This is identical with the first edition (see 21: 2716) except for the addition of a Supplement containing 5 previously published articles and the bringing of the bibliography (now 73 items) up to date. The 5 added articles present clarifications or modifications of views expressed in the first edition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

"This book is valuable as expounding in full a theory of meaning that has its roots in the work of Frege and has been of the widest influence.... The chief virtue of the book is its systematic character. From Frege to Quine most philosophical logicians have restricted themselves by piecemeal and local assaults on the problems involved. The book is marked by a genial tolerance. Carnap sees himself as proposing conventions rather than asserting truths. However he provides plenty of (...) matter for argument."-Anthony Quinton, Hibbert Journal. (shrink)

Seit beinahe einem Jahrhundert sind Mathematiker und Logiker mit Erfolg bemiiht, aus der Logik eine strenge Wissen­ schaft zu machen. Dieses Ziel ist in einem gewissen Sinn erreicht worden: man hat gelemt, in der Logistik mit Symbolen und Formeln ii. hnlich denen der Mathematik in strenger Weise zu operieren. Aber ein logisches Buch muB auBer den Formeln auch Zwischentext enthalten, der mit Hilfe der gewohnlichen Wort­ sprache iiber die Formeln spricht und ihren Zusammenhang kIar macht. Dieser Zwischentext laBt oft an (...) Klarheit und Exakt­ heit manches zu wiinschen ubrig. In den letzten Jahren nun hat sich bei den Logikem verschiedener Richtungen immer mehr die Einsicht entwickelt, daB dieser Zwischentext das Wesentliche an der Logik ist und daB as darauf ankommt, fUr diese Satze uber Satze eine exakte Methode zu entwickeln. Dieses Buch will die systematische Darstellung einer solchen Methode, der "logischen Syntax", geben (nahere Erlauterungen in der Einleitung, §§ 1, 2). In unserem "Wiener Kreis" und in manchen ahnlich gerich­ teten Gruppen (in Polen, Frankreich, England, USA. und ver­ einzelt sogar in Deutschland) hat sich gegenwartig die Auffassung immer deutlicher herausgebildet, daB die traditionelle meta· physische Philosophie keinen Anspruch auf Wissenschaftlichkeit machen kann. Was an der Arbeit des Philosophen wissenschaft· lich haltbar ist, besteht - soweit es nicht empirische Fragen betrifft, die der Realwissenschaft zuzuweisen sind - in logischer Analyse. Die logische Syntax will nun ein Begriffsgeb8. ude, eine Sprache liefem, mit deren Hilfe die Ergebnisse logischer Analyse exakt formulierbar sind. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) war einer der wichtigsten Vertreter der europäischen Philosophie der Zwischenkriegszeit wie auch der amerikanischen analytischen Philosophie der Nachkriegszeit. Seine frühen Tagebücher, mit deren Edition die Ausgabe seiner Schriften aus dem Nachlass eröffnet wird, bieten einen einzigartigen Einblick in die Motive und Gedanken einer Schlüsselfigur der Philosophie des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts und liefern unerlässliche Informationen zu Entstehung und Hintergrund von Carnaps Werk, aber auch zur (Vor-)Geschichte des Wiener Kreises und des Logischen Empirismus.

APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...) (or premises)." Furthermore, all principles and theorems of inductive logic are analytic, and the entire system is to be constructed by means of symbolic logic and semantic methods. This means that the author confines himself to the formalistic procedures of word and symbol systems. The resulting sentence or language structures are presumed to separate off logic from all subjectivist or psychological elements. Despite the abstractionism, the claim is made that if an inductive probability system of logic can be constructed it will have its practical application in mathematical statistics, and in various sciences. 16-page bibliography. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

"This book is valuable as expounding in full a theory of meaning that has its roots in the work of Frege and has been of the widest influence.

Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of ...

Das Ziel: Konstitutionssystem der Begriffe Das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchungen ist die Aufstellung eines erkenntnismäßig-logischen Systems der ...

In the paper translated here, Carnap and Bachmann shows that the apparently metalinguistic ?extremal' axioms that are added to some axiom systems to the effect that the foregoing axioms are to apply as broadly, or as narrowly, as possible may be formulated directly as proper axioms. They analyze such axioms into four fundamental types, with the help of a concept of ?complete? isomorphism.

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

As a leading member of the Vienna Circle, Rudolph Carnap's aim was to bring about a "unified science" by applying a method of logical analysis to the empirical data of all the sciences. This work, first published in English in 1934, endeavors to work out a way in which the observation statements required for verification are not private to the observer. The work shows the strong influence of Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege.

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

'My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophizing which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language.... The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who (...) are not yet acquainted with them.' -- From the Preface. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A basic system of inductive logic; An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization; A survey of inductive systems; On the condition of partial exchangeability; Representation theorems of the de finetti type; De finetti's generalizations of excahngeability; The structure of probabilities defined on first-order languages; A subjectivit's guide to objective chance.