In social and political philosophy, linguistic differences are usually seen as one item in the long and indefinite list of Cultural Differences; consequently, language rights are discussed and criticized together with other cultural rights. In this essay, it is argued that a right to use one's own language can be justified by appeal to the practical role of language in human life. The ability to communicate effectively is essential for human autonomy and well-being; thus there is no need to argue (...) that linguistic groups, as groups, are entitled to special treatment, or that language rights are group rights. Because learning a new language is invariably a costly matter, by recognizing some languages as official languages the state (re)distributes burdens and benefits among its citizens. The task of language rights is to guarantee that these burdens are not distributed in a too unequal way. (shrink)

”Rotu” mielletään usein pelkästään biologiseksi käsitteeksi. Niinpä rasismista syytetyt toisinaan puolustautuvat julkisuudessa sanomalla, että he eivät ole biologisten rotuoppien kannattajia, vaan esimerkiksi vain kannattavat kulttuurien oikeutta olla erilaisia. Historiallisissa yhteyksissä menneiden aikojen ajattelijoita saatetaan puolustaa sillä, että he eivät olleet ainakaan biologisia rasisteja. Erottelun taustalla on olettamus, että biologiaa koskevat ja kulttuuria koskevat käsitykset voidaan ongelmattomasti erottaa toisistaan. Tämän esityksen yhtenä pyrkimyksenä on pohtia biologia vs. kulttuuri -erottelun merkitystä rotua koskevissa käsityksissä, ja problematisoida sitä. Tarkastelun aineistona käytetään 1800-luvun lopun ja (...) 1900-luvun alun vaikutusvaltaisimpia ”klassisia” rotuteorioita. Näitä näkemyksiä luonnehditaan yleensä ”biologisiksi”. Vaikka rotuteorioiden juuria on etsitty antiikista saakka, ja vaikka eri vuosisatojen ajattelijoilta on helppo poimia rotuennakkoluuloja heijastavia kommentteja, tarkasteltuna ajanjaksona laskettiin se teoreettinen perusta, joille esimerkiksi 1930- ja 1940-lukujen rasistiset käytännöt rakennettiin. Harva enää vaivautuu lukemaan tuon aikakauden rotuteoreetikkoja tai edes tunnistaa heidän nimensä: rotuteoriat ovat tyypillistä pseudotiedettä, vailla itsenäistä älyllistä arvoa. Kuitenkin johtavien rotuteoreetikkojen kirjoitukset käännettiin aikanaan useimmille eurooppalaisille kielille, ja niitä myytiin satoja tuhansia kappaleita. Rotuajattelusta tuli liberalismin, sosialismin ja kommunismin kaltainen vaikuttava yhteiskunnallinen virtaus. Sen historiallisesti tunnetuin ilmaus oli Saksan kansallissosialismi, mutta lähes kaikissa Euroopan maissa – ja monissa Euroopan ulkopuolisissa maissa – syntyi paikallisesti värittyneitä versioita rotuopeista. Useimmissa maissa nämä opit syntyivät jo ennen kuin kansallissosialismista tuli Saksan hallitseva ideologia. Yhtäältä rotuopit sekoittuivat vanhempiin, kielellisesti ja kulttuurisesti muotoiltuihin nationalismin versioihin. Toisaalta ne kytkeytyivät usein biologisin käsittein muotoiltuihin ideoihin rodun parantelusta. Silti rotuopit erottuvat käsitteellisesti ja teoreettisesti sekä ”pelkästä” nationalismista että ”pelkästä” rotuhygieniasta. Tämän esityksen muina tavoitteina on pyrkiä muodostamaan historiallisesti ja filosofisesti täsmällisempi käsitys rasismia tukevasta ajattelusta. Samalla rotuopit toimivat kiinnostavana ja varoittavana esimerkkinä politiikan käyttöön valjastetun pseudotieteen argumentaatiotavoista. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the (...) reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory. (shrink)

