This extended collection of papers is the result of putting recent ideas on quantification to work on a wide variety of languages.

Record of papers given at a symposium held at the University of Texas at Austin, April 1967; includes; C.J. Fillmore - The case for case; E. Bach - Nouns and noun phrases; J.D. McCawley - The role of semantics in a grammar; P. Kiparsky Linguistic universals and linguistic change.

This book is an introduction to the current developments in model-theoretic semantics, which has become an essential part of the work in theoretical linguistics over the last decade. The author examines the model structure of Montague's theory and then presents elaborations on this basic model that have been of particular importance in the last few years: generalized quantifiers, the introduction of more structure in the domain of individuals, properties as primitive elements in the model, situations and similar 'smaller' worldlike entities. (...) Nothing is presupposed about knowledge of the mathematical and logical tools used in formal semantics, and Bach presents the informal with a minimum of formalism. (shrink)

[1]. Recently renewed interest in non transformational approaches to syntax [2] suggests that it might be well to take another look at categorial grammars, since they seem to have been neglected largely because they had been shown to be equivalent to context free phrase structure grammars in weak generative capacity and it was believed that such grammars were incapable of describing natural languages in a natural way. It is my purpose here to sketch a theory of grammar which represents a (...) generalization of categorial grammars of the sort invented by Ajdukiewicz (1935) and further elaborated especially by Bar Hillel (1953) and Lambek (1961). (shrink)

For the most part, the papers collected in this volume stern from presentations given at a conference held in Tucson over the weekend of May 31 through June 2, 1985. We wish to record our gratitude to the participants in that conference, as well as to the National Science Foundation and the University of Arizona SBS Research Institute for their financial support. The advice we received from Susan Steele on organizational matters proved invaluable and had many felicitous consequences for the (...) success of the con­ ference. We also would like to thank the staff of the Departments of Linguistics of the University of Arizona and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for their help, as weIl as a number of individuals, including Lin Hall, Kathy Todd, and Jiazhen Hu, Sandra Fulmer, Maria Sandoval, Natsuko Tsujimura, Stuart Davis, Mark Lewis, Robin Schafer, Shi Zhang, Olivia Oehrle-Steele, and Paul Saka. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to Martin Scrivener, our editor, for his patience and his encouragement. Vll INTRODUCTION The term 'categorial grammar' was introduced by Bar-Rillel as a handy way of grouping together some of his own earlier work and the work of the Polish logicians and philosophers Lesniewski and Ajdukiewicz, in contrast to approaches to linguistic analysis based on phrase structure grammars. (shrink)

In 1936, Benjamin Lee Whorf wrote a justly famous paper entitled "An American Indian Model of the Universe" (Carroll, 1956). In that paper, Whorf criticized the easy assumption that people in different cultures, speaking radically different languages, share common presuppositions about what the world is like. He contrasted the Hopi view of space and time with what he called elsewhere the Standard Average European view. For the Hopi, space and time are inherently relativistic; for the speaker of Western European languages, (...) like English, the universe is basically Newtonian, time and space are absolute, "containers" of things and events. (shrink)

In 1936, Benjamin Lee Whorf wrote a justly famous paper entitled "An American Indian Model of the Universe" (Carroll, 1956). In that paper, Whorf criticized the easy assumption that people in different cultures, speaking radically different languages, share common presuppositions about what the world is like. He contrasted the Hopi view of space and time with what he called elsewhere the Standard Average European view. For the Hopi, space and time are inherently relativistic; for the speaker of Western European languages, (...) like English, the universe is basically Newtonian, time and space are absolute, "containers" of things and events. (shrink)

0. Introductory remarks. I assume that every serious theory of language must give some explicit account of the relationship between expressions in the language described and expressions in some interpreted language which spells out the semantics of the language.1 Let's call this relationship the translation relation. Theories differ as to how this relation is specified. In the Aspects theory of syntax, taken together with a Katz-Postal view of "semantic rules", it was assumed that the relation was defined on deep structures. (...) Serious problems led to modifications of this view in several directions. Chomsky's latest papers assume that a modified 'intermediate structure' is transformed by rules of interpretation to a level of representation called 'logical form'. Common to all of these approaches is the assumption that the translation rules are defined initially on syntactic structures of one sort or another. Let us call this assumption the configurational hypothesis: the translation rules all have the form: [183]. (shrink)

We have sketched how it is possible to give an analysis for adjoined relative clauses which is consistent with the compositionality principle and have shown that the technique which seems necessary for this analysis can be used to provide a compositional semantics for the NP-S analysis of English relative clauses.It is unlikely that anyone working within the framework of a compositional theory would choose the NP-S analysis for English, since it is clearly much less elegant and simple, in some intuitive (...) sense, than the alternative Nom-S analysis. Our results seem to indicate, however, that such an analysis cannot be ruled out in principle, since any constraint on the theory that would exclude the NP-S analysis would seem to exclude the Hittite analysis as well. So the arguments for the Nom-S analysis in the English case must be based on other grounds, or the Hittite analysis is also incorrect and should be ruled out, or the happy discovery of some as yet unknown principles will allow one but not the other. (shrink)

1. When he was in India, Burton learned Persian. 2. When Burton was in India, he learned Persian. 3. Burton learned Persian, when he was in India. 4. He learned Persian, when Burton was in India. 5. When she was in India, every woman learned Hindi. 6. When every woman was in India, she learned Hindi. 7. Every woman learned. Hindi, when she was in India. 8. When he was in. Alaska, he learned Tlingit. 9. He learned Tlingit, when he (...) was in Alaska. (shrink)

Smalgyaxian (Tsimshianic): located along Nass River, the lower reaches of the Skeena and on coastal and island communities around and below mouth of Skeena and in Metlakatla, Alaska. Four languages: Coast Tsimshian (CT), Southern Tsimshian (ST); Nisg̱aʼa (Ni), Gitksan (Gi). The punctuation indicates subgrouping: Nisg̱aʼa and Gitksan are very close, the distinction being more political than linguistic. Southern Tsimshian (Sgu̎u̎x) is spoken by only a few people (in one..

