For those familiar with the contributions Robert Solomon has made to philosophy over the years, especially with Hegel, this book may either come as a bit of a shock bit or a bit of a pleasant surprise. Of course the reaction of the reader will mostly depend on what he or she thinks of the rather abstruse word “spirituality.”.

Twenty-five years after publishing Religion Without Explanation, D. Z. Phillips thought it time to reassess the book in the form of a second edition. With the amount of time passed since the first edition, it is not surprising that he quickly realized the revision must instead be rewriting.

This paper addresses the criticism recently directed at Internet companies who have chosen to do business in China. Currently, in order to conduct business in China, companies must agree to the Chinese government’s rule of self-censoring any information the government deems inappropriate. We start by explaining how some of these companies have violated the human rights of Chinese citizens to freely trade information. We then analyze whether the justifications and excuses offered by these companies are sufficient to absolve them of (...) moral responsibility. We argue that both justifications and excuses offered are insufficient. Wilfully abiding by unjust laws, albeit necessary to do business in China, should not trump moral actions that protect rights. (shrink)

This paper addresses the criticism recently directed at Internet companies who have chosen to do business in China. Currently, in order to conduct business in China, companies must agree to the Chinese government's rule of self-censoring any information the government deems inappropriate. We start by explaining how some of these companies have violated the human rights of Chinese citizens to freely trade information. We then analyze whether the justifications and excuses offered by these companies are sufficient to absolve them of (...) moral responsibility. We argue that both justifications and excuses offered are insufficient. Wilfully abiding by unjust laws, albeit necessary to do business in China, should not trump moral actions that protect rights. (shrink)

Most ethics studies employing accounting subjects have utilized the Defining Issues Test, generally finding the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants to be less advanced than those of the general population. This study assesses the validity of the DIT by examining whether an individual can achieve a higher moral judgment score on the DIT by responding from the role of a political liberal. Accounting undergraduates, defining themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative, completed the DIT once from their own (...) perspective and once from either an "extremely conservative" or "extremely liberal" perspective.The results indicate that DIT scores can be influenced by an aspect of political ideology not reflecting maturation in moral judgment. Subjects decreased their moral judgment scores when responding to the DIT dilemmas from a conservative perspective. Contrary to moral development theory, subjects were able to increase their moral judgment scores when responding from the perspective of a political liberal. These results imply that, given the generally conservative political orientation of the profession, the DIT may systematically understate the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants. (shrink)

This recent publication by professor Kai Nielsen may be best seen as a logical progression of thought that follows from his 1991 study, After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy, and from several articles since this publication. Described by Nielsen as a "metaphilosophical study", On Transforming Philosophy is his on-going treatment of how the aims of the traditional philosophical project have failed and how a transformed conception of philosophy should now focus on the (...) "problems of life." Although many philosophers may doubt that an inquiry of this nature is possible, Nielsen nonetheless sets out to dispel various traditional conceptions of the central task of philosophy. In its place he seeks to establish what he believes to be a more "humanly important" view of philosophy. (shrink)

Perceptually secured knowledge consists of beliefs that amount to knowledge just because they are based on suitable perceptual states. Relationism about the ground of perceptually secured knowledge is the view that if a perceptual state can make a belief based on it amount to knowledge, then it can do that because it constitutes an appropriate kind of relational state, e.g., a state of perceptual acquaintance. I explore the prospects of both maintaining that some beliefs amount to perceptually secured knowledge and (...) developing a relationist account of their ground. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of ordinary multisensory experience that go beyond mere co-consciousness of features (e.g., the experience that results from concurrently hearing a sound in the hallway and seeing the cup on the table). In one case, a sensory experience in one modality creates a perceptual demonstrative to whose referent qualities are attributed in another sensory modality. For example, when you hear someone speak, auditory experience attributes audible qualities to a seen event, a person’s speaking motions. The (...) second kind of multisensory experience attributes features experienced in several sensory modalities to one and the same object via a process of amodal perceptual integration, i.e., integration that occurs separately from processing within the individual sensory modalities. Multisensory experiences arising from holding and seeing a tomato or from seeing the Indian curry boil and smelling it are examples of the second kind of multisensory experience. At the end of the chapter we look at synesthesia, a kind of atypical multisensory experience, and argue that one version of this phenomenon may be able to shed light on the neural mechanism underlying amodally integrated multisensory experience. (shrink)

War Tubingen in der Tat eine Trutzburg der Orthodoxie, in der den Studenten nichts ubrig blieb, als einen Jakobinerclub zu bilden und revolutionare Literatur einschliesslich der grundsturzenden Philosophie Kants zu lesen? Dieser Frage geht der Verfasser zuerst nach und prasentiert dann Quellen, die das skizzierte Klischee aufheben. Es handelt sich um Archivalien, die Aufschluss uber die akademische Lehre geben. Die Autoren sind u.a. Holderlins Freunde Magenau und Neuffer, der kantische Enrage Diez und der spatere Begrunder des Philosophischen Journals Niethammer.

