Has history assigned special obligations to Germans that can transcend generation borders? Do the grandchildren of Holocaust perpetrators or the grandchildren of inactive bystanders carry any obligations that are only related to their ancestry? These questions will be at the centre of this investigation. It will be argued that five different models of justification are available for or against transgenerational obligations, namely liberalism, the unique evil argument, the psychological view, a form of consequentialist pragmatism and the community‐based approach. Only two (...) of these models stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Applying the community‐based model leads to the conclusion that young Germans do indeed have indirect, indeterminate, but strict obligations that transcend generation borders. However, it will be argued that only the obligation of compensation can be restricted to Germans. The remaining two Holocaust‐related obligations of prevention and remembrance have to be seen as universal. (shrink)

Triage-like procedures for solving the problems of rationing cannot work. And anyway, why should health- and medical workers carry the can for the economic and political decisions of their managers and our politicians? To foist rationing decisions onto them is a political con-trick, a deliberate attempt to deflect managerial and political responsibility elsewhere. Those on the front line should simply toss a coin; expalin to patients’ friends and relatives that that’s what they’re doing and why; and go public that that's (...) what they're doing. (shrink)

This timely and passionate book is the first to address itself to Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz’s controversial arguments for the limited use of interrogational torture and its legalisation. Argues that the respectability Dershowitz's arguments confer on the view that torture is a legitimate weapon in the war on terror needs urgently to be countered Takes on the advocates of torture on their own utilitarian grounds Timely and passionately written, in an accessible, jargon-free style Forms part of the provocative and (...) timely _Blackwell Public Philosophy_ series. (shrink)

This timely and passionate book is the first to address itself to Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz’s controversial arguments for the limited use of interrogational torture and its legalisation. Argues that the respectability Dershowitz's arguments confer on the view that torture is a legitimate weapon in the war on terror needs urgently to be countered Takes on the advocates of torture on their own utilitarian grounds Timely and passionately written, in an accessible, jargon-free style Forms part of the provocative and (...) timely _Blackwell Public Philosophy_ series. (shrink)

Fulford’s discussion of ‘values-based practice’ as a model for medical ethics is deeply puzzling. First, it remains unclear what exactly he takes values to be or how tyhey can be based in clinical skills. Second, his proposal does not make it clear whose values these are supposed to be. I conclude that his attempt in effect to take the morality out of ethics fails.

This chapter contains section titled: Dershowitz's Argument and the Ticking Bomb Who Tortures? Effectiveness and Time Knowledge and Necessity The Ticking Bomb Scenario: Conclusion.

Can we have a real obligation to the dead, just as we do to the living, or is such a notion merely sentimental or metaphorical? Starting with the example of making a promise, I try to show that we can, since the dead, as well as the living, can have interests, not least because the notion of a person is, in part, a moral construction. ‘The dead’, then, are not merely dead, but particular dead persons, members of something like the (...) sort of ‘transgenerational community’ proposed by Avner de–Shalit. More generally, I argue, we have an obligation to the dead that goes beyond the particularities of promise–making, on account of their role in having made us who we are. I then suggest, though only embryonically, that such obligations may appropriately be discharged by remembering the dead, who they were and what they did. Finally, I consider some possible objections. (shrink)

Getting What You Want? offers a critique of liberal morality and an analysis of its understanding of the individual as a 'wanting thing'.

Has history assigned special obligations to Germans that can transcend generation borders? Do the grandchildren of Holocaust perpetrators or the grandchildren of inactive bystanders carry any obligations that are only related to their ancestry? These questions will be at the centre of this investigation. It will be argued that five different models of justification are available for or against transgenerational obligations, namely liberalism, the unique evil argument, the psychological view, a form of consequentialist pragmatism and the community-based approach. Only two (...) of these models stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Applying the community-based model leads to the conclusion that young Germans do indeed have indirect, indeterminate, but strict obligations that transcend generation borders. However, it will be argued that only the obligation of compensation can be restricted to Germans. The remaining two Holocaust-related obligations of prevention and remembrance have to be seen as universal. (shrink)

In order to illustrate how terms of reference themselves, such as those announced by ‘professional ethics’, delimit and distort moral consideration I start with an extended discussion of how Just War Theory operates to do this; and go on to discuss ‘the power of naming’ with reference to the British attack on Iraq. Having thus situated my approach to the politics of professional ethics in a broader political context I offer a critique of ‘professional’ ethics in terms of what is (...) left out of the moral picture and how in particular political considerations are sidelined. Finally I argue that ‘codes’ of professional ethics are especially insidious. (shrink)

I argue that the family remains integral to neoliberal capitalism. First, I identify two tensions in the neoliberals' advocacy of the traditional family: that the ?family values? advocated run directly counter to the homo economicus of the ?free market?; and the fact that the increasingly strident rhetoric of the family belies its decreasing popularity. The implications of these tensions for how we might think of the family, I then propose, suggest that earlier critiques are worth revisiting for what they have (...) to say about the family?whether in biological or in social form?as a structure of ownership. Finally, I conclude with some embryonic thoughts about the ideological role of that state of affairs in shaping at once our understanding of ?politics? and our politics. (shrink)

I argue that the current popularity of ‘ethics’ in general, and the extension of ‘professional ethics’ in particular, masks an increasingly unethical culture. Furthermore, attempts to codify ethics encourage a rule-governed approach, thus misunderstanding the nature of ethical practice and — whether or not inadvertently — serving to protect the professions from ethical considerations rather than the opposite.

