This unique volume will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence as well as students of Castaneda and Latin American philosophy.

La presente investigación tiene como meta el tratamiento del espacio y del tiempo como objetos de la imaginación en el pensamiento de Leonardo Polo. El tratamiento del espacio imaginado es oportuno en un estudio sobre su filosofía jurídica toda vez que Polo sostiene que es el “lugar” en donde se elabora lo técnico. Así pues, ahí tendría su origen todo ars humano, dentro de los cuales ocuparía un lugar destacado el ars iuris. Los juristas romanos entendían el ius como el (...) “ars boni et aequi”, lo cual indicaría que la jurisprudencia desde antiguo era considerada un arte o técnica. (shrink)

Leonardo Polo sostiene que “en cuanto dianoética la prudencia tiene tres dimensiones: la memoria, la solertia y el consejo. Si falta alguna de estas propiedades la prudencia es imperfecta”. “Esto deja claro el papel de la memoria en la ética y la necesidad de profundizar en sus objetos, pues la memoria es muy importante en el hombre, porque el hombre depende de su pasado y su modo de captar la realidad presente es imposible si no se tiene en cuenta el (...) pasado”. Para acometer esta empresa el presente estudio analiza la teoría de la memoria en el pensamiento de Polo, particularmente sus objetos. Se busca con esto completar otros estudios sobre el conocimiento sensible encaminados a elaborar una reflexión filosófica sobre lo jurídico, lo cual es indudablemente un quehacer ético. (shrink)

This book consists of a series of papers "read and discussed at the first Symposium of Exact Philosophy" at Montreal in 1971. "Exact philosophy," the editor says, means "mathematical philosophy, i.e., philosophy done with the explicit help of mathematical logic and mathematics." Judging from the contents, a more accurate statement would be that "exact philosophy" means formal semantics and modal logic. Two thirds of the papers are on these topics. The others include an essay on "Concepts of Randomness" by Peter (...) Kirschenmann; a characteristically difficult paper on "Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations" by Hector Castañeda; a somewhat inexact discursus on "Foundations as a Branch of Mathematics" by William Hatcher with a reply by Charles Castonguay; and a paper by Raimo Tuomela on "Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws", or, more exactly, on Ohmer’s discussion of that topic. The subject’s are highly specialized and their treatment is complex. In addition to those mentioned, other essays are "Matters of Relevance" by Hugues Leblanc, with an answer by Brian Chellas; "Translation and Reduction" by Lars Svenonius; "A Program for the Semantics of Science" by Mario Bunge; "S-P Interrogatives" by Nuel Belnap; "The Logic of Conditional Obligation" by Bas C. Van Frassen with commentary by Harry Beaty; and "The Intuitive Background of Normative Legal Discourse and Its Formalization" by Carlos E. Alchourron.—M.H. (shrink)

Roderick Chisholm has proposed a novel theory of reference and belief involving the undefined notion of directly attributing a property. He uses direct attribution to account for Castañeda’s “he, himself” puzzle and for beliefs de re. He affirms as an axiom of his theory principle P1: if x directly attributes z to y, then x is identical to y. I shall argue that principle P1 is defective in that it prevents the identification of x with y and thus renders Chisholm’s (...) theory incapable of expressing a wide range of psychological phenomena. Thus the theory is an inadequate model of psychological reality. (shrink)

In replying to my criticism of his interpretation of this passage, Professor H-N. Castañeda has disregarded much of my argument. In particular, he has ignored my contention that a contrast between 'essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication is integral to the wider argument for immortality in which Phaedo 102b-d is embedded. This would remain the case whatever the grammar of 102b-c, and whatever the exact force of πεφυxέναι and τυγχάνει at 102c1-2. Further, Castañeda pays no heed to the difficulty of interpreting Plato's (...) other relational examples in his way, given that no analysis parallel to that of 102b-d is anywhere hinted at for them. Moreover, he disregards the difficulty that several other examples in the nearby context are analysed in terms of the Theory of Forms, and yet are not overtly ‘relational’ in the usual sense at all.Castañeda says that it is ‘clear’ from my own translation of several passages that τυΥχάνει in the Phaedo ‘has nothing to do with accident.’. (shrink)