ZusammenfassungWenn man davon ausgeht, dass eine der Voraussetzungen für ein gut fundiertes moralisches Urteil im Bereich der Medizin ein adäquates Verständnis der medizinischen Gegebenheiten und Zusammenhänge ist, dann muss diesem Aspekt bei der Beurteilung der künstlichen Ernährung bei fortgeschritten Demenzerkrankten in Zukunft mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden. Damit verbunden ist die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit aktuellen empirischen Untersuchungen, anhand derer es gerechtfertigt scheint, die künstliche Ernährung bei dementen Patienten als erfolglos hinsichtlich des Ernährungszustands, der Verbesserung der Lebensqualität und der Überlebenszeit zu (...) bezeichnen. Unsere Arbeit setzt an drei wesentlichen Punkten an: zum einen soll der Zusammenhang zwischen Ernährungssituation und Demenzerkrankung dargestellt werden, andererseits soll ein Modell vorgestellt werden, das bessere Ergebnisse verspricht als sie in den bisherigen empirischen Studien gefunden worden sind, und drittens soll darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, dass mit dem Erkennen der Möglichkeit der adäquaten Ernährung von fortgeschritten Demenzkranken auch neue Optionen in der normativen Beurteilung von künstlicher Ernährung offen stehen. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz gibt der Verfasser eine präcisere und vollständigere Darstellung des Inhalts seiner früheren Veröffentlichung über dasselbe Thema. Im Falle eines biologischen Systems, dessen innerer Zustand sich durch ein einziges Parameterc bestimmen lässt, werde seine zeitliche Entwicklung durch die Gleichung dctdt=f1+∫t−λtf2dτ......dargestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Differentiation dieser Gleichung nacht nicht zu einer gewöhnlichen Differentialgleichung zweiter Ordnung führt. Im Gegensatz zur Theorie gewöhnlicher Differentialgleichungen, werden die Eigenschaften von Gleichung und ihren Derivaten nach der Zeit diskutiert. Es lässt sich Gleichung auf (...) eine gewöhnliche Differentialgleichung höherer Ordnung reduzieren. nur im ausgeschlossenen Fall, dasst-λ ein bestimmter Zeitpunkt wäre.Wolle man einwenden, dass Gleichung und ihre Derivaten nach der Zeit die zeitliche Entwicklung von Systemen darstellen, die zu jedem Moment nur ein „Punktgedächtnis” besitzen, dann lässt sich das Integralglied leicht derart transformieren, dass keine weitere Differentiation nach der Zeit auf eine Gleichung ohne Integralglied führen kann. Beispiele solcher Transformationen werden gegeben. Die neuen Gleichungen beschreiben die Entwicklung von Systemen die sicher ein „lineäres” Gedächtnis besitzen, d.h. ein Gedächtnis das sich zu jedem Moment auf ein endliches Kontinuum von Zeitpunkten und Zuständen erstreckt.Es ergibt sich aus der vollständigeren Betrachtung, dass Gleichung der früheren Abhandlung einer Revision bedarf.L'auteur fait un examen plus exact et plus approfondi du sujet traité dans sa première publication. Pour le cas d'un système biologique dont l'état intérieur est défini par un seul paramètrec, l'évolution au cours du temps se laisse decrire par l'équation dctdt=f1+∫t−λtf2dτ......Une différentiation d'après le tempst ne peut pas réduire l'équation à une équation différentielle ordinaire. Cela est possible seulement dans le cas exclu quet-λ soit un moment fixé. Au contraste des équations différentielles ordinaires, l'auteur explique comment se différent les propriétés de l'équation et de ses dérivés d'après le temps.Pour éviter la critique que l'équation et ses dérivés d'après le temps décrivent l'évolution de systèmes qui à tout moment donné ne possèdent qu'une „mémoire à une seule valeur”, l'auteur expose comment l'intégrale peut se transformer afin qu'aucune nouvelle différentiation d'après le temps ne conduise à une équation sans intégrale. Plusieurs exemples d'une telle transformation sont donnés. Les équations transformées décrivent sans aucun doute l'évolution de systèmes qui à tout moment possèdent une mémoire qui s'étend sur une intervalle continue du temps passé. L'examen plus approfondi démontre que l'équation de la première publication doit être corrigée. (shrink)

Von Theoderich zunächst gefördert, dann wegen Hochverrats zum Tode verurteilt, verfasste Boethius seine Schrift im Gefängnis vor seiner Hinrichtung. Sein Werk ist eines der wirkungsmächtigsten der Spätantike und zählt zu den beliebtesten Büchern des Abendlandes überhaupt. Zweifellos war der Autor Christ, doch suchte er Trost und Hoffnung nicht beim Christentum, sondern in der philosophischen Tradition.

