Cairns, D. My own life.--Chapman, H. The phenomenon of language.--Embree, L. E. An interpretation of the doctrine of the ego in Husserl's Ideen.--Farber, M. The philosophic impact of the facts themselves.--Gurwitsch, A. Perceptual coherence as the foundation of the judgment of prediction.--Hartshorne, C. Husserl and Whitehead on the concrete.--Jordan, R. W. Being and time: some aspects of the ego's involvement in his mental life.--Kersten, F. Husserl's doctrine of noesis-noema.--McGill, V. J. Evidence in Husserl's phenomenology.--Natanson, M. Crossing the Manhattan Bridge.--Spiegelberg, (...) H. Husserl's way into phenomenology for Americans: a letter and its sequel.--Zaner, R. M. The art of free phantasy in rigorous phenomenological science.--Cairns, D. An approach to Husserlian phenomenology.--Cairns, D. The ideality of verbal expressions.--Cairns, D. Perceiving, remembering, image-awareness, feigning awareness.--Bibliography of the writings of Dorion Cairns (p. [263]-264). (shrink)

Taking his point of departure from William James and, by implication, Franz Brentano, Alfred Schutz made explicit the multifaceted experience of sub-universes as a phenomenon for phenomenological clarification on an entirely different foundation from James, Brentano and Husserl. The rethinking of Brentano, James and Husserl makes the phenomenon explicit in such a way that a vast new domain of phenomenological investigation is opened up.

This essay considers the apparent inconsistency between william james's doctrines of multiple realities and radical empiricism by examining the influence of brentano on james. Taken as james understood it in the de facto course of his thinking, That influence becomes a guide for clarifying james's transformation of multiple realities into pure experience. This is seen to involve an implicit rejection of brentano in such a manner that james's account of pure experience falls under the heading of what husserl called the (...) "problem of intentionality" rather than under the heading of radical empiricism. (shrink)

There is a paradox in Husserl’s writing in that he strives for insight into conscious experience and that he seems to a require a methodical approach, which might seem to have been imported from without, namely the phenomenological reduction. As Husserl notes in a passage cited from Ideas, first book, the precondition for the adequate insight into what is reflectively seized upon and the method, the epoche and reduction, the refraining from altering in any way what is given to reflection, (...) are reached at the same time. Thereby the paradox is resolved. Th is analysis helps resolve the paradox of idealism, namely that phenomenology creates an idealistic realm detached from the objective world, since the method of reduction converges with the self-reflection emerging within the pre-phenomenological world that is never “left behind” but that is now seen as included within the reflective-phenomenological context, as can be shown with regard to the ontology of the world and our epistemological grasp of it. (shrink)

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.