This chapter contains section titled: What is Torture? Dershowitz on Interrogational Torture Why Write about Torture? The Agenda.

A major obstacle in the way of any rationalistic understanding of morality is that the moral ‘ought' obliges action: and on the (neo-)Humean view, action is thought to require affect. If, however, one could show that “ordinary” practical reasons are by themselves action-guiding, then moral reasons – a particular sort of practical reasons – also have no need of desire to “move” us to act. So how does the practical ‘ought' work? To answer that, we need to ask what exactly (...) it is to be ‘guided' by reason in theoretical matters. And then we find that, in fact, theoretical reason is to be understood on the basis of practical reason, and not vice- versa. The argument proceeds by way of the internalism/externalism debate; practical and theoretical contradiction; and a critique of Humean assumptions about motivation. If it is broadly right, then the ground may have been cleared for an understanding of moral obligation as rational obligation, which is the larger thesis I have in view. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(2) 2005: 109-120. (shrink)

Paul Griseri’s generous response to my ‘Against Professional Ethics’1 offers an interesting point of view and there is much on which we agree. But we continue to differ about the nature of the primacy of morality, the possibility of a ‘general idea of professionalism’ and — perhaps — about Kant’s Categorical Imperative.

One way of characterising the present political conjuncture - worldwide, not just in Europe and North America - is to point to the rise to power of politicians best described as demagogues. Trump, Duterte, Putin, Modi, as well as the leaders of Europe's neo-fascist racists have in common not just certain policies and attitudes, but, significantly, a political style: that of the demagogue. Thinking through that term, ‘demagogue', is instructive in helping us to understand this phenomenon, no less historically than (...) politically. (shrink)

What is immediately striking about the general problem of how to allocate resources equitably is that although the task cannot be done, it nevertheless requires to be done. Imperfection is the most we can hope for. But of course some instances of imperfection are considerably worse than others: and those evidenced in all too much of the thinking of medical specialists, whether in the current discussion concerning cancer care or, for instance, by those involved in the management of kidney transplants (...) are frightening in their resolute refusal even to consider, let alone take adequately into account, the impact on the wider polity of their policies and practices. (shrink)

Despite its title, this is an extremely useful book: the first four of its five chapters expound the standard range of theories of practical reasoning more clearly and accurately than one might have thought possible. A measure of Schaubroeck’s authoritative handling of her material is her ability to navigate the peaks, troughs and crevasses of the myriad variations of ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ without inducing either vertigo or fury. Thus she patiently guides the reader through the stupefying obstacles along the route (...) of post-Bernard Williams usages of the terminology as well, it seems to me, as anyone could possibly do. Her specific focus, furthermore, on what she terms—albeit in my view somewhat misleadingly—Humean , Kantian and Platonic variations on a theme enables the reader to see very clearly just what is at stake in the tangled literature on practical reasoning and why it matters. As a guide for the perplexed, then, or for t .. (shrink)

I attempt in this paper to do two things: to offer some comments about recent discussions of the suggested institutionalization of surrogacy agreements; and in doing so, to draw attention to a range of considerations which liberals tend to omit from their moral assessments. The main link between these concerns is the idea that what people want is a fundamental justification (other things being equal, of course) for their getting it. I believe that this idea is profoundly mistaken; yet it (...) is an inevitable consequence of a liberal notion of the individual and liberals' extremely limited conception of harm. My intention, then, is to illustrate how unease about a concrete problem—whether or not surrogacy agreements should be institutionalized—might interact with dissatisfaction about liberal individualism to make clearer what the unease consists in and to suggest why liberal individualism is inadequate as a basis for moral philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Some Clarifications Three Positive Claims about the Consequences of Legalizing Interrogational Torture The Institutionalization of Interrogational Torture A Torturous Society.

This chapter contains section titled: Torture Torture, Death and Interrogation Why No Decent Society Can Torture Torture, the “War on Terror” and Intellectual Irresponsibility But What if Torture Really is the Only Possible Way to Avoid Catast rophe? Two Final Points.

That much goes without saying. What is controversial, however, is how we might understand and respond to these new wars. This book offers a new approach.

A socialist health service cannot be a socialist island in a sea of capitalism, as the record of the British National Health Service shows. Nonetheless, since health is a basic need, it can be a key component of the advocacy of socialism. I propose two central socialist principles. On the basis of these I suggest that a socialist health system would emphasise care rather than service; insist on democratic structures and control of resources; and require the prohibition of private medicine.

In responding to Thomas Magnell's notion of 'collapsing goods', I draw attention to how medical and health ethics practices are not innocent, but political; and to suggest something about their relation to the moral climate. More specifically, I show that to take them as innocent, or as politically neutral, is not only a misunderstanding, but one that is likely to impact on the moral climate as well as being already a reflection of it. Ethics, and the various practices and understandings (...) of health and medical ethics in particular, may well turn out to be collapsing goods. (shrink)