How do social institutions exist? How do they direct our conduct? The Opposite Mirrors defends the thesis that the existence of institutions is a conventional matter. Ultimately they exist because we believe in their existence, and because they play a role in our practical reasoning. Human action necessarily has an unpredictable aspect; human institutions perform an important task by reducing uncertainty in our interactions. The author applies this thesis to the most important institutions: the law and the monetary system. In (...) his analysis he connects many traditional topics of the philosophy of law, social philosophy and the philosophy of social sciences in a new way. He discusses the nature of rules, authority, and power and analyzes the Hobbesian presuppositions which have been dominant in legal theory and in the economic analyses of the state. The book is written for legal theorists as well as for political and social philosophers, and theoretically oriented social scientists. (shrink)

The theory presented in John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.

The theory presented in John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.

What is the nature of the social reality? How do the major social institutions like money and law exist? What are the limits of individualistically-oriented social theories? These and related problems are intensely discussed in philosophy, in legal theory and in the methodology of social sciences. This collection brings together the different traditions of the contemporary discussions. It includes new and thought-provoking articles by John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Ota Weinberg, Raimo Tuomela, Eerik Lagerspetz, Michael Quante, Maria Cristina Redondo (...) and Paolo Comanducci. (shrink)

What is the nature of the social reality? How do the major social institutions like money or law exist? What are the limits of individualistically-oriented social theories?These and related problems are intensely discussed in philosophy, in legal theory and in the methodology of social sciences. This collection brings together the different traditions of the contemporary discussion. It includes thought-provoking articles by John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Ota Weinberger, Raimo Tuomela, Eerik Lagerspetz, Michael Quante, Cristina Redondo and Paolo Comanducci. -/- (...) ”Wonderful selection of articles that contribute in important ways to the growing field of social ontology... A ’must-have’ for anyone working on issues of social ontology.” Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis. (shrink)

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that practical (...) argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality. (shrink)

This paper explicates some aspects of Hans Kelsen’s defence of democracy. Kelsen’s aim was to formulate a realistic normative alternative to the democratic ideal derived from Rousseau. He provided two, independent arguments for majoritarian democracy. First, the validity of majority principle could be derived from epistemological relativism. Second, majority principle maximized individual liberty. The latter argument is based on Kelsen’s own definition of liberty as a correspondence between an individual will and the ruling norms. This argument could be interpreted as (...) reasoning based on a hypothetical contract. The most important critiques of majoritarian proceduralism are based on the problem of the possibility of democratic self-destruction, the problem of the democratic origins of democracy and the problem of the possibility of permanent majorities. Kelsen had a convincing answer to problems, and. The problem of permanent majorities is more difficult to solve. Ultimately, Kelsen is forced to abandon his purely proceduralistic starting point. (shrink)

Kirjasymposio: Social Choice and Democratic Values – kirjan esittely.

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...) the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)

The All-Affected Principle has an important status in recent theoretical discussions on democracy. According to the principle, all who are affected by a decision should have a right to participate into making it. The principle is supposed to ground the right or optimal boundaries of democratic decision-making units. This paper is basically a critique of the principle. In the first parts of the paper, the All-Affected Principle is distinguished from some related principles. However, even a more precise version of the (...) principle is still troubled by ambiguities. It is argued that Robert Goodin’s expansive reading is the only coherent one. However, if it is accepted, the principle cannot be used for its original purpose. The last parts focus on some largely unexamined aspects of the principle. First, the principle also works as a means of exclusion, not only of inclusion. Second, if, as the principle says, participation rights are based on interests, it is by no means obvious that these rights should be equal. Third, the principle cannot provide us with a non-institutional starting point. Nevertheless, a much weaker form of the principle may be plausible. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is usually, and rightly, considered the foremost representative of the organistic conception of society. It is only natural to think that his view has nothing in common with the kind of individualistic outlook that dominates our legal and political thinking, and that I myself have tried to defend. I try to show why certain insights of Hegel are potentially important even for individualistic legal and political theories. First, I explicate some of the problems he struggled with, (...) and compare his views with those of Thomas Hobbes. Next, I try to link his views to the modern theories of institutions and of collective action. The antidemocratic ideology expressed in the main works of Hobbes and Hegel is clearly outmoded. Nevertheless, in their criticism of popular sovereignty, they posed some important questions. First, how do collectives like the People exist? Second, what do we mean by saying that collectives perform actions? It seems that, in order to perform an action, an entity ought to possess will. But what does it mean that a collective has a will? (shrink)

