The basic idea of the particular way of understanding mental phenomena that has inspired the "cognitive revolution" is that, as a result of certain relatively recent intellectual and technological innovations, informed theorists now possess a more powerfully insightful comparison or model for mind than was available to any thinkers in the past. The model in question is that of software, or the list of rules for input, output, and internal transformations by which we determine and control the workings of a (...) computing machine's hardware. Although this comparison and its many implications have dominated work in the philosophy, psychology, and neurobiology of mind since the end of the Second World War, it now shows increasing signs of losing its once virtually unquestioned preeminence. Thus we now face the question of whether it is possible to repair and save this model by means of relatively inessential "tinkering", or whether we must reconceive it fundamentally and replace it with something different. In this book, twenty-eight leading scholars from diverse fields of "cognitive science"-linguistics, psychology, neurophysiology, and philosophy- present their latest, carefully considered judgements about what they think will be the future course of this intellectual movement, that in many respects has been a watershed in our contemporary struggles to comprehend that which is crucially significant about human beings. Jerome Bruner, Noam Chomsky, Margaret Boden, Ulric Neisser, Rom Harre, Merlin Donald, among others, have all written chapters in a non-technical style that can be enjoyed and understood by an inter-disciplinary audience of psychologists, philosophers, anthropologists, linguists, and cognitive scientists alike. (shrink)

As a new field, cognitivism began with the total rejection of the old, traditional views of language acquisition and of learning ─ individual and collective alike. Chomsky was one of the pioneers in this respect, yet he clouds issues by excessive claims for his originality and by not allowing the beginner in the art of the acquisition of language the use of learning by making hypotheses and testing them, though he acknowledges that researchers, himself included, do use this method. The (...) most important novelty of Chomsky's work is his idealization of the field by postulating the existence of the ideal speaker-hearer and his suggestion that the hidden structure of sentences is revealed by studying together all sentences that are logically equivalent to each other. This is progress, but his tests of equivalence are insufficient, as they all are within classical logic. This limitation rests on the greatest shortcoming of Chomsky's view, his idea that every sentence has one subject or subject-part, contrary to the claim of Frege and Russell that assertions involving relations (with two-place predicates) are structurally different from those involving properties (with one-place predicates). (See the Appendix below.). (shrink)

Philosophers in the tradition of Berkeley say that the first step in gaining knowledge from perception is to report or describe one's perceptual data, or that which one sees ‘immediately'. Further, perceptual data are existing things of some sort, and always are exactly as they appear to be since, as H. H. Price says, “in the sphere of the given … what seems, is”. However, these two claims about perceptual data are sometimes incompatible, as the following case shows. Suppose a (...) man looking at a speckled hen reports that it has many speckles but is not able to report the exact number of speckles it has. If above is correct, the man's perceptual datum, as opposed to the physical hen itself which he sees—according to Berkeleians—in a merely indirect sense, would have to be indeterminate in character. Yet we assume that everything which exists ) is and has to be completely determinate. A person's knowledge is indeterminate if he knows that the planet Mars has either two or three satellites and doesn't know which. But Mars itself at any moment has to have some definite number of satellites. (shrink)

Abstract Is it plausible to claim (some) non?human animals have beliefs, on the (non?behaviourist) assumption that believing is or involves subjects? engaging in practical reasoning which takes account of meanings? Some answer Yes, on the ground that evolutionary continuities linking humans with other animals must include psychological ones. But (1) evolution does not operate?even primarily?by means of continuities. Thus species, no matter how closely related (in fact, sometimes even conspecifics) operate with very different adaptive ?tricks'; and it is plausible to (...) think these, rather than the physiological ?groundings? underlying them, are the best means of (analogies for) explaining beliefs. Also (2) it is reasonable to assimilate most cases ?down? to creatures (e.g. flies) that obviously lack beliefs rather than ?up? to others (chimpanzees) that apparently possess belief?like states (proto?beliefs), because observation shows the internal workings of such middle animals? ?beliefs? differ markedly from the corresponding things humans do. For example, ducks do not have beliefs about the numbers of objects, because although they estimate numerically, they do it in a way that is much more firmly connected to perceiving than would be the case either with counting or a counting?like process. (shrink)