Titus Livius (59 v. Chr. - 17 n. Chr.) hat in seiner "Römischen Geschichte" die Ereignisse von der Gründung der Stadt bis zum Tod des Drusus 9 v. Chr. dargestellt. Das Werk umfasste 142 Bücher, von denen 35 erhalten sind: Buch 1-10 (bis 293 v. Chr.) und 21-45 (219-167 v. Chr.). Von den übrigen Partien haben wir neben einigen Fragmenten Kunde durch antike Inhaltsangaben und andere Auszüge sowie durch die Benutzung des livianischen Werkes bei einer Reihe späterer Historiker. Livius' Darstellung (...) der Geschichte seines Volkes steht in engem Zusammenhang mit den Bemühungen des Augustus um eine Neuordnung des römischen Staates. Seine hohe Sprach- und Darstellungskunst und sein Einfühlungsvermögen ließen ein Werk entstehen, das rasch allgemeine Anerkennung fand und die früheren Darstellungen der römischen Geschichte in Vergessenheit geraten ließ. Als Geschichtsquelle, als Zeitdokument und als Kunstwerk ist die "Römische Geschichte" des Livius von höchstem Rang. Im ersten Buch seines monumentalen Geschichtswerks berichtet Livius von der Landung des Aeneas in Italien, der sagenumwobenen Gründung Roms und der Herrschaft der legendären sieben Könige bis zum Sturz der tarquinischen Gewaltherrschaft und der Einführung der Republik (509 v. Chr.). Die beiden folgenden Bücher stellen die Entwicklung bis 446 v. Chr. dar. Zunächst musste die errungene Freiheit gegen Gefährdungen von innen und außen verteidigt werden. Dann bestimmte der Ständekampf zwischen den Plebejern und den Patriziern weitgehend das Geschehen; er führte 493 v. Chr. zur Einrichtung des Volkstribunats und 451-449 v. Chr. zum Decemvirat und zur Aufzeichnung der Gesetze. Dazu sind die Kämpfe mit den benachbarten Sabinern und Etruskern, Volskern und Aequern und das Ringen um die Vormachtstellung in Latuum dargestellt. Die ersten Bücher haben den Ruhm des Livius begründet. Die Gestalten der römischen Frühzeit sind in seiner meisterhaften Darstellung zum gemeinsamen Besitz der Kulturwelt geworden. "Als Geschichtsquelle, als Zeitdokument und als Kunstwerk ist die 'Römische Geschichte' des Livius von höchstem Rang." Helvetia archaeologia "Die mustergültige Übersetzung ist eine treffende, unverzichtbare Hilfe." Lesenswert. (shrink)

Wenn man davon ausgeht, dass eine der Voraussetzungen für ein gut fundiertes moralisches Urteil im Bereich der Medizin ein adäquates Verständnis der medizinischen Gegebenheiten und Zusammenhänge ist, dann muss diesem Aspekt bei der Beurteilung der künstlichen Ernährung bei fortgeschritten Demenzerkrankten in Zukunft mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden. Damit verbunden ist die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit aktuellen empirischen Untersuchungen, anhand derer es gerechtfertigt scheint, die künstliche Ernährung bei dementen Patienten als erfolglos hinsichtlich des Ernährungszustands, der Verbesserung der Lebensqualität und der Überlebenszeit zu (...) bezeichnen. Unsere Arbeit setzt an drei wesentlichen Punkten an: zum einen soll der Zusammenhang zwischen Ernährungssituation und Demenzerkrankung dargestellt werden, andererseits soll ein Modell vorgestellt werden, das bessere Ergebnisse verspricht als sie in den bisherigen empirischen Studien gefunden worden sind, und drittens soll darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, dass mit dem Erkennen der Möglichkeit der adäquaten Ernährung von fortgeschritten Demenzkranken auch neue Optionen in der normativen Beurteilung von künstlicher Ernährung offen stehen. (shrink)

The most important thing to know about this book is that it is mostly not by Rorty. Twenty pages of this small book were transcribed from an audio recording of a public lecture by Rorty including portions of his discussion with the audience, in Turin, Spain, in 2005. A Spanish translation appeared in 2008, followed by this English version in 2011. Jeffrey W. Robbins wrote a foreword, “Richard Rorty: A Philosophical Guide to Talking About Religion,” (vii–xxii). The introduction at the (...) lecture was by Gianni Vattimo (1–5). Rorty’s section is twenty pages long (7–26). By far the largest portion of the book is the conclusion, by G. Elijah Dann, “Philosophy, Religion, and Religious Belief After Rorty” (27–76, including .. (shrink)

What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...) upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument. (shrink)

The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I (...) argue that the problem with the Gettier Problem is that it requires us to articulate conditions that suffice for knowledge even if those conditions are non-explanatory. After defending this view, I take up two related methodological issues, one about the evidence that can be given in favor of an account of knowledge, and one about the role that investigating justification might play in investigating knowledge. (shrink)

Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality.

