Edgar Bodenheimer emprende una revisi n cr tica de los principales conceptos del derecho, su filosof a y su historia, poniendo especial atenci n en aquellos problemas vinculados con las luchas pol ticas y sociales que marcaron un momento clave en la historia de nuestra modernidad.

Discusses the nature and functions and philosophical foundations of law as well as the central problems of legal method.

From the reviews of the first edition of Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (Harvard University Press 1962): A profoundly scholarly, clearly written and thoroughly unpretentious contribution to the literature of jurisprudence.

Law has variously been described as part of empirical social reality or as a set of normative prescriptions defining desirable conduct. The author takes the view that a legal system normally represents an amalgam of “is” and “ought” elements. It is operative in part as a living law of actual human conduct, in another part as an instrumentality for transforming unfulfilled social ideals or goals into reality. A different blending of “is” and “ought” factors often occurs in the judicial process, (...) when an application of given legal norms is combined with some injection of law deemed desirable by the judges. (shrink)

This book was written by a lawyer using an interdisciplinary approach in a broad, nontechnical manner.

Alan Turing is often portrayed as a materialist in secondary literature. In the present article, I suggest that Turing was instead an idealist, inspired by Cambridge scholars, Arthur Eddington, Ernest Hobson, James Jeans and John McTaggart. I outline Turing’s developing thoughts and his legacy in the USA to date. Specifically, I contrast Turing’s two notions of computability (both from 1936) and distinguish between Turing’s “machine intelligence” in the UK and the more well-known “artificial intelligence” in the USA. According to my (...) proposed historical interpretation, Turing did not view computations in the real world to be exhaustively and deterministically characterized by his automatic machines from 1936. (shrink)

The literary and scientific renaissance that struck Germany around 1800 is usually taken to be the cradle of contemporary humanism. Posthumanism in the Age of Humanism shows how figures like Immanuel Kant and Johann Wolfgang Goethe as well as scientists specializing in the emerging modern life and cognitive sciences not only established but also transgressed the boundaries of the “human.” This period so broadly painted as humanist by proponents and detractors alike also grappled with ways of challenging some of humanism's (...) most cherished assumptions: the dualisms, for example, between freedom and nature, science and art, matter and spirit, mind and body, and thereby also between the human and the nonhuman. Posthumanism is older than we think, and the so-called “humanists” of the late Enlightenment have much to offer our contemporary re-thinking of the human. (shrink)

This book is a volume in the Penn Press Anniversary Collection. To mark its 125th anniversary in 2015, the University of Pennsylvania Press rereleased more than 1,100 titles from Penn Press's distinguished backlist from 1899-1999 that had fallen out of print. Spanning an entire century, the Anniversary Collection offers peer-reviewed scholarship in a wide range of subject areas.

This chapter contains sections titled: Note.