Theme of two lectures: how does meaning work in grammar and lexicon? General question: Are morphemes the minimal meaningful units of language? Are the meanings of the parts of words of the same kind as those of syntax? The answer to this question has an obvious bearing on the question of the derivation of complex words "in the syntax." Is the split between syntax and morphology the proper division for asking the previous question? Answer: No. The crucial distinction is that (...) between grammar and lexicon. Framework: model theoretic semantics and constructive categorial syntax.. (shrink)

A language is specified by a Lexicon and a Grammar. A constructive grammar goes like this: The Lexicon provides a set of items. The items are associated with Categories and Denotations. The Grammar gives a recursive specification of the language by defining sets of derived expressions starting with the Lexicon as the base and allowing the combination of lexical items into expressions with their Categories and Denotations, by a rule-to-rule procedure, and so on ad libitum.

All over the world, local languages are facing possible or probable extinction. The situation is nowhere more acute than for First Nations* in the regions now called the United States of America and Canada. In the face of this situation many people have become interested in studying endangered languages. Interest in threatened languages comes from many different sides: commercial, academic, scientific, religious, and more. The most immediately affected are of course the very speakers of the languages and the communities where (...) they live or have lived. (shrink)

Summary: demonstrative and determiner systems in the Pacific Northwest show areal similarities. The categories include two or three way deictic distinctions, visibility, modality (existent - non existent), and temporal contrasts. There are formal characteristics that are shared as well. The presentation will give a preliminary survey of the features across some languages of the area, with emphasis on Northern Wakashan. Then we will look at two especially interesting categories: `just gone' in Upper North Wakashan, which combines spatial and temporal (or: (...) spatiotemporal) concepts, `visible-invisible', which seems to be basically evidential and modal in some languages. (shrink)

Preconference version of paper for the 17th International Congress of Linguists in Prague, July, 2003.

The term "morphosemantics" in the title of this talk is intended to raise a fundamental question about linguistic expressions and their meanings. When we talk about the meanings of morphemes and their combination into words should we expect to find the same kinds of meanings and combinations of meanings that we associate with the processes of putting together words into phrases? The answers to this question vary widely or even wildly across different linguists and their schools or theories. For example, (...) some linguists would say: "Decidedly not, since morphemes don't have any meanings at all. Meaning only begins with words and their combinations." Others would say: "Yes, of course! Complex words and their meanings are built up in syntax, so we predict that their complex meanings are made up uniformly across words and syntactic phrases.". (shrink)

...the true difference between languages is not in what may or may not be expressed but in what must or must not be conveyed by the speakers.

Many (all?) languages regiment differences between main and subordinate clauses and between straightforward assertions and other kinds of expressions. There are two main ways of expressing grammatical differences in natural languages: structural and inflectional. Other resources: lexical, intonational, etc.

About: the tensions between the inner and outer view of R-languages ("real languages"), the language-centered and theory-centered study of languages, the (often foreign) linguist and the (sometimes linguist) native speaker, description and theory, a language as a set of choices and extensions of universal grammar and as a concrete realization in a particular culture and history. The materials for this paper are drawn mostly from First Nations languages, especially those of the Pacific Northwest.

The controversies surrounding Daniel Everett's characterization of the Amazonian language Pirahã and the Evans and Levinson paper about "the myth of language universals" (2009) are just two recent manifestations of a debate about linguistic theory and methodology that is anything but new.

I want to do two things here today. First, I want to describe and comment on some materials in and on Western Abenaki. Second, I want to make some additions to the various lists of Western Abenaki verb forms that have been available from published sources. This will be strictly a report on work in progress. Let me make acknowledgments right off to two colleagues: Roger Higgins, who has been working on Wampanoag (Massachusett) for some years, and Roy Wright, with (...) whom I have been collaborating on some of the WA materials, as I will report in a minute. And I want to give special thanks to Cécile Wawanolett, who first introduced me to her language. I put my email address on the handout. I would appreciate any comments that you might care to send to me on what I present here today. (shrink)

The C. elegans male tail is being studied as a model to understand how genes specify the form of multicellular animals. Morphogenesis of the specialized male copulatory organ takes place in the last larval stages during male development. Genetic analysis is facilitated because the structure is not necessary for male viability or for strain propagation. Analysis of developmental mutants, isolated in several functional and morphological screens, has begun to reveal how fates of cells are determined in the cell lineages, and (...) how the specification of cell fates affects the morphology of the structure. Cytological studies in wild type and in mutants have been used to study the mechanism of pattern formation in the tail peripheral nervous system. The ultimate goal is to define the entire pathway leading to the male copulatory organ. (shrink)

We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that species setup, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent connectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent connectedness measures the extent to which agents' choices are sequentially stable. Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand strategic interaction over time. In particular, we provide suffcient conditions (...) for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Also, our framework makes explicit that the epistemic independence assumption involved in backward induction reasoning is stronger than usually presumed, and makes accessible multiple-self interpretations for dynamic games. (shrink)

We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework. Moreover, we provide an epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Besides, it is argued that the epistemic independence assumption underlying backward induction is stronger than usually presumed.