What holds together the various fields, which - considered together - are supposed to constitute the general intellectual discipline that people now call cognitive science? Some theorists identify the common subject matter as the mind, but scientists have not been able to agree on any single, satisfactory answer to the question of what the mind is. This book argues that all cognitive sciences are not equal, and that rather only neurophysiology and cultural psychology are suited to account for the mind's (...) ontology. (shrink)

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Contrary to what many philosophers believe, Calvinism neither makes the problem of evil worse nor is it obviously refuted by the presence of evil and suffering in our world. Or so most of the authors in this book claim. While Calvinism has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years amongst theologians and laypersons, many philosophers have yet to follow suit. The reason seems fairly clear: Calvinism, many think, cannot handle the problem of evil with the same kind of plausibility as other (...) more popular views of the nature of God and the nature of God's relationship with His creation. This book seeks to challenge that untested assumption. With clarity and rigor, this collection of essays seeks to fill a significant hole in the literature on the problem of evil. (shrink)

Acculturation is the process through which an individual's cultural behaviors and values change via contact with a majority or host culture. Although some individuals accomplish acculturation smoothly, most experience psychological stress during the acculturation process. When psychologists encounter individuals struggling to acculturate, they are mandated by ethical guidelines and principles to help through several steps: (a) recognize their own biases, beliefs, and attitudes that may influence their work with the acculturating individual; (b) develop competence to work with individuals whose cultural (...) beliefs and practices differ from their own; (c) counsel the acculturating individual using scientifically supported techniques; and (d) intervene without discrimination or disrespect. Two case studies are presented to illustrate how psychologists can ethically and effectively encourage mentally healthy acculturation. Keywords: acculturation, ethics, cultural differences. (shrink)

In C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, I took the con in a debate with Victor Reppert about the soundness of Lewis’s famous “argument from reason.” Reppert then extended his argument in an article for Philosophia Christi; this article is my reply. I show that Reppert’s argument fails for three reasons. (1) It “loads the die” by falsely assuming that naturalism, by definition, can't include mental causation "on the basic level." (I provide multiple examples of naturalist theories of (...) mind that do exactly that). (2) Physical processes can reliably produce true beliefs. And (3) reasoning isn’t necessarily mental. (shrink)

BackgroundRobust ethics consultation services cannot be sustained by all hospitals; consultative service from a high-volume center via teleconferencing is an attractive alternative. This pilot study was conceived to explore the feasibility and understand the practical implications of offering such a service.MethodsHigh-definition videoconferencing was used to provide real-time interaction between the rounding clinicians and a remote clinical ethicist. Data collection included: (1) evaluation of the hardware and software required for teleconferencing, and (2) comparison of ethics trigger counts between the remote and (...) on-site ethicist during rounds.ResultsIssues with audio represented the majority of technical problems. Once technical difficulties were addressed, the onsite ethicist’s count of “triggers” was not statistically different from the count of the remote ethicist.ConclusionRemote clinical ethics rounding is feasible when the equipment is optimized. Remote ethicists can identify similar numbers of “triggers” for possible ethical issues when compared to on-site ethicist numbers. (shrink)