NOTE: this is a substantial revision of a previously uploaded draft. Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. (...) According to inferential internalists, in order to gain justification for believing the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument one must “see” that the premises support the conclusion. I motivate this view and endorse the idea that one’s “seeing” such a support relation consists of one’s having an intuition. In a number of recent papers, Paul Boghossian has pressed a regress argument against inferential internalism inspired by Lewis Carroll’s dialogue “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I develop a response to Bogossian’s argument according to which intuitions work like mental imperatives and inferences are mental actions performed by obeying them. After developing this response to Boghossian’s argument, I take up the question of what it is in virtue of which intuitions play a guidance role, when they do so. (shrink)

In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...) and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions. (shrink)

A blindfolded clairvoyant walks into a room and immediately knows how it is arranged. You walk in and immediately see how it is arranged. Though both of you represent the room as being arranged in the same way, you have different experiences. Your experience doesn’t just represent that the room is arranged a certain way; it also visually presents the very items in the room that make that representation true. Call the felt aspect of your experience made salient by this (...) contrast its presentational phenomenology. Many philosophers have observed that perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology. In this paper I explore its nature, scope, and significance. I argue that in addition to perceptual experiences, presentational phenomenology can be found in intuitive, introspective, imaginative, and recollective experiences. I also argue that presentational phenomenology is epistemologically significant: it plays a central role in explaining why the experiences that have it justify beliefs and give us knowledge. (shrink)

Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima facie justification for believing its content below a baseline. This is epistemic downgrade due to etiology, and its possibility is incompatible with phenomenal conservatism. I develop a view that explains the epistemic deficiency in certain possible cases of cognitive penetration but on which there is no epistemic downgrading below a baseline and on which (...) etiology plays no explanatory role. This view is not phenomenal conservatism exactly, but it does capture what’s right about phenomenal conservatism. (shrink)

According to Seungbae Park, two versions of the pessimistic induction argument against scientific realism, what he calls the "absolute" and "relative" versions, each fail for the same reason. Depending on whether their respective premises refer to distant or recent past theories, either each premise is implausible, or the conclusion does not probably follow from them. I suggest that Park has misconstrued the sort of argument his pessimist interlocutors rely on. When properly recast, the absolute and relative versions of the argument (...) become deductive rather than inductive. The result in each case is an argument that, contra Park, has both a plausible premise and a conclusion that follows from it. (shrink)

Thought experiments figure prominently in contemporary epistemology. Beyond that humdrum observation, controversy abounds. The aim of this paper is to make progress on two fronts. On the descriptive front, the aim is to illuminate what the practice of using thought experiments involves. On the normative front, the aim is to illuminate what the practice of using thought experiments should involve. Thought experiments result in judgments that are passed on to further philosophical reasoning. What are these judgments? What is the point (...) of making them? What basis do we have for making them? A conception of thought experiments includes answers to these three questions. My thesis is that epistemologists should use thought experiments in accordance with a conception of them organized around the idea of explanation. My case for endorsing the thesis rests on the fruitfulness of the interventions in current debates about the content, point, and basis of thought experiment judgments that it suggests. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Nietzsche did his philosophizing while he was coming apart at the seams. His writing is hard for readers to find their way around because he was all over the place when he produced it. But it's philosophy of coming apart at the seams and being all over the place, and also philosophy as a way of coping with that predicament-which makes it both fascinating and important. Why Didn't Nietzsche Get His Act Together? has three main tasks on its agenda. Nietzsche (...) is hard to make sense of; this is a guide, a book that shows you how to read him for yourself. Second, Nietzsche coped with his disintegrating self by philosophizing, and so this is a work that takes up disunified agency through Nietzsche's own engagement with the topic. Third and finally, Nietzsche managed his fragmenting personality by inventing one after another meaning of life for himself; examining those inventions and the job they did for him is an occasion to ask what a meaning of life is for. (shrink)

What is the epistemic significance of taking a veridical perceptual experience at face value? To first approximations, the Minimal View says that it is true belief, and the Maximal View says that it is knowledge. I sympathetically explore the prospects of the Maximal View.