...) re-activates traumatypes, providing opportunities for bifurcations in the future. Warburg’s employment of photographic montage is considered as an exploration of pharmacological possibilities inherent to tertiary retentions and providing the condition for revenance. Such revenance is proposed as the return of the serpent in absentia: as a new form of tertiary retention that today appears as digital tertiary retention. At stake is the libido’s economisation, interactivity and algorithmic governmentality all of which effect the faculties for dreaming, imagination and knowledge. (shrink)

L’articolo prende in considerazione il peso crescente che gli schermi dei nostri dispositivi di comunicazione di informazioni ed elaborazione di dati stanno acquisendo in quanto “schermi di scrittura”. Tali schermi costituiscono un pericolo per l’esperienza individuale e collettiva, in quanto ridisegnano profondamente i tempi e i ritmi delle attività umane, in primo luogo il lavoro, che diventa una forma di vita che non smette mai di accompagnare le nostre esistenze. Fedele all’idea derridiana di pharmakon, l’autore propone di interpretare dall’interno il (...) concetto stesso di “schermo di scrittura”, nel tentativo di elaborare una nuova “ermeneutica” degli schermi, capace di restituire un senso condiviso e la possibilità di un’esperienza attraverso i nuovi dispositivi e media interattivi. (shrink)