In replying to my criticism of his interpretation of this passage, Professor H-N. Castañeda has disregarded much of my argument. In particular, he has ignored my contention that a contrast between 'essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication is integral to the wider argument for immortality in which Phaedo 102b-d is embedded. This would remain the case whatever the grammar of 102b-c, and whatever the exact force of πεφυxέναι and τυγχάνει at 102c1-2. Further, Castañeda pays no heed to the difficulty of interpreting Plato's (...) other relational examples in his way, given that no analysis parallel to that of 102b-d is anywhere hinted at for them. Moreover, he disregards the difficulty that several other examples in the nearby context are analysed in terms of the Theory of Forms, and yet are not overtly ‘relational’ in the usual sense at all.Castañeda says that it is ‘clear’ from my own translation of several passages that τυΥχάνει in the Phaedo ‘has nothing to do with accident.’. (shrink)

H´ector-Neri Casta˜neda-Calder´on (December 13, 1924–September 7, 1991) was born in San Vicente Zacapa, Guatemala. He attended the Normal School for Boys in Guatemala City, later called the Military Normal School for Boys, from which he was expelled for refusing to fight a bully; the dramatic story, worthy of being filmed, is told in the “De Re” section of his autobiography, “Self-Profile” (1986). He then attended a normal school in Costa Rica, followed by studies in philosophy at the University of San (...) Carlos, Guatemala. He won a scholarship to the University of Minnesota, where he received his B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952), and Ph.D. (1954), all in philosophy. His dissertation, “The Logical Structure of Moral Reasoning”, was written under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. He returned to teach in Guatemala, and then received a scholarship to study at Oxford University (1955–1956), after which he took a sabbatical-replacement position in philosophy at Duke University (1956). His first full-time academic appointment was at Wayne State University (1957– 1969), where he founded the philosophy journal Noˆus (1967, a counter-offer made to him by Wayne State to encourage him to stay there rather than to take the chairmanship of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania). In 1969, he moved (along with several of his Wayne colleagues) to Indiana University, where he eventually became the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy and, later, its first Dean of Latino Affairs (1978–1981). He remained at Indiana until his death. He was also a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin (1962–1963) and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1981–1982). He received grants and fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation (1967–1968), the T. Andrew Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Science Foundation. He was elected President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1979– 1980), named to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1990), and received the Presidential Medal of Honor from the Government of Guatemala (1991). Casta˜neda’s philosophical interests spanned virtually the entire spectrum of philosophy, and his theories form a highly interconnected whole.. (shrink)

A dix ans d’intervalle deux déontciens de premier plan, G.H. von Wright et H.N. Castañeda, ont abordé -indépendamment l’un de l’autre- le probleme du fondement des normes et des énoncés normatifs. Leurs solutions respectives méritent d’être attentivement examinées. Ne prêtent-elles pas a discussion? Pour qu’une norme juridique soit fondée, suffit-il qu’elle soit édictée par un législateur compétent conformément a la procédure législative en vigueur? Un énoncé nornlatif est-il fondé du moment que l’ordre en faisant partie est légitimé au sens conféré (...) a ce terme par l’auteur de Thinking and doing? Et tout d’abord peut-on admettre que les ordres fassent partie des énoncés nomlatifs? L’article qui suit essaie de répondre à ces questions et aux questions connexes. (shrink)

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 (...) and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning. (shrink)

Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with unspecific terms. In Experiments (...) 2 and 3, we used the same problems as in Experiment 1 but also problems with unspecific terms in the conditional and specific terms in the categorical and vice versa. When the conditional and the categorical had the same specificity, results were as in Experiment 1. When the specificity of the conditional and the categorical mismatched, acceptance ratings were lower. Our results illustrate the importance of phrasing on reasoning. (shrink)