The Handbook of the Study of Play brings together, in two volumes, thinkers whose diverse interests at the leading edge of scholarship and practice define the current field. Because play is an activity that humans have shared across time, place, and culture, and in their personal developmental timelines - and because this behavior stretches deep into the evolutionary past - no single discipline can lay claim to exclusive rights to study the subject. Thus, this handbook features the thinking of evolutionary (...) psychologists; ethologists and biologists; neuroscientists; developmental psychologists; psychotherapists and play therapists; historians; sociologists and anthropologists; cultural psychologists; philosophers; theorists of music, performance, and dance; specialists in learning and language acquisition; and playground designers. Together, but out of their varied understandings, the incisive contributions to The Handbook of the Study of Play take on vital questions of educational policy, literacy, fitness, the role of play in brain development, spotaneity and pleasure, well-being and happiness, fairness, and the fuller realization of the self. These volumes also comprise an intellectual history, offering retrospective looks at the great thinkers who have made possible the modern study of play. -- from back cover. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called countless counterfeits. The countless counterfeits fallacy occurs when one argues that the fact that there is an abundance of unreliable evidence for a conclusion is a good reason to think there is reliable evidence for that conclusion. A countless number of counterfeit pieces of evidence are seen as a good reason to think that some such evidence is legitimate. In the Townsend article, Kreeft suggests that an abundance (...) of counterfeit ghost sightings “strongly argues for” the existence of real ones. Indeed, this fallacy is committed most often in discussions regarding what James Randi calls “flim‐flam” (i.e., pseudoscience and the paranormal). It's utilized to defend belief not only in ghosts, but in UFOs, demons, alternative medicine, and even conspiracy theories. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, “confirmation bias”. Confirmation bias is the human tendency only to look for evidence that confirms what one wants to believe or what one already thinks is true. Usually people are not too keen to look for evidence against what they want to believe is true. The human propensity for self‐delusion is strong. When one is confronted with sufficient evidence against some belief that one holds, what one should do (...) is reject that belief ‐ at least if one is concerned with truth. When we surround ourselves with people and views that already agree with our own, we can draw erroneous conclusions. Confirmation bias greatly hinders one's ability to find the truth. Confirmation bias and evidence denial is why we start “seeing something everywhere” once you learn about it. The more scrutiny a belief can withstand, the more likely it is that it's true. (shrink)

One commits the availability error when one pays attention to, or is compelled by, the readily available evidence – the evidence that is obvious, memorable, or psychologically compelling – instead of taking into account all the evidence or the reliable evidence. This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called availability error. The availability error contributes to confirmation bias, the tendency to only pay attention to the evidence that confirms what we believe and ignore the evidence (...) that doesn't. The availability error also encourages other fallacies, such as hasty generalization – where you generalize about an entire group based on a statistically insignificant portion of that group. In fact, memory is especially susceptible to the availability error because we are apt to remember only what is memorable, and that is often only what is psychologically compelling. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'mystery, therefore magic fallacy' (MTM). One commits the (MTM) when one takes the fact that one cannot find a “natural” or “rational” explanation for some event or thing as a reason to favor or to accept a magical, supernatural, or fantastic explanation for that event or thing. This fallacy gets its name from the fact that we instinctually avoid it every time we watch a good magic show. (...) MTM is very common in religious circles since “God did it” is often the religious supernatural explanation of choice. In fact, MTM is simply another way of committing the appeal to ignorance fallacy. When committing MTM, one simply takes one's inability to prove there is a natural explanation (by finding one) to be a good reason to conclude there is not one. (shrink)