La mort est ce qui identifie l'homme à l'animal et ce qui l'en différencie. Comme tout être vivant, l'homme subit la mort. A la différence de tout être vivant, il nie la mort dans ses croyances en un au-delà. Edgar Morin dégage les attitudes fondamentales des hommes et des cultures à l'égard de la mort. Il examine l'horreur de la mort, le risque de mort, le meurtre, et les deux grands mythes originaires de la mort : celui de la (...) survie et celui de la renaissance. Il dégage les croyances concernant la mort dans les grandes civilisations historiques pour en arriver à la crise contemporaine de la mort et aux nouvelles conceptions biologiques sur les relations entre vie et mort. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen (b. 1842, d. 1919), more than any other single figure, is responsible for founding the orthodox neo-Kantianism that dominated academic philosophy in Germany from the 1870s until the end of the First World War. Earlier German philosophers finding inspiration in Kant tended either towards speculative, metaphysical idealism, or sought to address philosophical questions with the resources of the empirical sciences, especially psychology. In contrast, Cohen’s seminal interpretation of Kant offered a vision of philosophy that decisively maintained its independence (...) from empirical psychology, without at the same time simply lapsing back into uncritical metaphysics. Cohen brought these attitudes to bear on a wide range of topics, writing systematically about epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, law, political theory, and aesthetics. His anti-psychologism became a defining commitment not only of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, founded by Cohen himself, but of orthodox neo-Kantianism more generally. Indeed, that commitment ultimately defined the philosophical context from which, in the early twentieth century, both phenomenology and logical positivism emerged. No less significant than his influence on academic philosophy, Cohen was his generation’s preeminent German-Jewish public intellectual and religious philosopher. His philosophical ethics and political theory provided the foundation for a non-Marxist, Kantian democratic socialism that informed his more popular and topical writings. He argued publicly for universal suffrage and for the rights of workers to organize democratically-constituted collectives. He also saw deep points of connection between ethics and religion, and developed a view of Judaism as a fundamentally ethical system of belief and practice. He argued that monotheism was the historical source of the idea of universal ethical laws, and thus that Judaism offered the world its first model of a universalist morality. This view of Judaism’s ethical significance ultimately informed Cohen’s public defense of the Jews’ place in Germany not only against anti-Semitic attacks, but also against the arguments of early twentieth-century Zionists. However, Cohen’s influence on Jewish thought extends far beyond debates within Imperial Germany: his late religious writings inspired a broad renewal in twentieth-century Jewish ethics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Edgar Morin livre quelques leçons sur des philosophes qui l’ont marqué. Penseurs de la complexité, de la contradiction, de l’ambivalence, comme Héraclite, Montaigne, Pascal, Hegel. Penseurs universalistes et humanistes incarnant l’esprit « judéo-gentil », tels Spinoza. Penseurs messianiques, tels le jeune Marx. Penseurs de la technique comme Heidegger. Penseurs ayant su exprimer magnifiquement la dialectique de la souffrance et de la joie, tels... Beethoven. Ces leçons sont complétées de quelques réflexions sur la nature même de la philosophie, sur sa (...) place dans l’enseignement, sur son rôle dans la « réforme de pensée » prônée par Edgar Morin. (shrink)

If we consider human thought as the, so far, ultimate, if not supreme, stage in the evolution of life on Earth, we must also try to understand the evolutionary conditions that allowed it to emerge, and that leads us to look again at living organization.Whatever the origins of life (cf. the text of Jacques Reisse, p. 53), it is clear that the oldest living organization, that of a protobacteria, is extremely complex in its functional and complementary association of extremely diverse (...) macro-molecules, and that this complexity includes in particular: a) the organization of exchanges with an environment from which it draws both matter-energy and organization ; b) a permanent process of self-reorganization through the replacing of molecules that have deteriorated and through the production of new ones; c) the organization of the self-reproduction of the creature through division. An organization of this kind includes a quasi-informational dimension (the hereditary message inscribed in the genes and the capacity to extract information from the environment), a quasi-computational dimension (the processing of data, via indices or quasi-signs from the interior and exterior), and a communicational dimension (internal RNA-protein communication and external communication with its congeners). In short, from the beginning, a living being is the product/producer of a self-eco-organization the nature of which is at the same time computational, informational, and communicational. In other words, within every living organization, there is a cognitive dimension, but this cognitive dimension is undifferentiated within it. (shrink)

Nietzsche's Posthumanism explores the continuities and disagreements between Nietzsche's philosophy and contemporary posthumanism. Focusing specifically on Nietzsche's reception of the life sciences of his day and his reflections on technology, Edgar Landgraf provides both fresh readings of Nietzsche and a critique of post- and transhumanist philosophies.

Nos connaissances sur l'humain, sur la vie, sur l'univers, sont en pleine expansion. Elles sont aussi séparées et dispersées. Comment les relier? Comment affronter des problèmes qui sont tout à la fois complexes, fondamentaux, intellectuels et vitaux? Comment nous situer dans l'aventure de la vie et dans celle de l'univers, en tenant compte du fait que l'humain est intérieur à l'univers et que l'univers est intérieur à l'humain? La réponse d'Edgar Morin, avec ce livre, est lumineuse d'intelligence et accessible (...) à tous. L'auteur nous invite, à sa façon, à penser global, c'est-à-dire à considérer l'humanité dans sa nature " trinitaire ", puisque chacun est à la fois un individu, un être social et une partie de l'espèce humaine. L'humanité est emportée dans la course effrénée de la mondialisation : la réflexion d'Edgar Morin nous propose de scruter son avenir et son devenir sans céder aux facilités de l'air du temps ni aux injonctions de l'actualité. (Quatrième de couv.). (shrink)

This book addresses a key issue in Hegel's philosophical legacy - his account of purposiveness and teleology - that has often been wrongly criticised and misunderstood. Its re-examination of the issue has implications for the whole of Hegel's philosophical legacy.