No es posible una comprensión integral del influyente pensamiento de Anselmo de Canterbury (1033-1109) sin incluir su concepción de la verdad. La articulación entre la famosa demostración de Dios en el "Proslogion" con sus ideas acerca de la libertad en su "Tratado sobre la libertad del albedrío", mediadas por sus planteamientos sobre el origen y el significado del mal en su "Tratado sobre la caída del demonio", requiere centrarse en la presente obra. La presente edición está acompañada de una serie (...) de ensayos sobre el problema de la verdad en la Antigüedad y en la Edad Media que pasa por Aristóteles, Agustín de Hipona, Boecio, Dionisio Areopagita, Tomás de Aquino, Ockham y otros. (shrink)

Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductively. But it is still not clear how people reason with unfamiliar conditionals when they are instructed (...) to reason as in daily life. Can probabilities also predict reasoning with unfamiliar content? In two experiments we instructed participants to reason as in everyday life and to evaluate conclusions from familiar and unfamiliar conditionals. Results showed that reasoning with familiar conditionals can be predicted by the conditional probability. For unfamiliar conditionals, however, this was not the case. Conclusions from unfamiliar conditionals were accepted more strongly than what could be expected according to their conditional probability. Our findings challenge probabilistic theories of reasoning and suggest that other approaches, such as a dual-strategy model, describe our results more adequately. (shrink)

Here are crucial data for any theory of the self, self-consciousness or the structure of experience. We discuss the fundamental structure of both indexical reference, especially first-term reference, and quasi-indexical reference, used in attributing first-person reference to others. Chisholm's ingenious account of direct awareness of self is tested against the two sets of data. It satisfies neither. Chisholm's definitions raise serious questions both about philosophical methodology and about the underlying ontology of individuation, identity, and predication. Chisholm's adverbial account of non-physical (...) contents of consciousness is also examined; several questions are raised about the possible success of the linguistic technique of ontological reduction by hyphenation and creation of grammatical devices. (shrink)

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide (...) on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

En la abundante historiografía del siglo XIX mexicano hay varias explicaciones sobre las causas del colapso económico y se distinguen tres etapas: un periodo de muy bajo crecimiento entre 1820 y 1850, un periodo de retroceso absoluto entre 1850 y 1870 y finalmente una recuperación moderada a partir de la década de 1870. Una forma de articular coherentemente todas estas explicaciones consiste en poner el énfasis en la cuestión fiscal, aprovechando algunas novedades teóricas que arrojan nuevas luces sobre discusiones añejas. (...) Así se abona a la discusión sobre la formación del Estado mexicano y su relación con el desarrollo económico. (shrink)

A través del siguiente artículo presento algunas ideas acerca de la forma en que pienso el ejercicio del terapeuta filosófico. En breves apartados planteo la necesidad de entender que la Asesoría Filosófica se debe acercar a los enfoques propuestos por la teoría general de los sistemas, por lo tanto, es preciso que se conciba su quehacer en términos de integridad y de unidad, tanto disciplinar, como en su práctica terapéutica. Para ello, abordaré aspectos generales que ayuden a comprender algunos problemas (...) de la asesoría filosófica o filosofía clínica, y luego haré una reflexión que invita a pensar, que enfoques de la teoría general de los sistemas, pueden favorecer las prácticas terapéuticas dentro de este nuevo-viejo modo de hacer filosofía. Philosophy and Unity. A Reflection on Philosophical Counseling as a systemic work Throughout the following paper I present some ideas about the way I think of the philosophical therapist’s practice. In short sections I pose the need to understand that Philosophical Counseling is to come closer to the approaches proposed by the general theory of systems, and consequently that it is to conceive its work in terms of integrity and unity, both thas discipline and in its therapeutic practice. To this aim, I will address general aspects that help to understand some problems of philosophical counseling or clinical philosophy. After that I will reflect on how approaches from the general theory of systems might favor therapeutic practices within this both new-fashioned and old-fashioned way to do philosophy. (shrink)