Some Saturday Night Live (SNL) religion sketches are relatively harmless. Sears pulled their advertising from NBC's online posting of the sketch and Jim Baker argued that it was the “most blasphemous skit in SNL history.” Actor Pat Boone, who starred in the film, objected to the SNL parody, equating it to an attack on God and suggesting that the writers had earned themselves a place in hell. SNL was birthed into existence in conflict with religion. That conflict came to a (...) head on October 3, 1992 when Sinead O'Connor – after singing an acapella version of Bob Marley's “War” – held up a picture of Pope John Paul II, sang the word “evil,” tore the picture to shreds, and shouted “Fight the real enemy!”. The Republic is essentially one long argument that it's better to be like O'Connor because being virtuous comes with its own internal reward that far outweighs the reward of public recognition. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: the constructive nature of human perception. Many of the things that we believe are generated by our senses interacting with the outside world. Our brains make decisions about what information to interpret and how to do so mostly based on our assumptions, preconceptions, and desires. An assumption that informs how we interpret the information that our brain receives is that the size, color, and shape of objects is constant. (...) This allows us to perceive an object the same way even if how we are seeing it is changing. There are of course countless visual illusions that demonstrate this fact. This is why science has proved to be such a powerful tool in understanding the world; it is designed specifically to guard against the way our senses can lead us astray. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'Galileo gambit'. Perhaps the best way to describe the fallacy is as an association fallacy or a faulty analogy. The Galileo gambit fallacy is committed by those theories that contradict the mainstream scientific consensus. The Galileo gambit is often used to suggest that science is not open to criticism, but nothing could be further from the truth. No one is more open to criticism than the scientist; that (...) is how we make sure we are not wrong and get closer to the truth. Persons who are making the Galileo gambit in recent times are Rupert Sheldrake and his morphic resonance/fields, Bigfoot believers, UFO enthusiasts, creationists, conspiracy theorists of all stripes, and people who deny climate change. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the suppressed evidence. This fallacy is as simple as it seems: one commits the fallacy when one presents evidence or an argument for a position but leaves out (or suppresses) relevant evidence that would weaken or show false one's conclusion. Suppression of evidence is commonly found in the (mis)presentation of statistics. Suppression of evidence is most common among conspiracy theorists. The fallacy of suppressing the evidence can come (...) from left, right, or center. According to The Skeptics Dictionary, scientists sometimes do it, reporters do it, and pretty much everybody does it now and again. It is an extremely effective way to make one's argument appear stronger than it is. But those interested in the truth should always present all the evidence they can, regardless of whether it hurts or hinders what they want to believe. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'anthropomorphic bias'. One displays an anthropomorphic bias when one displays a tendency to ascribe humanlike characteristics, usually mental properties or agency, to things that do not have it. One is guilty of the anthropomorphic bias, however, when one stretches this kind of reasoning too far – when one sees a single or limited number of things that remind him of humanlike behavior and then jumps to the conclusion that (...) the entity in question possesses a humanlike mind. An example that is a bit more obvious and egregious is when people conclude that ghosts are the cause of unexplained noises or motions. Although this invokes the mystery therefore magic fallacy, it also includes ascribing humanlike agency to something that does not have it: the cause of the noise or motion. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'all or nothing (AON)'. AON presents a false dilemma by suggesting that there are only two options – either all or nothing – when in fact there are many more options in the middle ground between those two extremes. AON also happens in the political arena anytime a politician insists that being against one of the policies is equivalent to being against all of them. Often people adopt (...) a kind of all or nothing attitude when it comes to supporting a candidate or political party. Of course, the argument suggests that gun laws would be completely ineffectual – criminals would still find ways to buy guns. But AON also appears in politics when people are proposing or drafting laws and policy. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: “We Are All Playing Our Parts” “God Has a Plan for You, Gaius” “Out of the Box Is Where I Live” “It's Time to Make Your Choice” Notes.

The people in utopias have many characteristics Abraham Maslow said self‐actualized people have: they're accepting, spontaneous, creative, appreciative of life, honest, responsible, and hardworking; they even maintain deep relationships and have childlike wonder. In Star Trek: Mission Log, Ken Ray defends life under the care of Norman's androids on Mudd's planet as preferable because of its possibilities for self‐actualization. Self‐actualization is impossible unless the basic biological, safety, and social needs are met, all of which the spores and Vaal guarantee. The (...) spores even saved the colonists’ lives. Once one achieves self‐actualization, it's easy to pity those who can't attain it; but for those who struggle just to survive, giving up safety and security for an unlikely chance at self‐actualization would seem crazy. The criticisms of Vaal seem to echo the criticisms of communism, and the control a communist government must exercise in providing for its people. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'proximate causation'. One commits this variety of causal fallacy when one mistakes the relevance of proximate causation. One mistakes the relevance of proximate causation when one thinks the fact that something is a proximate cause makes it irrelevant to the story of how the event in question happened. Mistaking the relevance of proximate causation can also “go the other way”. That is, one can overinflate the importance of (...) something being a proximate cause. This is often done by those looking to avoid responsibility for their actions. Matters of causation are never simple. And sometimes whether something is a proximate cause is relevant to the issue at hand. But we must be careful to make sure that we do not mistake its relevance. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called ' representative heuristic'. A heuristic is a shortcut rule, or guide, by which one tries to organize one's understanding of the world. The representative heuristic is the rule that suggests we should associate things that are alike, grouping them together, usually invoking “the principle that members of a category should resemble a prototype”. A way the representative heuristic leads us astray is by making us apt to think (...) that causes and their effects must resemble each other – that like causes like. This is most striking in the realm of alternative and “natural” medicine, where certain physical qualities of objects are thought to be transferable to those who ingest them. (shrink)