El concepto de derecho de H. L. A. Hart es un clásico moderno de la teoría jurídica. Pero también es relevante para la filosofía moral y social. En este artículo se argumenta que las críticas de Hart hacia Austin y Bentham, así como sus teorías sobre la naturaleza del derecho, la moral y la coerción, retoman una tradición de pensamiento iniciada por David Hume. Además, la filosofía social de Hart tiene implicaciones normativas interesantes. Este artículo se concentrará en un solo (...) ejemplo: el concepto de libertad. A pesar de que Hart no analiza el concepto de libertad en su libro, el autor sostiene que su análisis del derecho puede ayudarnos a comprender esa noción tan altamente discutida.Abstract:H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law is a modern classic of legal theory. However, it is also relevant to moral and social philosophy. Here, it is argued that Hart’s criticism of Austin and Bentham, and his views on the nature of law, morality and coercion continue the tradition initiated by David Hume. Moreover, Hart’s social philosophy has interesting normative implications. I shall focus on one single example: the concept of liberty. Although Hart does not analyze the concept of liberty in his book, I argue that his analysis of law may help us to understand that highly contested notion. (shrink)

Ajatuksen toimitus on ystävällisesti suonut minulle tilaisuuden vastata Aki Lehtisen ja Kaisa Herneen kirjoituksiin. Vaikka Lehtinen on radikaalimpi sosiaalisen valinnan teorian kriitikko kuin minä, hän on joiltakin osin sitoutunut teorian perusolettamuksiin minua tiukemmin. Käsittelen vastauksessani kolmea näistä. Lisäksi tuon esiin, miksi riippumattomuussääntöä koskevat jatkuvat erimielisyydet eivät nähdäkseni ole vakavin heikkous sosiaalisen valinnan teoriassa; kiistanalaisin peruskäsite on pikemminkin sosiaalisen preferenssi- eli paremmuusjärjestyksen käsite. Kommentoin myös lyhyesti Lehtisen tulkintaa utiliteettien maksimoimisesta. Kaisa Herne tarkastelee omassa esityksessään äänestyssääntöjen valintaa. John Lockea seuraten, päätöksentekijöiden velvollisuus (...) on valita oikeudenmukaisin mahdollinen vaalijärjestelmä. Mahdollisia keskenään yhteensopimattomia oikeudenmukaisuuskriteerejä on kuitenkin hyvin paljon. Herneen käsittelemä ajatus tietämättömyyden verhon takana tehtävästä valinnasta oikeudenmukaisuuden takaajana on modernin yhteiskuntafilosofian keskeisiä oivalluksia. Hänen selostamansa päätöksentekokokeet osoittavat, että tietämättömyyden verhoa ei tarvitse mieltää vain ajatukselliseksi apuvälineeksi. Vaikka empiiriset deliberaatiokokeet ovat tietyllä tavalla vakuuttavampia kuin pelkät ajatuskokeet, ne nähdäkseni ovat alttiita osin samantyyppisille metodologisille ongelmille, joita lyhyesti esittelen vastauksessani. (shrink)

We present an inference to the best explanation of the immense cultural success of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic method. We argue that an account of psychoanalytic facts as products of unintended declarative speech acts explains this phenomenon. Our argument connects diverse, seemingly independent characteristics of psychoanalysis that have been independently confirmed, and applies key features of John Searle’s and Eerik Lagerspetz’s theory of institutional facts to the psychoanalytic edifice. We conclude with a brief defence of the institutional (...) approach against more contentious social constructivist approaches to science and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