En este artículo revisamos la relación que se establece entre la democracia y el proyecto socialista. Debido a que las democracias actuales son predominantemente representativas de tradición liberal, también analizamos su ideal central: la libertad, en relación con el valor más importante de toda propuesta socialista: la igualdad. Nos referimos a la propuesta de Cornelius Castoriadis de un proyecto de autonomía personal y colectiva que entiende la libertad y la igualdad como propósitos políticos, por lo que la verdadera democracia se (...) identificaría con el socialismo. Palabras clave: Democracia; socialismo; libertad; igualdad; autonomía. Democracy and Socialism? An approach to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposalIn this paper we review the relation between democracy and the socialist project. Since current democracies are predominantly representative and liberal, we also analyze their central ideal, namely, freedom, in connection with the most important value of every socialist proposal, namely, equality. We will refer to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposal, centered on a project of personal and collective autonomy that recognizes both freedom and equality as political purposes, whereby true democracy would be identified with socialism. Keywords: Democracy; socialism; freedom; equality; autonomy. (shrink)

ResumenEn este artículo me propongo realizar una defensa del naturalismo como fundamento metafísico de la ciencia, mostrando para ello que el “nuevo realismo” de Markus Gabriel es otra versión contemporánea del relativismo y del idealismo y a pesar de que Gabriel acepta la distinción fregeana de sentido y referencia, sus implicaciones son explícitamente antinaturalistas. En concreto, la defensa al naturalismo que intento ofrecer aquí es una crítica abierta a las consecuencias antinaturalistas y pseudocientíficas del “nuevo realismo” de Gabriel. Otra manera (...) de comprender este trabajo es mostrar que el naturalismo puede ser una pieza clave para entender la discusión contemporánea entre la ciencia y la pseudociencia.Palabras clave: Gabriel; naturalismo; nuevo realismo; demarcación; ciencia. (shrink)

In recent years, new forms of transnational regulation have emerged, filling the void created by the failure of governments and international institutions to effectively regulate transnational corporations. Among the variety of initiatives addressing social and environmental problems, a growing number of certification systems have appeared in various sectors, particularly agrifood. Most initiatives rely on independent third-party certification to verify compliance with a standard, as it is seen as the most credible route for certification. The effects of third-party audits, however, still (...) need to be empirically investigated. This article provides a critical assessment of the notion of ‘evidence’ which is at the heart of auditing practices. It focuses on the case of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and fieldwork carried out in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of palm oil. In this country, some non-governmental organizations decided to participate in the RSPO in order to use this platform to tackle the issue of land conflicts. They managed to include important clauses regarding indigenous and land rights in the RSPO standard. In practice, however, auditors rarely recognize as valid evidence the forms of proof put forward by local communities. As a result, the whole process risks compounding local power imbalances. (shrink)

Hacer un recorrido por las influencias que recibió la obra de Georg Lukács de los dramaturgos Ibsen, Strindberg y Shakespeare. Ver que los inicios de su rechazo hacia la burguesía, los primeros conatos de aspectos revolucionarios y la posterior inclinación hacia la estética vienen marcados desde esta temprana influencia que ejercieron sobre él los dramaturgos antes nombrados. Destacar de manera clara los giros dados por Lukács a lo largo de su vida intelectual. La cual desde luego estuvo marcada por la (...) influencia en las respectivas épocas por autores diferentes. hacer énfasis en los aspectos más destacados de la influencia recibida: la teoría del reflejo, la periodicidad, el dinero, la singularidad privada, la soledad, la relación del público con el drama etc. (shrink)