In South Park, Kyle views Cartman's happiness as an evil. Cartman doesn't deserve happiness and his attaining it just isn't right. According to Kyle, the problem is much deeper. Kyle observes that the course of events isn't just unbelievable. Given his worldview—which includes a belief in God—these events are impossible. God, if he exists, is all‐good and all‐powerful, and so he would surely prevent all evil. If we assume, like Kyle, that such a God exists, it would be impossible for (...) Cartman to attain such happiness. Since Cartman's happiness is undeniable, Kyle is forced to revise his worldview and conclude that God doesn't exist. Kyle's argument is a form of the “problem of evil”—more specifically, it is an example of the logical problem of moral evil. The problem centers on the fact that the existence of moral evil—that is, evil caused by human action—seems incompatible with God's existence. (shrink)

A world in which atheism has replaced religion is the dream of Oxford evolutionary biologist and “New Atheist” activist, Richard Dawkins. He thinks that religious belief is irrational superstition that leads to violence (like the inquisition), intolerance (like homophobia), ignorance (like creationism), and corruption (like red hot Catholic love). In fact, in the episode “Go God Go,” it is the cartoon version of Dawkins himself who pioneered the efforts culminating in religion's demise. First, one has to understand what science is. (...) Science is a method for discovering the truth about the world. Many philosophers argue that science and religion are perfectly compatible. Religion is about ethics and meaning, but science is about explaining the way the world works. Religion has led to a lot of violence—the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, witch trials, 9/11, and more. And it's certain that the end of religion wouldn't eliminate all violence. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'subjective validation'. An objective validation of a statement can be accomplished by showing that the statement actually matches up to the way the world is; this can be done by comparing the statement to the world itself. Combined with other mistakes, like confirmation bias and availability error, subjective validation can fool people into thinking that psychics can read their minds, predict the future, or even communicate with the (...) dead. Although the subjective validation of Nostradamus's “predictions” doesn't fuel much else besides silly beliefs in the paranormal, falling prey to subjective validation can be much more costly. The same subjective validation “retrodiction” techniques are also used to interpret the prophecies of the Bible, like those that are supposedly in the Book of Revelation. (shrink)

Some fans have suggested that the titles of the Skywalker Saga films are in the wrong order. Episode VIII: The Last Jedi should've been “A New Hope” ‐since Luke's sacrifice in his battle with Kylo gives Rey and The Resistance a new hope in their struggle against the First Order. In his Two Treatises of Government, Locke argues for a better solution: a separation of religious and political power. Religion should be a private affair; politics and government should be a (...) secular matter. To understand Luke's position, it's important to understand that pacifism is not a call to inaction; when something wrong occurs that could be stopped by violence, the pacifist is not obligated to stand around and do nothing. Especially when it's an act of violence, the pacifist is obligated to stop it. (shrink)

The Good Place is about moral philosophy. But one reason everyone hates moral philosophers is that they think everything is about ethics. When it comes to the Good Place versus Bad Place hypothesis, the big giveaway is simplicity. The Good Place hypothesis doesn't require a grand deception and all the planning that would be necessary to keep it afloat. The Bad Place hypothesis does. The biggest worry about an eternal life in something like The Good Place was made famous by (...) the philosopher Bernard Williams: boredom. Although it might take a while, The Good Place would eventually, and inevitably, turn into The Bad Place. Immortality would become torture. As Williams points out, even though a desire for immorality is irrational, the state of being dead is itself nothing to dread—it's still perfectly rational to want to live a longer life rather than a shorter life. (shrink)