"The central aims of this book are (1) to present an overview of the philosophical debate on trust in the last three decades; (2) to address a central issue in that debate, namely, the presumed prima facie conflict between trust and rationality; and (3) in the course of the analysis, to apply a non-essentialist understanding of psychological concepts, as developed in Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. The task is not to judge between different definitions of trust. Instead we need awareness of what (...) is implied in a given case when behaviour is singled out as an instance of trust. To invoke the vocabulary of trust and distrust in human interaction is both to describe it, to take a certain perspective on it and to influence it. This is also true in the philosophical debate itself. The issue of trust has been taken up in response to various theoretical conundrums. A dominant theme is the need to refute scepticism and show why trust can be embraced as a rationally justified pursuit. The author argues that this approach must in the end be self-refuting because it would lose the phenomenon it wants to justify. What emerges is instead a conception of rationality that includes the entire web of practices and ways of thinking that constitute human agency, including our ways of speaking about them. We are always already embedded in relations of dependence, we are ethically committed to each other as beings that trust and receive trust"--Bloomsbury Publishing. (shrink)

This book highlights the recent re-emergence of Edward Westermarck's work in modern approaches to morality and altruism, examining his importance as one of the founding fathers of anthropology and as a moral relativist, who identified our moral feelings with biologically-evolved retributive emotions. Questioning the extent to which current debates on the relationship between biology and morality are similar to those in which Westermarck himself was involved, the authors ask what can be learnt from his arguments and from the criticism that (...) he encountered. Drawing on Westermarck's manuscripts and papers as well as his published work, the authors show the importance of situating debates, whether modern or classical, in their correct methodological and philosophical context. This volume is a rigorous assessment of the ways in which morality is connected with human biological nature. It plays close attention to the development of debates in this field and will appeal to scholars of sociology, anthropology and philosophy. (shrink)

Re-Reading: G.E.M Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy, Vol 33, No. 124 (1958) 1 -33.

Dorothea, an idealistic young lady, is the central figure of George Eliot's Middlemarch . She longs to devote her life to something valuable, looking up to people like St Teresa as her ideal. Contrary to all expectations, she decides to marry Casaubon, an elderly clergyman. For years, Casaubon has been preparing his magnum opus called ‘Key to All Religions’. In the milieu where Dorothea is living—a quiet English parish in the 1830s—Casaubon's scholarly project appears to her as the right object (...) of her devotion. She would lighten the burden of his solitary labour; share his life of wisdom and pursuit of truth. (shrink)

We will look critically at three essays by Cora Diamond concerning Peter Winch's views on the possibility of communication and criticism between language-games. We briefly present our understanding of Winch's approach to philosophy. Then, we argue that Diamond misidentifies Winch's views, taking them to imply language-game relativism or linguistic idealism. When she does raise valid criticisms against language-game relativism, her critical points mainly coincide with things that Winch has already stressed in his own work. That leaves us with the question (...) what their real disagreement amounts to. Finally, we suggest that at the bottom of Diamond's objections lies her failure to appreciate Winch's insights about the place of logic in human intercourse. (shrink)

After the publication of Wittgenstein’s posthumous work the question was raised whether that work involved idealist tendencies. The debate also engaged Wittgenstein’s immediate students. Resistance to presumed idealist positions had been ideologically central to G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and other representatives of realism and early analytic philosophy. While Wittgenstein disagreed with them in key respects, he accepted their tendentious definition of ‘idealism’ at face value and bequeathed it to his students. The greatest flaw in the Realists’ view on idealism was (...) their assumption of symmetry between realist and idealist approaches. For Realists, the chief task of philosophy was to establish what kinds of thing exist, and they took Idealists to offer an alternative account of that. However, the Idealists’ guiding concern was rather to investigate the subjective conditions of knowledge. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical method was closer to theirs than to that of the Realists. This is especially obvious in his rejection of Moore’s idea of immediate knowledge. Ultimately, the trouble with Wittgenstein was not that he endorsed any kind of idealist ontology. It was his refusal to deliver the expected realist ontological messages on the supposed question of whether reality is independent of language or otherwise. (shrink)