Este artigo se inicia com a declaração de Díez e Moulines, segundo a qual é preferível dizer ‘família semanticista’ e não ‘concepção semanticista’, desde que, entretanto, os membros dessa família partilhem uma estratégia modal de apresentação e análise das teorias e, claro, de problemas metafóricos ligados a eles, ainda, entre eles não deve haver qualquer unanimidade em relação à natureza dos modelos. O estruturalismo, por exemplo, pensa os modelos como estruturas de conjunto teórico , enquanto para van Fraassen elas são (...) ‘pontos’ ou ‘trajetórias em fase de espaço’. Assim, o objetivo do presente trabalho consiste em pesquisar como é considerada a noção de modelo nesses dois membros da família semanticista, a despeito de sua relação em sua formulação inicial This article begins with the statement of Díez and Moulines, in which it is preferable to say ‘semanticist family’ and not ‘semanticist conception’, since, even though, the members of this family share a modal strategy of presentation and analysis of the theories and, of course, of metatheoric problems linked to them, also, between them there is no unanimity in relation to the nature of the models. Structuralism, for example, thinks in the models as structures of theory set , while for van Fraassen are ‘points’ or ‘trajectories in space phase’. Therefore, the aim of this paper consists to research how in these two members of semanticist family is assumed the notion of model, despite its relationship in its initial formulation. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo discuto la consistencia que elargumento de la inferencia a la mejor explicación ofrece al realismo, en particularal realismo científico. Mi trabajo está dividido endos partes. En la primera, trataré de explicar lasvirtudes del realismo, relacionándolo con la IME.En otras palabras, expondré los argumentos de porqué la IME es importante para el realismo científico.Adicionalmente mencionaré algunas definicionessobre teorías de la verdad para justificar cuál deellas es la más afín al realismo en general; y mereferiré a las diferencias (...) que existen sobre losdistintos niveles de realismo para mostrar que,por lo menos, uno de ellos puede ser compatiblecon una postura antirrealista, que en últimas esla que voy a defender. En la segunda, mostrarétres réplicas que se le pueden hacer a la IME si lointerpretamos como un razonamiento distintivodel realismo científico. El primer reparo es que losrealistas científicos incurren en un error categorialcuando hablan de términos observacionales yentidades teóricas; el segundo es que la IMEconstituye una petición de principio, siempre ycuando se use como un argumento realista; y latercera objeción consiste en mostrar que la IMEno es genuinamente un argumento exclusivo delrealismo científico ya que puede ser compatible conposturas empiristas o instrumentalistas.In this paper I try to discuss the consistencyargument that the inference to the best explanation offers to realism, in particular toscientific realism. My paper will be divided in twoparts. In the first one, I try to explain the virtuesof realism, relating it to IBE. In other words, I willdiscuss the arguments of why IBE is important forscientific realism. I also mention some definitionson theories of truth to justify which one is moreakin to realism in general. In addition, I will focuson the differences of various levels of realism toshow that, at least one of them may be compatiblewith an anti-realist position, which ultimately iswhat I defend. In the second part, I offer threereplies that can be given to IBE if we interpret it asan argument typical of scientific realism. The firstobjection is that scientific realists make a categorymistake when they talk about observation termsand theoretical entities, the second is that IBE turnsout to be a petitio principii, provided it is realisticto use it as an argument, and the third objection isthat IBE is not genuinely an argument exclusive ofscientific realism, since it may also be compatiblewith empiricist or instrumentalist views. (shrink)

El texto analiza algunas de las propuestas que las agencias internacionales más directamente relacionadas con el sector educativo han ofrecido a fin de afrontar las situaciones creadas por la pandemia de covid-19 y reactivar la educación en condiciones similares, o al menos comparables, a las que se encontraba antes de pandemia. A partir de ese análisis, se trazan conexiones entre las agendas educativas, políticas y económicas que enmarcan las respuestas actuales en términos de mediciones, evaluaciones e inversión de recursos y (...) tiempos. Al cierre, despejadas algunas dudas y aclaradas algunas decisiones, se toma distancia frente a las estrategias sugeridas por los organismos multilaterales, y se les ve desde una perspectiva que hace énfasis en las personas y las comunidades, antes que en los sistemas y en el comercio de datos, para sacar conclusiones que permitan repensar las direcciones en las que las acciones han de apuntar. (shrink)