This article argues that, in order to understand Peter Winch's view of philosophy, it is profitable to read him together with R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history. Collingwood was both an important source for Winch and a thinker engaged in a closely parallel philosophical pursuit. Collingwood and Winch shared the view that philosophy is an effort to understand the various ways in which human beings make reality intelligible. For both, this called for rapprochement between philosophy and the humanities. Like Collingwood, (...) Winch wanted to reformulate philosophy as a form of human science. Both thinkers advanced a conception of logic where the validity of judgements, propositions, and thought are dependent on their function as instruments in human dialogue. In their treatments of logic, Winch and Collingwood were fleshing out their idea that questions concerning human meaningful behaviour also tie back to the question of what philosophical analysis is about. There is a deep connection between two main issues in both Collingwood's and Winch's writings: on the one hand, the need for ‘internal’ understanding of how human beings relate to reality, and on the other hand, their critique of the idea of logic as a self-sufficient system, external to historically embedded forms of life. At the core of their shared vision there was a comprehensive critique of metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Recently, high media visibility was reached by an experiment that involved “hoaxlike deception” of journals within humanities and social sciences. Its aim was to provide evidence of “inadequate” quality standards especially within gender studies. The article discusses the project in the context of both previous systematic studies of peer reviewing and scientific hoaxes and analyzes its possible empirical outcomes. Despite claims to the contrary, the highly political, both ethically and methodologically flawed “experiment” failed to provide the evidence it sought. The (...) experiences can be summed up as follows: journals with higher impact factors were more likely to reject papers submitted as part of the project; the chances were better, if the manuscript was allegedly based on empirical data; peer reviews can be an important asset in the process of revising a manuscript; and when the project authors, with academic education from neighboring disciplines, closely followed the reviewers’ advice, they were able to learn relatively quickly what is needed for writing an acceptable article. The boundary between a seriously written paper and a “hoax” gradually became blurred. Finally, the way the project ended showed that in the long run, the scientific community will uncover fraudulent practices. (shrink)

Peter Winch often returned to questions about the nature of logic. In the context of his work on Wittgenstein and political philosophy in the 1990s, Winch described a contrast between ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Socratic’ reasoning. Aristotelian conceptions of reasoning, attributed to Frege and Russell, would see logic as a formal science and rationality as consistency with pre‐existent rules of inference. The Socratic conception, attributed to Wittgenstein, understands rational argument as a form of socially embedded dialogue that involves moral relationships and a (...) dimension of depth. Rational persuasion may also involve use of persuasive images and examples. (shrink)

A conscious being is characterized by its ability to cope with the environment--to perceive it, sometimes change it, and perhaps reflect on it. Surprisingly, most studies of the mind's place in nature show little interest in such interaction. It is often implicitly assumed that the main questions about consciousness just concern the status of various entities, levels, etc., within the individual. The intertwined notions of " experience" and " consciousness" are considered. The predominant use of these notions in cognitive science (...) can be traced back to Cartesianism. What is important is the survival of the central methodological commitments despite seemingly profound changes of metaphysical outlook. The author argues that cognitive scientists typically assimilate perception to sensation, thereby ignoring ways in which descriptions of perception and descriptions of the environment are logically intertwined; that this involves methodological solipsism and an unacknowledged sceptical position that was originally part of Descartes' Dream argument; and that it is impossible to identify the object supposedly to be studied by a science of the phenomenal consciousness. A somewhat parallel argument is identified in Kant's critique of rationalist psychology. (shrink)

Peter Winch believed that the central task of philosophy was to investigate ‘the force of the concept of reality’ in human practices. This involved creative dialogue with critical metaphysics. In ‘Ceasing to Exist’, Winch considered what it means to judge that something unheard-of has happened. Referring to Wittgenstein, Winch argued that judgments concerning reality must relate our observations to a shared ‘flow of life’. This implies criticism of the form of epistemology associated with metaphysical realism. Just as, according to Wittgenstein, (...) a sentence has no fixed meaning in isolation, an observation does not constitute knowledge outside shared human practices. (shrink)